


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كِتَابُ الْمَسِيحِ

فِي الرَّدِّ عَلَى أَهْلِ التَّزْيِغِ وَالْبِدْعِ

تأليف

أشَّيْخِ الْإِسْلَامِ

أَبِي أَحْسَنَ عَلِيِّ بْنِ إسماعِيلَ الْأَشْعَرِيِّ

مَنْ بَشَّرَهُ وَنَصَحِيحُهُ

الْأَبِ رَتَشَرْدِ يَوْسُفَ مَكَارَنِي الْيَسُوعِيِّ

الطبعة الكاثوليكية

بيروت

١٩٥٢

الحمد لله

والصلاة والسلام على من لا نبي بعده

والصلاة والسلام على من لا نبي بعده

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بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

وبه استعين

3 1 الحمد لله ذي الجود والثنا، والحمد والثناء والتمجيد والكبرياء، أحمدته على
سوانح النعماء، وبجزيل المعطاء، وأشهد أن لا إله إلا الله وحده لا شريك له
6 عنده (1) اللقاء، وأشهد أن محمدًا عبده ورسوله خاتم الأنبياء.

2 أما بعد فإنك سألتني أن أصف لك كتاباً مختصراً أبين فيه جملاً
7 توضح الحق وتدمغ الباطل (2) التامع بالتلوف [فرأيت اسماءك بذلك
[رحك (3) وأغدق عليك] الله الخيرات وأعانك على الخير [بال] مطلوبات .

(1) M has *عن*.

(2) There is a jagged hole in the page of the manuscript. I have supplied the words in these brackets and in the next two sets of brackets. There are a few slight indications to support my readings, but in any case the gap, coming in this short *khutba*, is not of great importance.

(3) In my translation: «direct you aright» — because I first read *رحك*; but closer examination of M has led me to think that the first letter is *رڤ*, and the second *ڤڤ*.

[الباب الاول]

[باب الكلام في وجود الصانع وصفاته]

مسألة

8 انه سأل سائل فقال ما الدليل على ان للخلق صانعاً صنعه ومديراً
 9 دبره قيل الدليل على ذلك ان الانسان الذي هو في (ص ٢) غاية الكمال
 والتمام كان نطفة ثم مخلقة ثم مضغة ثم لحماً وعظماً ودماً وقد علمنا انه لم ينتقل
 7 نفسه من حال الى حال لاننا نراه في حال كمال قوته وقام عقله لا يقدر ان
 يحدث لنفسه سمياً ولا بصراً ولا ان يخلق لنفسه جراحة يدل ذلك على انه في
 9 حال ضعفه ونقصانه عن فعل ذلك أصغر لان ما قدر عليه في حال النقصان فهو
 في حال الكمال عليه أقدر وما عجز عنه في حال الكمال فهو في حال النقصان
 11 عنه أصغر . ورأيتاه طفلاً ثم شاباً ثم كهلاً ثم شيخاً وقد علمنا انه لم ينتقل نفسه
 من حال الشباب الى حال الكبر والمهرم لان الانسان لو جهد ان يزول عن نفسه
 13 الكبر والمهرم ووردها الى حال الشباب لم يمكنه ذلك فدل ما وصفنا على انه
 ليس هو الذي ينتقل نفسه (ص ٣) في هذه الاحوال وان له ناقلاً نقله من حال
 15 الى حال ودبره على ما هو عليه لانه لا يجوز انتقاله من حال الى حال بغير
 ناقل ولا مدبر .

17 * محايين ذلك ان القطن لا يجوز ان يتحول غزلاً مقتولاً ثم ثوباً
 منسوجاً بغير ناسج ولا صانع ولا مدبر ومن اتخذ قطعاً ثم انتظر ان يصير غزلاً
 19 مقتولاً ثم ثوباً منسوجاً بغير صانع ولا ناسج كان عن معقول خارجاً وفي الجهل
 والجل . وكذلك من قصد الى برية لم يجد فيها قصراً مبنياً فانتظر ان يتحول
 21 الطين الى حالة الآجر ويتخذ بعضه على بعض بغير صانع ولا بان كان جاهلاً .

1 وإذا كان تحول النطفة علقة ثم مشقة ثم لحاً ودماً وعظماً أعظم في الاعجوبة (ص ١) كان أولى أن يدل على صانع صنع النطفة ونقلها من حال الى حال.

3 ووفر قال الله تعالى (1) «أَفَرَأَيْتُمْ مَا تُنْتُونَ [أ] أَنْتُمْ تَخْلُقُونَهُ أَمْ نَخْنُ الْخَالِقُونَ» فا استطاعوا أن يقولوا بحجة أنهم يخلقون ما ينون مع 5 [تفتيهم] (2) الولد فلا يكون ومع كراهتهم له فيكون . وقد قال الله تعالى منها خلقه على وحدانيته (3) «وَلِيَّ أَنْفُسِكُمْ أَفَلَا تُبْصِرُونَ» يبين لهم 7 عجزهم وقصرهم الى صانع صنهم ومدير دبرهم .

6 فان قالوا فما يؤمئذكم ان تكون النطفة لم تزل قديمة قيل (4) لهم 9 لو كان ذلك كما ادعيت لم يجر أن يلحقها الامثال والتأثير ولا الانقلاب والتغير لان القديم لا يجوز انتقاله وتغيره وأن يجري عليه سمات الحدث لان ما جرى 11 ذلك عليه ولزمت الضعة لم يفلح من سمات الحدث وما لم يسبق المحدث (ص ٥) كان محدثاً مصنوعاً فبطل بذلك قدم النطفة وغيرها من الاجسام .

مسئلة

7 فانه قال قائل لم زعمتم ان الباري سبحانه لا يشبه المخلوقات قيل 15 لانه لو اشبهها لكان حكمه في الحدث حكمها ولو اشبهها لم يتحل من ان يشبهها من كل الجهات او من بعضها فان اشبهها من جميع الجهات كان محدثاً 17 مثلها من جميع الجهات وان اشبهها من بعضها كان محدثاً من حيث اشبهها ويستحيل أن يكون المحدث لم يزل قديماً وقد قال الله تعالى (5) «ليس كشيء

(1) 56.58-59.

(2) This reading seems to be correct, although a worm hole has made the word practically illegible, Cf. *Risāla* (Arabic) N° 17.

(3) 51.21.

(4) M has ٤ قبل. This confusion of numbers occurs several times in M, and hereafter it is corrected tacitly.

(5) 42.11/9.

١ شي. « وقال تعالى (٦) » كَمْ يَكُنْ لَهُ كُفُوًا أَحَدٌ » .

مسئلة

8 8 فانه قال فائس لم قلتم ان صانع الاشياء واحد قيل له لان الاثنين لا يجري (ص ٦) تديروهما على نظام ولا يثيق على احكام ولا بد أن يسلطهما العجز او واحدا منهما لان أحدهما اذا أراد أن يُحيي إنساناً وأراد الآخر أن يميت لم يخل أن يتم مرادهما جميعاً او لا يتم مرادهما او يتم (7) مراد أحدهما دون الآخر . ويستحيل أن يتم مرادهما جميعاً لانه يستحيل ان يكون الجسم حياً ميتاً في حال واحدة وإن لم يتم مرادهما جميعاً وجب عجزهما والعجز لا يكون إلماً ولا قديماً . وان تم مراد أحدهما دون الآخر وجب العجز (8) [الآن لم يتم مراده منها والعجز لا يكون إلماً ولا قديماً . فدل ما قلناه على 11 ان صانع الاشياء واحد وقد قال تعالى (٩) » لو كان فيها آفة إلا الله لآتيناها » فهذا معنى احتجاجنا إلماً

مسئلة

9 فانه قال فائس ما الدليل على جواز إعادة الخلق قيل له الدليل على ذلك (ص ٧) ان الله سبحانه خلقه أولاً لا على مثال سبق فاذا خلقه أولاً لم يُعْجَبْ أَنْ يَخْلُقَهُ خَلْقًا آخَرَ وقد قال الله عز وجل (10) » وَضَرَبَ لَنَا مَثَلًا 17 وَنَبِيٌّ خَلَقَهُ قَالَ مَنْ يُحْيِي الْعِظَامَ وَهِيَ رَمِيمٌ قُلْ يُحْيِيهَا الَّذِي أَنْشَأَهَا أَوَّلَ مَرَّةٍ وَهُوَ بِكُلِّ خَلْقٍ عَلِيمٌ » فجعل النشأة الاولى دليلاً على جواز النشأة الآخرة 19 لانها في معناها ثم قال (11) » الَّذِي جَعَلَ لَكُم مِّنَ الشَّجَرِ الْأَخْضَرِ نَارًا فَإِذَا

(6) 112.4.

(7) The words supplied in the brackets are clearly required. It is easy to see how the copyist became confused.

(8) Perhaps it would be better to read : وَجِبَ عَجْزُهُنَّ

(9) 21.22.

(10) 36.78-79.

(11) 36.80

١ « أَنتُمْ مِنْ تَوَقُّدُونَ » فصل ظهور النار على حرها ويسها من الشعر الأنصر
على بداوته ودرجته دليلاً على جود خلقه الحيوان في الرمة الدابة والظام
« النخلة وعلى قدرته على خلق مثله ثم قال (12) » « أَوَلَيْسَ الَّذِي خَلَقَ السَّمَاوَاتِ
وَالْأَرْضَ بِقَادِرٍ عَلَى أَنْ يَخْلُقَ مِثْلَهُمْ » وهذا هو المعنى عليه في الحجاج في
٥ حوار إعادة الخلق .

10 وهذا هو الدليل أيضاً على صحة الحجاج والطرف لأن الله تعالى حكم
٧ في التي بحكم مثله وحمل سبيل النظر وعمره عوى نظره وقد قال (ص ٨)
تعالى ١٣ « أَفَلَا يَدْرَأُ الْخَلْقُ ثُمَّ يُعِيدُهُ » وقوله تعالى (١٤) « وَهُوَ الَّذِي يُنْزِلُ
١٥ الْخَلْقَ ثُمَّ يُعِيدُهُ وَهُوَ أَهْوَنُ عَلَيْهِ » يزيد وهو هي عليه جعل الإبتداء كالإعادة .

11 فانه قال فأنزل زيدوني وضوحاً في صحة النظر قبل له قول الله تعالى
11 مُعَذِّبًا عَنْ إِبْرَاهِيمَ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ مَا رَأَى الْكُرُوكَ (١٦) « قَالَ هَذَا رَبِّي فَلَمَّا
أَقْبَلَ قَالَ لَا أُجِيبُ لَأَقْضَى رَبِّي الْقَضَاءَ قَالُوا هَذَا رَبِّي فَلَمَّا أَقْبَلَ قَالَ
13 لِأَنْ تَهْتَدِيَ رَبِّي لَا تُكُونُ مِنْ الْغَاوِينَ » فتعني عليه السلام القمر
والكوكب في انه لا يجوز ان يكون واحد (17) منها فأمرنا لاجتماعها في
15 الأقول وهذا هو المنظر والاستدلال الذي يُنكره المذكرون ويعرف به
المنحرفون .

مسئلة

12 فانه قال فأنزل لم أنكرتم ان يكون الله تعالى حياً قبل له أنكرنا
19 ذلك لانه لا يحلو (ص ٩) ان يكون القائل لذلك أراد ما أنكرتم أن

(12) 36-81

(13) 30.11 10

(14) 30 27 26

(15) 6 76 77

(16) M has وهو .

١ يكون طويلاً عريضاً مجتمعاً أو ان يكون أراد تسبته حساً وإن لم يكن
طويلاً عريضاً مجتمعاً عيافاً فإن كان أراد ان يكون طويلاً عريضاً
٣ مجتمعاً كما يقال ذلك للأجسام فيما بينها فهذا لا يجوز لأن المجتمع لا يكون
شيئاً واحداً لأن أكثر قليل الاجتماع لا يكون إلا بين شيئين لأن الشيء الواحد
٥ لا يكون لنفسه محامياً وقد بينا أنه ان الله عز وجل شيء واحد فطل بذلك
أن يكون مجتمعاً وإن أراد لم لا تستويه حساً وإن لم يكن^{١٦} طويلاً
٧ عريضاً مجتمعاً فالأسماء ليست بيننا ولا يجوز لنا ان نسمي^(١٨) الله تعالى باسم
لم يُسم به نفسه ولا سمّاه به رسوله ولا أسمى المسطوح عليه ولا على مناء

مسئلة

١٣ فإنه قال فأنزل لم قلتم ان الله تعالى عالم قيل له لأن الافعال المحركة
الا تنسق في الحكمة الا من عالم وذلك أنه لا يجوز ان يجوز (ص ١٠)
الدياج والتدوير ويصنع دقائق الصناعة من لا يحسن ذلك ولا يصنع. وما رأينا
١٤ الانسان على ما فيه من اناساق الحكمة كالخيل التي ركبها الله فيه والسمع
والبصر ومخاري الطعم والشراب وانعامه فيه وما هو عليه من كانه وقامه
١٥ والعلك وما فيه من شحمه وقمره وكوكبه ومخاريها دل ذلك على ان اندي
صنع ما ذكرناه لم يكن مصنعه الا وهو عالم بكيفية وكيفية. ولو حار أن
١٧ تحدث^(١٩) الصانع الحكيم لا من عالم لم ندر لعل جميع ما يحدث من حكم
الحيوان وتدابيره وصنائعهم يحدث منهم وهم غير عالمين فلا احتمال ذلك دل
١٨ على ان الصنائع المحركة لا تحدث الا من عالم.

١٤ كذلك لا يجوز ان تحدث الصنائع الا من قادر نعمي لأنه لو حار
٢١ حدوثها من ليس بقادر ولا حي لم ندر لعل سائر ما يظهر من الناس يظهر منهم وهم

(١٦) M has يكون

(١٨) M has ليس

(١٩) M has يحدث

١ عجزه ، وثقى به استعمال ذلك ذلك الصانع على (ص ١١) ان الله تعالى حي قادر .

مسئلة

٣ 15 فانه قال قائل لم غنم ان الله سمع بصير قيل به لان احب اذا لم يكن موصوفاً بأفة غنمه من ادراك السموات والارضات اذا وحدث فهو سمع بصير فما كان الله تعالى حياً لا يجوز عليه الآفات من الضم والعسى وغير ذلك إذ كانت الآفات تدل على حدوث من جازت عليه صح أنه سمع بصير

مسئلة

16 فانه قال اتقون ان الله تعالى لم يزل عالماً قادراً سمياً بصيراً قيل به
 ١١ كذلك نقول فان الله تعالى لم يزل عالماً قادراً سمياً بصيراً قيل به الدليل على ذلك ان احب
 ١٢ اذا لم يكن عالماً كان موصوفاً بضد العلم من احب و الشك او الآفات ولو
 ١٣ كان الله تعالى لم يزل حياً غير عالم موصوفاً بضد العلم (ولو)
 ١٤ كان موصوفاً بضد العلم (من اجل او الشك (ص ١٢) والآفات (ولو كان
 ١٥ الله تعالى لم يزل حياً غير عالم موصوفاً بضد العلم (ولو كان لم يزل
 ١٦ موصوفاً بضد العلم لاستحال ان يعلم لان ضد العلم (كان قديماً لاستحال ان
 ١٧ يطل وداستحال ان يطل ذلك لم يجر ان يصنع الصانع الحكيمه
 ١٨ صنعها ودلت على به عالم صح وتنت به لم يزل عالماً إذ قد استحال ان يكون
 ١٩ لم يزل بضد العلم موصوفاً .

17 وكذلك لو كان لم يزل حياً غير قادر لوجب ان يكون لم يزل عاجزاً
 18 موصوفاً بضد القدرة ولو كان عاجزاً قديماً لاستحال ان يقدر وأن تحدث الأفعال
 منه وكذلك لو كان لم يزل حياً غير سمع ولا بصير لكان لم يزل موصوفاً
 21 بضد السمع من الضم (ص ١٣) والآفات وبضد البصر من العسى والآفات

(20) The words in parentheses here and a few words further on, seem to be superfluous.

1 وبحال جوار الآفات على الذي لأنها من سمات الحدث بدل ما قلناه على أن الله تعالى لم يزل عالماً قادراً حياً بصيراً

مسألة

18 فانه قال فأن لم قلتم إن ساري تعالى عما به علم قبل له لأن 5 الصانع حكيم كما لا يقع ما إلا من عالم كذلك لا تحدث منا إلا من ذي علم فلو لم تدن الصانع على علم من ظهرت منه منا لم تدل على أن من ظهرت 7 منه منا فهو عالم . فلو دلت على أن لاري تعالى عالم قياساً على دلت على أن 8 عما . وم تدل على أن به علماً (21) قياساً على دلت على أن له عما لدار لزامهم لأن يزعم أنها تدل على علما ولا تدل على آما علما . ودا لم يجر هذا لم يجر ما قاله هذا القائل .

11 19 (ص ١١) فانه قال ما فكرتم أن لا تدل لأصل الحكيمية على علم العالم منا كما دلت على أنه عالم لأنه ليس معنى اسلم منا أن له علماً 13 لأنه قد يعلم العالم منا علماً من لا يعلم أن به علماً قبل له إن حار لك أن يزعم هذا جاز لتترك أن يزعم أن الأطفال الحكيمية تدل على أن لي علماً بها 15 ولا تدل على آتي عالم لأنه ليس معنى العالم أن له علماً (22) لأنه قد يعلم الإنسان 16 ما أن له علماً من لا يعلمه عالماً وبما نأ شي . وأيضاً هذه أموى صدي 17 فاسدة وذلك أن معنى العالم صدي أن به عما ومن لم يعلم لزيد عما لم يعلمه عالماً

20 فانه قال فأن ما فكرتم من أن يدل الفعل الحكيم على أن 11 للإنسان علماً هو غيره كما قلتم أنه يدل على علم قبل له ليس إذا دل الفعل الحكيم على أن للإنسان علم دل على أنه غيره كي ليس إذا دل على أنه عالم 21 دل على أنه متاير على وجه من الوجوه . وأيضاً فإن معنى التجزية جواز مفارقة

(21) M has علم

(22) M has علم

١ أنه الشئ للآخر على وجه (ص ١٥) من الوجود فبدأ دلت الدلالة على قدم
لاري تعالى وعنه استحال ان يكون غيرين وأيضاً فلو صار لزاعم ان يزعم
٣ أن الفعل الحكمي⁽²³⁾ يدل على ان العلم عالم ثم يعلم⁽²⁴⁾ عليه بعد ذلك لمار
يراعم ان يزعم ان الفعل الحكمي يدل على ان للعلم علم ثم يعلم أنه لم
بعد ذلك وادام لم يزهد وتكفا لقولان وحسب ان تكون الدلالة على ان
العالم عالم دلالة على العلم .

٦ 21 فإنه قال فأنش من انه إما يدل الفعل الحكمي على عدم العالم لأنه
من يجوز ان يوت ويجعل قيل له لو جاز هذا لقائله جاز لزاعم ان يزعم ان
الفعل الحكمي يدل على ان العالم عالم لأنه من يجوز ان يوت ويجعل .

22 وكما يسطر قول من قال ان دلالة الفعل الحكمي على علم العالم منه
١ دلالة على انه غير العالم وانه محدث ان الله يعلم⁽²⁵⁾ ما كان عالم لا للضرورة
ولا للمحدث فوجب ان تكون الدلالة على ان العالم عالم دلالة على العلم ولم
١١ يمكن العلم على انه غير (ص ١٦) العالم ولا لأنه⁽²⁶⁾ محدث لوجود غير
ليس يعلم ويحدث يس يعلم عليه عى ان تكون الدلالة على ان العلم علم
١5 دلالة على انه محدث او أنه غير العالم وأيضاً فلو جسد راعم ان يزعم ان
الدلالة على ان العلم عدم دلالة على حدثه او دلالة على انه غير العالم لمار لزاعم
١7 ان يزعم ان الدلالة على ان العلم عالم دلالة على حدثه وأنه متغير في ذاته

23 والدليل على أن هذا (27) على قدره وحياة كالدليل على أن الله⁽²⁸⁾ تعالى

(23) M has العلم

(24) M repeats يعلم

(25) M has ما العلم But the mā seems to be the mā al-ibhāmīyya,

and therefore the noun should be indefinite

(26) I vocalize as follows *mahdathan hu-ayādh ghawar raḥmā*
bi-lāw wa mahd kun ḥasbi wa ḥ He never let passage sawkara
and it might make better sense if one simply omitted the words after
mahdathan

(27) M has الله

(28) M has الله

24 وقد قال الله جل ذكره (29) «أولئك يعلمه» وقال (30) «وما تحسب من أني ولا تضع إلا يعلم» فثبت العلم لنفسه وقال تعالى (31) «إذ لم يروا أن الله أنادي خلقهم هو أشد منهم قوة» فثبت القوة لنفسه .

25 وما يدل على أن الله تعالى علم يعلم أنه لا يحلو أن يكون الله عالماً بنفسه أو يعلم يستحيل أن يكون هو نفسه فإن كان عاماً بنفسه كانت نفسه عبداً (32) فائلاً لو قال إن الله تعالى عالم بمعنى هو قهقهه لوجب عليه أن يكون ذلك (ص ١٧) المعنى علماً ويستحيل أن يكون العلم عاماً أو لعالم عاماً أو يكون الله تعالى بمعنى الصفات . ألا يرى من لطيف الذي أنه يعلم أن العلم علم أن العالم به علم لأن قدرة الإنسان التي (33) لا يعلم بها لا يجوز أن تكون على مثل استحال أن يكون الباري تعالى عاماً استحال أن يكون عالماً بنفسه (34) وإذا استحال ذلك صح أنه عالم يعلم يستحيل أن يكون هو نفسه .

26 فإنه قال فأمس ما أنكرتم أن يكون الباري سبحانه عالماً لا بنفسه ولا بمعنى يستحيل أن يكون هو نفسه قبله لو جار هذا الجار أن يكون أقول عالم لم يوجب به أي نفسه ولا أي معنى (35) ولم يثبت به نفسه ولا معنى يستحيل أن يكون هو نفسه وإذا لم يجوز هذا بطل ما قاوه وهذا الدليل يدل على إثبات صفات الله تعالى مداته كلها من الحياة والقدرة والسمع والبصر وما في صفات الذات .

(29) 4 168 164

(30) 4 12

(31) 41 15 14

(32) M has لا قهقهه .

(33) M has التي

(34) So M, although one would expect منه .

(35) For greater clarity, perhaps one should add يستحيل أن يكون نفسه

[الباب الثاني]

باب الكلام في القرآن والارادة

27 انه قال فأنزل لم نعلم ان الله تعالى لم يزل (ص ١٨) متكلماً وان كلام الله تعالى عبر مخلوق قيل له قل ذلك لأن الله تعالى قال (١) « نينا » قولنا شيء إذا أردناه ان نقول له كُنْ فيكون ». هو كل القرآن مخلوق لكان الله تعالى قائلاً له كن والقرآن قوله ويستحيل ان يكون قومه مقولاً به لأن هذا يوجب قولاً ثانياً والقول في القول الثاني وفي نفسه يقول ثالث كالقول في القول الأول وتلقه يقول ثاب وهذا يقتضي ما لا نهاية له من لا قوال وذلك فاسد وإذا عد ذلك فعد ان يكون القرآن مخلوقاً . ولو حار ان يقول لقومه طار ان يريد إردنه وذلك فاسد عندنا وعدم هذا سطل هذا استحالة ان يكون مخلوقاً .

28 فانه قال فأنزل ما سكرتم ان يكون معنى قومه تعالى « ان نقول » [له . كُنْ فيكون » ي تكونه فيكون من غير ان نقول له في الحقيقة (ولا) ان نقول له في الحقيقة شيئاً قبل له قال الله تعالى « نينا قولنا شيء » إذا أردناه ان نقول له كن فيكون » هو حار لقائل ان يقول لم يكن الله تعالى قائلاً شيء في الحقيقة كن وإنما المعنى ان يكونه فيكون طار لزعم ان يوعم ان الله تعالى لا يريد شيئاً في حقيقة (ص ١٩) وإنما معنى أردناه فعلناه من غير ان يكون ارادة في الحقيقة على وجه من الوجوه

29 فانه قال فأنزل انه (٤) يكون معنى ان الله تعالى اراد الشيء انه فعله

19

(1) 16 40 42

(2) M has تكون

(3) The words in parentheses seem to be superfluous

(4) M has ان

1 وهو يريد له في الحقيقة معنى انه فاعل له قيل به لو جار هذا لقائله جار لزامه
ان يزعم ان الله عز وجل قائل للشيء في الحقيقة كمن يزعم ان (5) معنى ذلك
3 انه يكونه فيشت الله تعالى قولاً في الحقيقة هو يقول له كمن يزعم ان الله
تعالى ارادة في الحقيقة هي مراده ولو جاز لزامه ان يزعم هذا جار (6) لآخر
5 ان يقول ان علم الله تعالى بالشيء هو فعله له .

30 قوله قال فأول اليس قد قال الله تعالى (7) « جداراً يريد أن ينقض »
7 ولا ارادة للجدار في الحقيقة والله قال يريد تنويعاً والمعنى انه ينقض قيل له
بمعنى فان قال لا انكروتم ان يكون معنى (8) نقول به كمن « اي تكونه
1 فيكون قيل له لفرق بين ذلك ان الجدار يستحيل مع حاديته ان يكون
مريداً ولاري تعالى في الحقيقة لا يستحيل عليه ان يريد (ص ٢٠) او يقول
11 عندك « يمكن قوله » ان نقول له كمن فيكون « معنى تكونه (9) . وايضا
هو كان قوله « ان نقول له « ليس معناه انات قول له وإنما معناه ان يكونه
18 كما ان قوله « جداراً يريد ان ينقض » معناه ان ينقض جداراً لزامه ان يزعم
ان قوله « اردناه » معناه وهو في الحقيقة لا يريد فعله كما ان قوله « جداراً
15 يريد ان ينقض » معناه انه ينقض وهذا أولى في حقيقة القياس . واداً لم يحسب
هذا لم يجب ما قلتموه (10)

17 31 ويقال لهم اذا سمعوا ان الله تعالى اراد فعل الشيء انه فعله ومعنى
أرد حركة الشيء انه حركه لا انكروتم ان يكون الجدار في الحقيقة مريداً

(5) M has به

(6) M has به

(7) 18.77/76

(8) M has يقول

(9) M has يكونه

(10) Strictly speaking one would expect *is* but the author is evidently thinking of a group of adversaries rather than of an individual opponent. Cf n. 4 to Ch. 1

- ١ حركة نفسه معنى انه متحرك ون لا يكون للداري تعالى على الحد مزية في الارادة وان لا يكون له مزية على من وقع عليه وهو غير مريد له لانه قد حصل له معنى فاعل كي حصل للداري تعالى معنى فاعل .

32 فانه قال ما معنى قوله تعالى ١١ « قَالَا أَتَيْنَا طَائِعِينَ » قيل له ١٢ معنى ذلك انهما (ص ٢١) قالا في الحقيقة « أتينا طائعين » .

33 ومما يدل من القياس على ان له تعالى لم يزل متكبداً به لو كان لم يزل غير متكلم وهو عن لا يستعمل عليه الكلام لكان موصوفاً بصد من اعداد الكلام من السكوت او لآفة. ولو كان لم يزل موصوفاً بصد الكلام لكان ضد الكلام قديماً . ولو كان ضد الكلام قديماً لاستحال ان يقدم وان يتكلم للاري لان القديم لا يجوز عدمه كي لا يجوز حدوثه فكان يجب ان لا يكون الداري تعالى قديماً ولا مراً ولا ناهياً على وجه من لوجه وهذا فاسد عندنا وعدمه . وداعيد هذا صحيح وثبت ان الداري لم يزل متكبداً ١٤ قائلًا

34 فانه قال قائل ولم دعمم نه لو كان لم يزل غير متكلم لكان ١٥ موصوفاً بصد للكلام قيل له لان المحي اذا لم يكن موصوفاً بالكلام كان موصوفاً بصده كي نه اذا لم يكن موصوفاً بالعلم كان موصوفاً بصده وذلك ١٦ ان المحي فيما بيننا ذلك حكمه ولم نعم دلالة على حيي (ص ٢٢) يحلو من الكلام واضداده في المناسب كي لم نعم دلالة على حيي يحلو من العلم واضداده ١٧ حتى يكون لا موصوفاً بانه عالم ولا بصد العلم فقد اختص الامر بغيره انه مستحيل فيما بيننا حيي غير عالم ولا موصوفاً بصد العلم وانه مستحيل فيما بيننا ١٨ حيي غير متكلم ولا موصوفاً بصد الكلام وانه لم نعم على ذلك دلالة في 21

١ الثاني . فلو حار أحد الأمرين وهو حي غير متكلم ولا موصوف بضد الكلام حار الأمر الآخر وهو حي غير عالم ولا موصوف بضد العلم .

3 35 وأيضاً فإنه يستحيل فيما بيننا عالم يوصف بضد العلم مع علمه ومتكلم يوصف بضد الكلام مع كلامه فلما اجتمع في الاحاطة وحسب ان يكون من وجود متكلماً في انفس يوصف بضد الكلام مع كلامه كمن جوز عالماً في الثاني يوصف بضد العلم مع علمه فكذلك يجب أيضاً لما استحال فيما بيننا 7 حي غير عالم ولا موصوف بضد العلم وحسب ان يستحيل فيما بيننا حي غير متكلم ولا موصوف (ص ٢٣) بضد الكلام ان يستحيل ذلك في الثاني 9 ووجب ان يكون من حوز أحد الأمرين في الثاني كمن حوز الأمر الآخر .

36 وهذا هو الدليل على ان الله تعالى لم يزل مريداً وذلك ان الحي 11 اذا كان غير مريد لشيء أصلاً وحسب ان يكون موصوفاً بضد من اعداد الارادات من الآفات كاسهول والكراهة والإله (12) والآفات كما وجب ان 13 [يكون] الحي اذا كان غير عالم لشيء أصلاً موصوفاً بضد من صداد العلوم من الآفات كاحمل والنهضة او الموت او ما أشبه ذلك من الآفات . فلما (13) 15 استحال ان يكون الباري تعالى لم يزل موصوفاً بضد الارادة لأن هذا يوجب ان لا يريد شيئاً على وجه من الوجوه وذلك ان ضد الارادة اذا كان الباري 17 تعالى لم يزل موصوفاً به بوجوب قدمه ومحال عدم القديم كي محال حدوث القديم فاداً استحال عدمه وحسب ان لا يريد الباري شيئاً ويعصد فعله على وجه من 19 الوجوه وذلك فاسد . واذا قصد هذا صعب (ص ٢٤) وثبت ان الباري تعالى لم يزل مريداً .

(12) M has *الوفاة* . *الإله* is the only reading which I can suggest in the context

(13) This is an involved sentence which does not seem to be completed properly ; but the sense is clear.

1 37 فانه قال فأنزل لم نعلم اذا كان من لم ينزل غير متكلم ولا مرید
 وجب ان يكون موصوفاً بضد الارادة والكلام اذا كان ممن لا يستعمل عليه
 3 الكلام والارادة فما انكرتم من ان من لم ينزل غير فاعل وجب ان يكون
 موصوفاً بضد الفعل وان يكون تاركاً فيما لم ينزل قيل له لا يجب ما قلته وذلك
 5 ان للكلام (14) صدأ ليس بكلام وللارادة صد ليس بآرادة فوجب لو كان
 الباري (15) تعالى حياً غير متكلم ولا مرید ان يكون موصوفاً بضد الكلام
 7 والارادة . وليس بالفعل صد (16) ليس بفعل فيجب سمي الفعل من الفاعل وحود
 ضده لان الموجود اذا لم يكن محدثاً (17) كان قديماً والتقديم لا يضاد التحديث .
 9 قد لم يكن للفعل صد ليس بفعل لم يجب سمي الفعل من الله تعالى في آية
 اثبات صد . ولما كان للكلام صد ليس بكلام وجب سمي الكلام من الله
 11 تعالى في آية اثبات ذلك الضد لا محالة .

88 فانه قال فيجب اذا كان (ص ٢٥) القديم غير فاعل فيما لم ينزل
 13 ان (18) يكون عاجزاً او تاركاً قيل له ليس العجز مضاداً للفعل وذلك انه
 ليس من جنس من اجتناس الفعل من حركة وسكون ومعهما من سائر الاعراض
 15 الا وقد يجوز ان يخلقه الله مع العجز فلهذا ان العجز لا يضاد الفعل لان
 الاجسام والخواهر من اتصال الله تعالى فلهذا ان العجز لا يضاد الفعل لان
 17 هجري لو ضاد فعلي (19) للمركة لسكان تضاد وقوع الحركة من ربي في جسمي .
 الا ترى انه اذا استحتم ان يفعل في علماً مع الموت استحتم ان يفعل ربي

(14) M has الكلام

(15) M has باري

(16) M has حدث .

(17) M has *but it scarcely seems possible to retain this unless we suppose that something has been omitted* Perhaps we might read *القديم قد لا يكون قديماً قديماً والتقديم* The general argument is fairly clear, but this passage does puzzle me

(18) M has يكون

(19) M repeats في .

١ في مع الموت عداً فلما لم يكن العجز مضاداً لتفضل وإنما بصاد الغدرة وكان التوك للشيء مع ضده فكان اناري تعالى لم يزل عجز فاعل شيء على وجهه
٢ من الوجوه لا يجب بنفي (٢٠) الفصل عنه في أوله عجز (٢١) ولا ترك

٣٩ وأيضاً من الحلي إذا كان عجز متكلم ومريد وحسب أن يكون
موصوفاً بحد الإرادة والكلام وليس إذا كان عجز فاعل شيء. وجب إثبات
ضد هو عجز أو ترك (ص ٢٦) إذا كان عجز الانسان لا يصاد صله علم يجب
٧ بنفي الفعل عن أنه تعالى في أوله إثبات ترك أو عجز كما وجب في نفي الكلام
والإرادة عنه في أوله إثبات تضادها.

٩ ٤٠ فإنه قال يجب نفي الحركة عن أنه تعالى في أوله أن يكون
ساكناً قيل لا كان من يجوز أن يتحرك وحسب لمعني الحركة عنه أن
١١ يكون - كذا كما يجب نفي الكلام والإرادة عنه في أوله إثبات تضادها
إذا كان ممن لا يتعيل ذلك عليه.

١٣ ٤١ فإنه قال يجب نفي التفضل عنه في لم يزل أن يكون بجلا قبل له
التفضل هو لا للتفضل أن يتفضل به وإن لا يتفضل به والمحل لا يجب
١٥ جمع مستحق أنشأ على من محل والاري تعالى لا يجب عليه من شيء.

٤٢ فإنه قال يجب نفي العدل عنه في أنه أن يكون حائراً (٢٢) أو
١٧ عاجراً قيل له ليس يجب بنفي العدل ضد هو عجز أو جور لأنه ليس من جنس
من أحسن العدل إلا ويجوز أن يفعله الله تعالى فينا مع العجز فهم يجب بنفي
١٩ العدل إثبات (ص ٢٧) ضد هو عجز. ولم يجب أيضاً إثبات الجور لأن
الإنسان قد لا يكون عادلاً إذا لم يكن منه عدل كسبه ولا فعله ولا يكون

(20) M has شيء.

(21) M has ولا ترك.

(22) M has حائراً, and so twice below.

١ حدثنا فليس من نفيّا عنه الدليل أثبتنا له صدقاً هو جور أو عجز إذا كنا قد نفى ذلك عنه ولا ثبت صدقاً هو عجز أو جور والحقي ما ومن غيرنا إذا لم لا يمكن⁽²³⁾ عدم كان موصوفاً بصدق العلم . وإيضاً فقد لا يكون لادسان عدلاً ولا يكون جائزاً محوّر من جنس الدليل فليس يحسب ينهي الدليل ضد هو جور . كما وحسب في الكلام والآراء لأن لادسان قد يكون عدلاً بالكون في المكان إذا أمره الله تعالى أن يكون فيه ويكون في وقت آخر حائزاً 7 بالكون فيه إذا أمره الله تعالى عن الكون فيه فيكون الدليل من جنس المحوّر لأن الكون في المكان من جنس الكون فيه

١١ 43 فإنه قال ما نسكروم إذا لم يكن لنا ربي تعالى لمحركاً في قوله أن يكون مسكراً قيل له لا يخلو قولك إذا لم يكن محركاً أن يكون (ص ٢٨) 11 مسكراً يعني إذا كان لم يزل غير محرك لنفسه أن يكون مسكراً لها أو يعني 12 إذا لم يكن محركاً لحم كان مسكراً له فإن عتيت أن لم يحرك 13 نفسه كان مسكراً لها بعد خطأ لأنه يستحيل أن يحرك نفسه ونحن لم نقل 14 لم يشكلم من يستحيل كلامه كان موصوفاً بصدق الكلام وإن عتيت إذا لم يكن محركاً فيما لم يزل لحم كان مسكراً له فليس مع أنه تعالى في قدمه أحسنه فيجب إذا لم يحركه أن يسكبه . وما لم يكن موجوداً يستحيل 17 تحركه . فليس إذا لم يحرك ما يستحيل حركته وحسب أن يسكبه .

مسئلة

1 44 فإنه قال القادر يثبته على الكلام في حال قدرته عليه قد خلا من الكلام وأضاده [قيل له هذا ضرب من الخلاف لأن القدرة على الكلام 21 في حال قدرته عليه متكلم لا محالة ومستدل على ذلك بعد هذا موضع من كتابنا .

(23) M has يكون

(24) M has لم I have read يعني , understanding the subject to be as before, although لم would seem to be allowable in both cases — especially in view of عتيت in the next sentence

١ على أن يقول له ما أنكرت أن يكون القادر على العلم قد خلا من العلم
واضافه فان قال الددر على العلم قد خلا من العلم وضده (25) الذين يقدر
٢ عليها ولا يخلو من علم آخر او ضده قيل له فَقُلْ ان القادر على (ص ٢٩)
الكلام وضده [قد] يخلو منها ولا يخلو من كلام آخر او ضده لا يقدر عليها .

٥ 45 **وروي آخر على أن الله تعالى لم يزل متكلماً** ان الكلام لا يخلو ان
يكون قديماً او حديثاً (26) فان كان محدثاً لم يخل ان يُحدثه [الله] في نفسه
٦ او قديماً بنفسه او في غيره . ويستحيل ان يحدثه في نفسه لانه ليس بعمل
للحوادث . ويستحيل ان يحدثه قديماً بنفسه لانه صفة وانصفة لا تقوم بنفسها .
٧ ويستحيل ان يحدثه في غيره لانه لو أحدثه في غيره لوحب ان يشتق (27) ذلك
العلم الذي فيه الكلام من شخص أوصاف الكلام اللازمة له لنفسه اسماً
٨ وللصلة التي احل منها اسماً فان كان شخص أوصاف الكلام انه كلام وجب
ان يكون ذلك العلم متكلماً . وان كان شخص أوصافه انه أمر وجب ان
٩ يكون ذلك العلم أمراً . وكذلك ان كان شخص أوصافه انه نهي وجب
ان يكون ذلك العلم نهياً . فلما استحال ان يتكلم بكلام الله تعالى غيره
١٠ وبأمر بأمره غيره وبنهي بنهي غيره استحال ان يحدث كلاماً في غيره فيكون به
متكلماً . واذا (ص ٣١) فسدت الروح التي لا يخلو الكلام منها لو كان
١١ محدثاً صح انه قديم وان الله تعالى لم يزل به متكلماً .

46 **فانه قال اطلب قد يحدث الله تعالى في غيره فعلاً وتفضلاً ونعمة**
١٩ وإحساناً ورزقاً فيكون فاعلاً متفضلاً معاً محباً رارفاً (28) أنكرتم ان

(25) M has **يحدثه**.

(26) One would have expected **يحدث** the usual contrary of **يحدث**.

(27) M has **يحدث** (or) **يحدث**. According to Lane the form **يحدث** may be used in the same sense as **يحدث** and **يحدث** he cites a *hadith* *qudāt* in which it is so used. But certainly the usual form is **يحدث**, which our author uses himself in a similar passage in the last part of No. 46. Perhaps **يحدث** could be retained but **يحدث** seems better.

(28) M has **يحدث**.

1 'يحدث في غيره كلاماً يكون به متكلماً قيل له لو لم هذا لزم ان يعلم ويقدر بعلم وقدرة يحدثها في غيره كما يتفضل وينعم ويحسن فيما يحدثه في غيره تفضلاً وكرماً وإحساناً ورقاً فان لم يلزم هذا لم يلزم ما قلتموه . وبضاً فان الله تعالى اذا تحدث في غيره تفضلاً ونعمة ومعللاً وإحساناً ورقاً كل ذلك احسن موصوفاً 5 بأخص أوصاف الفعل والتفضل والرزق والنعمة والاحسان لانه ان كان التفضل والنعمة والاحسان ولعل قوة لا بد ان يكون ذلك لجسم قوياً وكذلك ان 7 كان علماً او حياة او ارادة او سمعاً او بصراً فيجب اذا تحدث كلاماً (29) في غيره ان يشتق ذلك (30) الغير من أخص أوصاف الكلام علماً لم يحرك (ص ٣١) 9 ذلك بطل ان يكون الكلام متباً على ما قدم من ان الله تعالى يحدث كلامه في غيره كما يحدث فعله وفضله ونعمه وإحسانه في غيره

11 47 فانه قالوا انليس قد يحدث لله تعالى كتابة في غيره ولا يكون الشيء الذي قامت به الكتابة كتاباً قيل لهم ان أحدث الله تعالى في غيره 13 كتابة ضرورة كان ذلك الغير 31 كتاباً باصططار وكذلك ان كانت الكتابة كما كان ذلك الغير كتاباً ما كساب فيجب ان أحدث الله تعالى كلامه في 15 غيره ان يكون ذلك الغير متكلماً بكلام الله .

48 وهذا الدليل على قدم الكلام هو الدليل على قدم الارادة فله تعالى 17 لأنها لو كانت محدثة لكانت لا تحرك من ان يكون [الله] يحدثها في نفسه او في غيره او قائمة بنفسها فيستحيل ان يحدثها في نفسه لانه ليس يحمل للحواث . 19 ويستحيل ان يحدثها قائمة بنفسها لأنها صفة والصفة لا تقوى بنفسها كما لا يجوز أن يحدث علماً وقدرة قائمة بنفسها (ص ٣٢) مانفسها ويستحيل ان يحدثها في غيره . لان 21 هذا يوحد ان يكون ذلك الغير مريداً بلادة الله تعالى . فلما استحال هذه الوجوه التي لا تحرك الارادة منها لو كانت محدثة صرح بها قديرة وان الله لم يزل مريداً .

(29) Reading might make the following sentence more intelligible

(30) M has كذاك الغير .

(31) M has لغير

[الباب الثالث]

باب الكلام في الإرادة وانها نعم سائر المهرات

3 49 فانه قال فأنزل لم قلتم ان الله تعالى يريد لكل شيء يجوز ان يراد
قيل له قلنا ذلك لان الإرادة اذا كانت من صفات الذات بالدلالة التي ذكرناها
5 وجب ان تكون (1) عامة في كل ما يجوز ان يراد على حقيقة كما اذا كان
اعلم من صفات الذات وجب عمومها لكل ما يجوز ان يُعمم على حقيقة (2)
7 وأيضاً فقد دلت الدلالة على ان الله تعالى خالق كل شيء، حادث (3) لا يجوز
ان يخلق ما لا يريد. وقد قال الله تعالى (4) «عَالِمُ الْغَيْبِ يُرِيدُ» . وأيضاً فانه
9 لا يجوز ان يكون في سلطان الله تعالى ما لا يريد. لانه لو كان في سلطان
الله تعالى ما لا يريد وجب تحدُّه (5) (ص ٣٣) إما بإتات فهو وعلة او
1. اثبات صف وعز ووهن وتقصير عن نوع ما يريد. فل لم يجر ذلك على الله
تعالى استحالة ان (4) يكون في سلطانه ما لا يريد .

14 50 فانه قال وفيه عموم ذلك قيل له نعمنا ذلك لان المراد اذا وقع لم
يلحق من وقع مراده صف ولا تقصير عن بلوغ ما يريد. يوقع المراد موجب
11 ان يلحقه ضعف والتقصير عن نوع ما يريد . د . يقع مراده ألا ترى ان
من وقع ما يمل به لم يلحقه جهل ولا صد من تضاد العلم بذلك الشيء. اذا
17 وقع وهو يمل به فدل ذلك على انه اذا لم يقع وهو لا يمل به وجب جهله او

(1) M has هكوه .

(2) M has حيت This could be retained, and then the preceding
من حيت could also be read من حيت In fact حيت seems to me to
be more accurate

(3) 11 107, 109 and 85. 16

(4) M has هكوه

١ وصفه بضد من اصدد العالم . وكذلك اذا كان ما يريد لم يحس سهو ولا
ضعفه ولا وهنه ولا تقصيره عن بلوغ ما يريد . واذا كان ما لا يريد وجب
٢ سهو او ضعف وهنه وتقصيره عن بلوغ ما يريد .

51 وأيضاً اذا كان في كون ما لا يريد من أفعاله التي احتسنا على انها
٣ أفعاله وحسب انسهو والنسلة والضعف (ص ٣٤) ولو من والتقصر عن بلوغ ما
يريد فكذلك يلزم في كون ما لا يريد من غيره ما يلزم في كون ما لا يريد
٤، اتفقنا على انه من أفعاله . الا ترى انه اذا لزم من رعم به يكون من
أفعال الله ما لا يعلمه ان يصفه بالجليل او بصد من أصداد العلم لزم مثل ذلك
٥ من رعم انه يكون من غيره ما لا يعلمه وكذلك اذا لزم من رعم ان الله
يخبر به يكون من فعله ما لا يكون التكذيب فيه لزم من رعم ان الله تعالى
٦ يخبر به يكون من غيره ما لا يكون التكذيب لا فرق في ذلك بين ما
تعلق على انه فعله وبين ما يكون من غيره . وكذلك اذا لزم في كون ما
٧ لا يريد الباري تعالى من فعله ضعف وتقصير عن بلوغ ما يريد او سهو وعلة
لزم ذلك في كون ما لا يريد من غيره .

52 وأيضاً فقد دلت الدلالة على ان كل المحدثات مخلوقات لله تعالى
٨ هذا استحالة ان يفعل الباري تعالى ما لا يريد استحالة ان يقع من غيره ما لا
٩ يريد اذا كان ذلك أجمع أفعالا (ص ٣٥) فهو تعالى .

53 وأيضاً ولو كان في العالم ما لا يريد الله تعالى لكان ما يكون
١٠ كونه ولو كان ما يكون لكان ما ياتي (١) كونه وهذا يوجب ان الماحي
كانت شاء الله ام ابي (٢) وهذا صفة الضيف المقهور وتعالى ربنا عن ذلك علواً
١١ كبيراً .

(5) M has ٣٤

(6) M² has ٣٤ .

54 فانه قال فأنى حفرنا عن ملك من ملوك الدنيا لو أمر برجل مقعد
 زمن أمي فشته والملك لا يريد شته أنقولون⁽⁷⁾ ان الملك يلحقه في ذلك
 3 صفة وهو وتقدير عن ملوع ما يريد ادا⁽⁸⁾ أراد ان لا يشته فشته قيل له
 أهل ولو لم يكن ما أراد الزمن من شته وكان ما أراد ملك من مدحه
 6 إياه كان ذلك أولى برؤا الضف والوهن عنه على أن الملك ادا لم يرد شتم
 الأعمى المعند به فقد ذكره شته إياه وأنى ذلك وقد كان شته ش. ذلك
 7 الملك او أمه وعد⁹ صفة الضف والوهن وأحداً فان من ادا أراد ما
 أمر كان (ص ٣٦) وادى لم يرد كونه يمكن أولى بصفة الاقتدار من يريد
 1 كون ما لا يكون ومن لا يكون ما يكون ورب العالمين لا يوصف الا
 بالوصف الذي هو أولى بصفة الاقتدار .

11 55 فانه قال فأنى من اذا أراد أمراً كان وادى لم يرد لم يكن اما
 يكون اقتداره عن يتبعه ويصنه ويكون صفة قلّة أفعاله وأتباعه ورب العالمين
 12 لا يشكر احد يقال لهم ما أنكرتم ان كان هذا على ما تدعون ان يكون من
 أراد من فعله كون ما لا يكون وان لا يكون ما يكون فهو أولى بصفة الاقتدار
 15 من يريد كون ما يكون وان لا يكون ما لا يكون إك يصح وصفه بالاقتدار
 لانه من يشكر بفضله ويجب اقتداره من يتصره وصفه عن يقدر عنه .

17 56 وباللهم لم نعمت ان من أراد ما كون ما يكون إك يصح وصفه
 بالاقتدار لانه من يقوى سكرة من يشته ويصف سكرة من يقدر عنه. فان
 19 (ص ٣٧) قالوا لان هذا عيا بيت هكذا قيل وكذلك اما بدن الفعل الحكيم
 على ان من ظهر منه عالم قادر لانه من يعلم يعلم ويعبر بقدره لانا كذلك
 21 وحدها عيا بيتا من ذلك الافعال الحكيمية على انه عالم قادر . فما أنكرتم

(7) M has أن يقولون

(8) M has ادا .

(9) M has وعد , but here seems better, as in the last part of No 53

١ من انه واحد على اعتلالكم ان (لا) (١٥) تدل الافعال احكسية على ان
الباري تعالى قادر عام وكذلك يعارضون بان الافعال (١١) احكسية تدل على
٢ ان من ظهرت منه عالم قادر لانه بمن له علم وقدره من أجل أن ذلك مما بيننا
كذلك .

٥ 52 فانه قال فأن ما أنكرتم ان لا يلحق الباري الضف والوهن والتقصير
عن بلوع ما يريد لانه يقدر ان يلحق (١٢) عباده الى ما أراد كونه مهم
٦ قيل له ان الباري تعالى انه أراد كون الايمان مهم على أصلك فان يقع ذلك
منهم طوعاً يستحقون عليه الثواب واداء انعام اليه لم يكونوا عندك طائعين
ولا للثواب مستحقين . فكيف يحسبكون (١٣) ما لا يريد الضف والوهن
والتقصير عن بلوع ما يريد لو لم يوصف بالقدره على ان يلحقهم (١٤) الى ذلك
١٢ (ص ٣٨) وكذلك يجب له الضف والوهن والتقصير عن بلوع ما يريد اذا
أراد كونه على وجه لا يوصف بالقدره على وقوعه على ذلك الوجه

١٣ 58 وأيضاً انه يلزم القدرية اذا كان من قدر ان يؤمن قدر ان يكفر
ان لا يكون الباري تعالى موصوفاً بالقدره على الأمر الذي لو فعله لكافوا
١٤ مؤمنين لا محالة لانهم ١٥ يقدرون عدمهم على ان (لا) (١٦) يكفروا عند رول
الآيات الملحيات الى الايمان كما يقدرون ان يؤمنوا قبل ذلك ومن قدر على
١٦ الكفر عند رول الآية لم يؤمن وقوعه منه . وأيضاً فلو كان يقع من الانسان
لا يريد اسري سخطه ولا يلحق الباري بذلك ومن ولا صف لانه قادر

(10) The retention of this negative particle would seem to give a sense contrary to that intended by the author.

(11) M has يضاف .

(12) M has يلحق .

(13) M has يكره .

(14) M has للجهل .

(15) M has يقدره .

(16) We must either omit this negative particle, or read

على ان لا يؤمنوا .

١ ان يُنحسهم اليه سار ان يقع من الباري سبحانه من افعاله ما لا يريد ولا يلحقه ضعف وتقصير عن بلوغ ما يريد لانه قادر على إيقاعه وسكوبه . فان
٢ لم يجب هذا ولزم تكون ما لا يريد من فعله الضعف والوهن لانه ذلك في فعل عاده .

٥ 59 فانه (ص ٣٩) قال فاصل ما أنكرتم ان يكون كون ما لا يريد
الانسان من فعله يوجب وقوع ذلك عن سهو او عن ضعف ووهن وليس يلزم
٦ ذلك في كون ما لا يريد من فعل غيره فوجب مثل ذلك في القديم أيضاً
٧ قيل له ليس الأمر كما طست من القصة فيما يكون من الانسان ومن غيره
٨ وحده وذلك ان الانسان اذا كان من فعله ما لا يريد فاما ان يكون ذلك
٩ عن سهو او عن ضعف ووهن وتقصير عن بلوغ ما يريد وكذلك
١٠ القول فيما يكون من غيره لانه ان لم يكن ذلك عن سهو فوجب ان يكون
١١ من ضعف وتقصير عن بلوغ ما يريد وذلك ان العلم الذي هو الانسان اذا
١٢ كان قائماً وقع منه وهو غير مرید في الضعف والتقصير عن بلوغ ما يريد ان
١٣ مراده لم يقع وانه لم يوجد لانه لو كان ما يريد لم يلحقه ضعف ولا وهن فاذا
١٤ لم يقع قائماً لحقه الوهن والتقصير عن بلوغ ما يريد من أجل انه وقع منه وهو
١٥ عالم به غير مرید له (ص ٤٠) وقد كانت اللمعة ما ذكرنا وحده أيضاً مثل
١٦ ذلك فيما يقع من غيره وهو لا يريد لانه اذا كانت اللمعة التي لها وجب ان
١٧ يوصف الانسان بضد العلم في وقوع ما يقع منه انه وقع منه وهو لا يعلم
١٨ وكذلك قصة ما يقع من غيره وهو لا يعلم (١٧) كانت اللمعة في ذلك واحدة
١٩ وكذلك القول في الادارة وأيضاً فانه اذا كان من غيره ما لا يريد فقد
٢٠ كرهه واداك كونه فقد ابداه وهذا يوجب ان الشيء كان شياً م أبي
وهذا (١٨) صفة الضعف والوهن .

(17) M has in

(18) M has in Cf. n. 9, supra

1 60 فإنه قالوا ما نسكتهم من أن ندي يجب في حكون ما لا يريد
الذي تعالى من عادة أن يكون كراهاً بذلك فقط ولا يجب في ذلك ضعف
ولا وهو قيل له بل وقوع ذلك مهم وهو كراه به يوجب الضعف وأوهى لا
بحاجة لأنه إذا كان مكره كونه كان ما أنى كونه وإذا كان ما أنى كونه
قد كان الشيء شاملاً أم أباه . وهذا يوجب أن الشيء . كان شاملاً . لله تعالى ذلك
أم نه وهذا (19) صفة (ص ٤١) الضعف .

7 61 وأيضاً من لمعة رجلان أحدهما يقول إن إرادة الله تعالى في أفعال
عادة الأمر بها . والآخري يقول ببدنه في أفعال عادة حلفاً (20) غير الأمر بها
المن ذهب إلى أن الأمر زمه إذا لم يكن إلبي تراً بأفعال الأفعال والاصحاب
أن يكون كراهاً لها إذا كان يجب بنهي الإرادة لأفعال لعاد الكراهة لها
11 والله تعالى لا يكره إلا معصية كما لا ينهى إلا عن معصية وإذا لم يكن
هذا عندهم هكذا أطلق الله ما قاده ونفث فإذا كان يلزم بها جاز الأمر
13 به إذا لم يأمر به أن يكون له كراهاً لزم من كان في حصر رسول صلى الله
عليه وجاهز عنده أن يعد . يعني عن المدح الذي ليس مطاعة أن يكون إذا لم
15 يرد من الله تعالى الأمر به فقد كره وهذا يوجب أن كل مدح معصية

62 ومن ذهب إلى القول الثاني وهو قول الجبلي أن إرادة الله تعالى
17 لأفعال عباده هي غير الأمر بها بل بدل له إذا كان يجب بنهي الإرادة لأفعال
عباده الكراهة فعبثنا هل أراد (21) أنه كونه (ص ٤٢) الأفعال التي ليست
19 بمأمر (24) ولا طاعات فإن قال نعم قيل له يملك أن تكون طاعة لأن الطاعة

(19) M has هل

(20) In M's written in small letters between the lines. Perhaps it would be better to leave it out as it is left out below in No. 62. If it be retained the meaning would seem to be that given in the

M has جلال القروض

(21) M has أطلق

(22) M has به

(23) M has إرادة

(24) M has مأمور

١ عندك ان كانت طاعة لسطاع لانه اردها . فان قال لم يردّها قيل له فيلزمك
انه كاره لكونها وهذا يوجب ان تكون معصية لان ما كرهه الله سبحانه
٢ فهو معصية كما ان ما نهى عنه فهو معصية عندكم . ويقال لهم اذا كان نفي
الارادة يوجب إثبات كراهة ويلزمكم اذا كان الله تعالى لم يزل غير مرید شيء .
و نشأ ان يكون لم يزل كارهاً اذ كان يعني (25) الارادة يوجب إثبات كراهة .

مسئلة

7 63 ويقال للعترة لم رجمتم انه لا يريد السفه الا سفيه فان قالوا لان
مرید اسفه مسا سفيه يقال لهم فكذلك من راد مثا ما يعبر به لا يكون
٨ او يطلب عنده انه لا يكون فهو مُستثنى (26) فاقصوا بذلك على الله تعالى اذا
رجمتم انه اراد ان يكون ما علم انه لا يكون . ويقال لهم وكذبت أيضاً من
11 حلي (27) بين عبده وربه يربي بعضهم بعض وهو يراهم وهو لا يمشي عن
التفريق بينهم (ص ١٣) مع كراهته الزنا . على أصولكم وقد فهم قبل ذلك
١١ عن الزنا . هو سفيه فاقصوا بذلك على الله تعالى والا كنتم متناقضين (28)

64 فانه قالوا لو جار ان يريد السفه من ليس بسفيه حار (29) ان يقول
١١ لكذب من ليس مكاذب يقال لهم ما الفرق بينكم وبين من قال وهو جار
ان يريد . علم انه لا يكون من ليس مُستثنى (30) ويُحلي بين عبده وربه
17 يربي بعضهم بعض مع كراهته الزنا . عندكم وقدرته على اسمع وأجبلولة من ليس
سفيه طاز ان يقول الكذب من ليس مكاذب وهذا ما لا يجدون به عرقاً .
١٠ ويقال لهم كما ان مرید السفه منا سفيه فكذلك مرید الصاعة منا مطيع فاقصوا
بذلك على الناس

(25) M has سلى
(26) M has مقص
(27) M has خلا
(28) M has متناقضين . which perhaps could be retained if we sup-
plied أصولكم
(29) M has وفجر
(30) M has يمشي .

١ 65 **ومما يبين** ان الله تعالى مريد لكل شيء . يجوز ان يراد قول الله تعالى ^(٣١) « وما تشاؤون إلا أن يشاء الله » فأنخير أنفسنا لا نشاء إلا ما شاء الله . وقال تعالى ^(٣٢) « وكُلُوا شَرِبُوا » . ردت لكم من في الأرض كلهم جميعاً » وقال تعالى ^(٣٣) « وَكُلُوا شَرِبُوا لَا تَلْبِسُوا كَيْفَ نَفْسٍ هَذَا هَا » وقال ^(٣٤) « وَتَوَشَّاهُ رَبُّكَ مَا تَطْلُوهُ » وقال ^(٣٥) « وَكُلُوا شَرِبُوا » ما اقتتلوا ولكن الله يعمل ما يريد » (ص ١١) فأنخير الله لو لم يرد القتال لم يكن وإن ما اراد من ذلك فقد فعله

٧ 66 **فانه قالوا** معنى هذا « لو شاء الله ما اقتتلوا » أي لو شاء الله لم يكن من القتال لم يكن . يقول لهم ولم لا حملتم الآية على ظاهرها وتلقم على أي وجه شاء . ن لا يكون القتال لم يكن وكذلك المطالبة عليهم في قول الله تعالى « ووشاء ردت لكم من في الأرض كلهم جميعاً » . فان قالوا لو شاء الله ان يلعنهم أي الايمان لكانوا مؤمنين في لهم اوليسو مع الاجلاء قادرين على ان يكفروا كما هم قادرون على ان يؤمنوا فكيف يجب بالاجلاء . كون الايمان منهم وهم قادرين الا يكون منهم إيمان مع الاجلاء . كما هم قادرين على الايمان مع عدم الاجلاء .

١٥ 67 **فانه قالوا** ليس في كون ما لا يريد إيجاب ضعف كما ليس في كون ما لم يأمر به . إيجاب ضعف . فيلهم قد كانت أفعاله عندهم ولم يأمر بها ولا يلحقه ضعف ولو كانت وهو لا . يدها (ص ١٥) حلقه الضعف فكذلك كون ما لم يأمر به من غيره لا يوجب له ضعف في كون ما لم يرده من غيره [ما] يدل على الضعف ١٩ **ويجاء** فان ما لم يأمر به ونهى عنه وأراد وقوعه ٣٦ فذلك لم يلحقه ضعف .

(٣١) ٧ ١١

(٣٢) ١ ١١

(٣٣) ٢ ٢٥٤/٢٥٤

(٣٤) ١ ١١

(٣٢) ٣٢ ١٣

(٣٤) ٦ ١١٢

The Arabic seems a bit awkward, but the sense is clear. God may will what He has not commanded, indeed has forbidden, and not be thereby subject to weakness. Thus He creates a creature which will do as He does not command, and has positively forbidden it. This question is discussed at greater length in Chapters Five and Six.

[الباب الرابع]

باب الكلام في الرؤية

3 68 انه قال فان لم قلتم ان رؤية الله تعالى بالانصار حادثة من باب القدس

فيل له قتنا ذلك لان ما لا يجوز ان يوصف به الباري تعالى ويستحيل عليه
ان لا يجوز لان في تحويره ثبات حدته^(١) واثبات حدث معي فيه او
تشبيهه^(٢) وتخييه او قلعه عن حقيقته او تحويره^(٣) تنظيره او تكديسه .

7 69 وليس في حوار الرؤية اثبات حدته لان المرتبي لم يسكن مرتباً لانه
حدث ولو كان مرتباً بذلك لزمهم ان يرى كل محدث وذلك باطل عندهم على
ان المرتبي لو كان مرتباً لحدوثه لكان المرتبي محدثاً للمرتبي اذ كان مرتباً لحدوثه .

70 وليس في الرؤية ثبات حدوث معي في المرتبي لان (ص ١٦) الاثواب
11 مرتبت ولا يجوز حدوث معي فيها^(٤) على ان المرتبي لو كان مرتباً لحدوث
معني فيه لكان ذلك المعنى هو الرؤية وهذا يوجب ثبات رأينا الميت فقد
13 حدثت فيه رؤية واجامعت الرؤية الموت واذا رأينا عن الأعمى حدثت في عينه
رؤية فكانت الرؤية محامدة للمعنى فما لم يجوز ذلك بطل ما قاوره

15 71 وليس في اثبات الرؤية به تعالى تشبيه الباري تعالى ولا تخييه ولا
قلعه عن حقيقته لانما يرى السواد وابيض فلا تماثل ولا يشتهان بوقوع

(1) M has حله

(2) M has تشبيهه

(3) M has و .

(4) The words supplied in the brackets seem to be required . If a reason was added, one could suppose that the فيها was followed by something like : لا كانت امرها ولا يقوم للعرض بالعرض .

١ الرؤية عليه ولا ينقلب السواد عن حقيقته الى البياض بوضع الرؤية عليه^(٥) ولا البياض الى السواد .

٢ 72 وليس^(٦) في الرؤية تحويره ولا تظليه ولا تكويه لانا نرى الحدوث^(٧) والظالم والكاذب وزى من ليس بكذا^(٨) ولا ظالم ولا كاذب . هذا لم يكن في اثبات الرؤية شيئا . مما لا يجوز على الباري لم تكن الرؤية مستحيلة وادام لم تكن مستحيلة كانت جازمة على الله .

٣ 73 فانه عارضونا به (ص ١٧) اللس والدوق والشم ليس فيه اثبات حدوث ولا حدوث معنى في الباري تعالى قيل لهم قد قال بعض اصحابنا ان اللس صرب من صروب المهنات وكذلك الدوق وهو اتصال اللسان والاهوات بالشم الذي له العلم وان الشم هو اتصال الخيشوم بالشموم الذي يكون عنده الادراك انه وان المتأين انما يتأين بحدوث متأين^(٩) فيها و في اثبات ذلك اثبات حدوث معنى في الباري

٤ 74 ومن اصحابنا من يقول لا يخلو القائل ان يكون اراد بذكره اللس والدوق ان يحدث الله تعالى له إدراكاً في هذه الحوارح من غير ان يحدث فيه معنى او يكون اراد حدوث معنى فيه . فان كان اراد حدوث معنى فيه فذلك مما لا يجوز . وان كان اراد حدوث ادراك^(١٠) فينا فذلك حازر والأمر في التسمية الى الله تعالى ان أمرنا ان نُسبهُ لمساً وذوقاً وشم سميئاً وان منما امتنعنا . وما السمع فلم يختلف اصحابنا فيه وجوزوا^(١١) جميعاً وقالوا انه

(5) M has عليها

(6) M has وليس

(7) M has الحدوث

(8) M has بكذا .

(9) Perhaps this should be مستهين

(10) M has ذوقاً, which could sloy.

(11) So M, apparently; perhaps يجوزوه would be better.

1 جاز ان يُسَمِّعَ الباري (ص ١٨) تعالى نفسه متكلماً وقد أسمع موسى عليه السلام نفسه متكلماً

3 75 والدليل على ان الله تعالى يرى «لا يصاد قوله تعالى (12) «وَجِئُوا يَوْمَئِذٍ بِصِرَةٍ إِلى رَبِّهَا نَظَرَةٌ» ولا يجوز ان يكون معنى قوله «الى ربها نَظَرَةٌ» متعجئة كقوله (13) «أَفَلَا يَنْظُرُونَ إِلى الْأَوَّلِ كَيْفَ حَقَّتْ» لان الآخرة ليست مدار اعتبار ولا يجوز ان يعنى متعطفة راحة كما قال (14) «لَا يَنْظُرُ أَفَّةٌ إِلَيْهِمْ» أي لا يرحمهم ولا يتعطف عليهم لان الباري لا يجوز ان يتعطف عليه. ولا يجوز ان يعنى متعطفة لان النظر اذا قرن بذكر الوجه لم يكن معناه نظر القلب انما هو انتظار كما اذا قرن النظر بذكر القلب لم يكن معناه نظر العين. لان القائل اذا قال «انظر بذلك في هذا الامر» كان معناه نظر القلب وكذلك اذا قرن النظر بالوجه لم يكن معناه إلا «نظر الوجه والنظر بالوجه هو نظر (15) الرؤية التي تكون بالعين التي في الوجه. فصح ان معنى (ص ١٩) قوله 18 تعالى «الى ربها ناصرة» راية اذ لم يجوز ان يعنى شيئاً من وجوه النظر واداً كان النظر لا يجوز من وجوه اربع ومسد منها ثلاثة أوجه صح الوجه الرابع 15 وهو نظر رؤية العين التي في الوجه

76 فانه قال فأنزل الباري قد قال الله تعالى (16) «وَجِئُوا يَوْمَئِذٍ بِصِرَةٍ» 17 فظن ان يُقْبَلَ بها فاقرة «والظن لا يكون بالوجه» وكذلك قوله «وجوه يومئذ ناصرة الى ربها ناصرة» أراد نظر القلب. قيل له [لا] لان الظن لا يكون بالوجه ولا يكون إلا بالقلب فلما قرن الظن بذكر الوجه كان معناه ظن القلب اذ لم يكن الظن إلا به. فلو كان النظر لا يكون إلا بالقلب

(12) 75.22-23

(13) 88 17

(14) 3.77/71

(15) M has النظر

(16) 75.24-25

١ وجب اذا ذكره مع ذكر الوجه ان يرجع به الى القلب فلما كان النظر قد يكون
بالوجه ونظيره وجب اذا قرنه بذكر الوجه ان يربط به بنظر الوجه كما انه اذا
٢ قرنه بذكر القلب وجب ان يربط به بنظر القلب .

مثلة

5 77 فانه قالوا لا معنى قوله تعالى (١٧) « لا تُدْرِكُهُ الْأَبْصَارُ وَهُوَ يُدْرِكُ
الْأَبْصَارَ » فبين لهم في الدنيا دون الآخرة لان القرآن لا يند قص (ص ٥٠)
7 فلما قال في آية اخرى انه تنظر (١٨) اية الانصار علمنا ان الوقت الذي قال
انه لا تدركه الانصار فيه غير الوقت الذي أخبرنا ان تنظر اليه فيه .

١١ 78 فانه قال فانس . انكروتم ان يكون قوله تعالى « اي ربها فاطمة »
اي الى ثواب ربها فاطمة فيل له ثواب انه تعالى عبده ولا يجوز ان يُعَدَّلَ بالكلام
١٢ عن الحقيقة الى المحار بغير حجة ولا دلالة . الا ترى ان الله تعالى لما قال
« صلوا » (١٩) ولي واصدوي « لم يجوز ان يقول قائل عبي عبده ولو جاز لزعم ان
١٣ يزعم ان قوله « لا تدركه » اراد به انها لا تدرك عبده الانصار [حار (٢٠)
لزعم ان يزعم ان قوله صلوا الي واصدوي اراد به عبده . فاذا قد هذا
١٥ فسد ما قاله] .

79 فانه قال [فانس] فاذا كان قوله « لا تدركه الانصار » في وقت
١٧ دون وقت ما انكروتم ان يكون قوله (٢١) « لا تَحُدُّهُ سِتَةٌ وَلَا نَوْمٌ » في
وقت دون وقت فيل له الفرق بينهما انه قال لنا في آية انه لا تدركه الانصار

(17) 6 . 13

(18) M has ان لا تدركه الانصار — surely a slip of the copyist or the author

(19) M has صلوا الي which might be read صلوا الي

(20) Some such words as those in the brackets are required to complete the sense

(21) 2.255-256

١ وقال في آية أخرى ان الوجوه تنظر اليه فاستمعك الآيتين وقلنا ان المعنى في ذلك انها تنظر اليه في وقت ولا تدركه في وقت . ولم يقل لنا⁽²²⁾ في آية 3 ان السنة والنوم يأخذانه⁽²³⁾ وفي آية أخرى لا يأخذانه⁽²⁴⁾ فبُيِّنَت في وقتين .
وَيْضاً فان النوم آفة تقوم بالنائم تزيل عنه العلم وليست الرؤية آفة تحل في المرئي فيجب منع الرؤية مثل ما به وجب منع النوم .

مسئلة

7 80 (ص ٥١) فانه قالوا لو جاز ان يُرى القديم سبحانه وليس كلثنيات صار ان يُلْمَسَ وَيَذَاقَ وَيُسَمَّ وَلَيْسَ كَالْمَذَوَّاتِ وَلَا كَالْمُرْسَاتِ وَلَا كَالْمَشْمُوتِ قَبْلَ لِهْمٍ مَا الْعَرَقَ بَيْنَكُمْ وَبَيْنَ مَنْ قَالَ وَلَوْ جاز ان يكون القديم رانياً عالمًا قادراً حياً لا كالأرباب الطامثين . فجاز ان يكون لاماً
11 د قاً شاملاً لا كالاميين الدائفين الشاميين . فان [هـ] يجب هذا في أنكرتم من ان لا يجب ما قلناه .

مسئلة

81 فانه قال فانظر هل شاعدم⁽²⁵⁾ مربياً إلا جوهرًا او عرضاً محدوداً
13 او حالاً في محدود قيل له لا ولم يكن المرئي مربياً لانه محدود ولا لانه حال في محدود ولا لانه جوهر ولا لانه عرض فلما لم يكن ذلك كذلك لم يجب القضا . بذلك
17 على الدائب كما لم يجب اذا لم يجد فاعلاً إلا حساً ولا شيئاً إلا جوهرًا او عرضاً ولا عالمًا قادراً حياً إلا بعلم وحياة وقدرة محدثة ان نقضي بذلك على الثالث .
19 اذ لم يكن الفاعل فاعلاً لانه حس ولا شيء . شيئاً لانه جوهر⁽²⁶⁾ او عرض .

(22) M has لنا

(23) M repeats في آية after يأخذانه

(24) M has تأخذانه

(25) In the margin of M ; the text has شاعدم

(26) M has جوهرًا او عرضاً , though it seems that مرخا was corrected to عرض

[الباب الخامس]

باب الكلام في القدر

3 82 (ص ٥٢) انه قال فان لم نعمم ان أكتب البياض مخلوقة لله تعالى قيل له قلنا ذلك لان الله تعالى قال (١) «وَأَنَّهُ خَلَقَكُمْ وَمَا تَعْمَلُونَ» وقال (٢) «بِجَزَاءِ مَا كَانُوا يَعْمَلُونَ» (٣) «بِغَيْرِ حِسَابٍ» فها كان الجزاء. واقعاً على أعمالهم كان الخلق لأعمالهم .

7 83 فانه قال أميس الله تعالى قال (٤) «اتَّعِدُّوا لَهُ مَا تَفْعَلُونَ» وعني (٥) لأصنام التي تحتوها ما أنكرتم ان يكون قوله «خلقكم وما تعملون» أراد الأصنام التي عملوها قيل له خطأ ما ظننت لأن الأصنام منقوشة لهم في الحقيقة فارجع الله تعالى بقوله «اتَّعِدُّوا لَهُ مَا تَفْعَلُونَ» اليها وليست الخشب ممسولة لهم في الحقيقة فارجع بقوله «خلقكم وما تعملون» اليها

8 84 فانه قال فان قيل ليس قد قال الله تعالى (٦) «تَلَقَّوْا مَا يَأْفِكُونَ» ولم يرد إفساحهم ما أنكرتم ان لا يرجع بقوله «خلقكم وما تعملون» الى أعمالهم قيل له الذي يأفكون هو الامثلة التي حيلوا الى الناس انها حيات تسمى وإفساحهم 15 تحيلهم فاراد بعونه (ص ٥٣) «بأفكون» أي يحيلون الى الناس انها حيات تسمى وإفساحهم هي ايهاهم التي على خلاف ما هو نسيجه فالامثلة هي التي 17 يأفكون ويحيلون الى الناس انها تسمى في الحقيقة وهي التي تلقفها العصا .

(1) 37 96/94

(2) 46.14/13

(3) M has بماتكم لمعملون , which seems to be a mistake

(4) 37 95 93

(5) M has ما

(6) 7.117 114 and 26.45/44

١ وليس يجوز ان يعملوا الحش في الحقيقة فلم يجر ان يكون الله تعالى رجع^٧
بقوله «خلقكم وما تعملون» اليه ووجب ان يرجع الى الأعمال كما رجع
٢ بقوله «هراء» كما كانوا^٨ يعملون «الى الأعمال» فلو صار لزاعم ان يزعم ان
قول الله تعالى «خلقكم وما تعملون» أراد غير أعمالهم كما أراد بقوله «ما
٣ يافكون» غير إفكهم لساع لزاعم ان يزعم ان قول الله تعالى «هراء» كما
كانوا^٩ يعملون «اذا أراد به غير أعمالهم كما أراد بقوله «خلقكم وما تعملون»
٤ غير أعمالهم كما ان قوله «ما يافكون» اذا أراد به غير إفكهم فلما لم يجر
هذا لم يجر ما قاله هذا

٩ 85 والمراد من القياس على خلق أعمال الناس انما وجدنا الكفر قياساً
فاسداً باطلاً متناقضاً خلافاً (ص ١٤) لا يخاف ووجدنا الايمان حسناً متصفاً
١١ مؤملاً . ووجدنا الكفار يقصد ويجهد نفسه الى ان يكون الكفر حسناً حقاً
فيكون بخلاف قصده ووجدنا الايمان لو شاء المؤمن ان لا يكون متصفاً مؤملاً
١٣ ولا مؤملاً لم يكن ذلك كأننا على حسب مشيئة وادارته وقد علمنا ان
الفعل لا يحدث على حقيقته الا من يحدث أحدثه عليها لانه يجر ان يحدث
١٥ على حقيقته لا من يحدث أحدثه على ما هو عليه لانه ان يحدث الشيء فعلاً لا
من يحدث أحدثه فعلاً . فلما لم يجر ذلك صح انه لم يحدث على حقيقته الا من
١٧ حدث أحدثه على ما هو عليه وهو قاصد الى ذلك لانه يجر حدوث فعل على
حقيقته^(١٠) لا من قاصد يؤمن ان تكون الافعال كلها كذلك كما انه لو
١٩ جاز حدوث فعل لا من فاعل يؤمن ان تكون الافعال كلها كذلك .

86 واذا كان هذا هكذا فقد وجب ان يكون الكفر^(١١) يحدث

(7) M has *رجع*, which seems to be a slip

(8) M has *يماكنتم صلو*, as in n. (3), supra

(9) M as in previous note

(10) M has *الحقيقة*, but *حقيقته* seems to be the author's customary expression.

(11) M has *الكفر*

١ أحدثه كعراً ، طلاً قسماً وهو قاصد الى ذلك ومن يجوز ان يكون الحدث
(ص ٥٥) له هو الكافر الذي يريد ان يكون الكفر حياً صواباً حقاً
٢ فيكون على خلاف ذلك . وكذلك للإيمان (١٢) محدث أحدثه على حقيقة متباً
مؤيلاً مرمضاً غير المؤمن الذي يرحم ان يقع الايمان خلاف ما وقع من إيلامه
٣ وإنشائه ودرماصه ، يمكن له الى ذلك سبيل . وإذا لم يجوز ان يكون الحدث
للكفر على حقيقته الكافر ولا (١٣) الحدث للإيمان على حقيقته المؤمن فقد وجب
٤ ان يكون محدث ذلك هو الله تعالى رب العالمين القاصد الى ذلك لانه لا يجوز
ان يكون أحدث ذلك حم من الأحمم لأن الأحمم لا يجوز ان تعمل في
٥ غيرها شيئاً .

87 فإنه قال فأنزل فلم لا دل وقوع الفعل الذي هو كتب على انه لا
١١ فاعل ه . لا الله كما دل على انه لا خالق [هـ] الا الله تعالى قيل له كذلك
ينزل . فان قيل فلم لا دل على انه لا قادر عليه الا الله عز وجل قيل هـ
١٢ لا فاعل هـ (ص ٥٦) على حقيقته لا الله تعالى ولا قادر عليه ان يكون
على هـ هو عليه من حقيقته ان يحقره الا الله تعالى .

88 فإنه قال نعم لا دل كونه كساً على حقيقته على انه لا مكتسب
١٥ له في الحقيقة الا الله قيل هـ الافعال لا تُد هـ من فاعل على حقيقتها لان الفعل
١٦ لا يستغني عن فاعل فاعدا هـ يمكن فاعله على حقيقته احمم وجب ان يكون
الله تعالى هو الفاعل له على حقيقته وليس لا بد للفعل من مكتسب يكتسبه
١٧ على حقيقته كما لا بد من فاعل يفعله على حقيقته فيجب ان كان الفعل كساً
كان الله تعالى هو المكتسب له على حقيقته .

89 ألا ترى ان حركة الاطرار بدل على ان الله تعالى هو الفاعل لها 21

(12) M has لا يحد .(13) M has ولا .

1 على حقيقتها ولا تدل على أن المتحرك بها في الحقيقة هو الله تعالى إذا (14) كانت حركة كما كان هو الفاعل لها في الحقيقة ولا يجب أن يكون المتحرك المضطر إليها فاعلاً لها على حقيقتها (ص ٥٧) إذا (15) كان متحركاً بها على الحقيقة إذا كان معنى المتحرك أن الحركة حركته ولم يكن حائزاً على ربنا تعالى (16) وكذلك إذا كان الكسب دالاً على فاعل فعله على حقيقته لم يجب أن يدل على أن الفاعل به على حقيقته هو المكسب له ولا على أن المكسب به على الحقيقة هو الداعل به على حقيقته إذا كان المكسب مكتسباً للشيء لانه وقع بقدرته به عليه محدثة ولم يميز أن (17) يكون رب العالمين قادراً على الشيء بقدرته (18) محدثة فلم يميز أن يكون مكتسباً للكسب وإن كان فاعلاً له في الحقيقة .

90 11 فإنه قال فهل اكتسب لسان الشيء على حقيقته كقوله تعالى وإيماناً حسناً قيل به هذا خطأ وأنا معنى « اكتسب الكفر » أنه كفر بقوة محدثة 1.1 وكذلك قولنا « اكتسب الإيمان » (19) إنما معناه أنه آمن بقوة محدثة من غير أن يكون اكتسب الشيء على حقيقته بل الذي فعله على حقيقته هو رب (ص ٥٨) 10 الباب . والقول في الكسب وإن له فاعلاً [يقوله على] حقيقته وكاذباً به غير من فعله على حقيقته كالقول في فعل الحركة على حقيقتها (20) والمتحرك بها على الحقيقة غير من فعلها على حقيقتها وقد يفتأ ذلك أعماً

(14) M has *bi* I regard this phrase — *بها كانت حركة* — as parenthetical. It might well be omitted. It is also possible that something has been omitted from the text.

(15) M has *bi*

(16) This last phrase seems to lack something. Perhaps one should read *ورب يكون ذلك جازراً*, or perhaps one should add a phrase like *إن فعله الحركة*.

(17) M has *لهكونه*

(18) M has *يقدره*

(19) M has *فيمانه إنما هو إنما آمن*

(20) M has *الحقيقة*

1 91 ودليل آخر من القياس على خلق أفعال الناس ان الدليل على خلق الله تعالى حركة الاضطراب قائم في²¹ خلقه حركة الاكساب وذلك ان حركة الاضطراب ان كان الذي يدل على ان الله تعالى خلقه حدوثيا وكذلك⁽²²⁾ القصة في حركة الاكساب . وان كان الذي يدل على خلقها حاجب الى مكان 5 ورومان فكذلك قصة حركة الاكساب فلما كان كل دليل يستدل به على ان حركة الاضطراب محبوبة لله تعالى يجب به القضاء على ان حركة الاكساب مخلوقة 7 لله تعالى وجب خلق حركة الاكساب بمثل ما وجب خلق حركة الاضطراب

92 فإنه قال فأنش يجب اذا كانت إحدى الحركتين (ص ٥٩) ضرورة 1 ان تكون لأخرى كذلك واذا كانت إحداها كسباً ان تكون الأخرى كذلك قيل له لا يجب ذلك لافتراقهما في معنى الضرورة والاكساب لا بالضرورة 11 حمل عليه النبي ، وأكبره وحده عليه وهو جد في التخصيص⁽²³⁾ منه وأراد الخروج عنه واستخرج في ذلك محمودة لم يجد منه انفكاكاً ولا الى الخروج عنه سبلاً 13 فاذا كانت إحدى الحركتين بهذا الوصف الذي هو وصف الضرورة وهي حركة المرتض من الفالج والمرتعد من الحمى كانت اضطراباً واذا كانت الحركة الأخرى 15 بخلاف هذا الوصف لم تكن اضطراباً لأن الانسان في دهاشه ومجته وقناله وإداره بخلاف المرتض من الفالج والمرتعد من الحمى يعلم الانسان التفرقة بين 7 الخالين من نفسه وبغيره عليه اضطراب لا يجوز معه اشك فقد وجب اذا كان العجز في إحدى الحالتين ان القدرة التي هي صلة حادثه (ص ٦٠) في حال 11 الأخرى لأن العجز لو كان في الخالين جميعاً لكان سيل الانسان فيهما سبلاً واحدة . فلما لم يكن هذا هكذا وكانت⁽²⁴⁾ القدرة في إحدى الحركتين

21) M has خلق حركة الاكساب

(22) M has كذلك

(23) M has التخصيص AND AFTER هه ADD [الاشك] .

(24) M has كان .

- ١ وحسب (٢٥) تكون كسباً لأن حقيقة الكسب ان الشيء وقع من المكسب له بقوة محدثة لاقتضى الحائزين في الحركتين ولأن إحداهما يحى الضرورة وحسب ٣ ان تكون ضرورة ولأن الأخرى يحى الكسب وحسب ان تكون كسباً ودليل الحلق (٢٦) في حركة الاضطراب وحركة الاكساب واحد فذلك وحسب اذا كانت ٥ إحداهما خلقاً ان تكون الأخرى خلقاً

93 ألا ترى ان افتراقهما في باب الضرورة والكسب لا يوجب افتراقهما في باب الحدث والكون بعد ان لم تكونا فذلك لا يوجب افتراقهما في باب الضرورة والكسب افتراقهما في الحلق . ألا ترى ان الجسم لما لم يسبق المحدثات لاوجب حدوثه بدخوله في معنى الحدث وليس يجب اذا دخل في الحدث بمشركة (ص ٦١) المحدثات في معنى الحدث اذا كان من المحدثات ما هو حركة ان يكون ١١ الجسم حركة واذا كان منها ما هو جسم [لا] يجب ان تكون الحركة حساً اذا لم يكونا (٢٧) يتربن في معنى جسم وحركة واستويا في معنى المحدث . فذلك ١٣ لما استوى لكسب والضرورة في معنى الحلق واحداث وجب اذا كان أحدهما خلقاً فله ان يكون الآخر كذلك فذلك لم يوجب افتراقهما في باب الضرورة ١٥ والكسب افتراقهما في الحلق .

94 فانه قال فاقبل ما انكرتم ان يكون الذي دلّ على ان إحدى ١٧ الحركتين مخلوقة فله تعالى هو ان حركة الاضطراب وقعت معبراً عنها فاذا وقعت الأخرى مقدوراً عليها خرجت من ان تكون مخلوقة قيل له لو كان ما وقع ١٩ مقدوراً لغير الله تعالى خرج من ان يكون مخلوقاً لم يؤمن ان تكون حر كالت المريض من الفالج والمرقد من الحى قد أقدر الله تعالى عليه بعض ملائكة يفسله 2١ في المتحرك باضطراب اذا كان لا يستحيل (ص ٦٢) عند مخالفتنا ان يقدر القادر

(25) M has يكون

(26) M repeats الجسم

(27) M has يمكن

١ من المخلوقين على ان يفعل في غيره فبطلت (28) دلالتها على ان الله تعالى فعلها على ما هي عليه . وكذلك القول في حركات الافلاك واجتماع أجزاء السماء لا وثايقها . واذا كان هذا هكذا فقد بطلت دلالة هذه الاشياء على ان الله تعالى [فعلها على ما هي عليه] ولم يؤمن ان يكون لاجزاء السماء جامع غير الله سبحانه والافلاك محكم والكواكب محرك غيره . وهذا لم يجز ذلك فقد بطل ما (29) قالوه من ان الشيء اذا كان مقدوراً لله تعالى جاز من ان [يكون] الله (30) تعالى مخلوقاً .

95 وايضاً ليس المعبر بان يدل على ان الله تعالى خلق المجبور عنه بأوى من ان تكون القدرة التي جعلها (31) الله تعالى دلالة على ان الله خلق المقدور عليه لان ما خلق الله القدرة فينا عليه فهو عليه أقدر كما ان [ما] خلق فينا العلم به فهو به أعلم وما خلق فينا السمع به فهو له أسمع . فاذا استوى ذلك في قدرة الله تعالى وحسب اذا أقدرنا الله تعالى (ص ٦٣) على حركة الاكتساب 13 ان يكون هو الخالق لما في كسأ لنا لان ما قدر عليه ان يعطه فينا ولم يعطه فينا كسأ فقد ترك ان يعطه فينا كسأ . وهذا ترك ان يكون كسأ له 15 احتمال ان تكون (32) له مكتسب . فدل ما قلنا على ان لا يكتسبه (33) الا ولقد خلقه الله تعالى لنا كسأ .

مسئلة

96 فانه قال فأنش دا كان كسب الانسان خلقاً فانسكت ان يكون 10 به خالقاً قيل له لم أقول ان كسبي خلق لي بلزمني ان أكون له خالقاً وانما

(28) M has فبطل .

(29) M has ما قالوه .

(30) M has ان

(31) Perhaps عجزها would be better

(32) M has يكون .

(33) M has يكتسبه

١ قلت خلق لغيري فكيف يلزمي اذا كان خلقاً لغيري ان أكون له حلقاً ولو كان كسبي اذا كان خلقاً لله تعالى حكمت له حلقاً لكنت حركة المتحرك ٣ باضطرار اذا كُنت خلقاً لله تعالى كل ما متحركاً . فلما لم يحز ذلك لانه خلقها حركة لغيره لم يلزمنا ما قالوه لان كسبنا خلق لغيرنا

5 97 فانه قال ابيس (34) قد خلق الله تعالى حور الماد قيل له خلقه جوراً لهم لا به . فان قال فما أنكرتم (ص ٦١) ان يكون جائزاً قيل له لم يكن 7 الجائز حائزاً لانه فعل الحور حوراً لغيره لا له لانه (35) لو كان جائزاً لهذه العلة م يكن في المخلوقين حائر فلما لم يكن الحائر جائزاً لانه فعل الحور جوراً 9 لغيره لم يجب ان يكون الله بخلق الحور حوراً لغيره لا له حائزاً . وايضاً 11 فلو لم يبق ما قالوه لزم اذا فعل إرادة وشهوة وحركة لغيره لا له ان يكون مريداً مشتبهاً متحركاً فلما لم يجب هذا لم يجب ما قالوه .

98 فانه قالوا فقد يخلق الله تعالى حركة لا يكسبها أحد ولا يكون 13 متحركاً قيل لهم وكذلك لو خلق الله تعالى حوراً لا يكسبه أحد لم يكن به حائزاً وكان حوراً لمن خلقه حوراً له به يكون حائزاً .

15 99 فانه قالوا قس لا يقول قول غيره كما خلق حور غيره قيل هم لم نقل انه يجوز [يجوز] غيره فيلزمنا ان يقول بقول غيره وانما قلنا انه يخلق حوراً 17 لغيره لا له ولا يكون به حائزاً . فمروض هذا ان يخلق قولاً لغيره لا له ولا يكون به قائلاً . وايضاً هو وحده [هذا] (ص ٦٥) ان يقول 19 الكذب من ليس بكاذب كما فعل الحور من ليس بجائر (36) كما فعل الارادة من ليس بمريد لما والحركة من ليس بمتحرك بها فان لم يجب هذا لم يجب ما

(34) M has همي, which could stay.

(35) M has v.

(36) M has يكذب.

١ قاروه . وأيضاً بعد ذلك على ان كلام الله تعالى من صفات (37) ذاته في صدر كتاب هذا يستعمل (38) لذلك ان يكون بقول (39) عيونه قائلًا كما اذا كان العلم من صفات نفسه استعمال ان يكون علم عيونه طاماً له وان يكون رب العالمين عالماً بعلم محدث .

مسئلة

100 فانه قال فأنزل نزل يحلو العبد ان يكون بين نعمة يحب عليه شكرها او بليّة يحب عليه الصبر عليها قيل له لا يحلو العبد من نعمة وبليّة واللايا منها . يجب الصبر عليها كالمصائب من الامراض والاستقام وفي الاموال والاولاد وما أشبه ذلك ومنها ما لا يجب الصبر عليها كالكفر وسائر المصايب

مسئلة

101 (ص ٩٦) فانه قال فأنزل نزل قضى (40) الله تعالى المصايب وقدرها قيل به نعم من خلقها وهن كتبها وأخرج من كتبها كما قال (41) « وَفَضَيْتَ إِلَى 13 بني إسرائيلَ فِي الْكِتَابِ » يعني أخرجتهم وأعطاهم وكما قال (42) « إِلَّا أَمْرًا قَدَرْنَاهَا مِنَ الْقَابِرِينَ » يريد كتبناها وأخرجنا انها من القابرين . ولا 15 نقول قضاها وقدرها بان أسريها .

102 فانه قال [أ] قضا (43) الله تعالى حق قيل له من قضا . الله تعالى 17 الذي هو خلق ما هو حق كالطاعات وما يَبْتَعُ عنه . ومن قضا . الله تعالى الذي هو خلق ما هو حور كالكفر والمصايب لان الخلق منه حق ومنه باطل

(37) M has صفات

(38) M has استعمال

(39) M has عيونه

(40) M has قد

(41) 174

(42) 27-27-58

(43) M has قضاها

1 واد القضاء الذي هو أمر والقضاء الذي هو إعلام وإخبار وكتاب حتى لا يغير المقضي .

3 103 ومن أصحابنا من يوجب (44) بأن يقول قضاء الله المعصية والكفر - ويقول بلفظ المعصية والكفر هما باطلان ولا يقول بلفظ القضاء . أنه باطل لأن 5 قول القائل قضاء الله باطل كما يقول إذا رأى خشة منكسرة بلفظ (ص ٦٧) الخشة هي منكسرة وهي مع ذلك حقة لله تعالى ولا يقول بلفظ الخشة أنها 7 منكسرة لأن هذا يوم أن حجة الله تعالى لا حقيقة لها . فكذلك أن الكفر باطل والكفر قضاء الله تعالى يعني أنه حتى الله ولا يقول (45) قضا . الله باطل 9 لأنه يوم أن لا حقيقة لقضاء الله تعالى . وهذا كما يقول (46) الكافر مؤمن بالحق والطاعة ولا يقول (4) مؤمن وسكت لما فيه من الإيهام . ونقول 11 [أن] الذي صلى الله عليه [.] كافر بالحق والطاعة ولا نقول لكافر وسكت لما في ذلك من الإيهام

مسئلة

104 فإنه قال فأشقرضون قضاء الله وقدره الكفر قيل له رضي بان 15 رضي الله تعالى الكفر قبيحاً وقدره قاسداً ولا رضي بان كان الكافر به كافراً لأن الله تعالى نهاها عن ذلك وليس دا أطلقنا الرضى (48) بلفظ القضاء . وجب 17 أن نطلقه بلفظ الكفر كما لا يجب إذا قلنا أن الخشة حجة الله تعالى وأن الخشة منكسرة أن يقول (ص ٦٨) حجة الله تعالى منكسرة لأن هذا يوم 19 حجة الله تعالى لا حقيقة لها . فكذلك نطلق الرضى (49) بلفظ القضاء . والقدر

44 M has يجب (and the same at the beginning of No 105). In the latter case see us certain and it also seems best here

(45) M has يقول

(46) M has يقول

(47) M has يقول . but then وسكت and نقول .

(48) M has الرضا

(49) M has القضاء

١ ولا يعلقه بلفظ الكفر . هذا جواب أصحاب الدين ذكرنا جوابهم آنفاً

105 ومن أصحابنا من يُحِبُّ أن تُرَضَى بقضاء الله تعالى وقدره الدين
 ٢ أمرنا أن تُرَضَى بها إباحاً لأمره [لأنه] لا يتقدم بين يديه ولا يعترض عليه .
 وهذا كما رَضَى [ر] عطاء النبي عليه السلام ونكره موتهم ونكره بقاء
 ٣ الشياطين وكل يقضاه رب العالمين .

مسئلة

7 106 فانه قال فاضل قاذب (٥٠) خير الخير أو من الخير منه قيل له من الخير
 منه مُشْتَبِهاً به فهو خير من الخير . فان قال قائلنا شر الشر أو من الشر منه
 ١ قيل له من كان الشر منه حائزاً به فهو شر من الشر

مسئلة

11 107 فانه قال أو تقولون ان الشر من الله تعالى قيل له من أصحابنا من
 يقول بان الأشياء كلها من الله في الحلة ولا يطلق بلفظ الشر (ص ٦٩)
 3 من الله تعالى كما يقول الأشياء كلها لله في الحلة ولا يقول على التفصيل
 الزوجة 5 وأولاد الله تعالى وكما يقول في الحلة ما دون الله صعب ولا يقول
 16 على التفصيل من الله صعب . قال الشيخ أبو الحسن رحمه الله قايماً أنا قاي
 أقول ان الشر من الله تعالى بان خلقه شراً لله لا له .

مسئلة

108 فانه قال لا معنى قوله (52) « يَلْزَمُونَ أَلْبَتَهُم بِالْكِتَابِ تَضَمُّنُهُ »
 ١ من الكتاب وما هو من الكتاب ويقولون هو من عند الله وما هو من

(50) M has فاضل here and in the similar question following

(51) M has لا يولد لله .

(52) 3. 78 72

- ١ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ « قِيلَ لَهُ مَعَى ذَلِكَ أَنَّهُمْ حَرَّفُوا (53) وَصَبَّ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَاحَ وَأَوْهَمُوا
السَّعِيَةَ مِنْهُمْ أَنَّهُ [مِنْ] كِتَابِهِمْ قَالَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى « وَمَا هُوَ مِنَ الْكِتَابِ وَيَقُولُونَ
3 هُوَ مِنْ عِنْدِ اللَّهِ » يَمْنَى إِنْ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى أَوْهَمَ قَالَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى « وَمَا هُوَ مِنْ عِنْدِ اللَّهِ »
أَيُّ لَمْ أَتَوَلَّ عَلَيْهِمْ ذَلِكَ كَمَا يَذَّعُونَ .

مسئلة

- 109 فَأَمَّا قَالَ « مَعَى قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى (54) » « تَرَى فِي خَلْقِ الرَّحْمَنِ مِنْ
7 مِثَالٍ » قِيلَ لَهُ قَالَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى « تَخْلُقُ سَبْعَ سَمَوَاتٍ طَبَاقًا » وَاحِدَةً فَوْقَ
الْآخَرِ (ص ٧٠) « تَرَى فِي خَلْقِ الرَّحْمَنِ مِنْ تَفَافُوتٍ » يَعْنِي فِي السَّمَوَاتِ
« لِأَنَّهُ قَالَ « فَارْجِعْ الْكَوْكَبَ » بِمَعْنَى (55) ذَكَرَهُ السَّمَوَاتِ « هَلْ تَرَى مِنْ مَطْوَرٍ »
يَعْنِي مِنْ شَفَاقٍ وَالْكَوْكَبَ لَا شَفَاقَ فِيهِ . ثُمَّ قَالَ (56) « نَتَمَّ رَجْعَ النَّصْرِ
11 | كَرْتَيْنِ » يَعْنِي [فِي السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ] يَنْقَلِبُ إِلَيْكَ النَّصْرُ كَرَّتَيْنِ » يَعْنِي
مِثْلًا « وَهُوَ خَيْرٌ » يَعْنِي مَطْوَرًا وَلَمْ يَذْكُرْ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى الْكَوْكَبَ وَلَا أَفْعَالَ الْبَادِ
13 فِي هَذِهِ الْآيَةِ فَيَكُونُ (57) لِلْقُدْرَةِ فِي ذَلِكَ حِجَّةٌ

مسئلة

- 110 فَأَمَّا قَالَ فَأَمَّا « مَعَى قَوْلِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى (58) » « أَحْسَنَ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ خَلْقَهُ »
قِيلَ لَهُ مَعَى ذَلِكَ أَنَّهُ يُحْسِنُ أَنْ يَخْلُقَ كَمَا يَقْدِرُ فَلَا يَحْسِنُ الصِّيَاغَةَ أَيُّ يَعْلَمُ
17 كَيْفَ يَصَوِّغُ . فَأَجَابَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى أَنَّهُ يَعْلَمُ كَيْفَ يَخْلُقُ الْأَشْيَاءَ (59) .

(53) M has حَرَّفُوا
(54) 87.3
(55) M has بِمَعْنَى .
(56) 87.4
(57) M has فَيَكُونُ
(58) 32 7/8.
(59) M has وَأَمَّا

مسئلة

111 **فانه قال** لما معنى قوله تعالى (60) « وما خلقنا النساء (61) والأرض 3 وم بيتهنما باطلا » قيل له قال انه تعالى (62) « ذلك ظر الذين كفروا » يدل ذلك على ان المعنى فيها خلقهم وما بينهما و [لا] أنا لا أتيت من الطاعي 5 ولا أعاقب من عصاني وكفر في لسان الكافرين ظنوا انهم لا يبادون (ص ٧١) ولا لهم رجة فيعاقبون . قيل انه تعالى انه ما خلق الخلق الا ومصير بعضهم 7 الى ثواب (63) ورسوع بعضهم الى العقاب وان الكافرين ظنوا ذلك لانه بين ان ذلك باب الثواب والعقاب لانه تعالى قال (64) « ام يحسر الذين آمنوا وعملوا الصالحات كالملذنين في الأرض ام نجعل المؤمنين كالمفكر » فأنه تعالى ان على المشركين الذين أنكر عليهم انهم ظنوا انه لا عاقبة تقع في 11 تفرقة (65) بين المؤمنين والكافرين

112 **قال الشيخ ابو الحسن** وقد يحتل « ما خلقنا السماء (66) والأرض 13 وم بينهما باطلا » أي لم أخلق ذلك أجمع باطلا لان الباطل بمصر خلق انه تعالى . ويحتل « خلقت ذلك باطلا » أي لم أخلقه باطلا اذ خلقتها لان الباطل حدث 16 بعد ان خلقتها .

113 **وقد قال انه تعالى** (67) « الذي خلق السموات والأرض 17 وم بيتهنما في ستة أيام » صوره هذا القول يدل (ص ٧٢) على انه خلق ما

(60) 38 27 26

(61) M has السموات — a confusion with 18.85 ?

(62) ibid

(63) This seems to be a slip for شراب

(64) 38.27 26.

(65) M has سوف .

(66) M has السموات

(67) 25 59 60

١ يدهي بما حدث من الخلق كالملائكة استن كقرا بينهم وما خلقه بينهم من
أعمال الحيون في ذلك الوقت . قيسم قضاوا باحدى الآيتين على ان الله تعالى
٣ لم يخلق الباطل دون ان يقصوا بالآية الأخرى على ان الله خلق ما كان بينهما من
فعل الملائكة وغيرهم في ذلك الوقت .

٦ 114 ورجال ان كان قول الله تعالى في المشركين (68) « يلوون أنفسهم
ما كتب لتحموه من الكتاب وما هو من الكتاب ويقرون هو من عند الله
7 وما هو من عند الله » معناه لم يحقه الله فلم لا تكون الطاعات مخلوقة له [له]
لأنها عندكم من عند الله تعالى . وان كان الكفر والمعاصي غير مخلوقة به تعالى
٩ لأنها متفوتة بهم لا تكون الطاعات مخلوقة به لأنها عندكم غير متفوتة . واد
كان قوله سبحانه (٦٩) « أحسن كل شيء خلقه » على المصوم في كل شيء خلقه
11 الله تعالى فلم لا كان قوله (ص ٧٣) تعالى (70) « خالق كل شيء » [على
المصوم] في كل شيء . هو غيره .

١٢ 115 فانه قال ما معنى قوله (71) « ما خلقت السموات والأرض وما
بينهما إلا بأعني » قيل له خلق الله ذلك فان قال له « سكت » فالخلق قوله به
16 « كونا » فكانا .

مسئلة

١7 116 ورجال لاهل القدر أليس قول الله تعالى (72) « يكفر شيء عليم »
يدل على انه لا معلوم الا والله به عالم فاذا قايوا نعم قيل لهم (73) أنكرتم

(68) 3.78 72

(69) 32 7 6.

(70) 13 16 17

(71) 15 86

(72) 2 29 27 et al

(73) M hoz u .

- 1 ا ب يدل قوله تعالى (74) « عَلَى كُلِّ شَيْءٍ قَدِيرٌ » (75) على انه لا مقدور الا
والله عليه قادر وان يدل قوله تعالى (76) « خَالِقُ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ » على انه لا محدث
3 مفعول الا والله محدث له فاعل خالق .

مسئلة

- 5 117 انه سأل سائل عن قول الله تعالى (77) « أَنْ أَنَّهُ يَرِي » من المشركين
ورسوله « فاجواب ان الآية اما رلت في اليهود التي كانت بين المشركين وبين
7 رسول الله صلى الله عليه لان الله تعالى قال (78) « بِرَأْيِهِ » من أنه ورسوله إلى
الَّذِينَ عَاهَدْتُمْ مِنَ الْمُشْرِكِينَ فَيُخَوِّفُوا فِي الْأَرْضِ أَرْبَعَةَ أَشْهُرٍ (ص ٧٤)
9 وَأَعْلَمُوا أَنَّكُمْ عِزٌّ مُعْزَوِي لَهُ وَأَنَّ أَنَّهُ مُعْزِي لَكُمْ مُرِيدٌ » فأعلمهم الله
أربعة أشهر ثم قال (79) « وَأَذِّنْ » من أنه ورسوله « يَقُولُ وَإِعْلَامُ مِنْ اللَّهِ
11 ورسوله » إلى ناس يوم الحج لا كذا أن أنه يري من المشركين ورسوله
يعني من اليهود التي كانت بين رسول الله صلى الله عليه وبينهم (80) اذا انقضت
13 الارسة الاشهر ثم استثنى قوماً من المشركين يقال انهم من بني كنانة فقال (81)
« إِلَّا الَّذِينَ عَاهَدْتُمْ عِنْدَ الْمَسْجِدِ الْحَرَامِ فَتَسْتَأْذِنُوا لَهُمْ فَاسْتَقْبَلُوا لَهُمْ »
15 الى انقضاء مدتهم .

- 118 على انه الله تعالى ذكر المشركين ولم يقل « من شركهم »
17 ولو كان قوله « بري » من المشركين يدل على انه لم يخلق شركهم يدل على
انه لم يخلقهم لانه تعالى بري من المشركين ومن شركهم . ولو كان قوله

(74) 2 20 19.

(75) M repeats يدل after قدير .

(76) 13 16, 17

(77) 9 3

(78) 9 1 2.

(79) 9 3

(80) M has ٧٤

(81) 9 7

- 1 « بري. من المشركين » يوجب انه ما خلق شركهم فلم القدرة اذ قال انه (82)
 « ولي المؤمنين » فقد خلق إيمانهم . فلما لم يكن هذا عندهم هكذا بطل
 3 ما قايه .

مسئلة

- 5 119 (ص ٧٥) انه قال فأنش حدثنا من ثوأمين كتابا في برية موقع
 بقلب أحدهما ان الله واحد من التي ذلك في قلبه قلنا له انه تعالى فان قال
 7 أصدق ما لقاه بقلبه قيل له نعم فان قال أصدق [د] ما ألقاه بقلبه قيل
 صدق الله تعالى لا يكون الا كلامه وما وقع بقلب الانسان ليس بكلام الله
 9 تعالى يقال ان الله تعالى صدقه به فان قال فان الآخر وقع في قلبه ان الله
 ثالث ثلاثة من التي ذلك بقلبه قيل له انه تعالى فان قال أبطل ما ألقاه بقلبه
 11 قيل له نعم . فان قال أصدق ما ألقاه بقلبه ام كذبه قيل خطأ ان يقال له
 صدقه به لان صدق الناري من صفات نفسه وهو كلامه وخطأ ان يقال كذبه
 13 به لان الكذب لا يجوز على اباري تعالى لانه مستحيل ان يكذب وليس
 بحس اذا خلق كذبا لغيره وكذباً في قلب غيره ان يكون كذباً كما لا يحس
 15 اذا خلق قدرة في غيره وارادة (ص ٧٦) في غيره وحركة في غيره ان يكون
 بذلك قادراً مريداً متحركاً .

مسئلة

- 120 فانه قالوا لم نثبتوا قدرة قيل لهم لانكم تزعون في
 19 انكم انكم تقدرونها وتعملونها مقدرة لكم دون حالكم والقدري
 هو من يفس ذلك لنفسه كما ان الصانع هو من يعترف بانه يصوع دون من
 21 يزعم انه يصاع به والطار هو من يدعي انه يسجر دون من يعترف بانه يسجر

١ له ولا ينهر شيئاً . وكذلك القدي من يدعي انه يعمل أعماله مقدرة دون ربه ويؤمن ان ربه لا يفعل من اكتسابه شيئاً .

٣ 121 فانه قال يلزمكم ان تكونوا قدرية لانكم تثبتون القدر قيل لهم نحن نثبت ان الله تعالى قدر أعمالنا وخلفه مقدرة لنا ولا نثبت ذلك لأمس .
٤ من ثبت القدر لله تعالى ورغم ان الافعال مقدرة لربه لا يكون قدرياً كي ان من ثبت الصياغة والحجارة لغيره لا يكون صائناً (ص ٧٧) ولا بحاراً .
٥ ولو كنا قدرية بقولنا ان الله فعل أعمالنا مقدرة [لنا] لكانوا قدرية بقولهم ان الله تعالى فعل أعماله كلي مقدرة له ولو كنا بقولنا ان الله قدر المصهي
٦ قدرية لكانوا بقولهم ان الله قدر الطاعات قدرية . فسلم يكن ذلك كذلك بطل ما قالوه .

[الباب السادس]

باب الكلام في الاستطاعة

3 122 انه قال فأنى لمَ قلم ان الانسان يستطيع استطاعة هي غيره
قيل له لانه يكون تارة مستطيعاً وتارة عاجزاً كما يكون تارة عالماً وتارة غير
 عالم وتارة متحركاً وتارة غير متحرك فوجب ان يكون مستطيعاً¹ معنى هو غيره
 كما وجب ان يكون عالماً معنى هو غيره وكما وجب ان يكون متحركاً بمعنى
 7 هو غيره لانه لو كان مستطيعاً بنفسه او معنى نستحيل مغرقته له لم يوجد الا
 وهو مستطيع فما وجد مرة مستطيعاً ومرة غير مستطيع صح وثبت ان
 9 استطاعته غيره .

123 فانه قال فأنى اذا أثبت له (ص ٧٨) استطاعة هي غيره فلم
 11 رحمتم انه يستحيل تقدمها للفعل قيل له ردت ذلك من قبل ان الفعل لا يكون
 ان يكون حادثاً مع الاستطاعة في حال حدوثها او بعدها . فان كان حادثاً
 13 معها في حال حدوثها فقد صح انها مع الفعل للفعل . ون كان حادثاً بعدها
 وقد دلت الدلالة على انها لا تنفي وجب حدوث الفعل بقدرة معدومة ولو جار
 15 ذلك لجاز ان يحدث المحر بعدها فيكون الفعل واقعاً بقدرة معدومة ولو جار
 ان يفعل في حال هو فيها عاجز بقدرة معدومة لجاز ان يفعل بعد مائة سنة من
 17 حال حدوث القدرة وان كان عاجزاً في المائة سنة كلها بقدرة عدمت من مائة
 سنة وهذا قاسد .

18 124 وأيضاً لو جاز حدوث الفعل مع عدم القدرة ووقع الفعل بقدرة
 معدومة لجاز وقوع الإحراق بحجارة نار معدومة وقد قلب الله النار برذاً والقطع

(1) M has متحركاً .

1 يحد سيف ممدوم وقد قلب افع تعالى السيف قصاً والقطع مجازحة (ص ٧٩)
معدومة وديك محال . فإذا استحال ذلك وجب ان الفعل يحدث مع الاستطاعة
3 في حال حدوثها .

125 فإنه قال ولم زعم ان القدرة لا تبقى قبل له لان لو بيعت لك كانت
5 لا تخلو ان تبقى لنفسها او لغيرها . فان كانت تبقى لنفسها وجب ان
تكون نفسها بقاءً لها وان لا توجد الا دائية وفي هذا ما يوجب (2) ان تكون
7 دائية في حال حدوثها . وان كانت تبقى بقاءً يقوم بها والبقاء صفة فقد قامت
الصفة بالصفة والمرض بالمرض وذلك فاسد . ولو جار ان تقوم بالصفة صفة لمار
9 ان تقوم بالقدرة قدرة وبالحياة حياة وبالمعلم علم وذلك فاسد

126 [فإنه] قال لما أنكرتم ان تكون القدرة على شيء قدرة عليه
11 وعلى ضده قبل له لان من شرط القدرة الحديثة ان يكون في وجودها وجود
مقدورها . لان ذلك لو لم يكن من شرطها وحاز وجودها وقتاً ولا مقدور
13 لمار وجودها (ص ٨٠) وقتين واكثر من ذلك اد لا فرق بين وقتين ووقتتين
واكثر . وبكل هذا هكذا لمار وجودها الأبدية وهو فاعل غير فاعل على
15 وجه من الوجوه . ألا ترى انه لما لم يكن من (4) شرط قدرة القديم ان في
وجودها وجود مقدورها وحاز وجودها ولا فعل لم يستعمل (5) ان لا تزال
17 موجودة ولا فعل على وجه من الوجوه لما استحال ان تكون قدرة الانسان
الأبدية (6) موجودة ولا موجود (7) منه فعل لا أخذ (8) ولا ترك ولا طاعة ولا

(2) M has يبيع

(3) Perhaps the phrase لا يبيع is the one used more commonly, though لا يبيع also seems to be correct. It may also be that the copyist intended to write لا يبيع

(4) M repeats من شرط

(5) M has يستعمل

(6) Cf note (3), supra.

(7) M has موجود

(8) M has لا أخذ

١ عصيان والأمر والنهي قائمان استحالة ذلك وقت واحدًا . وإذا استحالة وقتًا واحدًا أن توجد القدرة ولا مقدور فقد وجب أن [يكون] من شرط قدرة الإنسان أن في وجودها وجود مقدورها فإذا كان ذلك كذلك استحالة أن يقدر الإنسان على الشيء . وضده لأنه لو قدر عليها لوحده (ص ٨١) وجودها وذلك محال .

127 فانه قال فأنش ما أنكرتم أن تكون قدرة واحدة على إرادتين
٧ وعلى حركتين أو على مثلب قيل له (٩) أنكرنا ذلك من قبل أن القدرة لا تكون قدرة إلا على ما يوجد معها في مظهرها . فلو كانت قدرة واحدة على
٩ حركتين لم تحل أن تكون قدرة على حركتين أن توجد معها في حال حدوثها أو على حركتين أن تكون (١١) واحدة بعد أخرى . فان كانت قدرة على
١١ حركتين أن تكونا معًا فقد رجعت حركتان في موضع واحد في وقت واحد ولو جاز هذا لجاز ارتفاع إحدى الحركتين إلى صدها من السكون فيكون
١٣ الجوهر متحركاً من المكان ساكناً فيه في وقت واحد وهذا محال (١١) وان كانت قدرة على حركتين [أن] توجد إحداهما (١٢) بعد الأخرى فقد قام الدليل
١٥ والبرهان على أن القدرة لا تبقى (ص ٨٢) وهذا يوجب حوار وجود الفعل بقدرة مدونة وهذا مما قد يثنا فساد .

128 ومما يدل على أن الاستطاعة مع الفعل للفعل أن من لم يخلق الله تعالى له استطاعة محال أن يكتسب شيئاً . فلما استحالة أن يكتسب الفعل
١٩ إذا لم تكن استطاعة صحت أن اكتسبها لو يوجد لوحدها وفي ذلك إثبات وجودها مع الفعل للفعل .

(9) M has or .

(10) M has يكون , but perhaps تكون would be better

(11) M has محال .

(12) M has بعضها

129 فانه قالوا أليس في عدم الحارحة عدم الفعل قيل لهم في عدم الحارحة عدم القدرة وفي عدم القدرة عدم الاكتساب لأنها إذا عدت عدمت القدرة ١ فلعدم القدرة ما استحال لكسب إذا عدت الحارحة لا (١٣) لعدم الحارحة ولو عدت الحارحة ووجدت القدرة لكان الاكتساب واقعاً ولو كان انما استحال ٥ الاكتساب لعدم الحارحة لكان (١٤) إذا وجدت وجد الكسب. فلما كانت توجد ويقدرها العجز وتعدم القدرة (ص ٨٣) فلا يكون كسب (١٥) علم ان 7 الاكتساب انما لم يقع لعدم الاستطاعة لا لعدم الحارحة .

130 فانه قالوا أليس في عدم الحياة عدم الكسب قيل هم نعم لان ٨ الحياة اذا عدت عدت القدرة فلعدم القدرة ما استحال الكسب لا لعدم الحياة ألا ترون ان الحياة تكون موحدة وثم عجز فلا يكون الانسان 11 مكتسباً نعم ان الكسب لم يعدم لعدمها ولا يوجد وجودها . واخواب في الحياة كاخواب في الجارحة .

131 فانه قالوا اذا كان في عدم الإحسان للعبد كفة عدم الحياة فلم 13 لا يكون في وجود الاحسان ١٠ ما وجودها قيل ان الحياة تعدل لعدم قدرتها لا لعدم إحسانها ولو عدت الحياة لعدم الاحسان لما لوجبت بوجود (١٧) الاحسان لها . فلما لم يكن ذلك كذلك وكان الاحسان لها يجاميه (١٨) العجز 17 علم انها انما تعدل لعدم القدرة عليها ولو أخرى الله تعالى العادة ان يخلق القدرة عليها مع عدم الاحسان لما لوجعت الحياة لا محالة .

132 (ص ٨٤) فانه قالوا عاذا كان في عدم التسمية (١٩) والإطلاق

(13) M has w .

(14) M has كانت .

(15) M has كتب .

(16) M has الامار .

(17) M has برجو

(18) This seems to be altered to يجمد in M

(19) M has التسمية

١ عدم الفعل فقي وجودهما وجود الفعل قيل لهم كذلك نقول . فان قالوا فاذا كان في عدم احتمال النية للفعل عدم الفعل بلم لا يكون في وجود احتمال البنية للشيء وجوده قيل لهم كذلك نقول لان البنية لا تحتمل الا ما يقوم بها وكلها متراضية به في هذه المسئلة فاحواب فيه كاحواب في المسارحة وحياة لانه
٥ ليس عدم الكسب لعمه .

133 ومما يدل على ان الاستطاعة مع الفعل قول الحضرة لموسى عليها السلام (20) « انك لن تستطيع مني صبراً » فصفا انه لما لم يصدم يمكن للصبر مستطاعاً وفي هذا بيان ان ما لم تكن (21) استطاعة لم يكن الفعل وانها اذا كانت كان لا محالة .

134 ومما يبين ذلك ان الله تعالى قال (22) « ما كانوا يستطيعون السمع » وقال (23) « وما كانوا يستطيعون السمع » وقد اُمرُوا ان يسبحوا الحق وكلفوه . فدل ذلك على جواز تكليف ما لا يطاق وان (ص ٨٥) من لم يقبل الحق ولم يسعه على طريق القول لم يكن مستطاعاً . فان قالوا لا يستطيعون الاستقبال (24) قيل لهم ما الفرق بينكم وبين من قال انهم لا يستطيعون قبول الحق للاشتغال بقره .

مسئلة

17 135 فانه قال فانئذ ليس تد كلفه الله تعالى الكافر الايمان فك له نعم ان قال يستطيع الايمان قيل له لو استطاعه لا من فان قال فكلفه لا

(20) 18.67 66

(21) M has يمكن

(22) 11 20 22

(23) 18.101.

(24) M has يستطيعونه وما كانوا يستطيعونه

(25) M has لا محالة

١ يستطيع قيل له هذا كلام على أمرين. ان أردتَ بقولك انه لا يستطيع الايمان لمجزه عنه فلا . وان أردتَ انه لا يستطيع لتركه واشتغاله بضده فنعم .
 3 فان قال ما أنكرتم ان يكون الله تعالى كلف الكافر ما يحزر عنه لتركه له قيل به المعجز عن الشيء. انه يخرج عنه وعن صده فذلك استحالة ان يحزر 5 العجز عن الشيء. لتركه له .

136 فانه قال ما أنكرت ان يكون القادر على (ص ٨٩) الشيء.
 7 قادراً (26) على ضده كما كان العاقل عن الشيء. عاجزاً عن ضده قيل له لو كانت القوة على الشيء. قوة على ضده قياساً على المعجز للزم ان يكون العجز على الشيء. 9 عجزاً على ضده قياساً على ان العجز عن الشيء. عجز عن ضده . وأيضاً ولو كانت القدرة على الشيء. قدرة على ضده قياساً على العجز لان العجز عن الشيء. 1. عجز عن ضده لوح في القدرة . وجب في العجز من انه يتأني به الشيء. وضده كما نتعذر بالعجز الشيء. وضده ولكان العجز اذا [وُحِدَ] عدم الشيء. وضده 13 المصور معها مع وجوده فانه يمكن الانسان مكتسباً له [و] (27) لكان يؤول في القدرة مثله اذا وجدت وهي قدرة على الشيء. وضده ان يوحد الشيء. وضده 15 معها لانه يجب من وجود الضدى مع وجودها بخلاف . ليحكم به في العجز لان العجز يحكم فيه بعدم المصور عنه وضده مع وجوده . فان لم يحز هذا 17 (ص ٨٧) فقد بطلت العلاقة وانتقضت المعارضة ولم يحز ان تُقاس القدرة على العجز اذا (28) لم تكن علة تجمع بينهما ولم تكن القدرة من جنس العجز .

137 فانه قالوا فيجوز ان يكلف الله تعالى الشيء. مع عدم المعارضة ووجود المعجز قيل لهم [لا] لان المأمور انما يؤمر ليفعل او ليقترك ومع عدم

(26) M has قدر .

(27) This conjunction may help a little, but this long sentence is certainly awkward.

(28) M has لا .

١ المطارحة لا يوجد أخذ ولا ترك . وكذلك الصبر لا يوجد معه أخذ ولا ترك
 لا [نه] صخر عن الشيء . وعن ضلوه . وأيضاً فلو وجب إذا أمر الله تعالى الإنسان
 ٣ الشيء . مع عدم قدرته (29) أن يأمر به مع علم القدرة كلها لوجب إذا أمر الله
 تعالى الإنسان مع عدم بعض العلوم وهو العلم بالله تعالى وبأنه أمر أن يأمره . فعمل
 ٤ مع عدم العلوم كلها . فلو لم يجب هذا لم يجب إذا أمر الإنسان مع عدم القدرة
 على ما أمره به أن يأمر مع عدم المطارحة التي إذا عذمت عذمت القدرة كلها ومع
 7 وجود الصخر الذي لم تقسم القدرة بوجوده .

138 قال الشيخ أبو الحسن (ص ٨٨) رحمه الله وكل مثله في تكليف
 ٩ ما لا يطابق من الأمر بالركوة مع عدم المال وغير ذلك من المسائل فالجواب
 عنه كما أحسنت به عن سؤالهم عن الأمر مع عدم المطارحة والتكليف مع
 11 وجود الصخر .

139 فانه قال فأنزل ما أنكرتم أن يعلم الشيء . وضده وجود صخرين
 13 قيل له لانه نهاية لما يصخر عنه الإنسان العاجز الذي لا قدرة فيه . فلو كان
 الصخر عن كل شيء . غير الصخر [من] غيره لكان في الإنسان من الأعصار ما
 15 لا ينسب له وهذا محال . وأيضاً فإن الموت هو أكثر الأعصار لانه يتعذر معه
 الأعمال كلها فلو كان الصخر عن كل شيء . غير الصخر عن غيره لكان بعض الميتين
 17 كما تقدم من الأعمال (30) لوجود أعجاز وهذا يوحد أن في الجزء الواحد صخرين
 وموتين وهو جار هذا طارح أن يوقع أحدهما إلى حياة (31) ويكون الآخر . الواحد
 19 حياً (ص ٨٩) ميتاً في حال معاً وهذا محال . فلما استحال هذا علم انه محال
 في قول من قال أن الصخر عن كل شيء . غير الصخر عن غيره وبالله التوفيق .

(29) So M, but جارحته seems to make better sense

(30) M has اتصال

(31) M has موت .

مسئلة

140 فانه قال [فأن] خبرونا عن طلق امرأته واعتق عبده متى
3 [استطاع⁽³²⁾] طلاق امرأته واعتق عبده قبل له [استطاع] اعتق عبده في حال
العتق واستطاع طلاق امرأته في حال الطلاق . فان قال فاستطاع ان يطلق من
5 ليست امرأته وان يعتق من ليس عبده قبل له استطاع ان يطلق من ليست
امراته في حال الطلاق وقد كانت امرأته قبل ذلك وان يعتق من ليس عبده
7 في حال لعتق وقد كان عبده قبل ذلك كما انه طلق من ليست امرأته في حال
الطلاق وقد كانت قبل ذلك امرأته⁽³³⁾ (واعتق من ليس عبده في حال لعتق
9 وقد كان عبده قبل ذلك) وكذلك الجواب في إلقاء العصا والانتقال من
الشمس الى الظل ومن كسر المكسور .

مسئلة

141 (ص ٩٠) انه قال فأن خبرونا عن قول الله تعالى ١٣٤ : وَعَلَى
13 لَدَيْنَ يَطِيقُونَهُ بِدْيَةٍ * قبل به يحتل ان يكون الله تعالى أراد الذين يطيقون
الامطار ويصعرون عن الصيام عليهم العدة اذا اضطرو . ويحتل ان يكون
15 أراد ان يطيعون الصيا [م] ان نكلفوه وارادوه على قول من رجع بالهاء الى
مذكور تقدم على⁽³⁵⁾ الصيام .

142 وقد فأت المعلقة لا يجوز ان يرجع بالهاء⁽³⁶⁾ الا الى المذكور تقدم 17

(32) The words in the brackets seem to be required to complete the sense.

(33) The words in the parentheses seem to be superfluous.

(34) 2:184/180

(35) So M, but it would seem better to read وهو — as in the next sentence.

(36) M has بها which could stay as a pronominal reference to the letter and not the letter itself.

١ وهو الصيام . قيل لهم التأويل اندي تأوذك . و⁽³⁷⁾ هو تأويل بعض المتقدمين وليس النحويون حجة على الصعابة والتامع على ان كثيراً من النحويين قد اجادوا ان لا يرجع بالهاء الى مذكور تقدم .

143 نعم نكرت على المعترلة راجعين فنقول لهم حدوثاً عن قول الله تعالى (38)
 « هو الذي خلقكم من نفس واحدة وجعل (39) بيني زوجها ليسكن إليها »
 - يعني آدم وحواء « فمما خلقناهم جعلنا جثلاً حملاً حملاً فترت به فلما
 7 أنفكت » - يعني حوا - « دعوا الله واتبوا آياته صابراً لعلكم ترحموا »
 « يرد آدم وحواء » وقوله (ص ٩١) تعالى (40) « فلما آتاهنا » (41)
 9 رعت المعترلة ان الهاء واصل لم يرجع بها الى ما تقدم ذكره بل رجع بها الى
 المشركين من ولدها فتقضى قولهم ان الهاء لا يرجع بها الا الى مذكور قد
 11 تقدم ذكره . وقد قرأها بعض الصعابة « وعلى الذين يطيقونه (42) عدية »
 وسكن تأويله انهم يحملونه ولا يطيقونه .

مسئلة

144 وقد سألوا عن قول الله تعالى (43) « وفيه على الناس حج لئن شئ من
 15 استطاع إليه سبيلاً » فالجواب ان الله تعالى أراد الم وهو الزاد والواحدة ولم
 يرد استطاعة البدن التي في كونها كون مندورها . وقيام الدلالة من قياس على
 17 ان لا استطاعة مع الفعل يصح تأويلنا ويبطل تأويل مخالفتنا

(37) This waw seems to be superfluous

(38) 7.189

(39) M has وعلى

(40) 7.190

(41) 1. e. صابراً — Cf the commentators

(42) It is difficult to determine from the text of M just what the reading was. At first sight the word in M looks like يطيقون which seems to have no sense. There is a space between the tā' and the qāf enough to allow for a yā' — but the connecting line is straight and there are no dots.

(43) 3.97/91.

مسئلة

145 انه قال فأنزل م معنى قول الله تعالى (44) « [وَمَنْ] يَحْتَمِلُونَ بَأْسَهُ
 3 لَوْ اسْتَطَاعُوا لَخَرَجُوا مِنْكُمْ » هل يحلوا ان يكونوا كانوا مستطيعين الخروج
 فلم يخرجوا ولو استطاعوا الخروج لم يخرجوا فالجواب انهم عسا بالاستطاعة
 5 احدة والمال وحفظوا (ص ٩٢) رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم لا مال لهم ولا
 ظهر يحملون به مع نبي الله صلى الله عليه وسلم فاكلهم الله في حلهم لاهم كانوا
 ; يحيدون المال . ولم تكن المناظرة بينهم وبين رسول الله في ان استطاعة مع
 الفعل او قبله وانما كانت انحصاراً (45) بينهم وبينه في الحدة والنظر وهكذا
 9 ذكر اهل التفسير وقلة الاخبار وحلة الآثار وإذا كان هذا هكذا فنحن
 لا سكر تقدم المال للفعل وانما انكرنا تقدم استطاعة البدن للفعل

مسئلة

146 فانه سألوا عن قول الله تعالى (46) « فَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ » فقد
 13 يحتمل ان يكون الله تعالى اراد اتقوا الله ما كنتم مستطيعين فان كانوا للتقوى
 مستطيعين كان عليهم ان يتقوا وان كانوا لتركه مستطيعين فليس عليهم ان يتقوا
 15 لان التقوى لا يلزمهم الا ان يستطيعوه او يستطيعوا تركه وقد يحتمل اتقوا
 الله فيما استطعتم .

مسئلة

147 ومن سأل عن قوله تعالى (47) « فَتَنَّا لَمْ يَنْتَهِ عَنِ طَعَامِ بَيْتِهِ
 10 يَسْكِينًا » (ص ٩٣) فالجواب ان من لم يستطع لسر عليه اطعام بيتين
 مسكيناً .

(44) 9.42

(45) M has معونه

(46) 64 16

(47) 58.4 ذ

1 148 ومن سأل عن قوله تعالى (48) « لا يُكَلِّفُ اللَّهُ نَفْسًا إِلَّا مِائَتَهَا »
 فدلني انه لا يكلفها من النفقة الا ما آتاه لان قال ذلك عقيب ذكر النفقة
 3 قال (49) « وَمَنْ (50) قَدِيرٌ عَلَيْهِ رِزْقُهُ فَلْيُؤَقِّبْ بِمَا آتَاهُ بِهِ لَا يُكَلِّفُ اللَّهُ نَفْسًا
 إِلَّا مَا آتَاهَا » .

5 149 ومن سأل عن قوله تعالى (51) « لا يُكَلِّفُ [اللَّهُ] نَفْسًا إِلَّا (52)
 وَثَنًا » فاجاب عن ذلك ان الله تعالى لا يكلفها ما يضيق عليها من إزالة
 7 الخواطر عن النعموس التي تدعو الى الشر لان الله تعالى قد تجاوز (53) عن ذلك ووسع
 على المسلمين فيما تدعوهم بقوسهم اليه من المعصية اذا لم يرتكبوا ذلك بعد ان
 9 كان ذلك مضيقاً عليهم . فليس « لا يكلف الله نفساً الا وثنها » يعني الا ما
 يطيقه عليها لان ما أمر الله تعالى به عباده لا يضيق عليهم فعله ولا يحزرون
 11 عن الاتيان به . وقد قال بعض أصحابنا « لا يكلف الله نفساً الا وثنها »
 يعني الا ما يسرها ويحل (ص ٩١) لها .

13 150 ومن سأل عن قول الله تعالى مجداً عن العربيت (54) « وَإِنِّي عَلَى
 لَقْوِيْ اٰمِيْنٌ » [فالجواب عن ذلك] ان (55) كان العربيت صادقة فالمعنى في
 15 قوله « وإني عليه لقوي أمين » ان تكلمت ذلك وأردت (56) وان كان معنى
 اذا أراد ذلك أحدث الله تعالى له القدرة عليه لم يكسر كلامه وان لم يقل
 17 هذا القول على هذا المعنى فهو كلام وليس في قول الفاريت والشافيين حجة
 على هذين رب العالمين .

(48) 66.7.

(49) 66.8.

(50) M has من

(51) 2 286

(52) M has ما يثني ، but it appears that an effort was made to erase the

(53) M has تجاوز

(54) 27 39

(55) M has كان

(56) M has وفروجه .

151 وزعمت المعتزلة ان العربيت لم يكذبها سليمان وهو نبي من انبياء الله تعالى على قوله (57) « انا انيك » قل ان تقوم من مقامك ولاني عليه لقوي أمين » ولا يجوز لاحد ان يكذب بين يدي نبي وهو يعلم انه اذا كذب رد الله عليه كذبه على لسان النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم قال لنيه (58) « اذا جاءك المؤمنون بالآية » فاحبر الله تعالى سكنتهم ومثل ذلك في القرآن كثير واحتجوا بذلك ان الاستطاعة قبل الفعل فمن ما بالوا وظنوا بل سوت لهم انفسهم الا باطيل .

152 فاجاب انا نقول لمن احتج (ص ٩٥) علينا بذلك انه ليست تخلف هذه الآية التي حكها الله تعالى عن العربيت ان يكون العربيت على بقوله « ولاني عليه لقوي أمين » ان استطعت ذلك وتكلفت وادته او يكون على بقوله « ولاني عليه لقوي أمين » ان شاء الله او يكون على بقوله ان قواني الله تعالى عليه . ولو لم يعلم سليمان ان العربيت اضمر (59) شيئاً من ذلك فكذبته 13 ورد عليه قوله

153 والدليل في ذلك قول الله تعالى (60) « فاستأفوا ان يصبروه وما استأفوا له نفعاً » وقد جاء في التفسير لا خلف بين أحد من الموحدين فيه انهم في كل يوم يأملون ان يصبروا (61) وقد فتحوه ولا يقولون ان شاء الله 17 هذا كان المقدر قالوا ان شاء الله فأصبروا وقد فتحوه يدل ان لا استطاعة لهم قبل الفعل الا مع الفعل للفعل بمرادة الله تعالى ذلك .

154 وقول الله تعالى في صاحب يوسف (62) « فأتاه الشيطان ذكر » 19

(57) 27 39

(58) 63 1

(59) M has اضمر

(60) 18 97-96

(61) M has يصبروا — with the alif crossed out

(62) 12.42

أَرْتِه فَبَشَّرَ فِي لَيْلٍ بَضْعَ بَيْنَ « أَنَسَى الشَّيْطَانُ لِلنَّاحِي أَنْ يَدْهَكَرَ
يُوسُفَ عِنْدَ الْمَلِكِ فَلَمْ تَكُنْ لِلنَّاحِي اسْتَطَاعَةً (ص ٩٦) أَنْ يَذْكُرَ أَمْرَ يُوسُفَ
لِلْمَلِكِ إِذْ كَانَ غَدًا وَعَدَ يُوسُفَ أَنْ يَذْكُرَهُ عِنْدَ رَبِّهِ قَبْلَ خُرُوجِهِ مِنَ السَّجْنِ .
وَكَانَ ذَلِكَ أَتَمَّ مَرَادِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى بِيُوسُفَ إِلَى الْوَقْتِ الْمَعْلُومِ الَّذِي رَأَى الْمَلِكُ
فِيهِ الرُّؤْيَا .

155 وَأَمَّا قَوْلُ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى لَنَبِيِّهِ عَلَيْهِ السَّلَامُ (63) « وَلَا تَقُولَنَّ لشيءٍ
رَبِّي فَأَجْنٌ ذَلِكَ غَدًا . لَا أَنْ بَشَاءَ أَفْعُ » فَأَمَرَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى نَبِيَّهٗ أَنْ لَا يَقْدُمَ عَلَى
فِعْلِ شَيْءٍ يَقَعُ فِي نَفْسِهِ لَمْ يَأْتِ (64) أَنْ يَسْتَعِثَّ فِي قَوْلِهِ فَأَخْبَرَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى بِهِ أَنْ
« لَا يَكُونُ قَوْلُكَ هَذَا كَأَنَّ قَبْلَ مَعْلُومِكَ لَهُ أَنْ أَرَدْتُ أَنْ ذَلِكَ فَعَلِمَ النَّبِيُّ صَلَّى
اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ تَعَالَى .

156 وَفَقَوْلُ مُوسَى (65) « زَيْنًا تَطْلُسُ عَلَى أَمْوَالِهِمْ وَاشْتَدَّ عَلَى قُلُوبِهِمْ
فَلَا يُؤْمِنُونَ حَتَّى يَرَوْا الْعَذَابَ الْأَلِيمَ » فَلَمْ يَقْدِرُوا إِذَا رَأَوْا الْعَذَابَ الْمَلْعُونُ
لَهُمْ إِلَى الْآخِرَةِ أَنْ يُؤْمِنُوا وَلَوْ اسْتَطَاعُوا ذَلِكَ لَأَمْنُوا عِنْدَ مُعَذِّبِهِمْ لِأَوَّلِ الْعَذَابِ
الَّذِي نَزَلَ بِهِمْ وَمِثْلُ ذَلِكَ فِي كِتَابِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى كَثِيرٌ . وَمِمَّا ذَكَرْنَا بِهِ كَفَايَةً وَمِثْلُهُ
15 قَوْلُهُ تَعَالَى (66) « إِلَّا قُوَّةَ يَبُوسَ لَمَّا آمَنُوا »

مَسْئَلَةٌ

157 وَصِفَةُ سَأَلِ (ص ٩٧) مِنْ قَوْلِ اللَّهِ تَعَالَى لَهَا (67) « يَا أَبَتِ
أَسْأَلُكَ أَنْ تُخْبِرَ مَنْ تَسْأَلُ عَنْ الْقَوِيِّ الْأَمِينِ » فَرَعَمَ الْحَبَّابِيُّ أَنْ مَعَى هَذِهِ

(63) 18.23.

(64) M has ~~تَب~~, with a line drawn as though to cross out the two dots ~~تَب~~ is the best reading I can suggest.

(65) 10.88

(66) 10.98.

(67) 28 26

- ١ الآية ١٦ أنجبت عنه انه قوي على ما يحتاج اليه أيها من الاعمال واستدل بها
 ٢ زعم بذلك على ان الاستطاعة قبل الفعل . لما أخرجه من أي طريق استدل
 ٣ بهذه الآية على هذا الفصل وذلك انها لم تعرف موسى من قبل قلعه للبحر
 الذي قلعه وزعه مالدو الذي روع وانما لما عابت من شدته وقوته وأمانات
 ٥ وذلك انها لما رحلت اليه في المرة الثانية فقالت له (٦٨) « إن ألي يدعرك » قال
 لها « امشي خلفي واهبني الطريق » ففعلت ذلك فكانت الريح تصب له
 ٧ فادركت موسى عليه السلام الحشية فقل لها « امشي خلفي وعرفيني »^(٦٩) الطريق
 لسانك بينه وبسره وتلقاه^(٧٠) ففعلت ذلك فلما حانت الى أبيها وقالت^(٧١) له
 ٩ « انه قوي أمي » فجرد عليها حرذاً شديداً وقال لها « يا ابنتي أما قوته فقد
 علمت (ص ٩٨) بها لما رأيت منه فها عرفته أمانته » فأخبرته « رأيت منه
 ١١ فكيف عشت انه كان مستطيلاً لما قبل الفعل وانما ظهر لها ذلك منه بعد فعله
 إياه فصح عندها وصحت الحجة [على] من خالفنا ان يسمى ان تكون
 ١٣ استطاعته لذلك مع نفس فعله .

- 158 والمرسل على ذلك من القياس انما لو رأينا رجلاً في حال قائماً بصلي
 ٥ لما كنا نعلم استطاعته متى حدثت له الا اننا نعلم من نفس الفعل ظهرت منه
 للفعل وهي الصلاة التي كان يفعلها . وصحت على من خالفنا في كل . . يورده
 ١٧ من المسائل في باب الاستطاعة كما رحنا فيها بيناً وشرحنا ومافه التوفيق .

مسئلة

- 159 ومن سأل عن قول الله تعالى (٧٢) « وما خلقت الجن والإنس إلا

(68) 28 25.

(69) M has وعرفني .

(70) M has رت The words of Moses to the daughter of Shuaib, and Shuaib's rejoinder, are not in the Qur'an

(71) M has فتلقاه .

(72) 51 ٥6.

الْيَهُودُونَ « قِيلَ لَهُ الْمَعْنَى فِي ذَلِكَ أَنَّهُ أَرَادَ بَعْضُ الْخَنِّ وَالْإِنْسِ وَهُمْ الْعَانِدُونَ
فَهُمْ مِنْهُمْ لِأَنَّ اللَّهَ تَعَالَى قَالَ فِي مَوْضِعٍ آخَرَ (73) « وَقَدْ دَرَأْنَا ١٧٤ لَهَنَّهُمْ كَثِيرًا مِنْ
أَعْمَى وَالْإِنْسِ » وَالْقُرْآنُ لَا يَتَنَاقَضُ فَوَجِبَ أَنْ يَكُونَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى خَلَقَ لَهُمْ
كَثِيرًا ، آيَةُ الَّتِي (ص ١٩) تَلَوْنَاهَا وَأَنَّهُ خَلَقَ مِنْهُمْ ثَلَاثَةَ أَلْفٍ يَقُولُهُ « وَمَا خَلَقْتُ
لِخَنِّ وَالْإِنْسِ إِلَّا لِيُعَذِّبَهُمْ » . وَإِنَّ خَلْقَهُمْ لِمُدَّتْهُ هُمُ اسْمُ اراد (74) هُوَ أَنْ
يُعَذِّبَهُمْ وَنَاقَتَهُمْ عَذَابَهُ .

٦ 160 وَمَنْ سَأَلَ مِنْ قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى (76) « مَا تَجْعَلُ لَهُ » مِنْ تَعْدِيَةٍ وَلَا
نَائِبَةٍ وَلَا وَصِيْلَةٍ وَلَا حَامٍ وَلَكِنَّ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا يَقْتُلُونَ عَلَى أَنْفُسِهِمُ الْكُذْبَ
٩ فَاَلْحَقْنِي بِمَنْ لَمْ يَفْرَضْ عَلَيْهِمْ ذَلِكَ وَلَمْ أَمْرَهُمْ بِهِ وَلَكِنَّهُمْ كَذَّبُوا عَنِّي وَقَتُّوا
الْكُذْبَ فِي قَوْلِهِمْ إِنِّي أَمَرْتُهُمْ بِهِ .

١١ 161 وَالرَّبُّ عَلَى حِوَارِ تَكْلِيفٍ مَا لَا يَطَاقُ مِنَ الْقُرْآنِ قَوْلُهُ لَعَلَّانِكَ 77
« أَنْبِئُونِي بِأَسْمَاءِ هَؤُلَاءِ » بَعِي أَسْمَاءُ الْخَلْقِ وَهُمْ لَا يَطَاقُونَ ذَلِكَ وَلَا يَقْدِرُونَ
١٢ عَلَيْهِ . وَابْنُ قَتَادَةَ أَخْبَرَنِي أَنَّهُمْ (78) « يُدْعَوْنَ إِلَى التَّجْوُدِ فَلَا يَسْتَطِيقُونَ »
فَإِذَا جَازَ تَكْلِيفُهُ إِيَّاهُمْ فِي الْآخِرَةِ مَا لَا يَطِيقُونَ حَازَ ذَلِكَ فِي الدُّنْيَا وَقَدْ
١٥ أَمَرَ اللَّهُ تَعَالَى بِالْعَدْلِ وَقَدْ قَالَ (79) « وَلَوْ أَنْتَ لَطِيقٌ أَنْ تُعَذِّبُوا مِنْ أَلْسِنَةٍ وَلَوْ
تَوَضَّعْتُمْ » .

١٧ 162 وَمَنْ سَأَلَ عَنْ قَوْلِهِ تَعَالَى (80) « وَمَا أَفْعُ يُرِيدُ ظُلْمًا لِلْعَادِلِ »

(73) 7 179 178.

(74) In M a line runs from *هو* to an explanatory *عنه* in the margin.

(75) M has *هو* . The reading could be *هو* , but my reading seems more in accord with al-Ash'ari's doctrine.

(76) 5.103 102.

(77) 2.31 29.

(78) 68 42.

(79) 4.129 128.

(80) 40 31/33.

١ [و] (81) « وَمَا أَنَّهُ يُرِيدُ ظُلْمًا لِلْعَالَمِينَ » فاعني في ذلك انه لم يرد ان يظلمهم
ون كان اراد ان يظلموا

3 163 ومن سأل عن قوله تعالى (82) [« سَيَقُولُ (83) الَّذِينَ أَشْرَكُوا]
لَوْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ مَا أَشْرَكُوا (84) وَلَا آتَانَا » الى قوله « كَذَبْتَ كَذَّبَ الَّذِينَ
(ص ١٠٠) مِنْ قُلُوبِهِمْ » فاطلوب انهم قالوا ذلك على طريق الاستهزاء ولم
يقولوه على جهة الاعتقاد فأنصفهم في قولهم اني لم يسكبوا له معتقدي كما
7 أكذب المنافقين في قومه (85) « نَشْهَدُ إِنَّكَ لَرَسُولُ اللَّهِ » على طريق الاستهزاء
فقال الله تعالى « وَأَنْتَ بِعِلْمٍ إِنَّكَ لَرَسُولُكَ وَأَنْتَ يَشْهَدُ إِنَّ الْمُتَفَبِّحِينَ لَمُكَذِّبُونَ ».

9 164 ومن سأل عن قوله تعالى (86) « يُرِيدُ اللَّهُ نَكْمُ الْيُسْرِ وَلَا يُرِيدُ
نَكْمُ الْيُسْرِ » فاطلوب انه اراد ان لا يسكبوا بالصيام في السر والمرص
11 حرجين ولا آتمين ولا ان يسكبوا في سر من اطارهم

(81) 3, 108, 104.

(82) 6, 148/149.

(83) M has الله وقاروا لوشاء الله.

(84) M has هركت.

(85) 63 1.

(86) 2 185/181.

[الباب السابع]

باب الكلام في التعريف والتعريف

165 فانه قال فأنى هل يقدر الله على لطف لو فعله بالكفر (1) لآمنوا
 قيل لهم نعم والدليل على ذلك انه يقدر ان يفعل بالمؤمنين ومساخه ما لو فعله
 بهم لعموا في الارض قال الله تعالى (2) « وَلَوْ نَشَاءُ لَفُتَّتْ أَرْزَاقُ سَادِمٍ لَبِمَا فِي
 الْأَرْضِ » وقال (3) « وَلَوْ لَا أَنْ يَكُونَ النَّاسُ أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً » - يعني على
 الكفر - « لَصَحَّاحُ مَنْ يَكْفُرُ بِالْإِسْلَامِ لِيُؤْتِيَهُمْ نَشَقًا مِنْ بَصِيٍّ وَمَتَارِجَ عَدَمِهَا
 يَهْرُونَ » فلما كان الله تعالى قادراً على ان يفعل ما خلق ما لو فعله بهم
 (1) [ا] ككروا كان قادراً [على] ان يفعل بهم ما لو فعله (ص ١٠١) بهم لآمنوا.
 وأنشأ فقد دللنا على ان في كون الاستطاعة كون الفعل هذا كان قادراً على
 (2) [ا] قدرهم على الايمان فهو قادر على ان يفعل ما لو فعله بهم لآمنوا .

166 فانه قال وذا لم يفعل بالكفر ما يؤمنون عنده فقد يحصل عليهم
 قيل به العمل ان لا يفعل الداعل ما يحب عليه فعله فاما ما كان تعصلاً فالتعصّل
 ان يتفضل به وله ان [لا] تعضل به وما كان تعصلاً لم يلحق العمل في ان
 (3) لا يفعله الفاعل .

167 فانه قال وذا لم يفعل [الله] بهم ما يؤمنون عنده فهل أراد سبحانه
 1 وكفرهم قيل له نعم وقد أوضحنا ذلك فيما سلف من كلامنا

مسئلة

168 ثم يقال لهم ان كان الله تعالى اذ لم يفعل بهم ما يؤمنون عنده

(1) M has بالكفر

(2) 42 27 26

(3) 43.33 32

يجب ان يريد فسادهم لا أنكرتم من انه اذا خلقهم وهو يعلم انهم يكفرون فقد أراد كفرهم فان قالوا يريد الله سفيه قبل لم ليس خالق من يعلم انه يكفر لا يكون سفيهاً بخلق ولا يكون خلقه بأنه سفيهاً لا أنكرتم ان يكون الخالق اذا أراد سفيهم لم يكن سفيهاً وقد تكلفنا في هذه المسألة قبل هذا الموضع

مسئلة

169 (ص ١٠٢) فإنه قال قائل من الله تعالى ان يؤلم الاطامل في الآخرة . قيل له قد تعالى ذلك وهو عادل ان فعله وكذلك كل ما يفعله على حرم متناه (١) . عقاب لا ينتهي وتضيق الحيوان بعضهم لبعض والإلزام على بعضهم دون بعض وخلقهم إياهم مع علمه بانهم يكفرون كل ذلك عدل منه . ولا يقبح من الله لو استدام بالعداب الأليم وأدامه (٢) . ولا يقبح منه ان يُعَذَّبَ المؤمنين (٣) ويُدخل الكافرين الجنات وانما نقول انه لا يفعل ذلك لانه أخبرنا انه يعاقب الكافرين وهو لا يجوز عليه الكذب في حجه .

170 والدليل على ان كل ما فعله الله فعله انه المالك القاهر الذي ليس تملوك ولا موقه مُبيح ولا أمر ولا زاجر ولا حاطر ولا من رسم له الرسوم (٤) وحد له الحدود . فاذا كان هذا هكذا لم يقبح منه شيء . (٥) كان الشيء . انما يقبح منا لاننا نخافوننا من حد ورسم لنا وآتينا ما لم نملك إتيانه . فلما لم يكن الذي تملكنا ولا نحت مر (٦) لم يقبح منه شيء .

171 فإنه قال فانما يقبح الكذب لانه قبحه قيل له أجل ولو حسه (٧) لكان حسناً ولو أمر به (ص ١٠٣) لم يكن عليه اعتراض .

172 فإنه قالوا معززون (٨) عليه ان يكذب كما جوزهتم ان يأمر بالكذب

(١) M has متهم .

(٢) M has دامته .

(٣) M has (١) , but (٢) seems better .

(٤) M has امر , which could be أمر or أمر .

(٥) M has معززون , but my reading seems better .

١ قيل لهم ليس كل ما جاز ان يأمر به جاز ان يوصف به ألا ترون انه قد أمرنا ان نصلي ونحضع وتنحرك ولا يجوز عليه ان يصلي ويحضع ويتحرك لان ذلك مستحيل عليه وكذلك لا يجوز عليه الكذب ليس لقصة ولكن لانه يستحيل عليه الكذب ولا يجوز ان يوصف بالقدرة على ان يكذب كما لا يجوز وصفه بالقدرة على ان يتحرك ويجهل وهو حار لزامه ان يزعم انه يوصف الباري بالقدرة على ان يكذب ولا يوصف بالقدرة على ان يجهل ولا يأتي بين ذلك فرقان حار لقالب ان يقلب القصة فزعم ان الذي يوصف بالقدرة على ان يجهل ولا يوصف بالقدرة على ان يكذب ، فلما لم يجر ذلك بطل ما قاوه .

٩ 173 فانه قال فأنى اذا أمر الله تعالى ان نصلي فصلاتنا هي حركاتنا التي تنحرك [بها] اذا صلياً ونحرك متحرك لخلول الحركة به والشم والكاف انما كان شاعاً كلاً لانه فعل الشتم والكذب لا لان ذلك حل به

174 يقال له ان كانت الطقة (ص ١٠١) التي هي ألومنا ان يجوز (٩) ان يكذب الباري - تعالى من ذلك علواً كبيراً - انه أمر به فيجب في كل شيء أمر به ان يجوز وصفه به فاذا أمر ان تحمل في أنفسنا حركات تنحرك بها 15 وصلاة يصلي بها لزم ان يجوز ان تحمل في نفسه حركات يتحرك بها وصلاة يصلي بها اللهم الا ان لا يقولوا اذا حار ان يأمر الباري غيره [ان يكذب] 17 نعم لا يجوز ان يفعل كذاً يكون به غيره كاذباً كما اذا أمر غيره ان يصلي حار ان يفعل كذاً [=] صلاة كان غيره بها مصلياً . فان سألونا من هذا السؤال على 10 هذا الوجه فهذا ما لا ينكر .

175 على انه ان كان [المصلي] مصلياً لخلول الصلاة فيه كما ان المتحرك 21 [كان] متحركاً لخلول الحركة فيه فواحد ان يكون كل جبر (10) من الانسان

(9) Or one might read يجوز .

(10) M has جبر here and a few words further on.

١ [اذا حلت الصلاة] مصلياً كما كان كل جزء منه اذا حلت حركته متحركاً
ويقال لهم الصلاة في اللغة هي الدعاء فان [كان] المصلي مصلياً لخلول الصلاة
فيه فيجب ان يكون داعياً لخلول الدعاء فيه وهذا فاسد عندهم

176 ثم يقال لهم اذا حار ان يفعل الباري تعالى صلاة لتبوء ويكون
5 فيها مصلياً فلم لا [يجوز ان] يفعل لتبوء إرادة يكون بها مريداً (ص ١٠٥)
وكلاماً يكون به متكلفاً فان قالوا المتكلم المرید متكلم مريد لانه فعل
7 الكلام والارادة قيل لهم ما أنكروتم ان يكون المصلي مصلياً لانه فعل
الصلاة فيه والمتحرك متحركاً لانه فعل الحركة فيه فان قال [قائل] قد يتحرك
١٠ مثلاً من لا يفعل الحركة قيل له وقد يريد ويتكلم [م] من لا يفعل إرادة
ولا كلاماً كالماشق الذي يحب مشوقته محبة لا يمكنه الانصراف عنها وكالذي
١١ يتكلم وهو قائم او^{١١} في حال تصرعه كلاماً لا يمكنه الانصراف عنه
فان قال ليست محبة العاشق محبة في الحقيقة ولا إرادته ارادة [في الحقيقة]
١٨ قيل به وليس كلام المصروع والنائم كلاماً في الحقيقة ولا كلام اليقظان كلاماً
في الحقيقة ولا إرادة الماشق إرادة في الحقيقة وهذا لا يعجز عنه أحد .

177 ثم يقال لهم ان كان المصلي مصلياً لخلول الصلاة فيه أفليس الخاصع
15 خاصاً عندكم لخلول الخضوع فيه لان الخضوع يكون في القلب والاسنان سكاله
17 خاصع فان ادعوا ان القلب خاصع (ص ١٠٦) حاشع الزمانهم ان يكون اللسان
متكلفاً في الحقيقة والقلب مريداً في الحقيقة . وان قالوا الخاصع لم يكن خاصعاً
19 لخلول الخضوع فيه قيل لهم فاذا أمر [تا]^(١٢) الله تعالى ان يحصع فيجب على
قياسكم ان يحضع هو فان قالوا لا ولكنه يفعل خضوعاً تبدياً [هـ] قيل لهم
21 وكذلك ان أمرنا بالكذب فحازر ان يفعل كذباً تبويهاً . فان قالوا الكاذب

(11) M has و

(12) I add the u and read يُحْصَعُ since this seems to conform with the rest of the passage.

- ١ كاذب لأنه فعل الكذب قيل لهم مثل ذلك في الخاضع . فان قالوا لم يكن الخاضع خاصاً بحلول الخضوع فيه ولا لأنه فعله قيل لهم ذلك في الكاذب .
- ٢ ثم يقال لهم اذا أمرنا الله ان نتحرك أفليس حائراً (١٣) ان يحلنا متحركين فان قالوا نعم قيل لهم فكذلك لو أمرنا بالكذب طار ان يحلنا كاذبين
- ٣ 178 ثم يقال لهم خبرونا أليس رعم ان الصلاة اذا كانت [كانت] حركات وكان المتحرك متحركاً بحلول الحركة فيه والمصلي مصلياً (١٤) بحلول الصلاة فيه فان قالوا نعم قيل لهم يجب اذا أطاع الإنسان بفعل حركة أمره الله تعالى بها ان يكون طائعاً لان الطاعة حلت (ص ١٠٧) كما انه متحرك
- ٤ بحلول الحركة فيه فان قالوا نعم قيل لهم بعض الإنسان وانه بعضه عاصي اذا حلت المعصية ولا يذم من نعم [ثم] بقول لهم (١٥) أنكرتم ان يكون
- ٥ بعض الإنسان مشككاً وهو اللسان وبعضه عالم مريد وهو القلب فان قالوا الحركة اذا كانت [كانت] طاعة فالتحرك [كان] متحركاً بحلول الحركة
- ٦ فيه وليس الطائع طائعاً بحلول الطاعة فيه بل هو طائع [لانه] بفعل الطاعة قيل لهم ما أنكرتم وان كانت حركات صلاة وكان المتحرك متحركاً بحلول
- ٧ الحركة فيه فالمصلي مصلياً (١٦) لانه فعل الصلاة لا لانه (١٧) حلت .
- 179 فانه أجابوا الى ذلك قيل لهم فاذا أمرنا ان نصلي ولم يجوز ان يصلي
- ١٧ هو فيلزم (١٨) لو أمرنا [الله] ان يكذب ان لا يجوز ان يكذب هو بل يجوز ان يفعل لنا كذباً كما جاز ان يفعل لك صلاة ولم يجوز ان يصلي هو قتل في
- ٩ الكذب هذا القول ثم يقال لهم اذا أمرنا ان نتحرك جعل لنا حركات تتحرك بها فكذلك لو أمرنا بالكذب لم يستحيل ان يفعل لنا كذباً فكذلك

(١٣) M has جاز .
 (١٤) M has مصلي
 (١٥) M has ما
 (١٦) M has مصلي
 (١٧) M has لا
 (١٨) M has فيلزم .

[الباب الثامن]

باب الكلام في الوباء

3 180 (ص ١٠٨) انه قال فأنزل ما الايمان عندكم بالله تعالى قيل له هو التصديق بالله وعلى ذلك إجماع^(١) اهل اللغة التي رول بها القرآن قال الله تعالى 2 « وما أرسلنا من رسول إلا بلسان قومه » وقال تعالى 3 « بلسان عربي مبين » عند كان الايمان في اللغة التي أول الله تعالى بها القرآن هو 7 التصديق وقال الله تعالى 4 « وما أنت بمؤمن لنا ولو كنا صادقين » أي مصدق لنا وقالوا جميعاً « فلان يؤمن بطاب القدر والشفاعة » يريدون يصدق بذلك فوجب ان يكون الايمان هو « كان عند اهل اللغة إيماناً وهو التصديق .

181 فإنه قال فأنزل فحيثما من العاسق من أهل الفسقة أمؤمن هو قيل به 11 نعم مؤمن بإيمانه فاسق بنفسه وكثيره وقد أجمع أهل اللغة ان من كان منه صرب فهو ضارب ومن كل منه^(٢) قتل فهو قاتل ومن كل منه كفر فهو 13 كافر ومن كل منه فسق فهو فاسق ومن كان منه تصديق فهو مصديق . وكذلك من كان فيه إيمان فهو مؤمن .

15 182 ولو قاله الفاسق لا مؤمناً ولا كافراً لم يكن منه كفر ولا إيمان 16 ولكن^(٣) لا موحداً (ص ١٠٩) ولا ملحداً ولا دياً ولا عدواً فلما استحال 17 ذلك استحال ان يكون فاسق لا مؤمناً ولا كافراً كي قالت المعتزلة .

(1) M has *إجماع* , but *إجماع* seems to be better.

(2) 14 4

(3) 20 195.

(4) 12 17

(5) M has *من كان منه فهو قاتل* , but the reading which I have given seems to be better.

(6) M has ولكن .

1 183 وأيضاً فإذا كان الفاسق مؤمناً قبل فسقه تشويده حدوث الزنا.
بعد التوحيد لا يبطل اسم الايمان الذي لم يفارقه .

3 184 وأيضاً فقد كان الناس قبل حدوث وإصل بن عطاء رئيس اعتزلة
على مقالتين منهم خوارج يكفرون مرتكبي الكبائر ومنهم أهل استقامة
يقولون هو مؤمن بإيمانه فاسق بكبريته . ولم يقل منهم قائل أنه ليس بمؤمن
ولا كافر قبل حدوث وإصل بن عطاء حين⁽⁷⁾ اعتزل وإصل الأمة وخرج عن
7 قوله قسني معترفاً بحالته لا إجماع . فيعدم الإجماع [على] قوله -- وانفق
المسلمون عليه من أن العصي من أهل الصلاة لا يحلو من أن يكون مؤمناً أو
كافراً - يُقتضى على بطلان قوله .

185 وأيضاً طر حار لقائل أن يقول أن من منه إيمان وآتى كبرية فليس
11 مؤمناً ولا كافراً⁽⁸⁾ طر لقائل أن يقول (ص ١١٠) بل هو مؤمن بإيمانه ولا
يقال فاسق بنفسه لأن كان هذا القول مستحيلاً لأنه لا يجوز فسق لا فاسق
13 كان قولهم مستحيلاً لأنه لا يجوز إيمان لا لمؤمن

(7) Th s^t might be حق in M, though it looks more like حين

(8) M has مؤمن

[الباب التاسع]

باب الكلام في الخاص والعام والوعد والوعيد

3 186 انه قال قائل خذونا من قول الله تعالى (١) « وَإِنَّ الْفُتَارَةَ لَفِي
حُجْمٍ » وعن قوله (٢) « وَمَنْ يَقُلْ ذَلِكَ عُذْوَانٌ وَطُلًّا مَرْفَعٌ نُصْلِيهِ نَارًا »
وقوله تعالى (٣) « [إِنَّ] الَّذِينَ يَأْكُلُونَ أَمْوَالَ الْيَتَامَى طُلًّا بُسًا يَأْكُلُونَ
فِي بُطُونِهِمْ نَارًا وَسَيَصْلَوْنَ سَعِيرًا » طالوت عن ذلك ان قوله « ومن يفعل
ذلك عدواناً » يحتمل ان يقع على جميع من يفعل ذلك ويحتمل ان يقع على
بعض لان لفظ « من » يقع في اللفظة مرة على الكل ومرة على البعض فلما كانت
الصوره اللفظة ترد مرة ويواد بها البعض وترد أخرى ويواد بها الكل لم يحرم
ان يقطع على الكل بصورتها كما لا يقطع على البعض بصورتها .

11 187 وكذلك لا يقضى بقوله « وان الفطار لفي حُجْمٍ » و « الذي
يأْكُلُونَ » على بعض ولا على كل اذ كان يقع ذلك ثلثة على الكل وثلاثة على
البعض ولو حاد لزاعم (ص ١١١) ان يزعم ان الصورة انما هي للكل حتى
تأتي دلالة البعض لم يكن هذا لزعم برعه هذا أولى ممن قال صورة هذا القول
١٥ يوجب القضاء على البعض الى ان تقوم دلالة الكل . فما نكاه القائلان في
قولها وجب ان يكون القولان جميعاً مُلَقَّيْن .

17 188 وقد قال زهير : (٤)

وَمَنْ يَضْرِبُ فِي أُمُورٍ كَثِيرَةٍ يُضْرَبُ بِأَنْيَابٍ وَتَوَاطُءٍ يَنْتَمِ

(١) 82, 4

(2) 4, 30, 34

(3) 4, 10, 11

(4) The two citations are from his *Mu'allaga*. Cf. e.g., J. Hausheer, *Die Mu'allaga des Zuhair*, Berlin, 1906, pp. 55-6

١ وليس كل من لا يصانع كذلك وقال

وَمَنْ لَا يُظْلَمُ شَأْنٌ يُظْلَمُ

٢ وليس كل من لا يظلم الناس يُظلم ويقول القائل «جاءني من أخت»
 و«ثامي واحد» . ويقول «جاءني الثمار» وإن لم يكن الكل عام .
 ٣ و«جاءني حيراني» وإن «يأتيهم» . ويقول القائل «سني القدر تأخرت»
 ولا يعني جميعهم . فلما كانت هذه اللفاظ ترد مرة يراد بها الكل وترد
 ٤ أخرى يراد بها البعض . يجر أن يقضى على الكل دون البعض ولا على
 البعض (٥) دون الكل إلا بدلالة .

١٨٩ وأيضاً ظهر وجب لفصا بصورة هذه الآيات أن يقضى على عذاب
 كل طاجر وآكل أموال (ص ١١٢) البتامة ظناً وآكل أموال الناس بالباطل
 ١١ فوجب أن يقضى على أن كل موحدة من أهل الصلاة في الجنة نظاهر قوله
 تعالى (١٢) «مَنْ جَاءَ بِهَذَا صِرَافٌ فَلَهُ ثَمَنٌ مِمَّا فِي بَيْتِهِ مِنْ تَمَرٍ أَوْ زَيْتٍ ثَمَنٌ مِثْلُ بَيْتِهِ»
 ١٢ ونظاهر قوله (١٣) «وَلَا تَحْسَبِ الَّذِينَ يَتْلُونَ كِتَابَ اللَّهِ إِذَا دَعَوْهُمْ إِلَى الْغِيَاثِ وَجَدُوا نَجْدًا»
 عند ربهم يُزْعِقُونَ» على أن كل مقتول في سبيل الله في حداث يرق فيها .
 ١٤ ونظاهر قوله تعالى (١٥) «إِنْ كُنْتُمْ تُحِبُّونَ اللَّهَ فَاتَّبِعُوا أَمْرًا» على كل دس أنه
 منقول إلا دياً (١٦) وقف عليه النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم وأجمع المسلمون أنه لا يُغفر
 ١٧ وهو الشرك والكفر . وليس قول من قال أن الآيات (عامة) (١١) في

(٥) M has ويراد

(٦) M has بعض

(٧) 27.89/91

(٨) 8.109.163

(٩) 30.53 54

(١٠) So M, though we should expect something like مع الله الذي وقف الله

(١١) This word seems to be superfluous

١ الوعيد عامة والآيات الأخر خاصة أولى من [قول] قائل قلب القصة وجعل آيات الوعيد خاصة والآيات الأخر عامة .

190 وأيضاً فهو وحسب أن يعنى بظواهر الآيات على أن كل فاسق وآكل أموال اليتامى ظلماً في جهنم طار من بعض بقول الله تعالى (١٢) « كَلِمَاتُ الَّتِي فِيهَا فَوْحٌ مَنَّهُمْ يُخَرِّجُهَا آلُكُمْ بِأَنفُسِكُمْ تَدْبِيرُ » قالوا بلى قد نجونا بدبر مكذبات وقلنا ما يؤل هذا من شيء « مكذبات النار لا يدخلها إلا كافر 7 ووظاهر قوله تعالى (١٣) « فَأَنذَرْتُكُمْ نَارًا تَلَظَّى لَا يَصْلَاهَا إِلَّا الْأَشْقَى الَّذِي كَذَّبَ وَتَوَلَّى » ر كل من يصلى النار كذبات ووظاهر قول الله تعالى (١٤) « وَمَنْ لَمْ يَغْفِرْ لَكُمْ تِلْكَ الْآيَةُ فَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْفَاسِقُونَ » (١٥) أنه لا يقوى الحكم بما أتول الله إلا فاسق (١٦) هذا لم يلزم أن لا يدخل النار إلا كافر ١ بهذه الآيات لم يلزم أن يكون كل فاسق في جهنم وكل آكل أموال اليتامى ظلماً وكل من يأكل أموال الناس ساطل في النار بآيات التي تلونها . واحواب عن كل آية يقتلون بها في الوعيد كالحواب عن هذه الآيات .

191 وقوله (١٨) « وَمَنْ يَقْتُلْ ذَلِكَ مُدُونًا وَظُلْمًا » يحتل من يقتل ذلك مستعلاً (١٩) ويحتل الجميع وقوله (٢٠) « أَنْ الْعَارَ لِمَنْ حَمِيمٌ » يحتل ١٧ انقص منهم وهم الكفار ويحتل الجميع . وهكذا الحواب عن كل آية في الوعيد .

(12) 67 8-9.

(13) 92 14-16

(14) 5 47/51

(15) M has الكافرون .

(16) M has كافر

(17) M has كافر

(18) 4.30-34.

(19) M has مستعلاً

(20) 82 14

1 192 وبلغزم اسقولة ان يكون جميع أهل الشمال كاهنين بظاهر قول
الله تعالى (21) « وَأَصْحَابُ بَيْتَالِ مَا أَصْحَابُ الْبَيْتَالِ فِي سُجُودٍ وَحَمِيمٍ وَظَلِّ
مِنْ يَحْتُمِرُ لَا يَكْرِدُ وَلَا كَرِيمٍ إِنَّهُمْ كَانَُوا قَبْلَ ذَلِكَ مُتْرَفِينَ وَكَانُوا
يُصْرَفُونَ عَلَى الْغَنَى الْعَظِيمِ وَكَانُوا يَقُولُونَ أَئِذَا (22) (ص ١١٤) مَثَا
وَكُنَّا تُرَامًا وَيُخَذُّونَا 21 إِنْنا لَنُفْرَفُونَ » ويقولون (22) « وَأَمَّا مِنْ أُولَئِكَ كُنَّا
بَشَاتِهِ فَيَقُولُ يَا لَيْتَنِي لَمْ أُوتَ كِتَابِيهِ » إلى قوله تعالى « إِنَّهُ كَانَ لَا يُؤْمِنُ
بِآيَةِ الْعَظِيمِ وَلَا يَخْضَعُ عَلَى طَعَامِ الْمُسْكِينِ »

(21) 56.41-47/40-47

(22) M has the .

(23) M has وَحَمِيمٍ وَظَلِّ

(24) 69.25-34 (verses 26-32 not cited).

[الباب العاشر]

باب الكلام في الإمامة

193 انه قال فأنشأ ما الدليل على إمامة أبي بكر رضي الله عنه قيل له
الدلالة على ذلك أنا وجدنا الناس على ثلاثة أصناف فأنشأ يقولون بإمامة علي
بعد الرسول صلى الله عليه وآله وقائلين يقولون بإمامة العباس رضي الله عنه [وقائلين
يقولون بإمامة أبي بكر رضي الله عنه] ورأينا علياً والعباس قد بلغاه وانقادا
7 لأمره في كافة المسلمين وإن كان قد تَوَقَّفَ (1) عن البيعة متوقفون (2) وقتاً ما
قد أطلقوا (3) على البيعة له والانتقياد لإمامته والكون تحت رايته واتباع أمره
9 وقالوا له « يا خيفة رسول الله » صلح . ولا يجوز أن يجمع الأئمة على خطأ .

194 وقد يجوز للذاع أن يدعي أن باطن علي والعباس بخلاف ما أظهره
11 ولو جاز ذلك لم يجوز لنا أن نقضي على صحة إجماع من الأمة على شيء (4) [لانا]
لا مانع أن يكون باطن بعض الأمة بخلاف ظاهرهم فما كان (ص ١١٥)
13 يظهر من الأمة من الاتفاق قد يعلم به الإجماع ولا يلتفت إلى دعوى من
أدعى الباطن وكان مدعي ذلك كقائل يقول من الطوارىء من يقول أن باطن
15 علي بخلاف ظاهره فلما كان في هذا إنشاد الإجماع وجب التقطع على إمامة
أبي بكر بعد من صفها له من المسلمين وبيعة من بيعة من المهاجرين والأنصار
17 وإجماع المسلمين عليه في وقته لا سيما وعلي والعباس عاقدن له البيعة على أنفسهما
ومترآن له بالإمامة وخلافة الرسول صلى الله عليه وآله فإذا كانت الإمامة لا تخرج

(1) M has يوقف .
(2) M has مشروط .
(3) M has أطلقوا
(4) M has هي لا للمسلمين .

1 عن هؤلاء الثلاثة راجع وقد دلت في كافة المسلمين وحسب ان يكون اماماً مفترض الطاعة .

195 وقد طوى القرآن باسمه الصديق ودل على امامة الصادق وذلك ان الله تعالى قال في سورة براء للقاعدين من نصرة نبيه صلى الله عليه وسلم والمتطعين 5 عن الجهاد معه 15 « [وَأَمْلُ مِنْ تَعَرَّجُوا مَعِيَ أَبَدًا وَلَنْ تُكَافِلُوا مَعِيَ عَدُوًّا إِنَّكُمْ رَضِيتُمْ بِالْقُعُودِ أُولَئِكَ فُتِنُوا مَعَ الْخَائِبِينَ] » وقال في سورة أخرى 16 « نَسْأَلُ الْمُخَلَّفِينَ بِأَنْ تَخْلُفُوا عَنْ مَقَامِكُمْ إِذَا خِذُوا بِهَذَا شَيْئًا مِنْكُمْ يُرِيدُونَ أَنْ يُبَدِّلُوا كَلَامَ اللَّهِ - يعني قوله - مِنْ تَخْرُجُوا مَعِيَ نَدًا وَنَاقِلًا تَقَاتِلُوا مَعِيَ عَدُوًّا - ثم قال - كَذَلِكَ قَالَ اللَّهُ مِنْ قَبْلِ أَنْ يَبْغُيَ قَوْمٌ نَبِيًّا فَيَخْلَوْا أَنْ يَكُونُوا كَالَّذِينَ لَا يُفْقَهُونَ إِلَّا قِيلًا » . ثم قال (١١٦) 7 « قُلْ لِلْمُخَلَّفِينَ مِنَ الْأَعْرَابِ سِتْرَةٌ فِي قَوْمِ أَهْلِ بَيْتٍ شَدِيدٍ يُقَاتِلُونَهُمْ أَوْ يُنَلَّوْنَ مِنْهُمْ فَاصْبِرُوا لِمَا نَزَّلْنَا مِنْهُ إِنَّ آيَاتِ اللَّهِ لَمُنِيرَةٌ لِلنَّاسِ وَإِنَّ تَوَلَّوْا - يعني [إن] تعرضوا عن إمامة الداعي لكم إلى قتاله - كُنَّا نَوَلِّيْكُمْ مِنْ قَبْلُ - » 16 كما أمرهم من قبل - « يُبَدِّلْكُمْ عِدَاءًا أَيْ » .

196 وقد علمنا ان الداعي لهم عبد النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم لانه قال شبه 8 17 « قُلْ لَنْ تَخْرُجُوا مَعِيَ أَبَدًا » وقال في سورة النحل 9 « يريدون ان يبدلوا كلام الله » . فهم الله تعالى عن الخروج مع نبيه صلى الله عليه وسلم 18 جرحهم معه ببدلته كلامه . فوحسب ان الداعي الذي أمروا بالتباعد دافع يدعوهم بعد الرسول .

5) 9: 83-84

6) 48: 15

7) 48: 16

8) 9: 83-84

9) 48: 15

1 197 وقد قال الناس قولين قال بعضهم هم فارس والروم وقال آخرون هم أهل اليمامة . وأبو بكر قاتل الروم وأهل اليمامة وقوتلت فارس في أيامه³ وظهر بهم من بعده . فإن كانوا أهل اليمامة أو الروم فقد قاتلهم أبو بكر رضي الله عنه وفي ذلك إيجاب إمامته . وإن كانوا فارس فقد قوتلوا في أيامه⁴ وخرج أكثر منهم من بعده فقد وحت إمامة عمر . وإذا وجبت إمامة عمر وحت إمامة أبي بكر رضي الله عنهما لأن أبا بكر عتدها له . وإن كان المعنى⁷ من قاتل فارس وخرج منهم فإذا وجبت إمامة عمر وجبت إمامة أبي بكر (ص ١١٧) لأنه هو القائد لإمامته

9 198 فدل ما قلناه من القرآن على إمامة الصديق والاروق وإذا وحت إمامة أبي بكر بالدلالات التي ذكرناها بظاهر القرآن وبإجماع المسلمين في وقته^{١٠} عليها فسد قول من قال إن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم نص على إمامة عمر لأنه لا تخور إمامة من نص رسول على إمامة غيره . وهذا يقضي على بطلان قول من¹³ قال إن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم نصب علياً بعده إماماً .

199 ومما يبطل قول من قال بالنص على أبي بكر أن أبا بكر قال¹⁵ « نسط يدك أبليك » يوم النخبة . فلو كان رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم نص على إمامته لم يجر أن يقول « نسط يدك أبليك » .

17 200 وقد قلنا في الأبواب التي تكلمنا عليها قولاً واحداً⁽¹⁰⁾ . ثم الكتاب والحمد لله رب العالمين وصلى الله على محمد وآله وسلم .

(10) M has وجرى , which could be وجرى ; but وجرى seems to be a better reading.



رِسَالَةٌ
فِي اسْتِحْسَانِ الْخَوْضِ فِي عِلْمِ الْكَلَامِ

تصنيف
الشيخ الإمام
أبي الحسين علي بن اسمعيل الأشعري


تم طبعه من النسخ المطبوع (الطبعة الثانية)

مكتبة مجلس دائرة المعارف السنية

في حيدرآباد الدكن في سنة ١٣٦٦ هـ

وطلب عليها

الأب رتشارد يوسف مكارني اليسوعي



بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الحمد لله رب العالمين وصلى الله على سيدنا محمد
وعلى آله وصحبه وسلم اجمعين

- 1 ابن الشيخ الامام جمال الدين ابو الحسن بن ابراهيم بن عبد الله القرشي
- 5 حادة بخطه قال ابن الفقيه الامام السامع عمر الدين ابو المظفر محمد بن ابي
- الفرج بن محمد بن يوسف الموصلي قراءة عليه وانا اسمع في مسجده بسوق السلطان
- 7 بغداد يوم الثلاثاء الثامن من شوال سنة ست مائة - قيل له قرأت على الشيخ
- الامام الصدوق ابي منصور اسدك بن عبد الله بن محمد السدادي يوم عرضك
- 8 برباطه المعروف برباط العبيدة شرقي مدينة السلام من سنة ثلاث وسبعين
- وخمس مائة فآخرو به .
- 11 ابن الشيخ الامام الحافظ جمال الدين ابو الفضل عبد الرحيم بن احمد بن محمد
- ابن محمد [بن] ابراهيم بن خالد المعروف بابن الاحوة سنة اثنتين واربعم وخمس مائة
- 13 ابن الشيخ ابو الفضل محمد بن يحيى الناطلي عارندران في مسجده بقراءة عليه
- ابن ابو نصر عبد الكريم بن محمد بن هارون الشيرازي ابن علي بن رستم ابن
- 15 علي بن مهدي قال سمعت الشيخ الاوحد شيخ امثانيه ابا الحسن علي بن اسمعيل
- الاشعري رضي الله عنه يقول -
- 17 الحمد لله رب العالمين وصلى الله على محمد النبي وآله الطيبين واصحابه الاثمة
- المتحسين .

- 2 ابا بعد فان طائفة من الناس جعلوا الجمل رأس داهم ونقل عليهم
- 19 النظر والسمت عن الدين واملوا الى التحفيف والتقليد وطعنوا على من فسد عن

١ أصول الدين ودسبوه الى الضلال ودرعوا ان الكلام في الحركة والسكون والحسم والعرض والالوان والاكران والحز. والظفرة وصفات الباري عز وجل
٢ بدعة وضلالة .

٣ وفانوا لو كان ذلك هدى ورشاداً لتكلم فيه النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم وحلفاؤه واصحابه (قالوا) ولأن النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم لم يمت حتى تكلم في كل ما يحتاج اليه من امور الدين وبينه بياناً شاعياً ولم يترك بعده لاحد مقالاً فيما للسليين اليه حاجة من امور دينهم وما يقرهم الي الله عز وجل ويباعدهم عن سخطه .

٤ فلما لم يروا عنه الكلام في شي. بما ذكرناه علمنا ان الكلام فيه بدعة والبعث منه ضلالة لانه لو كان خيراً لما فات النبي صلى الله عليه وآله واصحابه وسلم وتكلموا فيه . (قالوا) ولانه ليس يخلو ذلك من وجهين ، اما ان يكونوا علموه فكثروا عنه ، او لم يعلموه بل جهلوه . فان كانوا علموه لم يتكلموا فيه وسعنا ايضاً نحن السكوت عنه كما وسعهم السكوت عنه وسعنا ترك الخوض [فيه] كما وسعهم ترك الخوض فيه ، ولانه لو كان من الدين ما وسعهم السكوت عنه . وان كانوا لم يعلموه وسعنا جهله كما وسع أولئك جهله ، لانه لو كان من الدين لم يجهلوه . فعلى كلا الوجهين الكلام ١٧ فيه بدعة والخوض فيه ضلالة . هذه جملة ما احتجوا به في ترك النظر في الاصول .

١٩ ٥ قال الشيخ ابو الحسن رضي الله عنه الجواب عنه من ثلاثة اوجه -
احدها قلب السؤال عليهم بان يقال النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم لم يقل ايضاً « انه من بحث عن ذلك وتكلم فيه فاحملوه مبتدعاً ضالاً » . فقد ائتمكم ان تكونوا مبتدعة ضلالاً اذ قد تكلمتم في شي. لم يتكلم فيه النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم وصلىتم من لم يضلله النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم .

1 6 الجواب الثاني ان يقال لهم ان النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم لا يحل شيئاً مما ذكرتموه من الكلام في اللحم والعرض والحركة والسكون والحز. 3 والطفرة وان لم يتكلم في كل واحد من ذلك شيئاً وكذلك الفقهاء والملاء من الصعابة . غير ان هذه الاشياء التي ذكرتموها معينة اصولها موجودة في القرآن 5 والسنة جملة غير مفصلة .

7 اما الحركة والسكون والكلام فيها فاصلها موجود في القرآن وهم يدلان على التوحيد وكذلك الاحتجاج والاعتقاد . قال الله تعالى مُضِعّاً عن خليله ابراهيم صلوات الله عليه وسلامه في قصة اول الكوكب والشمس والقمر 9 وتحريكها من مكان الى مكان ما دل على ان ربه عز وجل لا يجوز عليه شيء من ذلك وان من جار عليه الاموال والانتقال من مكان الى مكان 11 وليس بآله (1).

8 واما الكلام في اصول التوحيد فأتخذ بعضاً من الكتاب قول الله 13 تعالى (2) « لَوْ كَانَ فِيهَا آلِهَةٌ إِلَّا اللَّهُ لَفَسَدَتَا » وهذا الكلام موجز منه على الحق بانه واحد لا شريك له وكلام المتكلمين في الاحتجاج في التوحيد 15 بالجماع والتعال فاما مرجعه الى هذه الآية وقوله عز وجل (3) « مَا تَعْبُدُونَ إِلَّا اللَّهَ مِنْ وَرَاءِ الْحُجُوبِ وَمَا كَانَ مِنْهُ إِلَهٌ إِلَّا اللَّهُ إِذَا أَذْنَبَ كُفْرًا إِذْ هُمْ سَاهِقُونَ وَلَهُ يَمُضُّهُمْ 17 عَلَى نَفْسٍ » الى قوله عز وجل (4) « أَمْ يَجْعَلُونَ لِمُشْرِكٍ مَقَادِيرَ كَسْبَتِهِ فَتَشَاءُ أَلَمُلُوقُ عَلَيْهِمْ » وكلام المتكلمين في الاحتجاج في توحيد الله اما مرجعه 19 الى هذه الآيات التي ذكرناها وكذلك سائر الكلام في تفصيل هروغ التوحيد والبدل الله هو ماخوذ من القرآن .

(1) Cf. *Lumen*, N° 11

(2) 21 22

(3) 23 91 93.

(4) 13. 16. 17

٩ ١ فكذلك الكلام في حوار الميث واستحالته الذي قد اختلف عقلا.
 العرب ومن قبلهم من عوهم فيه حتى تعجبوا من حوار ذلك فقالوا (٥) «إذا
 ٣ مبتأ وكذا ثوان ذلك رجع بعيد» وقولهم (٦) «هيهات هيهات لما توعدون»
 وقولهم ٧ «من ينهي العظام وهي رميم» وقوله تعالى (٨) «أيذكركم أنكم
 ٥ إذا متهم وكنتم ثوانا وعظاما أنكم تخرجون» وفي نحو هذا الكلام منهم
 ١١ ورد بالطباع في حوار الميث بعد الموت في القرآن تأكيد لجوار ذلك في
 ٧ القول وعلم نبيه صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم وأثنه السجاج عليهم في إسكارهم
 الميث من وجهين على طائفتين منهم ، طائفة أقرت بالخلق لأول وأنكرت
 ٩ الثاني ، وطائفة حصدت ذلك بقدّم الماء .

١٠ فاصبح على القر من مائها بالخلق الاول بقوله (٩) «قل ينهيها الذي أنشأها
 ١١ أول مرة» ويقول (١٠) «وهو الذي يبدؤ الخلق ثم يعيده وهو أهون عليه»
 ويقول (١١) «كما بدأكم فهو ذوون» فمنهم هذه الآيات على أن من قدر
 ١٣ أن يفعل فعلا على غير مثال سبق فهو أقدر أن يفعل فعلا بعدنا هو أهون عليه
 فيما بينكم وتعارفكم وأما الناري حل تناؤه وتقدس استأجره فليس خلق
 ١٥ شي. بأهون عليه من الآخر . وقد قيل إن الماء في «عليه» إنما هي كتابة
 الخلق بقدرته أن الميث والإضافة فهو على أحدكم وأحب عليه من ابتداء خلقه
 ١٧ لأن ابتداء خلقه إنما يكون بالولادة والتربية وقطع البرة والقرط وحروج
 لاسنن وغير ذلك من الآيات الموحدة المؤيدة بإعادته إنما تكون دفعة واحدة

(٥) ٥٠ ٣

(٦) ٢٣ ٣٦ ٣٨

(٧) ٣٦ ٧٨

(٨) ٢٣ ٣٥ ٣٧

(٩) ٣٦ ٧٩

(١٠) ٣٠ ٢٧ ٢٦

(١١) ٧ ٢٩ ٢٨

١ ليس فيها من ذلك شيء. فهي أهون عليه من ابتدائه. وهذا ما احتج به على الطائفة المقررة بالخلق

٣ 11 وأما الطائفة التي أنكرت الخلق الأول والثاني وقالت بتقديم العلم فلما دخلت عليهم شبهة بأن قالوا وجبت الحياة رطبة حارة والموت بارداً يابساً وهو من طبع القواب فكيف يجوز أن يجمع بين الحياة والقواب والعظام النخرة فيصير خلقاً سوياً والضدد لا يجتمعان فأنكروا المثلث من هذه الجهة.

7 12 ولهم في أن الصدى لا يجتمع في محل واحد ولا في جهة واحدة ولا في انحدار في الصل وسكنه يصح وجودهما في محلين على سبيل المحاورة. 8 فاحتج الله تعالى عليهم بأن قال (12) «لَدَيَّ خَصْلُ لَكُمْ مِنْ شَجَرٍ الْأَخْضَرِ نَارًا إِذَا أَنْشَمُ مِنْهُ تُوقِدُونَ» فردهم الله عز وجل في ذلك إلى ما يعرفونه 11 ويشاهدونه من خروج النار على حرها وبسببها من الشجر الأخضر على بردها ورطوبتها فصل جوار النشأة الأولى دليلاً على جوار النشأة الآخرة لأنها دليل 13 على حوار محاورة الحياة القواب والعظام المحرقة فصلها خلقاً حديباً وقال (13) «كُنَّا بَدَأْنَا أَوَّلَ خَلْقٍ يُعِيدُهُ».

15 13 وأما ما يتكلم به المتكلمون من أن الحوادث 'ولا' (14) وردتهم على الدهرية [التأويل] أنه لا حركة إلا وقلها حركة ولا يوم إلا وقته يوم والكلام 17 على من قال ما من جزء إلا وله نصف لا إلى غاية فقد وجدنا أصل ذلك في سنة رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم حين قال «لا عدوى ولا طبرة» 19 فقال امرأتي «فما بال الأمل كتاب الطء. تدخل في الأمل الحرقى فتعبر» فقال

(12) 36:80

(13) 21:104

(14) The editor of the printed edition notes that there is a gap in the original here and suggests الحوادث لها يوم as a possible reading. It would be even simpler to keep the text as it is, but to read الحوادث instead of العوادث

¹ النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم « من أعدى الأول » فسكت الاعرابي لما
أبهره بالحقّة المقولة . وكذلك نقول لمن زعم انه لا حركة الا وقبلها حركة
³ لو كان الامر هكذا لم تحدث منها واحدة لان ما لا نهاية له لا يحدث له

14 وكذلك لما قال ارجل « يا بني الله ان امرأتى ولدت علماً أسود »
وعرض عليه فقال النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم « هل لك من ابل » فقال
« نعم » . قال « فما ثوبها » قال « حر » . فقال رسول الله صلى الله عليه
7 وآله وسلم « هل فيها من أوزق » قال « نعم ان فيها اوزق » . قال « فأني
ذلك » قال « لمن عرقاً رعه » . فقال النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم « ولعل
9 ولدك رعه عرق » . فهذا ما علم الله به من رد الشيء الى شكله ونظيره
وهو اصل لنا في سائر ما نحكم به من الشيء والنظير .

15 وبذلك محتج على من قال ان الله تعالى وتعالى يشبه المخلوقات وهو
حسم ان نقول له لو كان يشبه شيئاً من الاشياء لكان لا يخلو من ان يكون
13 يشبه من كل جهاته او يشبه من بعض جهاته . فان كان يشبه من كل
جهاته وجب ان يكون محدثاً من كل جهاته . وان كان يشبه من بعض
15 جهاته وجب ان يكون محدثاً مثله من حيث أشبهه لان كل مشبهين حكمهما
واحد فيما اشبهاه . ويستحيل ان يكون المحدث قديماً والتقديم محدثاً وقد
17 قال تعالى وتقدس (15) « ليس كمثله شيء » وقال تعالى وتقدس (16) « ولم
يكن له كفواً أحد » .

16 واما الاصل بان الحكم نهاية وان الجزء لا ينقسم فتقوله عرجل
17 « وكل شيء أخضيه في إمام مبين » ومحال احصاء ما لا نهاية له

(15) 42 11/9

(16) 112 4

(17) 36 12 11. (Cf. 72 28).

ويعمل ان يكون الشيء الواحد بنقسم (18) لان هذا يوجب ان يكونا شيئين وقد أخذ ان العدد وقع عليهما .

17 واما الاصل في ان الحديث يجب ان يتأتى له الفصل نحو قصده واختياره وتنتفي عنه كراهيته فغوله تعالى (19) « أَفَرَأَيْتُمْ مَا تَحْمِلُونَ أَأَنْتُمْ تَحْمِلُونَهُ أَمْ كُنْزُ السَّمَوَاتِ » فلم يستطيعوا ان يقولوا بجنة انهم يحملون مع قبيح الولد فلا يكون مع كراهيته له فنبههم ان الخلق هو من يتأتى منه المخرقات على قصده .

18 واما اصلنا في المناقضة على الخصم في النظر لأخود من سعة سيدنا محمد صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم . وذلك تعليم الله عز وجل إسماء حين لقي الحجر السمين فقال له « شدتك باقة هل تجد فيها أنزل الله تعالى من التوراة ان 11 الله تعالى يبيص الحجر السمين » فنضب الحجر حين عر به ذلك فقل (20) « ما أول أفعى على شجر من شيء » فقال الله تعالى (20) « قل من أول الكتاب 19 لدى جاء . يع موسى نوراً الآية » فناقضه عن قرب لان التوراة شيء وموسى بشر وقد كان الحجر متراً بان الله تعالى أنزل التوراة على موسى . وكذلك 16 ناقض الذي دعوا ان الله تعالى عهد اليهم ان لا يؤمنوا لرسول حتى يأتيهم بقرآن تأكله النار . فقال تعالى (21) « قل قد جاءكم دسل من قبلي بالبينات 17 وبالنبي قلتم فلم تقتلوهم إن كنتم صادقين » فناقضهم بذلك وحاجتهم .

19 واما اصلنا في استراكتنا مناقلة الخصوم لأخود من قوله تعالى (22)

(18) A gap here in the original, according to the editor. One might read : بل غير نهاية .

(19) 56-9.

(20) (bis) 6-91.

(21) 3.183-180.

(22) 21-98-100.

- ١ «يُسْكُمُ وَمَا تَعْدُونَ مِنْ دُونِ أَمْرِ حَصْبِ حَمَمٍ أَنْتُمْ لَهَا وَارِدُونَ» - إلى قوله - «لَا يَسْتَعُونَ» فإنها لما روت هذه الآية بلغ ذلك عباده بن الريرقي ٣ وكان حدلاً خصاً فقال «خصت محمداً وروى الكلمة» «فجاء إليه رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم فقال «يا محمد أنت ترعى أن عيسى وعمرؤا ٥ والملائكة عبدوا» فسكت النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم لا سكوت عبي ولا منقطع تصباً من جهة لانه ليس في الآية «يوحى دخول عيسى وعمرؤ ٧ والملائكة فيها لانه قال «وما تعبدون» ولم يقل «وكل» تعبدون من دون الله» . واما أراد ابن الريرقي مناقضة النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم ليوم ٨ قوله انه قد حابه . فانزل الله عز وجل (٢٣) «إِنَّ الَّذِينَ تَسَبَّوْا لَهُمْ مَاءً الْخَسْيَ» يعني من المصدق «أولئك هم المعتدون» فقرأ النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم ١١ وآله وسلم ذلك فضجوا عند ذلك ثلاثين نقصاعهم وعلطهم فباؤا «أَتَهْتَأُ أَخْبَرُ أَمْ هُوَ» يعنون عيسى فانزل الله تعالى (٢٤) «وَلَوْ ضَرَبَ آدَمُ مَرْيَمَ مَثَلًا إِذَا قَوْلُكَ مِنْهُ يَتَّبِعُونَ» - إلى قوله - «يَحْيُونَ»

- 20 وكل ما ذكرناه من الآي او ما يذكره صل وحجة لنا في الكلام ١٥ فيها نذكره من تعصير وان لم تكن مسئلة معينة في الكتاب والسنة لان ما حدث تعيينها من المسائل العقلية في ايام النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم ١٧ والصحابة قد تكلموا فيه على نحو ما ذكرناه .

- 21 والجواب الثالث ان هذه المسائل التي سألت عنها رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم ولم يحسن منها شيئاً مفصلاً غير انها لم تحدث في ايامه معينة يتكلم فيها او لا يتكلم فيها وان كانت أصولها موجودة في القرآن 2١ والسنة . وما حدث من شيء . فيما له تعلق «بدين من جهة الشريعة فقد تكلموا

(23) 21, 101

(24) 43, 57, 58.

فيه وبجشوا عنه وناصروا فيه وجادوا وحأخوا كسائل العول والحدآت من مسائل
الفرائض وغير ذلك من الأحكام والالحوام والبان والثثة و«حلك على
د عارك» وكللسائل في ا حدود والطلاق كما يكثو ذكرها قد حدثت في
ايامهم ولم يجي في كل واحد منها نص عن النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم
لأنه نص على جميع ذلك ما اختلفوا فيه وما بقي الخلاف الى الآن .

22 وهذه المسائل وان لم يكن في كل واحدة منها نص عن رسول
الله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم فانهم ردوها وقاسوها على ما فيه نص من
كتاب الله تعالى والسنة واجتهادهم هذه أحكام حودث الفروع ردوها الى
أحكام الشريعة التي هي فروع لا تستدرك أحكامها الا من جهة السمع
والرسل فاما حوادث تحدث في الاصول في تعيين مسائل فينبغي لكل عاقل
مسلم ان يرد حكمها الى جهة الاصول لتتفق عليها بالفضل والحق والهدية
وعبر ذلك لان حكم مسائل الشرع التي طريقها لسمع ان تكون مردودة
الى اصول الشرع لتي طريقها السمع . وحكم مسائل العقلية والمحسوسات
ان يرد كل شيء من ذلك الى بابها ولا تخطأ (25) العقلية بالسميات ولا
السميات بالعقلية هو حدث في ايام النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم والكلام
في خلق القرآن وفي الحزب والصخرة بيده اللفاظ لتكلم به وبينه كما بين سائر
17 ما حدث في ايامه من تعيين المسائل وتكلم فيها .

23 ثم جال النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم لم يصح عنه حديث في أن
10 القرآن غير مخلوق او هو مخلوق فلم يلقم انه غير مخلوق فان قالوا قد قاه
بعض الصعابة وبعض لتابعين قبل لهم يلزم الصعابي والتابعي مثل ما يلزمكم
21 من ان يكون مبتدعاً صالاً اذ قال ما لم يقله الرسول صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم
فان قال قائل فانا اتوقف في ذلك فلا أقول مخلوق ولا غير مخلوق قيل له

(25) The printed edition has يخطأ .

١ فانت في توقفت في ذلك متدع صال لان النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم لم يقل « ان حدثت هذه احادته بعدي توقفوا فيها ولا تقفوا فيها شيئاً » ولا قال « صلوا وكفروا من قال بخلقه او من قال بنبي خلقه »

24 وغبروا و قال قائل ان عنه الله حقوق اكنتم تتوصون فيه ام لا فان قالوا لا قيل لهم لم يقل النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم ولا اصحابه في ذلك شيئاً . وكذب لو قال قائل هذا رسكم شهاب او ريان او مكس او 7 غريب او مقور او صراوي او مرطوب او حرم او عرض او بشم الريح او لا يشها او هل له ايت وقلب وكبد وطحال وهل ينج في كل سنة وهل 8 يركب الخيل او لا يركبها وهل يفتن ام لا ونحو ذلك من المسائل لكان يعني ان تسكت عنه لان رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم لم يتكلم في 11 شي من ذلك ولا اصحابه . او كنت لا تسكت فكنت تبين مكلامك ان شيئاً من ذلك لا يجوز على الله عز وجل وتقدس كذا وكذا بجملة كذا وكذا .

13 25 فانه قال فاني سكت عنه ولا احية شي . او اجمعه او اقوم عنه او لا اسلم عليه او لا اعوجه اذا مرض او لا اشهد جنازته اذا مات قيل له 15 ويلزمك ان تكون في جميع هذه الصيغ التي ذكرتها مبتدعاً صالاً لان رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم لم يقل « من سأل عن شي من ذلك فاسكتوا 17 عنه » ولا قال « لا تسلموا عليه » ولا « قوموا عنه » ولا قال شيئاً من ذلك . فانتم مبتدعة اذا سلمتم ذلك

19 26 [وبعالرحم] ولم لم تسكتوا عن قال لمخلق القرآن ولم كفرتم ولم يرد عن النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم حديث صحيح في نفي خلقه وتكفير 21 من قال بخلقهم . فان قالوا لان أحمد بن حنبل رضي الله عنه قال بنبي خلقه وتكفير من قال بخلقهم قيل لهم ولم لم يسكت أحمد عن ذلك بل تكلم فيه 23 فان قالوا لان عباس الصبي ووكيعاً وعد الرحمن بن مهدي وفلاناً

١ قالوا انه غير محقق ومن قال بانه مخلوق فهو كافر قيل هم وليا يسكت
اولئك عما سكنت منه [الذي] صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم قال قالوا لان عمرو بن دينار
٢ وسفيان بن عيينة وحماد بن محمد رضي الله عنهم وقالوا وفلاناً قالوا ليس بخالق
ولا مخلوق قيل هم وليا يسكت اولئك من هذه الغفلة ومن يغلها رسول الله
صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم

27 فانه اعلموا ذلك على الصحة وخدمة منهم كاد ذلك مكروه
7 فانه يدل لهم انه لم يسكن من ذلك ولم يتكلم به ابي صلى الله عليه
وانه وسلم ولا قاله كبروا قائله ان قور مدد للعداء من الكلام في
"الحافضة بعلوم" اخاهن حكما قيل هو هذا الذي اردناه مكمل هو منعم
الكلام فانتم ان شئتم سكتكم حتى لا تفتنهم قلتم هيب عن الكلام وان شئتم
١١ قدتم من كان مسكرا ولا حجة ولا بيان وهذا شهادة ومحكمة

28 ثم يقال لهم يا اي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم يسكنكم في الدور
١٢ ونوصي ولا في لفتي ولا في حساب المساجد ولا صوت فيها كان كبر صوته
ذلك والتوري والشهري وبو حبيبة فيهمكم لا يكونون مستدعة صلاحاً او
١٣ اعلموا ان لم يسمع الذي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم وقاروا ان لم يلقه بها بعده
وصنعوا ما م نصفه ابي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم وقاروا بتكفير القائلين
17 بخلق القرآن ومن نقل الذي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم وما ذكرنا كفاية كل
عاقل غير معاند .

19 بحمد والحمد لله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم على سيدنا محمد وآله وصحبه وسلم .

فهرس الاسماء

جمال الدين ابو الفضل عبد الرحمن بن احمد بن
 محمد بن محمد بن ابراهيم بن خالد المعروف
 87 11-12
 71 11 : 78 14
 78 11
 68, 3 , 79 4, 11
 93. 10 ff.
 83, 9
 62 6, 8
 8 6
 76, 4 , 81 14
 91 16
 94 3
 87 9
 83, 1 ff.
 77 17
 97 1
 60 1, 12
 89 5 14, 15, 21 10, 8
 91 18
 93 8-9
 82 4
 82 17
 87 6
 97 14
 95 12, 13
 94, 21 , 95, 9
 64 17
 65, 19
 62 2, 11 , 89, 4 , 94 17 , 95 20
 97 6

ابراهيم
 89 8
 60, 1 , ff
 81 3, 6, 16 , 83 2 , 4, 6, 7 10, 14
 4, 1 , 42 12 , 60
 8 , 87 15-16 , 88 19
 97 14
 87 13
 87 8
 87 14
 96 21
 62 6, 8
 88 5, 11 , 96, 5, 11
 35 8 1 , 18 4 , 3 , 47 11
 81 9
 81 16
 76 4
 63 9
 80 1
 76 8 , 78 11
 75 10
 90 17
 83 2 8
 7 14 +
 87 7
 62 2 9, 10
 95 20
 93 10, 13
 97 14
 29 16 , 66, 18
 97 1
 87 4

الجهاد

الجنة

الجنة

الجنة السعد

حيات الآخرة

الجنة

الجنة

الجنة

الجنة

رب كعبة

رباط الريح

الجنة

وعبد (بن الی سحر)

سفین بن هیمة

سفین

السفین

سفین بن هیمة

سفین بن هیمة

سورة یوسف

سورة الفتن

سورة الطه

الجنة

الجنة

الجنة

الجنة

صاحب یوسف

صاحب یوسف

صاحب یوسف

احمد بن حیل

آدم

اصحاب (الی)

اصحاب (الی)

الجنة

الجنة

أهل ستمائة

أهل التمسرة

أهل شجاعة

أهل صلاة

أهل القناعة

أهل القدر

أهل النجاة

الجنة

الجنة

التابون

الجنة

الجنة

الجنة

الجنة

الجنة

الجنة

الجنة

89 12, 94 15	كتاب	95 20	صهايا
66 14, 95 8	كتاب	82 3, 83 9	البشائر
87 3	ماريوس	81 3, 10, 17	نصاي
97 14	مالك بن النسي	96 23	عباس الميوني
87 1	مكتبة السلام	94 2 8	عبدالله بن النسي
64 8, 76 8, 78 16, 81 7, 18	المسود	98 23	عبد الرحمن بن مهدي
17 82 1 83 10, 88 7		94 4	عزير
29 7, 30 7, 61 17, 62 4, 9	نسخة	64 17	الطائفة
65 1, 75 17 76 3, 80 1		64 13 ff	الطائفة
76 7	مصري	81 4, 6, 10 15, 17 83 13	فلي
56 1 4 68 11, 94 3 7	الملايك	87 14	فلي رستر
61 5, 69 7	مهاجرين	87 15	فلي بن مهدي
81 16	مهاجرين	83 1, 7 15	عمر
65 15, 78 11	نور حنون	97 2	السروين شهاب
34 1, 58 6, 66 11, 67 3, 7	نورسي	94 4, 6, 12	عيسى
93 13, 14			
79 6, 8, 10, 12	نور	83 1 ff	نورس
62 2	سحر	82 3, 83 9	الطائفة
66 9	نسخة الأخبار		فخر الدين أبو النعمان معتمد بن أبي القريب بن محمد بن بكعة الموصلي
76 3 6	واحد بن صبا	87 5 8	
96 23	وكبير		
66 2-4	يوسف	52 10 53 1 5	مصري
83 5	يوم النجدة	2 13 48 3, 52 1, 18;	الطائفة
66 15	يولي	3 3 7 9	
		15 1, 65 3, 68 3, 11, 75 4, 6;	الطائفة
		89 4 20 94 20, 95 19	

58 12	61 13	إطال	39 14	إختبر	18 12	إيه
81.8		أطبق	33.18, 90.1	إختف	71.10	إيتدا
57.19		إطلاق	93.4	إختبر	9.9; 90.16	إيتدا
46.16		إطلق	55.18	إخت	32.3	إيتدا
81 10		إظفر	34.5	إخترة	81 15	إيطال
49.5		إحد	22.1	أحد رصاص	13.11	إيطال
8 14 9 5 9 9 90 10		إحد	71 10	أفلام	46 10	إيهام
34.6		إختبر	11.4; 33.11	إختبر	25 19	إيه
71 19		إحد	7.8+	إختبر	81.8	إيهام
47.1		إحد	8.5+	إحد	10.13	إيهام
76.1		إحد	15.2+	إحد	8.4; 10 11	إيهام
61 2		إحد	35 12	إحد	33.9	إيهام
69.4		إحد	60.18	إحد	81 13	إيهام
79 13		إحد	64.8	إحد	25.7	إيهام
27.1		إحد	10.4	إحد	63.14	إيهام
7.9		إحد	19.9+	إحد	71.10	إيهام
6.0		إحد	11.13; 30.8	إحد	64.11	إيهام
45 11		إحد	7.8; 92.10+	إحد	49.4	إيهام
43 11		إحد	10	إحد	14.17	إيهام
8 16		إحد	9.14	إحد	16.3; 21 11	إيهام
1.4+		إحد	95.9	إحد	69 11	إيهام
41 10; 89.7		إحد	41.5	إحد	62.3	إيهام
68.9		إحد	9.15	إحد	87.5	إيهام
1 10		إحد	4.4; 11.1	إحد	4 11; 10 4 1.2	إيهام
43 2		إحد	54.2+	إحد	80	إيهام
92 2		إحد	62.16; 83 10	إحد	17 19; 18 4	إيهام
27.8		إحد	61.1	إحد	25.4; 91.6	إيهام
15.8		إحد	39.1	إحد	96.8	إيهام
70 11		إحد	55.11	إحد	57 17	إيهام
47 20		إحد	69	إحد	81 11+	إيهام
6.10; 90 13		إحد	42.12	إحد	10.8; 81 9	إيهام
90.8		إحد	10.1	إحد	97.6	إيهام
41 2 17; 59 2; 17 2 7		إحد	7.14 17 92 11	إحد	18.4	إيهام
39.18; 40.11; 40 12-14; 41 5		إحد	39 17; 32 16	إحد	85.17	إيهام
44 12 13 36 18		إحد	58.15; 59 2	إحد	8.12	إيهام
63.6		إحد	22.1; 23.8	إحد	38.1	إيهام
41 11		إحد	62 17	إحد	40 12	إيهام
88 2		إحد	27.7; 89 6+	إحد	38.1; 22 6	إيهام
27.6		إحد	88 18; 95 10	إحد	22 19; 1.1	إيهام
41 11		إحد	89 12	إحد	10 1.1; 23 2; 48 16	إيهام
72 12		إحد	88.1	إحد	92.20	إيهام
95 16		إحد	19 21; 41 2	إحد	8.4	إيهام
		إحد	41 14; 41 17	إحد	30.8	إيهام
		إحد	49 4; 74.1	إحد	25 10	إيهام

32 6	تجوير	81.10	يا ط	16	ال
32 5	تجوير	88 8	يا عد	32.10 ; 88 2	الود
81 8	تحت ريشه	81 6	يا ف	82 1	العام
20 10 +	تجوير	21 14	يا حساب	81 2 0	إمامه
21 17	تجوير	95 11	يا سفل و لعل و البدهيه	67 4	إمامه
89 9	تجوير	81 6	يا ع	29 8	أمر
97 11	تجوير	9 2	يا ع	6 13	أمر
6 17	تجوير	8 1	يا ع	27.17	أمر
7 1	تجوير	87 20	يا ع	27 13 +	أمر
87 20	تجوير	70 1 2	يا ع	88.8	أمر
41 11	تجوير	20 14	70 13	65.11 ; 65.16-17	أمر
57 19	تجوير	20 13	يا ع	67.12 ; 95 10	أمر
8 4	تجوير	88 3	يا ع	34	أمر
91 5	تجوير	95 11	يا ع	43 4	أمر
88 7	تجوير	91 11	يا ع	6 15 , 7 10 , 89.10	أمر
20 2 , 88.14 4	تجوير	96 15	يا ع	6 17	أمر
71 8	تجوير	11 10	يا ع	73.10	أمر
10.1 ; 33 17	تجوير	7 12 +	يا ع	23 2	أمر
32 6	تجوير	88 12	يا ع	7 11	أمر
75 4	تجوير	90 1	يا ع	41 12	أمر
60 2	تجوير	7 8	يا ع	81 8	أمر
32 6	تجوير	70 5	يا ع	92 13	أمر
58 4	تجوير	47 4	يا ع	7 1 1	أمر
90 14	تجوير	14 14	يا ع	51 12	أمر
70 2	تجوير	4 1	يا ع	94 11	أمر
10 12	تجوير	38 2	يا ع	7 9	أمر
31 7	تجوير	55 8	88 6	33 1	أمر
15.7 94 21	تجوير	81 7	يا ع	81 8	أمر
89 15	تجوير	6 17 ; 88.6 +	يا ع	80 7	أمر
7 10	تجوير		يا ع	9 11 +	أمر
7 9	تجوير		يا ع	15 7 83 1	أمر
41 16	تجوير	56.11 , 98 3	يا ع	70 17	أمر
30 12	تجوير	7 9	يا ع	46 7 , 94 8	أمر
89 19	تجوير	19 4	يا ع	31 1 1	أمر
20.14 ; 70.14	تجوير	90 6	يا ع	28 2	أمر
20 13 , 70.13	تجوير	43 4	يا ع	27 7 75 2 +	أمر
47.8	تجوير	62 1	يا ع	47 16	أمر
54 11	تجوير	62 1	يا ع		أمر
24 11 +	تجوير	82 19	يا ع		أمر
87 20	تجوير	94 11	يا ع	95 2	أمر
63 13	تجوير	32 16	يا ع	91 4	أمر
77 15	تجوير	71 16	يا ع	43 13.42.21.44.3	أمر
20 13	تجوير	32 6	يا ع	38 10	أمر

60 11	حرب	8.18 +	جمل	20.10	تكذيب
48 1	حرف	16 9	حياد	36 22	تكفير
16 18 +	د	16 9	جنادية	61 15 , 61 10	تكلف
16 18 88 +	حركة	9 13	جند	1 16 83 17 88 4	تكلم
39.21 ;	حركة الاصطلاح	59.18 , 91.5	جند	85 12 ,	تكليف
41 20 ; 42 4 , 42 17		22 11	جند	60 8 9 , 68 11	
41 20 ;	حركة الاحتساب	8 + 8	جند	28 2	تكوين
42.4 , 43.12		19 14	جند	8 6 10	ثم
95.11	جند	82 3	جند	33 1	تجاس
97 13	حساب المناظرات	7 16 , 91 6 7 92 14	جند	80 15	تسام
71.18	جند	72 3 88 12	تجمل	7 3 92 6	تسمير
38 10	جند	11 10	جند	35 6	تسليم
17 8	جند	51 4	جند	60 15 , 71 8	تسليم
88 11 , 41 16 17 ;	حق	8.14 , 90 1 +	جند	76 1 89 7 4	توحيد
58 13		20 17	جند	89 18	توحيد
42 6 , 46 7 ,	حقيقة	18 3 , 71 20	جند	16 7	توسيع
9 7 , 10 1 , 92 10	حكم	19 16 36 14 , 19 15	جند	8 7 45 22	تواف
7 15 92 15 +	حكم	15 19 30 15		96	تواف
10.11.13	حكم				
38 4 , 40 4 , 64 12 ,	حق	9 15	جند	52 10	ثلاث ثلثة
72 11-1 , 73 1		11 4 ; 88 7	جند	11 16	ثلاث
74 8 , 10 15		24 7 41 18 74 12	جند	14 2 1	ثلاث
72 10 , 20-21 ;	حقول	8 2	جند	27 8	ثلاث
73.2 3 , 15-16 , 19 ,		91 4	جند		
74 2 , 6 , 9 , 12 14		71 14	جند		
41 8	جند	6 7 41 19 +	جند	29 16	جائر
41 11	جند	36 5	جند	32 3	جائر
22 8 , 91 15	جند	6.21	جند	95 1	جادل
8.8 +	جند	10 7 3	جند	93 14	جارية
10 13 , 91 4	جند	96 8	جند	6.17 ; 89.9 +	جائر
30 16	جند	9.4, 8 , 89.14	جند	32 13	جائر
1 18	جند	7 4, 89 14 +	جند	43 4	جائر
		71 15	جند	41 11	جائر
73 17	جند	10 15 92 1 +	جند	50 1	جند
77 2 73 1-2	جند	29 18	جند	71 7	جند
77 2	جند	7 10 32 3 +	جند	7 10 , 8 4	جند
3.15	جند	10 51 +	جند	43 2 , 43 4 60 17	جند
38 10	جند	71 15 , 9 3	جند	18 , 72 21 , 73 1 ,	
43.19 , 93.6	جند	22 6 45 18 ,	جند	88 1	
26.1	جند	30 20		42 10	الجند
42.18	جند	91 11	جند	7 12 , 10 1 3, 1	جند
41 11	جند	45 2	جند	19 10 , 88 2	

فهرس الكلمات والاصطلاحات

١٠١

18.12	سور	87.9	رباط	72.2	حظم
91.6	سوي	14.15	زج	73.16	خطره
		49.6	وجهة	21.13	خطاً
		49.7	وجه	21.19 +	خلا
25.20 + 10	هـ	95.7	رد	21.20 : 9.5	حلاف
96.14 : 91.11	خامد	91.15	رد	81.18	حلاف
91.4	طبعة		رد الهـ الى شكله ونظيره	29.8	خلف
92.10	طبة	92.9		88.5	حلق
67.4	طكة	22.19	رد	6.8 : 93.5 +	حلق
47.8	الدر	71.14	وسم	6.4 : 48.12	حلق
67.7	خرم	71.14	رسوم	90.14 +	
5.11	خرط	88.4	رطبات	90.8	الحلق الاول
5.12.19	الدر	46.14	زطبي	95.16 : 90.19	خلق الكرك
51.16	خرق	91.4	رطبة	97.17	
94.21 - 95.9	الفرسية	91.12	وطرقة	30.11	خلق
75.8	الصدقة	10.13	زطبي	81.9	حيلة
1.10.12	حك	88.9	زوي	64.7	مواطر
45.7	شكر			47.7	الغور
6.9	شكل			37.14	خلق
31	شم	71.11	رجم		
96.14	شعد	7.8 +	ر		
44.16 : 97.11	شيرة	7.14 : 92.2 :	رجم	52.13	دبر
10.4 +	شي	60.9	الركوة	40.5	قال
		41.5	زمان	6.5 : 15 : 7.7	دبر
		78.1	زلا	73.2	دعاء
91.6	عطر	26.5	زوال	12.16	مغوى
8.4 +	صايم			6.8 : 89.7 +	فلز
45.7	صبر			12.7	دلاء
11.16 : 91.8 +	صبة	38.5	صاير	6.1 : 91.12 +	دليل
9.6 : 10	صبة	20.10	صاكن	35.6	الدنيا
52.7	صداق	7.11 : 42.9	صقي	87.20 : 88.15 :	الدين
75.8	صداق	37.16 : 39.5	صجيل	94.21	
52.8	صداق	30.7 : 70.16	صفا		
73.11	صدة	30.7	صفيه		
14.8 +	صفت	88.12	صكب من	74.13	دبة
88.2	صقات الهاري	17.8 : 88.13	صكوت	20.9	دعوى الى
14.18 - 24.4	صقات البت	19.14 : 88.1	صكون	33.7	دوق
52.12	صقات عده	24.9	صعدان		
22.8	صفا	7.10.11	صبة		
67.16	الصلاة	95.9	الصم	22.19	وزن
67.14	صن	95.14	الصحيات	68.5	وزلا
10.17	الصناد العكب	10.6-8	صقي	32.2	الزفة
11.5		11.5 +	صميم	9.4	رب

24 2	عبر	٢٠ 20 ٢١	عدد	10, 19	اصطلاحات
37 3	عبل	2 3	عاصر	6 4 : 9 3	صحة
	عس	7 1 1	عاق	- 1	صك
21 6	عجود	٢ 4 ٩	عاصر	81 4	صم
9 1 1	عجود و... ت	49 ١	عاقب	2 2	صوب
10 8 10	عجود	4 10 68 6	عاقبة	- ٩	صورة نافذة
		8 1 ١	عاقب	90 ١ ١	صفة
		80 1 ٩ ١ 0	عاق		
30 20 : 30 17 18	عاقب	10, 10 +	عاق		
18 14	عاقب	25, 18 9 ٩	عاق	1 8	طام
30 9	عاقب	91 ١ ٧ 2 ١ 2	عاق	8 21	عقال
91 11	عاقب	2 6	عاقب	11 10 9 ١ 4	سد
1 1 9 19	غير محذوف	68 1 6	عاقبة	1 2 3 ١	عرب
12 21	الكبرى	11 1 97 1 1	عاق	2 1 3 4 8 1 ١ ١	عروء
		6 10	عاق	42 2 6 8 1 1 15	
		7 1 1 9 4 +	عاقب	- 11	صفة
78 10	عاقب	93 2	عاقب	24 1	طام
76 2	عاقب	20 16 : 71 9	عاقب	2 20	طام
12 1 ٢	عاقب	1 ٢ 34 17 +	عاقب	88 1	عقال
75 10	عاقب	17 10 +	عاقب	84 3	عقال
16 1 : 17 3	عاقب	75 16	عاقب	88 9 3	عقال
87 20	عاقب	١ 8	عاقب		
68 9	عاقب	19 14 : 36 14 16	عاقب		
16 9 : 25 11 : 30 15	عاقب	17 19 : 88 2	عاقب		
72 ٢	عاقب	44 17	عاقب	٢ 8	طام
١ 8	عاقب	91 10	عاقب	87 19	طام
80 19 20	عاقب	92 8	عاقب	2 14	طام
58 16 : 71 1	عاقب	49 ١	عاقب	88 2	طام
15 9 +	عاقب	56	عاقب	1 4 ١ ١	طام
٢ 11	عاقب	49 ٢	عاقب	81 2	طام
67 3	عاقب	81 16	عاقب	2 8	طام
15 19 : 100 13 +	عاقب	8 16	عاقب		
6 9 : 16 5 : 100 13 +	عاقب	90 ٢ ١ 1 1	عاقب		
12 18 20	عاقب	١ 14	عاقب	41 8 78 11 81 12	طام
13 3 1 ٢ 9	عاقب	28 12 19 7 12	عاقب	6 1	طام
"	عاقب	10 12 88 12	عاقب	28 8	طام
89 3	عاقب	11 10 +	عاقب	44 17	طام
9 2 ١	عاقب	41 ١	عاقب	10 21 81 1 1	طام
1 1 1 +	عاقب	12 8 9 8 ١ ١	عاقب	9 1	طام
17 18 21 18 ١ 9	عاقب	47	عاقب		
90 14	عاقب	38 11	عاقب		
10 3 : 17 17	عاقب	4 13	عاقب	8 8 +	طام
20 : 18 3 6 7	عاقب	38 15	عاقب	17 17	طام
26 19 21 ٢ 3	عاقب		عاقب		

8 15	لا على مكان سبق	26 18	لوى	19 4, 12	فيما لم يزل
19 11	لا معاك	65 11	لوى		
15 8	لا لهابة له	23 6	لوى		
لا يجوز ان يجمع الامة على خطا		16 17 6 1	القياس	92 7	قاله بـ
81 9		38 9, 41 1, 62 10		10 20 +	قادر
14 4 +	لا يظفر	67 11 73 20		57 6	قارن
22 10	لازم	12 7 8 59 8	قياس على	59 17, 95 7	قاس
7 9, 8 5 +	لحق	62 16	فيما	38 17 82 4	قاصد
7 11, 23 1, 88 21	لزم			72 7	قالب
70 3		38 13 : 66 9	كالى	23 12	قادر بـ
46 4	لفظ	36 15	كاذب	36 13	قادر عن
90 7	لقر	29 2	كاره	7 17	قامت دلا على
11 8 +	لم يهر	73 13 97 1 +	كافر	71 9	قائم
33 7	لحق	7 11	كبيسة	71 18	قائم
		45 12	كاتب	72 3	قائم
		52 1 +	كاتب	38 13	قائم
92 20	ما لا لهابة له	39 15 +	كاتب	58 10	قائم
92 1	لا لهابة له لا حدث له	7 5, 18 12	كراحة	38 4	قائم
71 3	كلمات القاهر	93 4	كراحة	6 7 : 90 12 +	قاهر
29 14	صباح	23 18	كره	45 11, 52 19	قاهر
88 21	مبتدأ	28 20	كسب	37 2	قاهر
11 4	البيصرون	23 14, 17 3, 39 10, 41 11, 40 5 9 41 11	كسب	9 3, 20 1, 100 16 +	قاهر
71 14	مبني	42 1 3 + 8 13 11		7 12	قاهر
17 1 +	مشرك	43 13, 14 16 18, 19		90 3	قاهر
47 8	مشعل	44 2, 4 2 10		7 8, 92 16 +	قاهر
31 6	مشعل	56 19, 57 1 6 8		87 7	قاهر
12 21	مشعل	4 11 58 5		87 6	قاهر
50 9	مشعلات	27 13	كسر	88 7	قاهر
20 14 : 70 13	مشعل	96 3	كسر	93 16	قاهر
15 3 +	مشكل	27 17 : 70 17	كسر	34 8	قاهر
89 14	مشكوب	77 8	الكس	28 8 : 28 19, 72 7 : 70 1	قاهر
91 11	للتك دون	15 2, 17 7, 88 1 +	كلاء	6 20 : 18 18	قاهر
33 11	مقباس	15 4	كلاء	38 12 : 93 1	قاهر
30 9	مقبور	38 12	كف	36 16, 45 16 ff.	قاهر
40 14	مقبور	90 15	كف	46 14, 47 2	قاهر
71 7	مقبور	10 16	كف	40 9, 45 11 +	قاهر
81 7	مقبور	43 7	كف	7 10	قاهر
8 15 37 14, 90 13	مقبور	15 13	كف	34 20	قاهر
56 7	مقبور	21 5 70 10	كف	32 6, 34 9 : 88 20	قاهر
63 8	مقبور	16 16	كف	97 11	قاهر
35 11	مقبور			23 6, 40 12-13	قاهر
10 5 32 14	مقبور			99 8, 67 4	قاهر
91 8	مقبور	91 17	لا على طاعة		

26 8	المحوسبات	7 12	مضموع	10.1 3 6, 7	مجموع
33.11	مماس	49 6	مضروب	12 1 . 92 20 +	مضاعف
43 9	مماسية	19.13	مضاد	-3. 0	مضاد
7. 17	مماسات	40 2	مضمر	7 11 . 90 13	مضمرات
71 14	مضروب	31 9	مماسية	32 9 93 3	مضمرات
7.8	من	54 13, 50 17	مواضع للخط	19 8	المضمرات
32 3	من باب التماس	40 18		30 14	محدود
95 8 10	من جهة المحور السلبي	39 17	مضارعة	21 9	مضروب
63 7	منظر	97 18	مضاد	29 10	مضروب
93 8	مماسية	40.13	مماسية	43 5	مضروب
34 8	مسكن	34 5	مضروب	22 7 ; 56 8 ; 91 7 +	مضروب
11 4 31 7 97 9	من	69 6	مستند	42 12	مضارب
20 15	من	42 7	مضروب	10 . 95 10	مضروب
22 9	من	43 8	مضروب	7 14 . 92 11	المضروب
34.6	منقطع	54 14-16	مضروب	43 1 4+ 8	المضروب
32 13 91 1	من	25 10	مضوية	6 4 16 18 . 7 7	مضروب
1 8.8 6 91 8 +	من	6 3 . 92 2	مضروب	51 17	مضروب
70 16	من	50 18	مضروب	36 8	المضروب
11 4 +	من	3. 10	مضروب	8 6 +	مضروب
2 21 . 56 11	من	10 8 54 5 7 +	مضروب	32 .	مضروب
		80 4	مضروب	38 8	مضروب
		93 18	مضارب	4 4	مضروب
73 11	من	12 21	مضارب	89 15	مضروب
6 1	من	82 2	مضارب	18 1 .	مضروب
43 13	من	51 3	مضارب	7 .	مضروب
6 14 16	من	88 7	مضارب	94 16	مضارب
97 12	من	76 4 9 4	مضارب		مضارب
92 8	من	52 10	مضارب	6 13	مضارب
27 7 16	من	42 8 . 51 1	مضارب	95 1-2	مضارب
72 20	من	43 9 10	مضارب	6 3 +	مضارب
8.18 91 12	من	31.18 + 100.10	مضارب	4 16	مضارب
83 1.12 16 95 5	من	46.2	مضارب	17 20 +	مضارب
83 14 . 95 4.6	من	25 20	مضارب	34 4 +	مضارب
97 1		15 6 . 16 3	مضارب	21 10	مضارب
83 14	من	23 3	مضارب	11 4	مضارب
82 3	من	97 6	مضارب	42 9	مضارب
8 4	من	2. 6 . 89 9	مضارب	92 1	مضارب
9 6.10 15 34 8 .	من	39 5 . 18 . 20 ;	مضارب	44 11	مضارب
87 40		40 6 . 7 . 9 ; 42 1	مضارب	39 10	مضارب
9.7 . 92 9	من	43 11 7 11 50 13	مضارب	36 9	مضارب
22 18	من	7 16	مضارب	38 13	مضارب
14 2 +	من	77 16	مضارب	79 8	مضارب
21 1	من	71 16	مضارب	79 13	مضارب

فهرس الكلمات والأصطلاحات

١٠٨

21 6	وقت	٦٤ ٧ +	وجه	19 .	تلفي
12 5 , 93 2 +	رقم	12 21 +	وجه	62 ٥0	لشخص
24.14	رقم	25.5	وجوب	6 6 11 14 , 7 2	لشخص
78 16	رقم	13 13 : 91 8	وجوب	60.13	لشخص
19 17	رقم	7 6	وجوب		
75.16	رقم	29 17 90 6 , 85.20	وجوب		
24 11	رقم	64.12 , 88 11	وجوب	88 4	عدى
		64 7	وجوب		
		97 13	وجوب	24 14 , 72 21	واجب
91 4	رقم	25 8 +	وجوب	8 ٥ , 28 9 , 89 14	وجوب
91 11	رقم	25 1	وجوب	7 ٥	والله
17 17 +	رقم	٢٧ 2	الوجوب والوجوب	11 18 , 22 14 +	وجوب
73.13	رقم	77 2 , 79 1 2	الوجوب	2٤.21	وجوب

فهرس اسكتاب

كتاب اللمع

٥	حسبه كتاب
٦	الباب الاول : باب الكلام في وجود المانع وصعانه
١٥	الباب الثاني : باب الكلام في القرآن والادراك
٢٤	الباب الثالث : باب الكلام في اراء ائمة شافى الحديث
٣٣	الباب الرابع : باب الكلام في رونه
٣٥	الباب الخامس : باب الكلام في القدر
٥٤	الباب السادس : باب الكلام في الاستطاعة
٧٠	الباب السابع : باب الكلام في احدين والنحو
٧٥	الباب الثامن : باب الكلام في الايمان
٧٧	الباب التاسع : باب الكلام في احسن وعدمه ووعده ووعده
٨١	الباب العاشر : باب الكلام في الامامة

الرسالة في استفسانه المحرمين في علم الكلام

٨٧	رسالة في استفسانه المحرمين في علم الكلام
١٩٠:٨٧	عنوان مسكرى محرمين في اصول الدين
٢٠٠:٨٨	اجواب الاول
١:٨٩	اجواب الثاني
١٨:٩٤	اجواب الثالث

الفهارس

٩٨	فهرس الاول
١٠٠	فهرس الكتاب واداءه
١٠٨	فهرس الكتاب

م مع هذا كتاب في الطبعة
الاولى كيه ايدوب في التلاوة
من شهر فبراير الذي سنة ١٩٥٢





ACHEVÉ D'IMPRIMER
SUR LES PRESSES DE
L'IMPRIMERIE CATHOLIQUE
A BEYROUTH LE DIX SEPT
JUN MIL NEUF CENT
CINQUANTE TROIS

- Tanzih 188, 190, 202
 al-taqīd 120
 tashbīh 147-8, 188, 190, 197
 ta'āl 148, 197
 tawallud 219
 tawātur 227
 tawhīd 167, 188, 190, 218
 Temporal production 8, 13, 18, 45-7
 Ten, the 247
 Term (death) 251
 Terminology 187
 Thing (inexistent not a thing) 221-2
 Throne (God's) 172-3, 214, 237
 Torah 128
 Tradition(s) 153-5, 165, 190, 196,
 200-1, 204, 222, 227
 Traditions from Muhammad 149,
 156-7, 159, 161, 166, 169, 183, 191,
 201, 204-6, 242, 248
 Transcendence of God 51
 Trinity 17, 73
 Twins (problem of the) 73-4
 Unbelief 65-6, 69
 uṣūl 186, 200, 212
 uṣūl al-dīn 186, 200
 uṣūl al-'uqūd 213
 Validity of reasoning 11
 Verses (of Ibn 'Asākir) 206-7
 Fire identifies and Ash'arite vision of
 God 45
 Vision of God 45-52, 153, 160, 172,
 214, 217, 226, 242
 waṣf 168
 Wasīla 94
 Well-made works 12-3
 Wine 226
 Wiping of shoes 249
 Works of wisdom 13-7, 38
 yastaqī'u 239
 yuridu 21
 yutuqūnahu 16-7
 Zakāt 85
 zandaqa 200
 zawāya 140
 zandīq 189

- Night of Power 153, 155
 Objection to Kalām 120-1, 183-7
 Omitting to act 27
 Only the foolish will folly 42-3, 98
 Particular and Universal 107-111, 214
 Perception 47
 Permitted, the 41
 Power 77 ff., 89
 Prayer (objection drawn from) 100 ff.
 Prayer for the dead 251
 Prime matter 225
 Promise and Threat 107-111
 Prophet(s) 3, 91, 147
 Punishment of the Grave 160, 244, 250
 qaḍā 65
 qaḍā' 65
 qadar 43, 53
 Qadar 53-75 (general); Qur'ānic proof 53-5; rational proofs 53-9
 Qadariyya (dispute over name) 74-5, 226(?)
 qā'imān bi nafsihi 30
 qalb 49
 al-qawl 94
 qidam al-'ālam 8
 qiyās 23, 227
 Quality 43-7, 78
 qudra 76, 238
 quwwa 76, 238
 Qur'ān — mentioned *passim*
 rafā 188
 rak'a 130
 Rational argument used by Muḥammad 126
 rawāyāt 140
 Reasoning 225, 227
 Repentance of heretics 196
 Reply to al-Ahwālī's charges 188-204
 Restoration of creatures 10-11
 Resurrection (of body) 123-5, 244
 Retort to argument from experience 37-8
 ribaṭ 119
 Saḥba 94
 ṣaddaqa 105
 ṣadr 200
 Satan 194, 252
 Secondary causation 58, 218-9
 Semen not preternal 8
 Settling of accounts 244
 al-Shāfi'ī and Kalām 184-5
 shahāda 147, 169
 al-shāhid wa'l-wujūd 23
 shai' 221-3
 shari'a 41
 sharik 129
 shirk 107
 shubah 154
 sūf 168
 Sign 252
 shir 251
 Sin(s) 96, 104-6, 253
 Sinner (believer or unbeliever) 104-6, 174, 214, 242-3
 al-siyām 87
 Sorcery 251
 Speech — defined 24; of God 20-32, 173, 238
 Stars (influence of) 225
 Station, the 244
 Story of the three brothers 156
 Submissiveness 102
 Substance 31-2
 Substrate 30, 32, 79, 125
 ṣuḥba 253
 sunan (pl. of *sunna*) 163-4
 Sunna of Muḥammad 106-7, 129-131, 148, 151, 160, 176, 184-5, 190, 199, 248, 251
 sunnā 140
 Sura of Quintance (IX) 114
 Sura of Victory (XLVIII) 115
 Suspension of judgment 241
 Sustenance(s) 251
 al-ṭabā' 225
 ta-dī 219
 al-tafrā 120
 taḥlīq 201
 tajmīn 190
 tajwīd 219
 takfir 201
 al-takhlīf 81
 takwīn 168
 ta'mālūn 53
 tamānu 10

- 'ilāt al-khamr 228
 'ilm al-tawhīd 167
 imām 112
 imām(s) 248-250
 imamate (Caliphate) 112-6, 160, 213,
 227-8, 246-7
 Impotence 26-8, 62, 77
 Imputation of justice and injustice
 (to God) 97-103, 218-9
 Inability 83-6 222
 Inert 224
 Infants 99, 251
 Infinite series 20, 223
 Injustice 63 ff.
 Innovation 120-1, 159, 175, 187, 190,
 193, 201, 242, 253
 Intercession of Muhammad 111, 153,
 190, 174, 244
 Invisible world 23, 43
 Iqdār 37
 Isām 150, 175, 193, 243
 isād 100, 145
 isṭi'ā'a 76, 90
 al-istiḥkāk' 92

 jadāl 218, 225
 jamā'a 149
 jamāl 149
 jawhar 224-5
 jihād 186, 249
 jism 161
 jiyya 152
 Juruprudents 122, 150-1, 187, 193
 juz' 85, 101

 kāfir 201
 Kādīm 120-3, 125, 129, 191-4, 148,
 155 183-7, 197, 211, 219-221, 241
 kalāmāhu 32
 kalām nafsi 24
 Kān al-ʿAlāh 48
 karāmāt 252
 kasb 53, 58
 khabar al-wāḥid 184, 227
 khalīfa 112
 khalq 35
 khaṭṭ a-na'māl 53
 khaṭṭa 167, 231
 khāya 193
 King and cripple (example) 36
 kiyāma 10

 Knowledge of God 15-9, 238, 253
 kunā (pl. of kunya) 193
 kunya 192

 lā yutanāḥā 99
 Lailat al-Qadar 153
 Law, the 190-1, 194
 Legal questions 190, 194
 Legitimacy of kalām 183-7
 Loci (theological) 176
 Lying not intrinsically evil 100-3

 madhhab 163
 maḥall 24, 30, 79
 manihūra 220
 maqdūra 259
 al-mawāl 224
 mawḥūf 244
 mawḥūf 168
 min al-qiyās 23
 Mi'rādī 240
 Miḥna 185
 Muecthoos 28, 98
 Motion, necessary and acquired 58-61
 Motion and rest 120, 122
 Motive (of composition of *Taḥyīn*)
 146, 206
 mu'allāqa 108
 al-muḥāsān 41
 muḥl 183, 197
 muḥdath 8, 26
 muḥdith 8
 mujallad 224
 mu'juzāt 252
 mujtahid 175
 mukadbdhiban 109
 mukawwin 168
 mulḥud 195
 Munkar and Nakir 250
 muqaddara 259
 murād 24
 Mu'tazilī (origin of name) 105
 Mu'tazilism 154, 194-6, 202
 Mutual hindrance (argument from)
 9-10, 123

 Nakir 250
 Name «Ash'arites» 187-8, 202
 Names of God 237-8, 245
 Names and Predications 214, 227
 naṣṣ 112
 nazzaha 188

- Conversion (of al-Ash'ari) 150-6
194-5
Creation or incitation of Qur'ān
131-4, 184-5, 241
- al-dahr 212
dahrl 212
Day of Judgment 206
Day of the Porch 116
Day of Resurrection 242, 248
Death (greatest of inequalities) 85
Decree (of God) 65-7, 241
Descent (of God) 172-3, 248
Determination (of God) 65-7, 241,
243, 245-6
Difficulties (Qur'anic) against Qadar
68-75, against Capacity 86-96
din 165
Distinguished Ash'arites 177-183
Divorce and manumission (difficulty)
86
Dream(s) 170, 176, 251
Duration 77-8
- Elements 225
Enjoining what cannot be done 82-3
Essential attributes 19, 33, 64, 161
Eternity of the world 212-3
Evil 67-8, 246
Exceptive phrase (God willing?) 92
Experience (as proof or argument)
17-8, 118
Eyes (of God) 237
- Face (of God) 172, 213, 237
fā'il 56
Faith 104-6, 173, 198, 228, 243, 244-5
fakhr 206
fāsiq 201
faql 212
«Fat Rabbi» and Muhammad 197-8
fatwā 183
Festival prayers 249
Firmā bānānā 23
fiqh 165, 184, 191, 254
Fire (hell) 236, 244-5 251
Friday Prayer 249
- Garden (Paradise) 236, 242, 245,
247, 251
Genealogy of al-Ash'ari 139, 149-150,
191 3
- Generosity 28
Genus 45-6
al-ghā'ib 23
God — existence 6-8; unlike crea-
tures 9; one 9-10 not a body 11-1,
knowing 12-3, hearing and seeing
13, eternity of attributes 14-5; has a
knowledge by which He knows 15-9,
eternal speech 20-32, eternally
willing 23, 32, His willing embraces
all temporally produced things 33-
44, vision of God by the eyes 45-52,
sole agent 56 ff., creates injustice
63 ff.; decrees disobedience and
unbelief 65-7, how evil is from Him
67-8; can enjoin what cannot be
done 82-5; and justice and injustice
97-103; absolute monarch 99; uni-
city 122-3, does not resemble crea-
tures 126-7; hands and face 172,
213, 237, His «descendants» 172-3; in
creeds 236 ff., sole Creator 239-240,
guides and leads astray 240
guma' (qama') 141
- habluka 'alā ghāribi. 130
hadath 8
hadath al-'ālam 8
hadith 150
hādithu 149-150
hafiz 140
halla 57, 101
ḥallāl 94
Hands (of God) 172, 213, 237
al-hayawān 99
al-hayūlā 225
ḥikma 157
Hour, the 237
hudūth 8
Human acts (vs. Acts of man) 58, 57,
61, 76
Human freedom and responsibility 44
- 'Ifit (Difficulty of the) 90-1
ihdāth 225
ijāz 189
imā' 149
iḥkād 191, 175
ikhṭiyār 172
iktisāb 53
ihād 198, 201

IV. — INDEX OF SUBJECTS, TERMS, ETC.

- Accident(s) 46-7, 51-2, 57, 78, 120, 122, 148
 Acquarer 47-8
 Acquisition(s) 53, 56-60, 62, 79-81, 172
 Acts of disobedience 65-6, 71, 75
 ahlatas 8
 aksab 53
 alā haqiqah 33
 'alaib 124
 al-ahwān wa'l-akwān 120
 āmarā 105
 amma ha'd 147
 Analogical proof 23
 Analogy of being 9, 13
 Angels 61, 236, 243, 248
 Apologetic miracles 232
 Apostles 108, 236, 243
 aqmā' 141
 'araḍ 57
 Argument from mutual hindrance 9, 10, 143
 Ascension (of Muḥammad) 160, 250
 a. 'Ashara 'l-Mubashshara 222
 al-'Ash'ari — dates 140, 158, 169-170; name and ancestry 149-150; account of his conversion 15-6 'reformers' of the third century 157-8, distinguished ancestors 158, excellence in disputation 159; orthodoxy and function 160-164; a Shāfi'ite 162; a Mālikite 163; a Hanafite 165, renown of his learning 165-8; his companions and disciples 166; number of his works 167, 229; piety and asceticism 140, 168-9; attitude towards heretics 171; middle position in dogma 171-5; soundness of doctrine 175-6, laudatory verse 176, distinguished followers 177-182; charges of al-Ahwāzī 191-204; works 211-232
 'Ash'arism 9, 19, 57, 146, 163, 203, 222
 Atom(s) 12, 57, 120, 122, 125, 127, 13, 148
 Attack on al-Ahwāzī 204-5
 Attributes (of God) 12 ff., 161, 171, 197, 202, 213-4, 217-8
 Authenticity of the *ḥadīth* 196-7, 23, 22
 al-'awl 130
 ba'd 131
 Bahira 94
 al-bā'in wa'l-battā 130
 hakhalā 28
 Balance, the 160, 244
 baqā' 77
 basar 49
 Basin, the 160, 244
 bātulan 69
 Believers do not remain in hell 160
 Best of centuries (tradition) 169
 bilā kaifa 24, 237
 burva 81
 Body 11-12, 52, 120, 122, 127, 148, 214, 273
 Book (Qur'ān) 129, 131, 160, 184-5, 190, 199, 201, 248
 Books 236, 243
 Bridge, the 244
 Caliphate — cf. Imamate
 «Caliphate of Prophecy» 247
 Caliph 248
 Calumniation of the learned 149
 Capacity 29, 76-96, 97, 213
 Centenary Reformer (tradition) 157-8
 Community (Muslim) 105, 113, 160-1, 169, 190, 244
 Consensus (of Muslims) 12, 113, 115, 176, 185, 190, 227, 248
 Contingencies 47
 Contrary (of knowledge, speech, etc.) 14, 23-30, 34-5, 78, 89, 125

- A Shi'ite Creed (Fyzee) 33, 112
 The Shi'ite Religion (Donaldson) 113
 Streuschrift des Gazālī gegen die Bāṭinīya-Sekte (Goldziher) 151
 Sul' origine del nome dei Mu'tazilīti Nasano, article 105
- Ṭabaqāt al-Mutakallimīn (Ibn Fūrak) 165
 K. al-Ṭabariyyīn (al-Ash'arī) 219
 K. al-Ṭabī'īn 'an Uṣūl al-Dīn (al-Ash'arī) 229
 Ṭabī'īn Kadhib al-Muḥarrī etc. Ibn 'Asākir 140, 145-6, 211, 219, 221, 224, 229, 231
 Tafīr mā ba'd al-Ṭabī'a (Averroes; ed. Bouyges) 17
 Tafīr al-Qur'ān wa-Radd alā mān khāḥaḥa'l-Bayān min 'Ahl al-Ilk wa'l-Buḥān (al-Ash'arī) 150, 200, 223-4, 231
 K. al-Ṭā, al-Rawand 112, 227
 K. al-Tamhīd (al-Bīḡḡān) 8, 12, 35, 85, 112, 184, 212-3, 218, 220, 225
 al-Tanbīh (al-Shīrāzī) 190
 Ta'rīkh Baghdād (al-Khatīb) 199
 Teologia de Averroes (Alonso) 6, 10, 17, 20, 33, 97
 Topica (Aristotle) 225
- al-Uṣūl (Muḥammad 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Jubbā'ī) 215
 Uṣūl al-Dīn (al-Baghdādī) 78, 83, 120
- Vorlesungen über den Islam (Goldziher) 231
- Worship in Islam (Calverley) 150
 K. al-Wuqūf wa'l-'Umūm (al-Ash'arī) 227
 Ziyādāt al-Nawādir (al-Ash'arī) 224

- al-Lam' al-Kabir (al-Ash'ari) 215
 al-Lam' al-Saghir (al-Ash'ari) 215
 al-La'if (al-Ikâfî) 221
 The Life and Times of 'Alî ibn 'Isa, the Good Vizier Bowen 221
 K. al-Luma' (al-Ash'ari) 122, 126-7, 151, 213-5, 218-9, 222, 226, 232

 K. fi'l-Ma'arif (al-Ash'ari) 202
 Mahādī' al-'Arabiyya (al-Sharūnī) 193
 Madhhab al-Dhurra 'inda'l-Mushimīn (trans. Abū Ridāh) 120
 Maqālāt Creed (al-Ash'ari) 24, 170, 172, 235 ff
 Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyin wa l-khāḍi' al-Muḥadḍin al-Ash'ari 216, 217(?), 235
 K. al-Masā'il 'alā Ahl al-Tathnaya (al-Ash'ari) 223
 al-Masā'il al-Manthūrat al-Baghdādiyya (al-Ash'ari) 220
 Meteorologica (Aristotle) 208
 Moslem Schisms and Sects (Halkin) 139, 147
 al-Muḍāhāt (al-Ikâfî) 226
 al-Muhadḍih (al-Khāḍi) 217
 al-Mūjiz (al-Ash'ari) 167, 212, 215, 229
 K. al-Mukhtasar fi'l-Tawhīd wa'l-Qadar (al-Ash'ari) 218
 al-Mukhtasar (al-Ash'ari) 163, 221, 223-4
 al-Mulakhkhas al-Khāḍi 217
 al-Musakhkha fi'l-Masā'il al-Manthūrat al-Baḥriyyāt al-Ash'ari 220
 The Muslim Creed (Weinick) 43, 45, 53, 76, 104-5, 57, 61, 172, 232, 236-7, 241, 243-4, 249, 250
 Muslim Institutions (Gaudetroy-Demonchyne) 41, 153
 Muslim Theology (Trotton) 42, 76, 81, 104-5, 113, 120, 161, 172-3, 191, 214, 216, 219, 221, 228
 K. fi Mutashābih al-Qur'ān (al-Ash'ari) 227

 Naqḍ Sharḥ al-Kutāb (al-Ash'ari) 228
 Naqḍ Ta'wīl al-Adilla (al-Balkhī) 216
 al-Nawādir fi Daqā'iq al-Kalām (al-Ash'ari) 220

 The Origin of the Islamic Doctrine of Acquisition (Watt, article) 53
 The Origins of Ima'ism (Lewis) 203
 Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Schacht) 183

 Philologia (Ritter, article) 229
 Prolegomena (Ibn Khaldūn) 225

 al-Qāmi' li Kutāb al-Khāḍi fi'l-Itida' (al-Ash'ari) 217
 Qawl Jumlat Aḥbāb al-Hadīth wa Ahl al-Sunna fi'l-I'iqāḍ (al-Ash'ari) 229

 Raccolta di scritti editi e inediti (Nallino) 74, 105
 K. fi'l-Radd 'alā'l-Falāḥa (al-Ash'ari) 225
 Reason et foi en Islam (Gardet, article) 171
 al-Rawḍat al-Bahriyya (Abū 'Udhayb) 26, 82, 92
 Rusālat al-Hathīb 'alā'l-Baḥth (al-Ash'ari) 228
 Rusālat Iṣṭihān al-Khawḍ fi Jum al-Kalām (al-Ash'ari) 9-11, 20, 222, 229

 Sharḥ Adab al-Jadal (al-Bāqillāmi) 223
 al-Sharḥ wa l-Taḥḍīl fi'l-Radd 'alā Ahl al-Lik wa'l-Tadlīs al-Ash'ari 215, 229

- al-Fihrist (Ibn al-Nadīm) 229
 Fi'l-Ijtihād fi'l-Ahkām (al-Ash'ari) 222
 Fi'l-Naqq 'ala'l-Jubbā' fi'l-Uqūl (al-Ash'ari) 167
 Fiqh Akbar 241, 243
 Furaq al-Shi'a (al-Nawbakhti) 166
 Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam (Watt) 35, 53, 74, 76, 82, 105, 147, 173, 214, 216, 219, 221
 K. al-Fuḍūn al-Ash'ari 220, and another work with the same title 222
 al-Fuqūl al-Ash'ari 211-3

 A Handbook of Early Muhammadan Tradition (Wensinck) 113, 157, 69, 170, 247
 The Hashwiyya (Halkin, article) 171
 Hayy ben Yaqdhān (Gauthier) 8

 al-Idāna 'an l-qūl al-Diyāna al-Ash'ari 33, 44, 48, 50, 74, 99, 111, 112, 148, 170, 173, 175, 196-7, 219, 226, 229-232, 233 ff
 Iqāḥ al-Burhān fi'l-Radd 'alā Ahl al-Za'gh wa'l-Tughyān (al-Ash'ari) 214-5, 229
 al-Idrāk al-Ash'ari 220
 al-Itā'ā al-Ash'ari 228
 Iktāf al-Fuqahā' al-Sāji 150
 K. al-Imāma (al-Ash'ari) 212
 K. al-Imān (al-Ash'ari) 230
 K. al-Inshāf (al-Bāqillāni) 24, 33, 35, 45, 49, 65
 K. al-Intiqār (al-Khayyāt) 212, 214, 219, 221
 Introduction à la Doctrine Musulmane (Gardet et Anawati) 71, 71, 106
 a.-Iqtisād fi'l-Iqāḍ al-Ghazālī 6, p. 20, 45, 82, 112, 219
 al-Ishād fīmā a. Harāma 6, 17, 20, 24, 33, 45, 53, 82, 97, 112-3
 al-Itiqā' h. jamī' l-irād al-Dahrīyyin wa'ṣ-ṣā'ir asnāf al-Mahidin al-Ash'ari 223
 Institutione dei dritto musulmano malachita Santillana 130

 Jawābāt Ahl Fān (al-Ash'ari) 224
 al-Jawābāt fī 'Sifāt al-Masā'il Ahl al-Za'gh wa'l-Shubahāt al-Ash'ari 217
 Jawāb al-Dimashqiyyin (al-Ash'ari) 220
 Jawāb al-Jurjāniyyin (al-Ash'ari) 220
 Jawāb al-Khurāsāniyya (al-Ash'ari) 219
 Jawāb al-Misriyyin (al-Ash'ari) 222
 Jawāb al-Rāmihumunyyin (al-Ash'ari) 220
 Jawāb al-Sirāfiyyin (al-Ash'ari) 219
 Jawāb al-'Umāniyyin (al-Ash'ari) 216
 Jawāb al-Wāsiyyin (al-Ash'ari) 220
 al-Jawhar fī Radd 'alā Ahl al-Za'gh wa'l-Munkar al-Ash'ari 224
 Jumal al-Maqālāt (al-Ash'ari) 216
 Jus Shafiiticum (Juybolff) 130
 El Justo Medio en la Creencia Asn Palacios cf. a.-Iqtisād

 Kashf al-Asār wa Hāk al-Astār (al-Ash'ari) 151, 230
 al-Khulāfa aw al-Imāmat al-'Uḡmā Rashid Ridā 112
 Kitāb al-Qadar (de Vlieghe) 65

III. — INDEX OF WORKS MENTIONED

In this list are included only those works of al-Ash'ari which seem to have a more or less proper title «Kitāb» or K. is disregarded alphabetically, as are also the articles. The name of the author is added in parentheses immediately after the title.

- Adab al-Jadal (al-Ash'ari) 219(2), 225
 Ahmad ibn Hanbal and the Miḥna (Patton) 20, 169
 K. al-Akhbār (al-Ash'ari) 228
 al-'Amad (al-Ash'ari) 211, 216
 Aqḍat Yaḥyā al-Imām al-Muḥṭab al-Shāfi'i al-Jawāmi, senior 162
 Arabic Grammar (Wright) 192
 K. al-Arḥāṣiyyīn (al-Ash'ari) 219
 K. Aḥkām al-'Ulwiyya (Aristotle's *Metaphysics*) 228
 Atlas of Islamic History 220
 al-Bābu'l-Hādī 'Ashar (al-Hill) 6, 20, 45, 112
 Baghdad during the 'Abbasid Caliphate (Le Strange) 14', 202
 K. al-Bayān 'an Uḥūl al-Imān (al-Simnānī) 218
 K. al-Bayān fī Sharḥ 'Uḥūl Ahl al-Imān (al-Ahwālī) 191
 Beiträge zur islamischen Atomlehre (Pines) 12, 120
 Le Califat dans la doctrine de Rashīd Rūḍā (Laoust) 112
 The Caliphate (Arnold) 112
 The Caliphate, its Rise, Decline and Fall (Muir) 113, 116, 174, 240
 A Commentary on the Creed of Islām (Elder) 136
 al-Dāfi b'l-Muḥaddith (al-Ash'ari) 217
 De Caelo et Mundo (Aristotle) 226
 De Sophisticis Elenchi (Aristotle) 225
 The Disagreement of the Two Shāḥs, al-Qalāṣī and al-Ash'ari Ibn Fūrak 200
 Early Discussions about the Qur'ān (Watt, article) 20
 The Elucidation of Islām's Foundation (Klein) 230, 237, 247
 Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Taki-d-Dīn Ahmad b. Taḥmīya (Laoust) 112
 Exposé de la Réforme de l'Islamisme (Mehren) 145, 191
 Falsafat al-Mu'azala (Nādir) 6, 19-21, 45, 59, 76
 Fī Af'āl al-Nabī (al-Ash'ari) 227
 Fī al-Akhbār wa Takhyishā al-Ash'ari 222
 Fī anna'l-Ma'dūm Laysa bi-Shay' (al-Bāqillānī) 222
 Fī anna'l-Qiyās yakhuṣṣu Zāhira'l-Qur'ān al-Ash'ari 222

- Rāfiqite 188
 Refugees 114
 Salamiyya 191, 194, 198
 Shāfi'ite(s) 150, 162-3, 167, 183, 187, 197
 Shi'a 112-3, 139, 161
 Shi'ite 6, 64
 Sunni 110
 Sunnite(s) 146, 148, 194, 206
 'Ulamā' 133
 Unawaiyya 175
 Umayyad 249
 Yamāmites 115
 Zanādiqa 193

D. — *Place Names*

- Al Ahsā 203
 Abwāz 189
 Arrajān 219
 Baghdad 19, 140, 158, 164, 169, 171, 176, 192, 198-9, 202-4, 220
 Basra 140, 152-3, 59, 64, 167-8, 187, 189, 194, 199, 202-3, 220
 Cairo 216, 229, 230
 Cemetery of the Martyrs 208
 Damascus 145-6, 191, 220
 Egypt 187
 Fās 224
 Hyderabad 229-232, 235
 'Irāq 141, 185, 197
 Irbahān 187
 Istarbul 216
 Jurjān 219
 Khurāsān 187, 199
 Kūfa 197
 Masjid al-Harām 72
 Marandārān 120
 Mecca 104, 201
 Medina 156, 164, 186
 Merv 40, 98
 Mosque of al-Manṣūr 140, 149
 Mowil 119
 Naxābūr 161
 Ray (Rayy) 154
 Rāmburinus 220
 Riḍā' & Rābānīyya 119
 Sāf 219
 Street of the Cells 140, 158
 Sultan's Market 119
 Svirin 197
 Tasharṭān 154, 29
 Tigris 140
 'Uzmān 29
 Wāsit 220
 Wharf of the Water-jars 140
 Yaman 156-7

- Ahl al-Qibla 201
 Ahl al-Rafī 205
 Ahl al-Sunna 163-4, 188, 193, 196, 235
 Ahl al-Sunna wa'l-Jamā'a 149, 151, 155, 160, 166-8
 Ahl al-Ta'usukh 226
 Ahl al-Tashbih 147
 Ahl al-Tathayya 223
 Anthropomorphists 147, 214
 Ashāb al-Hadīth 161, 197, 235
 Ashāb al-Haqq 148
 Ashāb al-Kadīm 200-1
 Arabs 94, 143
 Abbasids 249
 Ash'arite(s) 7, 35, 45, 56-8, 145, 148, 159, 163-4, 176, 182-3, 187-8, 201-3, 205, 232
 Ash'ariyyūn (family) 158, 192
 Assimilators 147, 211

 Banū Ismā'īl 174-8 99
 Banū Kināna 72
 Banū Umayya 205
 Brahmins 212
 Byzantines 115

 Christian(s) 35, 43, 73, 151-2, 212, 227
 Companions 131-2, 189, 191-3, 160, 186-7, 205
 Corporalizers 161

 Dahriya 223
 Dualists 223

 Egyptians 222
 Elementalists 211
 Emigrants 189
 Epicureans 212

 Follower(s) 132, 160, 187

 Hanafites 163
 Hanbalites 19, 100, 163, 176, 196-7, 202, 204, 232
 Hashwyya Hashwi 171-3, 191
 Helpers 114
 Hurairiya 113
 Hypocrites 91, 95

 Jahmiyya (Jahmi) 139, 164, 171-3, 187, 196, 198, 213, 238, 252
 Jews 151, 192, 212
 Jinn 24, 99
 Jam'iyya 214

 Kharijite 113
 Khawārij (Khārdjites) 105, 140, 174, 187, 201, 205, 238, 243
 Khurāsānians 219

 Magians 189, 210
 Mahkute(s) 163-4, 197, 228
 Materialists 125, 211-2, 223
 Metempsychosists 226
 Mu'ajila 199, 203
 Muḥaddida 171
 Mujasimūn 161, 167, 171-3, 191, 214, 227
 Mukayyifa 171
 Mulhida (Mulhidūn) 199, 195-6, 211-2, 216, 220, 222-3, 227
 Murji'a 173
 Mushabbihā 147, 172-3, 191, 203
 Muslim(s) 12, 85, 90, 105, 107, 109, 111-3, 146, 152, 186-7, 195-6, 201, 203-6, 212, 214, 216, 227, 239, 247-8, 250-1, 253
 Mutakallimūn 123, 125
 Mutazala 17, 10, 13, 36, 41-2, 47, 49, 53, 80, 87-8, 91, 103, 110, 139, 141, 147, 151-2, 155, 159, 161, 164, 166-7, 171-4, 187, 193-5, 197-8, 201-2, 203, 213-6, 218, 220, 227, 238, 250
 Mu'tasiliṭe 6, 42, 64, 76, 150-2, 154, 163-4, 194, 198, 201, 216-7, 224
 Muthbitūn (Muthbita) 147-8

 Najāniyya 172-3
 Naturalists 211

 People of the Prayer 103, 108-9
 People of the Qibla 104, 142, 251
 People of Rectitude 105
 Fernans 115
 Philosophers 211, 225
 Polytheists 70-3, 88, 249, 252

 Qadariṭe 100
 Qadariyya (Qadari) 38-40, 73-5, 162, 164, 184, 187, 213
 Qarmatians 203

 Rāfiḍa (Rawāfiḍ) 159, 161, 171, 174, 201, 204-5

B. — Western Names

- Abraham 11, 122, 186
 Adam 87-8, 150
 Apostle (Muhammad) 5, 18, 41, 68,
 79, 119, 126, 128, 130-3, 150-5,
 158, 169, 174, 187, 194, 236, 242-6,
 248
 Aratoile 225-6
 Arnold, T. W. 112
 Averroes 10, 17, 53, 97, 99

 Bell, R. 18, 49, 54, 68, 69, 86
 Blachère, R. 49, 33-4, 68-9, 71, 198-9,
 173
 Bouyges, M. 17
 Bowen, H. 221

 Calverley, E. E. 150

 De Slane 225
 Donaldson, D. M. 113

 Eider E. E. 156
 Eve 88

 Gardet, L. 171
 Gaudetroy-Demombynes, M. 41, 153
 Gauthier, L. 8
 Goldziher, I. 151, 157, 231

 Hakin, A. S. 139, 147, 171
 Hava, J. G. 202

 Jesus 124-9
 John the Baptist 205
 Jonah 93
 Joseph 92
 Juynboll, A. W. T. 130

 Kemal Atatürk 112
 Klein, W. C. 33, 226, 230-2, 237,
 247
 Lane, E. W. 130
 Laoust, H. 112

 Le Strange, G. 140
 Lewis, B. 203

 Masagnon, L. 203
 Mehren, M. A. 143, 177-180, 182,
 191, 228-9
 Michel, A. 45
 Moses 48, 54, 82, 92-3, 128, 249
 Mother of the Faithful 174
 Muir, W. 113, 116, 174, 249

 Nallino, C. A. 74, 105
 Nyberg, H. S. 39, 210

 Palmer, E. H. 49
 Patton, W. M. 20, 163
 Pines, S. 12, 120
 Prophet (Muhammad) 5, 92, 112,
 114-6, 120-2, 126, 129-134, 152-3,
 160, 186, 203, 246-250

 Qiwardeddin 230
 Quatremère, E. 225

 Ratter, H. 166, 216, 229, 235

 Santillana, D. 190
 Satan 194, 232
 Schacht, J. 41, 183
 Solomon 91

 Thomson, W. 53, 230
 Tritton, A. S. — all ref. to his book,
 Muslim Theology; cf. Index III.
 Tughralbeg 159

 de Vlieger, A. 65

 Watt, W. M. 20, 53, 231 — Cf. Index
 III for ref. to his book, *Free Will
 and Predestination in Early Islam*.
 Wensinck, A. J. 43, 53, 76, 113, 157,
 169, 173, 227, 231-2, 247
 Wright, W. 192

C. — Group Names

- Ahl al-Dhmma 159
 Ahl al-Ḥadīth wa'l-Sunna 236
 Ahl al-Ḥaqq 148, 164, 206, 229
 Ahl al-Ḥaqq wa'l-Sunna 235

 Ahl al-Ithbāt 147, 176
 Ahl al-Kutāb 151
 Ahl al-Munīq 226
 Ahl al-Qadar 159

- al-Kawthari 145, 163, 197, 200, 201, 224
 al-Khābūdī 217-8
 al-Khaṣīb — cf. Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. 'Alī
 al-Khidr 82
 al-Kirmānī (Abū Sa'd Ismā'īl b. Abī Sā'ih 182
 al-Kiyā (Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Ṭabarī) 181
 al-Laith b. Sa'd 160, 187
 Mā'ik (b. Anas) 134, 160, 164, 183, 190, 200
 Ma'mar 213-4
 al-Ma'mūn (the Caliph) 163, 185-6
 al-Maqrizī 221, 224
 Mu'āwiyā (the Caliph) 174
 Muḥammad 5, 111-3, 116, 119, 120, 124-5, 127-9, 133-4, 147, 149, 160, 169, 174, 188, 191, 194, 236, 243, 247 (and cf. Apostle, and Prophet, in the next part)
 Muḥammad 'Abd al-Hādī *Abū Ridā* 2
 Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Jabbār (b. 'Alī b. Maḥammad al-Ḥarā'ī) 162
 Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Shāshī 183
 Muḥammad b. 'Alī a. Dāmughānī 83
 Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Khabbāzī 162
 Muḥammad b. 'Alī al-Sūrī 140
 Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusām 167
 Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan 162
 Muḥammad Muḥyī'l-Dīn 'Abd al-Ḥamid 216, 235
 Muḥammad b. 'Umar al-Ṣamari 224
 Mundar 250
 Muslim b. al-Ḥajjāj 160
 Muṣṭafā (Muḥammad) 154
 al-Mustashid Billāh (the Caliph) 158
 al-Mu'tasim (the Caliph) 163, 185
 Na'im b. Ḥamād 196
 al-Najār 172
 Nakir 250
 a. Nāshī 214
 Nāṣir b. al-Ḥusām al-'Umarī al-Ḥarāwī 162
 Naṣr b. Muḥammad al-Shāshī 183
 al-Nawbakhtī 166
 Naṣīl Makka (Abū 'Abdallāh al-Ṭabarī) 181
 al-Nazzām 120, 167, 213
 al-Nazzām (Minister) 176
 Qāḍī'l-'Askar Abū'l-'Abbās 167
 al-Qaḥnūfī 200
 al-Qarwīnī (Abū Ḥāsum al-Ṭabarī) 180
 al-Rashīd (the Caliph) 185
 Rashīd Riqā 112
 al-Sāhib Ibn 'Abbād 224
 al-Sājī 165
 al-Sha'bī 183
 al-Shāfi'ī (founder of legal school) 134, 157-9, 160, 162, 183-6, 188, 199, 200, 205
 al-Sharīfūnī 193
 Shu'aib (daughter of) 93
 al-Siddīq (Abū Bakr) 114-5
 al-Subkī 146, 224
 Sufyān 197
 Sufyān b. 'Uyayna 153
 al-Ṭabarī 34
 Ṭalḥa 174
 al-Tawḥīdī 224
 a. Thawrī Sulvān 134, 160
 al-Udārī (Abū Bakr al-Bukhārī) 178
 'Umar (the second Caliph) 114 b. 139, 205, 246-7
 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz Umayyad Caliph 15-8
 'Uthmān (the third Caliph) 174, 197, 204-5, 246-7
 'Uthmān b. Saḥmān al-Barrī 187
 'Uzair 128-9
 Waki' 133
 Wāṣil b. 'Atā' 105-6
 al-Wāthiq (the Caliph) 185
 al-Wazzān 194
 Yahyā b. Zakarīyyā 205
 Zaid 16
 Zakarīyyā b. Yahyā al-Sājī 150
 al-Zamaksharī 54, 87-8
 al-Zubair 174
 Zubair (the Jāhūryya poet) 108
 Zuhair b. Harb 186

- 'Alī b. 'Isā 221
 'Alī b. Mahdī 120
 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. Abī Ayyūb 162
 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Mulqābādī 160
 'Alī b. Rustam 120
 'Amr b. Dīnār 31
 al-Awzā'ī 160
 al-Baḥdāwī 49, 54, 87, 124, 128
 al-Balkhī (al-Ka'bi) 216, 218, 223
 Bandār b. al-Ḥusain 140, 169, 177, 178
 al-Rāqillānī 7, 8, 24, 49, 65, 83, 85, 151, 178, 184, 188, 197, 200, 202, 212-3, 218, 222, 225
 al-Barbādhārī 97
 B. al-B. b. Abī Burda b. Abī Mūsā al-Ash'arī 140, 158, 193
 B. al-B. al-Marwī 185
 al-Bukhārī 160
 al-Burhān (?) 218
 al-Dabbān 7, 228
 al-Dabbān 228
 al-Dabbān 228
 al-Dabbān 228
 Fakhr al-Dīn Abū 'l-Ma'ālī Muḥammad b. Abū 'l-Faraj b. Muḥammad b. Baraka (of Mosul) 119
 al-Fāṭima 200
 al-Fāṭima the Caliph 'Umar 114-5
 Fāṭima 111
 al-Fawā' 213
 al-Gazālī 7, 157, 158, 181, 213
 Ḥaṣṣ al-Fard 184, 185
 al-Ḥaṣṣ 249
 al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī 163
 Ḥārith al-Warrāq 226
 al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī 205
 Ḥātim b. 'Unwān al-Aṣamm 184
 al-Ḥusain b. al-Faḍl al-Baṣrī 186
 Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Qudā'ī 145-6
 Ibn 'Abbās 156, 165
 Ibn Abī Sālih al-Ṭabarī 188
 Ibn 'Amr 199
 Ibn 'Asākir 145-6, 150, 156, 165-6, 168, 170, 175, 177, 181, 189, 190, 206, 211, 219, 228-9, 231, 235
 Ibn Fārak 149, 158, 165-6, 170, 178, 192, 200, 204, 211, 224, 226, 228
 Ibn 'Iyād 183
 Ibn al-Jurjānī (Abū Bakr al-Dimashqī) 180
 Ibn Khaldūn 225
 Ibn Kulāb 201
 Ibn al-Labbān Abū Muḥammad al-Iḥṣānī 188
 Ibn al-Nadīm 229
 Ibn al-Qāsim (Abū 'l-Ḥasan 'Alī al-Qasrawānī) 164
 Ibn Qasr 225-6
 Ibn al-Rawandī 198, 212, 217-8, 226-7
 Ibn al-Raḥbī (Abū 'l-'Abbās Aḥmad b. Salāma) 182
 Ibn Shāhin 176
 Ibn al-Su'ūdī 199
 Ibrāhīm b. 'Alī al-Furzābādī 119
 Ibrāhīm b. Ismā'īl b. 'Uyā 184
 al-Ḥaṣṣ 200
 Imām al-Ḥaramain Abū 'l-Ma'ālī 'Abd al-Malik b. 'Abd al-Ḥaṣṣ al-Juwānī 162, 180, 181
 al-'Irāqī (Abū Muḥammad al-Ṭabarī) 177
 Isā b. Maryam 250
 al-Ḥaṣṣ 167
 al-Ḥaṣṣ 167
 Isḥāq b. Rāhawāsh 119
 al-Iḥṣān 221, 226
 Ismā'īl b. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Ṣābūnī 162, 167
 al-Jamāl b. Abū Bakr al-Jurjānī, 177
 Iyād al-Ash'arī 157
 Ja'far b. Muḥammad 133, 176
 Jaḥm b. Saḥwān 139, 172
 Jamāl al-Dīn Abū 'l-Faḍl 'Abd al-Rahīm b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Muḥammad (b.) Ibrāhīm b. Khālid 119
 Jamāl al-Dīn Abū 'l-Ḥasan b. Ibrāhīm b. 'Abd al-Ḥaṣṣ 119
 Jibrīl 153
 al-Jubbā'ī (Abū 'Alī) 41, 99, 155-6, 158, 167, 195, 215-6, 223-5, 227
 al-Juwānī (Imām al-Ḥaramain) 7, 24, 23
 al-Ka'bi al-Balkhī 167

- 176
 Abū Ma'mar b. Abī Sa'd b. Abī Bakr al-Jurjānī 179
 Abū Maṣṣūr al-Ayyūbī al-Naṣābūrī 179
 Abū Maṣṣūr b. Ḥimshād al-Naṣābūrī 178
 Abū Maṣṣūr Maḥmūd b. Aḥmad b. 'Abd al-Mun'im b. Māshādah 182
 Abū Maṣṣūr al-Mubārak b. 'Abd al-lāh b. Muḥammad 119
 Abū Muḥammad 'Abdalāh b. Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Iṣbahānī 140
 Abū Muḥammad 'Abdalāh b. Yūsuf al-Juwānī 162, 180, 186
 Abū Muḥammad 'Abd al-Wahhāb b. 'Alī al-Baghdādī 179
 Abū Muḥammad b. Abī Zaid (al-Qairawānī) 164, 201
 Abū Muḥammad 'Alī b. Aḥmad b. Sa'id *ibn Hazm* 140, 158, 159
 Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad al-'Askarī 153, 159
 Abū Muḥammad al-Iṣbahānī (*ibn al-Labbān*) 180
 Abū Muḥammad al-Qurashī al-Zuhri 178
 Abū Muḥammad al-Ṭabari (al-'Irāqī) 177
 Abū Mūsā (al-Ash'arī) 150, 156-8, 60, 170, 189, 19-2
 Abū Muza'far al-Isfara'īnī 181
 Abū Muza'far al-Khawāfi al-Naṣābūrī 181
 Abū Na'im al-Astarābādī 157
 Abū Na'im al-Iṣbahānī 179
 Abū Naṣr 'Abd al-Karīm b. Muḥammad b. Ḥārūn 120
 Abū Naṣr b. Abī Bakr al-Isma'īlī al-Jurjānī 178
 Abū Naṣr al-Kawwāzī 166
 Abū Naṣr al-Qushairī 176, 181
 Abū l-Qāsim 'Abd al-Wāḥid b. 'Alī al-Asadī 140, 158
 Abū l-Qāsim b. Abī Amr al-Bajīlī al-Baghdādī 179
 Abū l-Qāsim b. Abī 'Uthmān al-Ḥamdānī al-Baghdādī 180
 Abū l-Qāsim 'Alī b. al-Ḥasan b. Hibatalāh Thaqataddīn *ibn 'Asākir* — cf. *ibn 'Asākir*
 Abū l-Qāsim al-Anmāfī 185
 Abū l-Qāsim al-Anṣārī al-Naṣābūrī 181
 Abū l-Qāsim al-Dīrīfī 197
 Abū l-Qāsim a. Isfara'īnī 180
 Abū l-Qāsim b. Naṣr (the following?) 229
 Abū l-Qāsim al-Qushairī 161, 180, 186
 Abū Sa'd b. Abī Bakr al-Isma'īlī al-Jurjānī 178
 Abū Sa'd b. Abī 'Uthmān al-Naṣābūrī a. Kharkūshī 179
 Abū Sa'd Isma'īl b. Šālih Aḥmad b. 'Abd al-Malik b. 'Alī b. 'Abd al-Šamad al-Naṣābūrī (al-Kirmānī) 181
 Abū Sahl al-Šu'ūkī 159, 166, 177
 Abū Sa'id As'ad b. Abī Naṣr b. al-Faḍl al-'Umari al-Miḥānī 181
 Abū Tāhir al-Baghdādī 164
 Abū Tāhir b. Kharrāsha al-Dimaṣḥqī 183
 Abū Ṭalīb b. al-Muḥtadī al-Ḥāshimī al-Dimaṣḥqī 179
 Abū Ṭayyib b. Abī Sahl al-Šu'ūkī al-Naṣābūrī 178
 Abū Ṭayyib Sahl al-Šu'ūkī 157
 Abū 'Umar Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusain al-Buḥārī 179, 199
 Abū 'Umar b. Yammānī 188
 Abū Ya'qūb al-Buwayrī 185
 Abū Yūsuf 183
 Abū Zaid al-Marwazī 166, 177
 Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal 133, 157, 160, 163, 176, 185, 202, 205, 232
 Aḥmad b. al-Ḥusain 150
 Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Abī Ayyūb 162
 al-Ahwāzī 146, 150, 188 ff. *passim*, 232
 Ā'sha 174, 205
 Alī (b. Abī Ṭalīb) 112-116, 174, 192, 197, 205, 246, 247
 Alī b. Aḥmad b. Isma'īl (of Baghdād) 164, 201
 'Alī b. Aḥmad al-Juwānī 162
 'Alī Da'ūd b. 'Alī al-Iṣbahānī 223
 'Alī b. al-Ḥasan al-Bakrī al-Zubairī 223

- Abū 'Alī al-Ḥasan b. Sulaimān (?)
 al-Iṣṭahānī 18.
 Abū 'Alī b. Shādhān al-Baghdādī 179
 Abū 'Alī Zāhir b. Aḥmad al-Sirakhi
 166, 171, 18
 Abū Bakr First Caliph 112-116,
 119, 192, 205, 213, 246
 Abū Bakr al-Aḥbarī 197
 Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. 'Alī b. Thābit
 al-Khatib al-Baghdādī 139, 149,
 180, 192, 200, 204
 Abū Bakr Aḥmad al-Barḥaḡī 149, 159,
 180, 183-4
 Abū Bakr b. al-'Arabī 221, 224
 Abū Bakr al-Bukhārī (al-Ḍaḥl) 178
 Abū Bakr al-Dimashqī Ibn al-Jurūl
 180
 Abū Bakr Ismā'īl al-Qarawānī 151
 Abū Bakr al-Jurjānī (al-Ismā'īl), 177
 Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan
 Ibn Farat al-Iṣṭahānī — cf. Ibn
 Farat
 Abū Bakr al-Qaffāl al-Shāhī 177,
 181
 Abū Bakr b. al-Ṣaurafī 141
 Abū Bakr b. Uthmān b. Muḥammad
 180
 Abū Bakr al-Warrāq 184
 Abū Bakr al-Wazān 169
 Abū Bishr (al-Ash'ari's grand father)
 149, 150, 192
 Abū Burda (son of Abū Mūsā al-
 Ash'ari) 151
 Abū Dharr al-Harawī 179
 Abū 'l-Faḡl b. 'Amrū (?) al-Baghdādī
 180
 Abū 'l-Faḡl Muḥammad b. Yabā
 al-Nāṣir 120
 Abū 'l-Farā, (the Mālikite) 228
 Abū 'l-Faṡḡ Naṣr b. Ibrāhīm al-Mu-
 qaddasī 181
 Abū 'l-Faṡḡ Nasrallāh b. Muḥammad
 b. 'Abd al-Qawī al-Maṣṣīfī 182
 Abū 'l-Faṡḡ Salīm b. Ayyūb al-Rāzī
 180
 Abū 'l-Fuṡḡ Muḥammad b. al-Faḡl
 b. Muḥammad b. al-Mu'tamid al-
 Isfarā'ī 182
 Abū Ḥāmid Aḥmad b. Muḥammad
 b. Dalwiyā (?) 179
 Abū Ḥanīfā, 134, 160, 168
 Abū 'l-Ḥasan 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Mu-
 ḥammad b. Ishāq al-Ṭabarī 177
 Abū 'l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Muḥammad b.
 Yazīd 141
 Abū 'l-Ḥasan 'Alī al-Qarawānī 164
 Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Bāḥlī 165, 166, 170,
 177
 Abū 'l-Ḥasan b. Da'ūd al-Muḡrī al-
 Dārānī al-Dimashqī 178
 Abū 'l-Ḥasan b. Mahdī 154, 178
 Abū 'l-Ḥasan b. Māshādhah al-Iṣṭa-
 hānī 179
 Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Na'īnī al-Baṣrī 179
 Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Qāḥṡī 164
 Abū 'l-Ḥasan Rūḡā b. Naṣīf al-Dī-
 mashqī 180
 Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Rummānī 166
 Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Shāhid 198
 Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Sukkarī al-Baghdādī
 179
 Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Sulāmī al-Dimashqī
 182
 Abū 'l-Ḥasan al-Ṭabarī al-Kyā,
 181, 200
 Abū 'l-Ḥasan Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥasan 197
 Abū Ḥāshim (son of al-Jubbā'ī) 228
 Abū Ḥāshim al-Ṭabarī (al-Qarwīnī)
 180
 Abū Ḥāshim al-Abdawī al-Naṣābūrī
 179
 Abū 'l-Hudhail 19, 213, 226
 Abū Hurayra 157
 Abū 'l-Ḥusayn b. Sam'ūn 170, 178,
 197
 Abū 'l-Ḥusayn al-Sarawī 168
 Abū Ibrāhīm al-Muzanī 185
 Abū 'l-Imrān Mūsā b. Aḥmad b. 'Alī
 168
 Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad
 al-Isfarā'īnī 165, 179
 Abū Ishāq of Nere 140, 198
 Abū Ishāq al-Shirāzī 130, 181
 Abū Ja'far al-Simnānī 165, 180, 218
 Abū Ja'far al-Sulāmī al-Baghdādī
 178
 Abū 'l-Ma'ālī b. 'Abd al-Malik (the
 following?) 229
 Abū 'l-Ma'ālī 'Abd al-Malik b. 'Ab-
 dallāh b. Yūsuf al-Jazawī (Imam
 al-Haramain) 169, 171, 181, 186
 Abū 'l-Ma'ālī 'Azīz b. 'Abd al-Malik

II. — INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

This Index is divided into four parts: Arabic names, western names, person or form, group names, and adjectives derived from them; names of places. The order of the English alphabet has been adhered to strictly. The sign for 'acc.' and the dots and long marks, as well as *f* and *h*, are disregarded. But *Abu* and *Ibn* will be found in their proper alphabetical positions. Respective adjectives formed from place names, etc., have usually been retained.

A. — Arabic Names

- Abbas b. Sulaiman 231
 al-'Abbās 113-4
 'Abbās al-'Anbari 195
 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Makkī 163
 'Abu al-Ghāni al-Nā'iri 149
 'Abd al-Jabbār al-'Alī b. Muḥammad al-'Isfahānī 162
 'Abd al-Jabbār al-Rāzi 16
 'Abd al-Karīm b. Hawāzim al-Qushairi 162
 Abdallāh b. Abi Awfī 192
 Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Nābūḥi 162
 'Abdallāh b. Ma'ūd 166
 'Abd al-Lāz b. Muḥammad b. Jābir al-Shāfi' 164
 'Abdallāh b. 'Umar (b. al-Khattāb) 249
 'Abdallāh b. Yazid b. Ḥarmuz 186
 Abdallāh b. al-Zibā'irī 188-9
 'Abu al-Qāsim al-Baghdādī 77-8, 85, 120, 179
 'Abu al-Rahmān b. Mahdī 33, 205
 'Abu l-'Abbās (Qāḍī) al-'Askarī 167, 229
 'Abu l-'Abbās Ahmad b. Salāma b. 'Umayyad b. Muḥammad Ibn al-Rutbi 182
 'Abu l-'Abbās Ahmad b. 'Umar al-Sarāfi 157
 'Abū Abdallāh al-'Azdi 164
 'Abū 'Abdallāh b. Dāmyāl (Bānyāl?) 130
 'Abū 'Abdallāh al-Furawī al-Nasībūrī 182
 'Abū 'Abdallāh Hamawāh al-Sirāfi 166
 'Abū 'Abdallāh al-Hamrānī 172, 175
 'Abū 'Abdallāh al-Hamrānī al-'Abdallāh b. Ḥātim al-'Azdi 154
 'Abū 'Abdallāh al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad 172
 'Abū 'Abdallāh al-'Isbahānī al-Shāfi' 178
 'Abū 'Abdallāh al-Khābiri al-Nasībūrī 180
 'Abū 'Abdallāh al-Khāfī 172, 177
 'Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad b. 'Abdallāh b. Ḥamdawāh 178
 'Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad b. Ahmad b. Yazīd b. Ḥarmuz al-Dibāfi al-Muqaddasī 181
 'Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad b. 'Abū b. Muḥammad 204
 'Abū 'Abdallāh Muḥammad b. Mūsā al-Mawraqī 162-4
 'Abū 'Abdallāh b. Muḥammad al-Ba'ri 177, 197, 200, 203
 'Abū 'Abdallāh al-Tabarī (Nasībūrī) 181
 'Abū 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Shurūfi al-Jurjānī 178
 'Abū 'Alī b. Abi Ḥarīṣ al-Hamdānī al-Dimashqī 180
 'Abū 'Alī al-Daqqūq al-Nasībūrī 178

36.79	124	48.15	114,115	67-4	69
36.80	10,125	48.16	115	67.8-9	109
36.81	11	50.3	123	68.42	95
37.95/93	54	50.16/15	249	69.25-94	110-111
37.96/94	53,239	51.01	8	72.28	127
38.27/26	69	51.56	94	75.22-23	48
38.28/27	70	52.35	239-240	75.24-25	49
38.74-75	237	53.8-9	249	76.30	43,239
39.18/19	175-6	54.14	237	81.29	231
39.53-54	109	55.27	237	82.14	107, 0
40.31/33	95	56.42-47 40-47	110	83.15	242
41.11-0	22	56.58-59	7,127	85.16	34
41.15, 14	18,238	58.4-5	89	88.17	48
42.11/9	9,127	59.23	173	89.22-73	248-9
42.27-26	97	61.1	91,95-6	92.4-16	09-110
43.23-32	97	64.16	89	112.4	0,127
43.57-58	129	65.7	89	114-4-6	252
46.14/13	33	67.3	68,69		

1. INDEX OF CITATIONS FROM THE QUR'AN

The first verse number is that of the Cairo edition of 1342/1923. When the number of Flügel's edition is different it is added after the virgule

1.20/19	72	6.103	49	18.23	92
2.29/27	71	6.108	194	18.67/66	82
2.31/29	95	6.112	43	18.77/76	21
2.184/180	86	6.148/149	93	18.82/81	194
2.185/181	96	7.29/28	124	18.97/96	91
2.253/254	43	7.44/42	170	18.101	82
2.255/256	50	7.117, 114	54	20.5.4	237
2.275/276	252	7.143/139	242	31.27	10.122
2.286	90	7.178/177	240	31.68-60	128
3.68/61	73	7.179/178	94	31.103	129
3.77/71	48	7.189	87	31.104	125
3.78/72	68, 71	7.190	87-88	32.5	6
3.85-91/79-85	196	9.1.2.3.7	72	23.14	6
3.90/84	196	9.42	88	23.35.37	123
3.97/91	88	9.51	65	23.36.38	123
3.108/104	95	9.83/84	114, 115	23.91.93	123
3.169/163	109	10.88	92	25.59.60	70
3.183/179	128	10.98	93	26.195	104
3.183/180	128	10.99	43	27.39	90, 91
4.10/11	107	11.20/22	82	27.57/58	65
4.30/34	107, 110	11.40/42	182	27.89/91	109
4.59/62	165, 248	11.107/109	34	28.25, 26	93
4.129/128	95	12.17	104	30.11.10	11
4.161/162	48	12.42	92	30.27.26	11.24
4.166/164	18, 238	13.15, 17	71, 72, 123	32.7.6	69, 71
5.47/51	110	14.4	104	32.13	49
5.54/59	157	15.85	71	34.13/12	182
5.64/69	237	16.17	239	35.3	239
5.81/93	194	16.20	239	35.11/12	18, 238
5.103/102	94	16.40.42	20, 238	36.12.11	127
6.76-77	11	16.123/126	187	36.78	123
6.91	128	17.4	65	36.78-79	10



INDICES

MAQĀLĀT

IBĀNA

studying fiqh with humility and submission, and of good moral character; and of generous well-doing; and of refraining from injury; and of abstention from backbiting and slander and calumny and greediness for food and drink

This is the compendium of what they enjoin and observe and approve. And we hold and embrace all these doctrines of theirs which we have mentioned. Our help is in God alone! He is our Sufficiency and the best of managers! On Him do we call for help; in Him do we place our trust; to Him is the final return!

We shall adduce arguments for the views of ours which we have mentioned, and for the others which we have not mentioned, chapter by chapter, and subject by subject, God willing!

MAQALAT

60. They confess that God knows what creatures will do, and has written that it will be, and that (all) affairs are in the hand of God.

61. They approve of patient endurance of what God ordains, and of holding fast to what God has commanded, and of abstaining from what God has forbidden, and of sincerity of action, and of loyalty to Muslims.

62. They profess the worship of God among those who worship; and loyalty to the Muslim community; and the avoidance of grave sins, and adultery, and speaking falsely, and party spirit, and boasting, and insolence, and contemning men, and pride

63. They approve of shunning every summoner to innovation; and of diligence in reciting the Qur'an and writing traditions; and of

IBANA

that has come down in the traditions.

57. We profess that God knows what creatures will do, and what will become of them, and what has been, and what will be, and how what will not be would have been if it had been.

58. We profess obedience to the Imāms.

59. We profess loyalty⁽⁴²⁾ to Muslims.

60. We approve of shunning every summons to innovation, and of avoiding the people of vain desires.

(42) H has *ṣubḥa* — company, friendly relations (with).

MAQALAT

vants, be they lawful or forbidden.

53. They confess that Satan tempts man, and suggests doubts to him, and deranges him.

57. They confess that God may favor the righteous with signs which appear at their hands ⁽⁴¹⁾.

58. They confess that the Sunna is not abrogated by the Qur'an

59. They confess that the affair of infants (who die) belongs to God, if He will He will punish them, and if He will, He will do with them what He wills

IBANA

servants, whether they be lawful or forbidden

54. We acknowledge that Satan tempts man, and suggests doubts to him, and deranges him, contrary to the view of the Mu'tazila and the Jahmiyya, as God said: « Those who devour usury will not rise save as he rises whom Satan deranges by madness » (2.275/276), and: « Against the evil of the furtive Tempter, who breathes temptations into the breasts of men, (the tempter) issued from jinn and men » (114.4-6)

55. We hold that God may favor the righteous with signs which appear at their hands.

56. Our view concerning the infants of polytheists is that God will kindly for them a fire in the next life, and then will say to them « Rush ye into it blindly' » as

(41) I understand the text as referring to *karāmât*, i.e. the miracles worked by holy men, as distinguished from *mu'jizât*, the apologetic miracles of the apostles sent by God.

MAQĀLĀT

49. They believe in the seeing of visions during sleep.

50. They believe that prayer for dead Muslims and almsgiving on their behalf reach them

51. They believe that there are sorcerers in this world; and that the sorcerer is an unbeliever, as God has said and that sorcery is really existing in this world (40).

52. They approve of the Prayer over those of the People of the Qibla who die, be they just men or sinners, and of accepting their bequests.

53. They confess that the Garden and the Fire are created

54. They confess that he who dies, dies at his term, and likewise that he who is killed, is killed at his term

55. They confess that sustenances are from God, granted by Him to His ser-

IBĀNA

47. We hold that many a vision seen during sleep is genuine, and we acknowledge that it has an interpretation.

48. We approve of almsgiving on behalf of the Muslim dead, and of prayer for them, and we believe that God benefits them thereby

49. We believe that there are sorcerers in the world, and that sorcery is really existing in this world

50. We profess the Prayer over those of the People of the Qibla who die, be they just men or sinners and the validity of inheriting from them

51. We acknowledge that the Garden and the Fire are created.

52. We acknowledge that he who dies or is killed, dies or is killed at his term

53. We acknowledge that sustenances are from God, granted by Him to His

(40) Cf. art. *Sifr*, in El or Hwb

MAQALAT

IBĀNA

fight al-Dajjal⁽³⁶⁾, and after that.

45. They approve of prayer for the welfare of the Imāms of the Muslims, and of not revolting against them with the sword, and of not fighting in civil strife

46. They believe in the going forth of al-Dajjal, and that Isā b. Maryam⁽³⁷⁾ will slay him.

47. They believe in Munkar and Nakir⁽³⁸⁾.
Cf. 28, *supra*

48. They believe in the Ascent⁽³⁹⁾

43. We approve of prayer for the welfare of the Imāms of the Muslims, and of acknowledging their Imamate, and of calling him erring who approves of rebelling against them when they manifestly abandon rectitude. And we profess disapproval of armed rebellion against them, and we profess abstention from fighting in civil strife

44. We acknowledge that al-Dajjal will go forth, according to what has come in the tradition from the Apostle of God.

45. We believe in the punishment of the grave, and in Nakir and Munkar, and their questioning those buried in their graves.

Cf. 30, *supra*

46. We credit the tradition of the Ascent

(36) i.e. a kind of Antichrist — cf. MC, 227 and the art *Dajjal*, in EI or Hwb

(37) i.e. Jesus.

(38) MC, 164-6; and art. *Munkar wa Nakir*, in EI or Hwb.

(39) i.e. Muhammad's ascent into heaven — cf. MC, 242-3, and references given there, art. *Mir'ād*, in EI or Hwb

MAQĀLAT

rank » (89.22/23).

41. They confess that God draws near to His creatures howsoever He wishes, as He said : « And we are closer to him than his jugular vein » (50.16/15)

42. They think it right to pray the festival and Friday and assembly prayers behind any Imam, just man or sinner

43. They approve of wiping the shoes⁽³⁴⁾ as a custom (*sunna*), and think it right both at home and when travelling.

44. They affirm the obligation of the Jihād⁽³⁵⁾ against the polytheists, from the time when God sent His Prophet to the last band which will

IBANA

rank ».

40. We hold that God draws near to His servants howsoever He wishes, as He said : « And we are closer to him than his jugular vein », and : « Then he approached and remained suspended, and he was two bowlengths away, or less » (53.8-9)

41. It is a part of our religion to pray the Friday and festival prayers, and the other prayers and assemblies, behind every just man and sinner, as it is related of Abdallah b. 'Umar that he used to pray behind al-Hajjaj⁽³³⁾

42. We believe that wiping the shoes is a custom (*sunna*), both at home and when travelling, contrary to the belief of him who denies it.

(33) An Umayyad Governor who was particularly disliked by the Abbasids — cf. Muir, *The Caliphate*

(34) MC, 158 ff

(35) The « holy war » — cf. art. *Djihad*, in EI or Hwb

MAQĀLĀT

37. They confess that they were the well-directed, rightly-guided Caliphs, the best of all men after the Prophet

38. They credit the traditions which have come from the Apostle of God reporting that God descends to the lowest heaven and says: « Is there anyone who seeks forgiveness? » as has come in the tradition from the Apostle of God

39. They hold to the Book and the Sunna, as God said: « And if you disagree about something, refer the matter to God and the Apostle » (4:59/82); and they think it good to follow the Imāms of the Religion who have gone before, and not to introduce into their religion what God has not permitted

40. They confess that God will come on the Day of the Resurrection, as He said: « And thy Lord will come, and the angels, rank on

IBĀNA

36. In submission to God we confess that the four Imāms were well-directed, rightly-guided Caliphs, virtuous men, of peerless merit.

37. We credit all the traditions approved by the transmitters regarding the descent to the lowest heaven, and we hold that the Lord says: « Is there anyone who asks? Is there anyone who seeks forgiveness? », and the rest of what they have transmitted and affirmed, contrary to what the misleading deviators hold.

38. We rely, in that wherein we disagree, on the Book of our Lord, and the Sunna of our Prophet, and the Consensus of the Muslims, and what is of the same meaning as that. And we do not introduce into the Religion of God any innovation which He has not permitted, nor do we say against God what we know not

39. We hold that God will come on the Day of the Resurrection, as He said: « And thy Lord will come, and the angels, rank on

MAQALAT

IBANA

that God glorified Religion by him, and rendered him victorious over the Backsliders; and that the Muslims chose him for the Imāmate, just as the Apostle of God had chosen him to lead the Prayer; ⁽³⁰⁾ and that they all called him the Caliph of the Apostle of God ⁽³¹⁾; and after him, 'Umar b. al-Khattāb; then 'Uthmān b. Affān — and we hold that those who attacked him did so unjustly and wrongfully; then Ali b. Abi Tālib These, then, were the Imāms after God's Apostle, and their Caliphate was « The Caliphate of Prophecy » ⁽³²⁾

34. We testify to the assurance of the Garden for the Ten ⁽³³⁾ for whom the Apostle of God testified that it was assured

35. We befriended all the Companions of the Prophet, and we refrain from discussing what was disputed among them.

Cf 35, supra

(30) (30) Omitted in T

(31) This seems to refer to the tradition from Muhammad that the Caliphate would last for thirty years — cf *Ibāna* (Kienin) 130, and Wensinck, *Handbook*, 109 B

(32) Cf. srl. al-'Ashara 'l-Mubashshara in Hwb

MAQĀLĀT

IBĀNA

tion ⁽²⁹⁾, and of argument about the matters of their religion concerning which the disputations argue and disagree; (and they profess) submissive acceptance of the sound relations and of what has come in the traditions which have been related by the trustworthy, just man from just man, going back to the Apostle of God. They do not say « How ? » or « Why ? », because that is innovation

34. They hold that God does not command evil, but forbids it and commands good; and that He does not approve of evil, even though He wills it

35. They recognize the justice of the ancients whom God chose to companion His Prophet, and they seize upon their virtues, and refrain from (passing judgment on) what was disputed among them, small and great

36. They put Abu Bakr foremost, then 'Umar, then 'Uthmān, then 'Alī.

Cf. end of 31, *supra*

32. We profess love of the ancients whom God chose to companion His Prophet, and we praise them as God has praised them, and we befriend them all

Cf 35, *infra*

33. We hold that the Imām after God's Apostle was Abu Bakr al-Ṣiddiq, and

(29) i.e. the Qadar

MAQALĀT

is speech and work; and that it increases and decreases, and they do not say that it is created or uncreated

30. They hold that the Names of God are God (cf. 11, *supra*).

31. They bear no witness of the Fire for any grave sinner, nor do they give judgment of the Garden in favor of any confessor of God's oneness, until God will have sent them where He will. They say that their affair belongs to God: if He will, He will punish them, and if He will, He will forgive them.

32. They believe that God will bring forth a group of the confessors of His oneness from the Fire, according to what has come in traditions from the Apostle of God.

33. They disapprove of disputation and quarrelling about religion, and of contention over the Determina-

IBĀNA

is both speech and work; and that it increases and decreases; and we admit the sound traditions concerning that which have been related from the Apostle of God by trustworthy narrators, just man from just man, going back to the Apostle of God

Cf. 11, *supra*

28. We profess that we do not assign to the Garden or to the Fire any confessor of God's oneness who holds fast to faith, save him who has been assured of the Garden by the witness of the Apostle of God. We hope for the Garden for those guilty of crimes, while fearing that they will be punished by the Fire

Cf. 29, *supra*

MAQALAT

27 They confess the intercession of God's Apostle, and that it is on behalf of the grave sinners of his Community

28 They confess the punishment of the grave, and that the Basin is a reality, and that the Bridge is a reality, and that the resurrection after death is a reality, and that God's settling of accounts with creatures is a reality, and that the Station before God is a reality.

29 They confess that faith

IBĀNA

hearts are between two of His fingers; ⁽²²⁾ and that He puts the heavens on a finger and the worlds on a finger, as has come down in traditions related from the Apostle of God.

29 We hold that God will bring forth a group from the Fire, after they will have been burned, because of the intercession of the Apostle of God; ⁽²³⁾ for we believe what has come down in the traditions from the Apostle of God

30 We believe in the punishment of the grave ⁽²⁴⁾; and in the Basin ⁽²⁵⁾, and that the Balance ⁽²⁶⁾ is a reality, and the Bridge ⁽²⁷⁾ is a reality, and the resurrection after death a reality, and that God will stop creatures at the Station ⁽²⁸⁾, and will settle accounts with the believers.

31 We believe that faith

(22) T omits from here to the end of this number.

(23) T omits from here to the end of this number.

(24) MC, 117 ff.

(25) MC, 231 f.

(26) MC, 167 ff.

(27) MC, 232 f.

(28) EI, s. v. *matokif*

MAQĀLAT

such as adultery, theft, and the like grievous sins. By reason of the faith which they have they are believers, even though they commit grave sins ⁽¹⁹⁾.

25. Faith, according to them is faith in God, His Angels, His Books, His Apostles, and in the Determination, its good and its evil, its sweet and its bitter, and in the fact that what misses them could not have hit them, and what hits them could not have missed them. And Islām is one's testifying that there is no God at all save God, and that Muhammad is the Apostle of God, according to what has come in the tradition ⁽²¹⁾. And Islām, according to them, is other than faith

26. They confess that God scrutinizes hearts.

IBĀNA

which he commits, such as adultery, theft, and wine-drinking, as do the Khawārij, who claim that they are thereby unbelievers. But we hold that he who commits a grave sin, such as adultery, theft, and the like, at the same time declaring it licit and not believing in its being forbidden, is an unbeliever.

26. We hold that Islām is more extensive than faith, and that the whole of Islām is not faith ⁽²⁰⁾.

Cf. 21, *supra*

27. We profess that God scrutinizes hearts, and that

(19) *Fiqh Akbar* I, art. 1 — MC, 103 ff.

(20) So T H reads *wa laisa kulla islāmīn īmānan* (sic).

(21) MC, 35 and 22 ff.

MAQĀLĀT

IRĀNA

say that the utterance of the Qur'ān is created, or that it is uncreated

23. They hold that God will be seen by eyes on the Day of the Resurrection as the moon is seen on the night of full moon. The believers will see Him, but the unbelievers will not see Him, for they will be prevented from access to God. God has said: «Out upon them! On that day they will surely be prevented from access to their Lord!» (83. 15) And they hold that Moses asked God for the vision (of Him) in this life, and that God revealed Himself to the mountain and pulverized it, thus making it known to him that he would not see Him in this life, but would see Him in the next. (cf. 7.143/139)

24. They do not call any member of the People of the Qibla an unbeliever because of a crime which he commits,

24. We profess that God will be seen by eyes⁽¹⁷⁾ in the next life as the moon is seen on the night of full moon. The believers will see Him, according to the traditions related from the Apostle of God. And we hold that the unbelievers will be prevented from access to God when the believers see Him in the Garden⁽¹⁸⁾, as He has said: «Out upon them! On that day they will surely be prevented from access to their Lord!» And we hold that Moses asked God for the vision (of Him) in this life, and that God revealed Himself to the mountain and pulverized it, thus making it known to Moses that he would not see Him in this life

25. We profess that we do not call any member of the People of the Qibla an unbeliever because of a crime

(17) T omits « in the next life », but after « eyes » has « on the Day of Resurrection »

(18) T omits « in the Garden ».

MAQĀLĀT

19. They confess that good and evil are by God's decision and determination, and they believe in God's decision and determination: its good and its evil, its sweet and its bitter.

20. They believe that of themselves they possess neither harm nor advantage, save what God wills, as He has said

21. They commit their affair to God, and affirm the need of God at every time and the want of Him in every circumstance

22. They hold that the Qur'an is the uncreated speech of God. As for *kalam* on the suspension of judgment and on the utterance (of the reciter), they consider him who holds the utterance (to be uncreated), or who holds that judgment should be suspended, to be an innovator. One should not

IBĀNA

20. We hold that good and evil are by God's decision and determination: and we believe in God's decision and determination, its good and its evil, its sweet and its bitter.

21. We know that what misses us could not have hit us, and that what hits us could not have missed us⁽¹⁵⁾; and that creatures of themselves possess neither harm nor advantage, save what God wills, as He has said

22. We commit our affairs to God, and affirm the constant need and want of Him.

23. We hold ⁽¹⁶⁾ that the Qur'an is the uncreated speech of God, and that he who holds the creation of the Qur'an is an unbeliever.

(15) *Fiqh Akbar* I, art. 3 — MC, 103 and 107-9

(16) H has: « that the speech of God is uncreated »

MAQALĀT

18. They confess that God helps believers to obey Him and abandons unbelievers, and that He favors believers and has compassion on them and makes them righteous and guides them, but does not favor unbelievers or make them righteous or guide them; and that, if He were to make the latter righteous, they would be righteous, and if He were to guide them, they would be guided. But God can make unbelievers righteous and favor them so that they will be believers. However, He has willed not to make unbelievers righteous, and not to favor them so that they will be believers, and has rather willed that they be unbelievers, as He foreknew, and He abandons them and leads them astray and sets a seal on their hearts.

IHĀNA

out of nothing? Or are they the creators? » (32 33) And this occurs frequently in the Book of God.

19. We hold that God helps believers to obey Him and favors them and has compassion on them and makes them righteous and guides them, but that He leads unbelievers astray and does not guide them and does not favor them with signs (13), as the impious deviators claim. If God were to favor the latter and make them righteous, they would be righteous, and if He were to guide them, they would be guided, (14) as He said: « Whom God guides is indeed guided; and whom He leads astray, those indeed are the losers » (7.178-177) (15). But we hold that God can make unbelievers righteous and can favor them, so that they will be believers. However, He has willed that they be unbelievers, as He foreknew, and He abandons them and sets a seal on their hearts.

(13) T has « with faith »

(14) (14) Omitted in H

MAQALAT

that all things are by the will of God, as He said: « But you shall not will, unless God will » (76.30 and 81.29), and as the Muslims say: « What God wills, is; and what He does not will, is not

16. They hold that no one can (*yastaff'u*) do a thing before he does it, and that no one is able to evade God's knowledge, or to do a thing which God knew he would not do

17. They confess that there is no creator at all, save God; and that the evil actions of creatures are created by God; and that the (good) actions of creatures are created by God; and that creatures are unable to create anything [any of them].

IBANA

and that all things are by the will of God.

17. We hold that no one can (*yastaff'u*) do a thing before he does it⁽¹¹⁾, and that no one is independent of God, or able to evade God's knowledge.

18. We hold that there is no creator at all, save God; and that the acts of creatures are created and determined⁽¹²⁾ by God, as He said: « When it is God who has created you and what you make » (37.95-94), and that creatures are unable to create anything, but are themselves created, as God said: « Is there any creator save God? » (35.3), and: « They create nothing, but are themselves created » (16.20), and: « Is he then who creates like him who creates not? » (16.17), and: « Or were they created

(11) T has: « before God does it »

(12) H — *maqaddura*; T — *maqdûra*.

MAQĀLĀT

of God are other than God,
as do the Mu'tazila and the
Khawārij

12. They confess that God
has a knowledge, as He said:
« He has sent it down with
His knowledge » (4.106.164),
and « No female conceives
or bears save with His knowl-
edge » (35.11/12).

13. They affirm hearing
and sight, and do not deny
that of God, as do the
Mu'tazila.

14. They affirm power of
God, as He said: « Did they
then not see that God, who
created them, was far more
powerful than they? » (41.
15/14)

15. They hold that there
is no good or evil on earth,
save what God wills, and

IBĀNA

of God are other than He, is
in error.

12. We confess that God
has a knowledge, as He said:
« He has sent it down with
His knowledge », and: « No
female conceives or bears
save with His knowledge ».

13. (9) We affirm hearing
and sight, and do not deny
that, as do the Mu'tazila, the
Jahmiyya, and the Khawārij

14. We affirm that God
has a power (10), as He said:
« Did they then not see that
God, who created them, was
far more powerful than
they? »

15. We hold that God's
speech is uncreated; and that
God has created nothing
without having said to it
« Be! », as He said: « When
we will a thing, our only
utterance is that we say to it
« Be! », and it is ». (16.40-42)

16. We hold that there is
nothing good or evil on
earth, save what God wills;

(9) T reverses 13 and 14.

(10) H — *quwwa*; T — *qudra*.

MAQALAT

Hour ⁽⁴⁾ is coming, no doubt whatever about it

6. They confess that God will raise up those who are in the graves.

7. They confess that God is on His Throne ⁽⁵⁾, as He said: « The Beneficent is firmly seated on the Throne » (20.3-4)

8. They confess that God has two hands ⁽⁶⁾, without asking how ⁽⁷⁾, as He said: « I have created with my two hands » (38.74-75), and: « On the contrary, both His hands are stretched wide » (5.64-69)

9. They confess that God has two eyes, without asking how, as He said: « Which moved along under our eyes » (5.1-14)

10. They confess that God has a face, as He said: « But the face of thy Lord will endure, glorious and venerable » (55.27).

11. They confess that one must not say that the Names

IBANA

Hour is coming, no doubt whatever about it

6. We confess that God will raise up those who are in the graves.

7. We confess that God is firmly seated on His Throne, as He said: « The Beneficent is firmly seated on the Throne »

9. We confess that God has two hands, without asking how, as He said: « I have created with my two hands », and: « On the contrary, both His hands are stretched wide »

10. We confess that God has two eyes, without asking how, as He said: « Which moved along under our eyes »

8. We confess that God has a face, as He said: « But the face of thy Lord will endure, glorious and venerable »

11. We confess that he who claims that the Names ⁽⁸⁾

(4) i.e. the end of the world — cf. MC, 23-4.

(5) Cf. *ibāna* (Klein) 83 ff.

(6) Cf. *ibāna*, 88 ff.

(7) Cf. MC, Index, under *bilā kaifa*.

(8) T has « the Name ».

MAQĀLAT

1. The compendium of what is held by the *Ahl al-Hadith wa'l-Sunna* the acknowledgment of God, and His Angels, and His Books, and His Apostles, and what has come from God, and what the trustworthy have related from the Apostle of God. They reject nothing of that.

2. They confess that God is one God, unique, eternal, no God at all save Him, and that He has not taken to Himself consort or child.

3. They confess that Muhammad is the servant of God and His Apostle.

4. They confess that the Garden is a reality, and that the Fire is a reality.

5. They confess that the

IBANA

1. The compendium of our belief is that we acknowledge God, and His Angels, and His Books, and His Apostles ⁽¹⁾, and the revelation they brought from God ⁽¹⁾, and what the trustworthy have related from the Apostle of God. We reject nothing of that.

2. We confess that God ⁽²⁾ is one God, and that there is no God at all save Him, and that He is the unique and eternal ⁽²⁾, and that He has not taken to Himself consort or child.

3. We confess that Muhammad is the servant of God and His Apostle ⁽³⁾, sent by Him with the Guidance and the Religion of Truth ⁽²⁾.

4. We confess that the Garden is a reality and the Fire is a reality.

5. We confess that the

(1) . . . (1) 'That has come and what has come from God.' In general the differences in T make the T text more like that of the *Miqātāt* creed.

(2) . . . (2) 'That is one God, unique, eternal, no God at all save Him.'

(3) . . . (3) Omitted in T.

APPENDIX IV


TWO CREEDS OF AL-ASH'ARĪ

The two creeds are those of his *Maqālat al-Islāmiyyah* and his *Ibāna 'an Usūl al-Diyāna*. The text of the former will be found in Rutter's edition, Vol. I, pp. 290-297, and in the edition of Muhammad Mahyū'l-Dīn 'Abd al-Hamid, Vol. I, pp. 320-325. The texts of the *Ibāna* creed which I have used are those found in the Hyderabad edition, pp. 7-13, and in Ibn Asakir's *Tuhfat*, pp. 158-163. In the notes the former is referred to as H, and the latter as I. Only the more important differences have been noted.

Other translations of both creeds have been made. The following translations are my own, as is also the numbering of the articles. To each article which I regard as distinct I have given a number, hoping thus to facilitate reference in any comparison with other creeds. The parallel arrangement will also, I think, be useful.

The *Maqālat* creed is introduced with these words: « This is a compendious account of the doctrine of the *Ashāb al-Hadith* and the *Ahl al-Sunna*.

The *Ibāna* creed is preceded by the title: « Chapter on the exposition of the doctrine of the *Ahl al-Haqq wa'l-Sunna* ».



IV TWO CREEDS OF AL-AZHARI

errors of his adversaries. (Klein, p. 49; Hyderabad ed., p. 7) This second promise is fulfilled more adequately than the first. It seems to me not improbable that the entire creed section was an insertion made, either by al-Ash'ari himself, or by some later Ash'arite. If this was so, there may have been some truth in the charges which al-Ahwazi levelled at the *Ibana* (No 22 of the list of his charges).

I do not propose to enter here into any detailed comparison of the *Ibana* with the *Luma*. But I think it is obvious that the former is much more traditionalist than the latter. If al-Ash'ari was the author of both, the difference could be explained on the score that the *Ibana* really was a kind of conciliatory gesture which al-Ash'ari made to the Hanbalites, either immediately after his conversion, or towards the end of his life. But perhaps it is a little too much to say, with Wensinck, that the *Ibana* reveals al-Ash'ari as 'a true stern adherent of Kuran and sunna' and nothing more (MC, p. 91). It may be true that in most of the *Ibana* 'there is scarcely a word that could not have been written by Ahmad ibn Hanbal' (MC, p. 92), but it seems to me equally true that Ahmad never would have written such a work. And I think that Ahmad would have shrunk in holy horror from the mere thought of writing such a work as the *Luma*.

I feel unable to share Dr. Klein's enthusiasm for the *Ibana*. He tells us 'In it al-Ash'ari displays a very high degree of forensic genius' (p. 29). He refrains from further elaboration of the point on the ground that the pages of his translation 'afford so many illustrations of his acumen'. Such praise seems more apposite in the case of the *Luma*, though even in the latter case I should be somewhat more reserved in my judgment. However, the reader is now in a position to make his own comparison. Here I should like to say, quite unapodictically, that I am unable to subscribe wholeheartedly to the proposition that the *Ibana*, in the form in which we have it, is a genuine work of al-Ash'ari.

A NOTE ON THE *IBANA*

Goldziher called this an important treatise, and one of the fundamental documents for the history of Muslim dogmas. He made good use of it in his *Vorlesungen über den Islam*, and it has also been used to good effect by other scholars, such as Wensinck and Watt. Goldziher also refers to the *Ibana* as « the last definitive exposition of his (al-Ash'ari's) doctrine » (*Vorlesungen*², p. 113; *Ar. u.*, p. 302), though he gives no reason for calling it « the last ». Indeed, the indications given in the *Tabyin* would seem to make it one of the first works written by al-Ash'ari after his abandonment of Mu'tazilism.

Ibn Asākir makes a good deal of the *Ibana* in his *Tabyin*. Apart from the *khatba* of the *Tafsi*r, it is the only work of al-Ash'ari which he actually cites. It may have been the only work of al-Ash'ari on which he actually laid eyes. If it was such an important work, it is certainly surprising, to say the least, that there is no mention of it in the list of al-Ash'ari's works given in the *Tabyin*. It also seems strange that it was not known to Ibn al-Nadīm under the title of *Ibana* — and it is not certain that the *Kitāb al-Tabyin* which he mentions is simply the *Ibana* under another title.

At the end of the creed in the *Ibana* the author says: « We shall adduce arguments for those views of ours which we have mentioned, and for the others which we have not mentioned, chapter by chapter, and point by point » (Klein, p. 55, Hyderabad ed. p. 13). This promise is certainly not fulfilled in our text. A similar promise is made at the end of the chapter in which the author enumerates the principal

- 103.** *Risāla kataba bihā ilā ahl al-thaḡhr bi bāb al-abwāb*
Letter addressed to the men of the frontier on a certain subject).

N. Cf. No 99 above. This was edited by Qiwameddin in *Haḡyat Fakūltesi Mecmuası*, 7, 154 ff., and 8, 50 ff.

- 104.** *Kitāb al-Imān* (Book on Faith)

N. The same as No 98 ?

- 105.** *Kitāb al-Ibāna ‘an Usūl al-Diyāna* (Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Religion)

N. Printed in Hyderabad, 1321, and Cairo, 1348. English translation by W. C. Klein, *The Elucidation of Islam's Foundation*, American Oriental Series, Vol. 19, 1940. One should read the extended review of Professor Thomson, *The Moslem World*, XXXII (1942) 242-260. It would be well to check any use of this translation with the Arabic text.

Another possible title is that referred to in the text of the *Tabyīn*, 39 18. See n. 19 to App. II, for what seems to be a curious coincidence.

- 106.** *Kitāb Kashf al-Aṣrār wa Halk al-Aṣṭar* (The Revealing of Secrets and Rending of Veils)

N. This may have been one of the works mentioned without a definite title in the list above.

explaining what they had asked him about the doctrine of the Ahl al-Haqq (Partisans of the Truth)

N. It is not quite clear that this number was distinct from the previous

Ibn 'Asākir (from Abu l-Qāsim b. Naṣr, from Abu'l Ma'ālī b. 'Abd al-Malik) « I heard a man whom I trust say I saw the titles of the books of the Imām Abī 'Hasan, and I counted more than two hundred and three hundred »

Mehren also reads « two hundred (sic) and three hundred » But Abū l- Abbas says that al-Ash'arī had « nearly two hundred books » — *Tabyīn*, 140 1-2

In the *Fihrist* of Ibn al-Nadīm five works of al-Ash'arī are mentioned (ed. Cairo, 1318, p. 257) *Kitāb al-Luma*, *Kitāb al-Maḥ*, *Kitāb Idāh al-Burhān*, *Kitāb al-Tabyīn an Uṣūl al-Dīn* and *Kitāb al-Sharḥ wa l-Tafṣīl fi l-Radd ala Ahl al-Ifk wa l-Tadlīl*. This gives us one more title for our list

100. *Kitāb al-Tabyīn 'an Uṣūl al-Dīn* (Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Religion)

N. Was this the *Idāna* ?

The reader should also consult G. A. G. I 195, S I 345-6, and H. Ritter, *Philologia* III, No 13, in *der Islam*, XVIII, 34-55. These supply us with a few more titles :

101. *Risālat Istiḥṣān al-Khawāḍ fi Ilm al-Kulām* (Treatise on Thinking Well of Engaging in the Science of Kalam)
Printed in Hyderabad, 1323 and 1344.

102. *Qawl jāmi'at aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth wa ahl al-sunna fi l-Iṭiqād* (The Belief of the Generality of the Traditionists and the Sunnites).

89. *Kitāb Naqd Sharh al-Kitāb* (Refutation of the Explanation of the Book)

N What «the Book» was I do not know. On the other hand Mehren, p. 102, reads «*al-Kibār*» (the Great Men).

90. A book on questions discussed by him and Abu l-Furayḡ the Malikite concerning «*illat al-khamr*»

N *illa* is an excuse, or a cause, etc. Possibly this discussion concerned the legality of drinking wine.

91. Refutation of Aristotle's *Kitāb Athār al-l hwayya* (Meteorologica?)

92. A book of answers to questions of Abu Hashim, dictated at the request of Ibn Abi Ṣalīḥ al-Ṭabarī.

N Abu Hashim was the son of al-Jubhāḥī (cf. *Tibbon* pp. 149-155)

93. *Kitāb al-Ihtiyāj* (The Argument, or Adducing of Arguments)

94. *Kitāb al-Akhbār* (On Testimony, or Traditions) dictated to al-Barhān (Mehren al-Dahhān)

Ibn Furak: «And that is the last which has reached us of the names of his works. And he had —»

95. A separate book on the signs of prophethood

96. And another separate book on the Imamate

III ADDITIONS OF IBN 'ASAKIR

97. *Risalat al-Hathth 'ala'l-Baḥth* (Incitement to Investigation)

98. Epistle on Faith: Is the term «creation» to be applied to it?

99. Reply to questions, addressed to the men of the frontier,

78. Questions put to al-Jabbā'ī on names and predications.
79. Meetings on individual testimony (*khabar al-wāhid*)
80. Vindication of Analogy (*Qiyās*) — or Reasoning
 N. This and the preceding three numbers are not very clearly distinguished in the text.
81. *Kitāb fi Af'āl al-Nabī* (On the Actions of the Prophet)
82. *Kitāb fi l-Wuqūf wal-'Umūm* (On withholding one's assent and universality)
 N. The precise meaning of this title escapes me. It may refer to the suspension of judgment regarding Muslim mortal sinners and the contrary position, or, perhaps, to attitudes regarding the creation of the Qur'ān.
83. *Kitāb fi Mutashabih al-Qur'ān* (On the ambiguous verses of the Qur'ān)
 in which he identified the Mu'tazila and the Mubhidūn in their attacks upon ambiguous traditions and refuted the *Kitāb al-Tay* (the Crow) of Ibn al-Rawandī
84. A book containing an exposition of the doctrine of the Christians.
85. A book on the Imāmate.
86. A book containing kalām against the Christians from the arguments against them drawn from all the books which they acknowledge.
87. A book against Ibn al-Rawandī refuting his refutation of *tawātur* and dealing with the arguments relied upon by the opponents of *tawātur*, and with questions concerning the affirmation of consensus.
 N. Cf. Wensinck's article and ref., Hwb. s.v. *Mutawātur*
88. A book containing accounts of the views of the Mujassima and the arguments used by them.

- NN. 1 I have not succeeded in identifying Ibn Qas.
 22 Perhaps he refers to Aristotle's *De Caelo* and *De Mundo*

Ibn Fārak * These are the names of the books which he had written by the year 320, apart from his dictations to people and various replies to questions that reached him from various quarters, and apart from what he dictated to people but did not here identify by name. He lived after that until the year 324, and during that time composed works among which are *

II. IBN FĀRAK'S LIST FOR 320-324

71. A book against al-Iskāfi, in which he refuted the latter's *al-Maḡahat* (Rivalry) on the application of the name "Qadar".
 N This was very probably the question discussed in the *Luma*, Nos 120-121, and the *Ibana* *Kān*, p. 113.
72. *Kitāb al-Amad fī l-Ru'ya* (The Supports, on the Vision)
 N I have read *Amad*, plural of *imad*. Other vocalizations are possible, but the point is not of great importance. This is the work from which Ibn Fārak quoted Nos 1-70 of this list.
73. *Kitāb fī ma'lumat Allah wa maqdarātihī* (On the objects of God's knowledge and power)
 that they are unlimited, against Abū l-Hudḥaḥ.
74. A book against Ḥārith al-Warrāq, on the divine attributes, concerning the latter's refutation of Ibn al-Rawandī.
75. A book against the *Ahl al-Tanāsukh* (The Metempsychosts).
76. A book of refutation concerning motions, against Abū l-Hudḥaḥ.
77. A book against the *Ahl al-Mantiq* (The logicians).

even, « atom ». But « gem », or « pearl », is probably correct here

67. A book in which we answered the questions of al-Jubba'ī on reasoning and inference and its conditions

68. *Adab al-Jadal* (The Art of Argument)

NN. 1. — The translation of the title seems to me the correct one. Possibly the book dealt with the type of matter we find in Aristotle's *Topica* and *De Sophisticis Elenchis* (cf. Ibn Klaldūn's *Prolegomena*, Quatremaire III, pp. 25-6, and De Slane's translation and notes, III, pp. 38-9)

2. — N. 30 of this list may have been a commentary on this work

3. — The list of al-Baqqilānī's works contains a *Sharh Adab al-Jadal*, which may have been a commentary on this work of al-Ash'arī (*Tamhid*, Cairo ed., p. 258, No 9)

69. A book devoted especially to the views of the Philosophers.

N. Probably a compendious survey along the lines of Nos 18 and 19.

70. *Kitāb fī'l-Radd ala'l-Falāsifa* (Refutation of the Philosophers)

containing three treatises (*maqalat*). In it we mentioned the allegations of Ibn Qais the Materialist and refuted them, and we argued in it against those who hold prime matter (*al-hayūla*) and the elements (*al-taba'i'*); and in it we refuted the arguments of Aristotle concerning the heavens and the world, and we explained what is against them respecting their view which ascribes production (*al-ihdath*) to the stars and makes the determination of happiness and misery dependent on them

only « *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān* » as a title, the rest of the title is mentioned by Ibn 'Asākir, 136.16 f. The Qāḍī Abū Bakr b. al-'Arabi said that the commentary « which he called *al-Mukhtaṣar* » (sic!) numbered 500 volumes (*mujallaṭ*)! Al-Maqrīzī said it numbered 70 volumes. Al-Kawtharī adds that the number of volumes would differ according to the handwriting. Ibn Farak cited it frequently, and al-Fāḍ b. al-Subkī said that he had come upon a volume of it. The Shaikh al-Kawtharī laments the fact that his long quest failed to turn up any of this commentary. He adds a report to the effect that al-Ṣāhib b. Aḥlād, the Mu'tazilite, paid the keeper of the Caliphal Library (*Khizāna Dār al-Khilāfa*) ten thousand dinars to burn the unique copy kept in that library. However, he does not credit the story, but regards it as one of the many lies of al-Tawḥīdī against the Ṣāhib (footnotes to the *Tahyīn*, p. 29, and pp. 136-7).

62. *Ziyādat al-Nawādir* (Additions to the Rarities)

N Additions to N° 43?

63. *Jawābāt Ahl Fārs* (Replies to the Men of Fārs)

64. A book in which we reported the argument of those who claim that the inert (*al-mawḍū'*) acts by its nature, and refuted their argument and made plain their deception.

65. A book on the vision of God, in which we refuted the objections urged against us by al-Jubbā'ī in different places in his books, which M.ḥammad b. 'Umar al-Ṣāmārī collected and related from al-Jubbā'ī, and we made their falsity perfectly plain.

66. *al-Jawhar fī-Radd alā Ahl al-Zaḡh wa'l-Munkar* (The Gem, in Refutation of the Pernicious Deviators)

N « *Jawhar* » also means « substance », « essence », and

57. *Kitāb al-Masā'il 'alā Ahl al-Tathayya* (The Book of Questions against the Dualists)

N Cf. the article, *Thanawiyā*, in *El* or *Hwb*

58. *al-Istiqṣā li Jam'i Fitrāq al-Dahiriyyin wa Sa'ir Aṣnāf al-Mulhidīn* (The Last Word to Every Objection of the Materialists and All Kinds of Mulhidūn)

a separate book, in which we mentioned every objection of the Materialists to the doctrine of the professors of God's oneness that (the series of) temporally produced beings has a *first* member, and that they cannot but proceed from a *producer*, and that the producer is one; and we answered every objection of theirs in a way that will satisfy those who seek the right direction. And we also mentioned their allegations concerning the eternity of bodies. This book is different from the books which we mentioned at the beginning of this book of ours

N The reader may consult the article, *Dahiriya*, by Goldziher, in *El* or *Hwb*

59. A book against the Materialists concerning their arguments for the eternity of bodies on the ground that if they were produced, the producer would have produced them either of himself, or because of some cause

60. A book in which we refuted the argument of Ali Ḍa'ad b. Ali al-Iṣbahānī on the question of belief (*Istiqād*)

61. *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān (wa'l Radd 'alā man Khalaṣa'l Baqān min Ahl al-Ifk wa'l-Buḥān)* (Commentary on the Qur'an and Refutation of the Liars and Deceivers Who Opposed the Clear Argument)

in which we refuted the errors of al-Jubbā'ī and al-Balkhī in interpreting the Qur'an.

N As noted before (N° 48) there seems to be some confusion regarding this and *al-Mukhtaṣar*. Al-Ash'arī himself gives

should chance on this book, he should place no reliance on it

- N This question occurs in al-Bāqillānī's *Tamhīd*, 408 ff. And the list of al-Bāqillānī's works contains one with the title *Fī anna l-Ma'dūm Lausa bi-Shay'* (That the nonexistent is not a thing).

50. *Fī l-Ijtihād fī l-Ahkām* (The right to exercise personal judgment in legal matters?)

51. *Fī anna l-Qiyās Yakhḥṣu Ḥāṭira l-Qur'ān* (That Reasoning (?) is proper to the literal meaning of the Qur'ān)

N I am not sure of the precise meaning of this title. Perhaps this work had to do with the question discussed in al-Ash'arī's *Risāla*, translated above

52. A slender book *Fī l-Murārif* (On knowledge(s))

N Probably a treatise on the definition of knowledge and its divisions. Cf. the beginning of al-Bāqillānī's *Tamhīd*

53. *Kitāb fī l-akhbār wa takhṣīṣihā* (On traditions and their exclusive attribution)

N «Traditions» here in a rather broad sense, as in the *Tamhīd* of al-Bāqillānī, 119-120 ff. «Testimony» would perhaps be a better translation

54. *Kitāb al-Funūn* (Kinds, or Branches)

on kalām subjects, different from the *Kitāb al-Funūn* which we composed against the Mulhidn (N° 42)

55. *Jawāb al-Miṣriyyīn* (Reply to the Egyptians)

in which we dealt with many kalām subjects.

56. A book dealing with the thesis that inability to do a thing is distinct from the inability to do its contrary, and that inability can attach only to what exists, in which we championed those associates of ours who hold that view

N. Cf. *Luma'*, N° 136.

— on various subtle points of *kalām*.

- N One could also read **al-Adrāk**, which would give other meanings for the title. But the matter is of no great importance.

45. A refutation of al-Iskāfī's *al-Latīf* (The Subtle?)

- N For al-Iskāfī cf. *Tritton*, pp. 123-5. *Watt*, pp. 78-80. *Intisār*, Index, s.v. *al-Iskāfī*.

46. A book in which I refuted the *kalām* of 'Abbād b. S. An-mān on the abstruse points of *kalām*.

- N For 'Abbād cf. *Tritton*, pp. 115-9. *Watt*, pp. 81-3. *Intisār*, Index, s.v. 'Abbād.

47. A book in which I refuted a book of 'Alī b. 'Isā, which he himself composed.

- N 'Alī was a famous Vizier. Cf. *The Life and Times of 'Alī ibn 'Isā, the Good Vizier*. H. Bowen, Cambridge and London, 1928.

48. *al-Mukhtāṣar* (The Storehouse)

on various aspects of *kalām*. In it we mentioned the questions of our adversaries which they did not ask us about, or wrote down in their books, or undertake to ask about, and we answered them with the help which God gave us.

- N In a footnote on p. 136 of the *Tabyīn al-Kawthār* seems to identify this work with al-Ash'arī's Commentary on the Qur'an — N° 61 below. Possibly the Commentary was also called *al-Mukhtāṣar*, or perhaps the use of this name was simply an error on the part of al-Maqrizī and the Qaḍī Abū Bakr b. al-Arabi. Cf. also the footnote on p. 29 of the *Tabyīn*.

49. A book on the subject of **shai'** (thing), and that things are things, even though they be nonexistent. But we have retracted that view and have refuted it. So if anyone

36. *Jawāb al-Jurjāniyyīn* (Reply to the Men of Jurjān)
— on questions debated by us and the Mu'tazila
37. *Jawāb al-Damashqiyyīn* (Reply to the Men of Damascus)
on subtle points of *kalam*.
38. *Jawāb al-Wāsiṭiyyīn* (Reply to the Men of Wāsiṭ)
on branches of *kalam*
39. *Jawāb al-Rāmhurmuziyyīn* (Reply to the Men of Rāmhurmuz)
one of the Mu'tazila of Rāmhurmuz had written to me asking for an answer to certain questions which were occupying his mind, and I answered them.
N The interested reader may get some idea of the geographical extent of al-Ash'ari's correspondence by looking at the map on p. 11 of the *Atlas of Islamic History*, Princeton, 1931.
40. *al-Masa'il al-Mantharat al-Baghdādiyya* (Scattered Baghdad Questions)
assemblies that took place between us and the leading Mu'tazila
N I take it that « *Manthara* » means « scattered » or « various », though there may be another meaning which eludes me
41. *al-Murtakhal fīl-Masa'il al-Mantharat al-Basriyyat*
(Anthology of Scattered Basra Questions)
42. *Kitāb al-Funūn* (Kinds, or Branches)
in refutation of the Mulhidān.
43. *Kitāb al-Nawādir fī Daqāiq al-Kalām* (The Book of Rarities on the Fine Points of *Kalam*)
44. *Kitāb al-Idrāk* (The Book of Apprehension, or Perception)

concerning the existence and nature of God, and particularly the questions concerning the divine essential attributes.

2 On secondary causation (*al-tawallud*) cf. *Intisār*, pp. 76-8. Watt, Index, s.v. *tawallud*, Tritton, Index, s.v. *Secondary Effects*.

3 The question of the imputation of justice and injustice to God is the subject of Ch. 7 of the *Lama'*. The phrase used in the *Tabaytā* is « *al-ta jir wa'l-tajwir* », and not « *al-ta dil wa'l-tajwir* ». I believe, however, that they are equivalent in meaning, since the second phrase also covers what God can or cannot do with respect to His creatures.

- 30 *Kitāb fi sharḥ Adab al-Jadal* (An explanation of « The Art of Argument »)

N. I think that this was a commentary on No 68. See my note on the latter.

31. *Kitāb al-Tabayyāt* (Letter to the Men of Tabarastān)
— on many aspects of many questions

N. This, and the following eight works, were very probably replies to questions which had been sent to al-Ash'ari by men in the places mentioned. So the titles were understood by Ibn 'Asākir, 412.4 ff.

32. *Jawāb al-Khurasāniyya* (Reply to the Khurasānians)
— on many sorts of questions

33. *Kitāb al-Arrajāniyya* (Letter to the Men of Arrajan)
— on different questions of kalām.

34. *Jawāb al-Sirāfiyyīn* (Reply to the Men of Sirāf)
— on various aspects of kalām

35. *Jawāb al-'Umanīyyīn* (Reply to the Men of 'Uman)
— on diverse aspects of kalām.

26. A book against al-Khalidī in which we refuted a book of his in which he denied that the creation and determination of human acts are from the Lord of the Worlds
27. A book in which we refuted a book of al-Balkhī in which he was said to correct the mistakes of Ibn al-Rāwandī in *jadāl*.

N. « *Jadāl* » seems to mean « argumentation », or « logic »
Cf. the note on N° 68.

28. *Kitāb fī l-Istishhād* (On appealing to experience)
in which we showed how the Mu'tazila are compelled, according to their own adducing of the visible as an argument to the invisible, to affirm God's knowledge, power, and other attributes.

N. For examples of this turning the argument from our experience against the Mu'tazila see N°s 56 and 81 of the *Lum'ā'*. Frequent use of this retort was made by al-Bāqilāwī, e.g. *Tawhīd* (Cairo ed.) 51.17 ff.; 70.20-23, 78.22-23, 81.7; 152.4 ff.; 155.23 - 156.25. The transference of conclusions regarding the visible to the invisible was regarded by al-Simmānī as the basic false principle of the heretics. *Kitāb al-Bayān an Usūl al-Imān* 9a, 2 ff.

29. *Kitāb al-Makhtasar fī l-Tawhīd wa'l-Qadur* (The Compendium on the Divine Nature and the Divine Determination of Human Acts)

on various chapters of *kalam*, among them the affirmation of the ocular vision of God, the *kalam* on all the attributes, and the *kalam* on all the matters related to the divine determination, and on secondary causation, and on the imputation of justice and injustice to God. In this book we asked them (Mu'tazila) about many questions which they could neither answer nor escape by argument.

NN 1. « *Tawhīd* » seems to include all the questions

20. *Kitāb al-Jawāb fī Ṣifāt 'an Mas'āl Ahl al-Zogh wa'l-Shubahāt* (Answers on the Divine Attributes to the Questions of the Doubting Deviators)

a large book on the attributes (and this is the largest of his books) in which we refuted a former work of our own in justification of the Matizilite doctrine. No such work had ever been composed on their behalf, but then God showed us the truth and we turned from that work and refuted it and made plain its falsity

21. *Kitāb ala Ibn al-Rawandī* (A book against Ibn al-Rawandī) — on the divine attributes and the Qur'an

22. A book in which we refuted a book of al-Khālidī, which he wrote on the Qur'an and the divine attributes before he composed his book called *al-Malakikhus* (The Abridgment)

N. So far I have been unable to identify this al-Khālidī

23. *al-Qam' li Kitāb al-Khālidī fī-l-ʿIrāda* (The Subduer of al-Khālidī's Book on the Divine Will)

a book in which we refuted a work of al-Khālidī in which he affirmed the beginning to be of God's will and claimed that God willed what did not take place and that there took place what He did not will

24. *al-Daf' li-l-Muhaddhib* (The Repeller of the Corrector) in which we related what we disagreed with in the book of al-Khālidī which he called *al-Muhaddhib*, on the *Maqālat*

N. Perhaps the work of al-Khālidī was one in which he ventured to offer some corrections of al-Ash'arī's *Maqālat* (No 18).

25. A refutation of a work by al-Khālidī in which he denied the ocular vision of God

and we mentioned the Mu'tazilite arguments which he did not adduce, and we refuted them by the splendid arguments and dazzling proofs of God, a book containing our kalam against him, and refuting him on all the questions and answers of the Mu'tazila concerning the points on which we and they differed.

- N This was the al-Jubbā'i who was al-'Ash'ari's teacher for so long. Cf. Watt, pp. 83-6, and Tritton, pp. 141-9.

17. *Kitāb kabīr* (A large book)

in which we refuted the book known as *Naqd Ta'wīl al-Adilla* (Refutation of the Interpretation of the Proofs) against al-Balkhī, on the principles of the Mu'tazila, in it we explained the difficulties which he brought forth, by means of God's clear proofs and shining signs, and to that we added the refutation of his kalam on the divine attributes concerning the principal questions and answers.

- N The Arabic is somewhat ambiguous, but it seems clear enough that al-Balkhī was the author of the book mentioned. This man was also known as al-Ka'bi. Cf. Tritton, pp. 157-161, Watt, pp. 80-81.

18. *Kitāb fī maqālat al-Muslimīn* (The Views of the Muslims)
meaning all their disagreements and their views.

- N This is doubtless the *Maqālat al-Islāmiyyīn wa Ikhtilāf al-Muṣallīn* (The Views of the Adherents of Islam and the Disagreement of Those Who Pray). Ed. Ritter, Istanbul, 1929. Ed. Muhammad Muhyīl-Dīn Abd al-Hamīd, Part I, Cairo, 1950. This work, since its publication by Ritter, has proved a veritable gold mine for students of the history and development of Muslim theological thought.

19. *Kitāb Jumāl al-Maqālat* (Compendia of Views)

- compendia of the views of the Muḥidān and of the doctrines of the professors of God's oneness.

an introduction to *al-Maṣṣir* (N° 2), in which we discussed the same questions.

11. *Kitāb latīf sammānahū Kitāb al-Luma fī'l-Radd 'alā Ahl al-Zaṭh wa'l-Bida'* (A slender work which we called, Highlights of the Polemic against Deviators and Innovators)

N. This has been discussed sufficiently in other parts of this book.

12. *al-Lam al-Kubr* (The Large Brightness or Flashing)
an introduction to the *Idāh* (N° 10).

N. The title could also be read « *al-Luma'* », with « *al-Kubr* » modifying an understood « *Kitāb* ». But perhaps *al-Lam'* goes better with the idea of *Idāh*.

13. *al-Lam' al-ṣaghīr* (The Small Brightness)
an introduction to the previous work.

14. *Kitāb al-Sharḥ wa'l-Tafṣīl fī'l-Radd 'alā Ahl al-Ifk wa'l-Taḍlīl* (Explanation and Detail(ing) in Refutation of Lying Misleaders)

a beginners' book and an introduction to be studied before the *Kitāb al-Luma'*, suitable for learners

N. I take it that he refers to N° 11, since a limit of simplification seems to have been reached in the series ended by N° 13.

15. *Kitāb mukhtaṣar* (An abridgment)
— to serve as an introduction to the previous work.

16. *Kitāb kubr* (A large book)

in which we refuted the book known as *al-ʿUṣal* (The Principles), against Muhammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Jubbālī, and revealed his deception in all the chapters in which he discoursed on the principles of the Muʿtazila.

firmly seated on the Throne, and against al-Nasbi and his doctrine on the names and attributes.

N For further details regarding the individuals mentioned cf. the indices of *Tritton*, *Watt*, and the *Intisār*. On the name « Ma'mar » cf. *Tritton*, p. 100, n. 1.

6. *Kitāb fī jau āz ru qat Allāh bi'l-absur* (On the possibility of the ocular vision of God)

in which we refuted all the arguments employed by the Mu'tazila in denying and refuting the vision

7. *Kitāb kabīr dhakarnā fīhu ikhtilāf al-nās fī'l-asma' wa l-ahkām wa l-khāṣṣ wa'l-amm* (A large book in which we mentioned the different views of men regarding names and predications and the general and the particular)

N The « names and predications » are those which one is to apply to the Muslim who commits a grave sin — cf. *Luma'*, Nos 181-185 for « the general (or universal) and particular » cf. *Luma'*, Ch. 9.

8. *Kitāb fī l-radd ala l-Mayassima* (Refutation of the Anthropomorphists)

9. *Kitāb akhar fī l-jism* (Another book on the body)

showing that the Mu'tazila cannot reply to the questions of the Jismiyya as we can, and showing the compelling force of the questions of the Jismiyya according to their (Mu'tazila) principles.

N. The Jismiyya are presumably the same as the Mu'assima and « fī l-jism » undoubtedly is the equivalent of « fī l-tajsim », i.e. attributing a body to God

10. *Kitāb Idāh al-Burhān fī l-Radd ala Ahl al-Zu'gh wa l-Tuḥqān* (The elucidation of the Proof in Refutation of the Deviators and the Unbelievers)

in which he discoursed on the vindication of Abū Bakr's Imāmate and refuted those who maintained the doctrine of designation and held that there must be an infallible Imām in every age

NN 1. Possibly this was an epitome of the *Fuṣūl*. At any rate it contained the same number of treatises

2. The treatise on the Imāmate is put last as it is in the *Luma'*, the *Ibāna*, al-Baqillāni's *Tamhīd*, al-Juwaynī's *Irshād*, al-Ghazālī's *Iqtisād*, etc. This position seems to have been due to the fact that the question was not strictly dogmatic. Thus al-Juwaynī remarks that it is not one of the *uṣūl al-rīqāḍ*. *Irshād*, 231-344

3. *Kitāb fī khalq al-ʿamal* (On the creation of human acts) — in which we refuted the allegations of the Muʿtazila and the Qadariyya regarding the creation of acts and laid bare their deception in that.

N. The question discussed in the *Luma'*, Ch. 5

4. *Kitāb kabīr fī l-ʾisṭiṣṭāʿ* (A large book on the capacity) against the Muʿtazila, in which we refuted their proofs that the capacity precedes the act and their questions and answers.

N. The question discussed in the *Luma'*, Ch. 6.

5. *Kitāb kabīr fī l-Ṣifāt* (A large book on God's attributes) in which we argued against the various Muʿtazila, Jahmiyya and other adversaries of ours on the question of the attributes, concerning their denial of God's knowledge, and His power, and His other attributes, and against Abū'l-Hudhail and Ma'mar (Mu'ammār) and al-Nazzām and al-Fuwaṭī, and against those who maintained the eternity of the world, and in which we discussed many questions connected with the attributes concerning the affirmation of God's face and hands and His being

maintain the eternity of *al-dahr*, according to their different opinions and various doctrines, then he refuted therein the Brahmans, Jews, Christians, and Magians. It is a large book containing twelve books, of which the first is a vindication of reasoning and rational argument and a refutation of those who denied that, then he mentioned and replied to the arguments used by the Mulhidun and the Materialists to prove the eternity of the world, and he dealt thoroughly with the assertions made by al-Rawandi in his *Kitab al-Tāy* (The Crown), i.e. the work in which the latter defended the doctrine of the eternity of the world.

NN 1. — « The Chapters » is probably the correct translation. The original was very likely fuller and perhaps involved a rhyming word like « *usul* ». For other possible meanings cf. SDA, s.v. *fasl*.

2. — « Materialists » might conceivably be « Epicureans » cf. SDA, s.v. *dahrī*.

3. — « *al-dahr* » is a famous Arabic word. Here it is perhaps equivalent to « the world ».

4. On al-Rawandi cf. *Kitab al-Intisār*, ed. Nyberg, Preface, pp. 25 ff. (In Arabic) The *Kitab al-Tāy* is mentioned on p. 34. Tritton, pp. 134-5.

5. The brief indications of the schema of this work suggest the plan followed by al-Bāqillānī in his *Tamhīd*. The length of the *Fuṣūl* may have been an obstacle to its multiplication by copying. In any case, we can be sure that much of its contents appeared again in other works of al-Ashʿarī.

2. *Kitab al-Majīz* (The Epitome)

containing twelve books according to the various opinions of adversaries, both Muslim and non-Muslim. The last part of this is the *Kitab al-Imama* (The Imamate),

APPENDIX III

THE WORKS OF AL-ASH'ARĪ

The following list is taken from Ibn 'Asakir's *Tabyin*, 128.14-136.14. The authority for most of this list is Ibn Fūrak. He, in turn, draws most of his list from a list given by al-Ash'arī himself in his *al-'Amad*. The latter list covers the works written by al-Ash'arī up to the year 320/932. Ibn Fūrak then adds the titles of works composed by al-Ash'arī between 320 and his death in 324/935-6. Ibn Asakir himself adds a few more titles.

This list is certainly very interesting. It helps us to form an idea of the nature and extent of al-Ash'arī's *kalam*. Suggestive as many of the titles are, I have been very wary of drawing unjustified conclusions. On the whole I have added very few notes, preferring, at least for the present, to let the list speak for itself. I see no reason for questioning its authenticity. My chief regret, no doubt shared by many others, is that so few of al-Ash'arī's works seem to have survived the ravages of time and, perhaps, of men.


I — WORKS MENTIONED IN AL-'AMAD

1. *al-Fuṣal* (The Chapters)

A relation of the Muḥidūn and of those who depart from (or are outside of) the religion of Islām, such as the Philosophers, the Naturalists (or Elementarists), the Materialists, the Assimilators, and those who



III. THE WORKS OF AL-ASH'ARI



O Lord, be merciful to our Shaikh and Leader,
And reveal his true worth to the seeker.
By Thy might rend the veil of his slanderer,
Be he envier, or reprover, or foul accuser
Inspire men's hearts with sympathy for his followers,
For they call Thee One, Thou most powerful sympathizer.
I end my discourse with Thy praise, O Most Generous!
Thanking Thee for Thy most beneficent favor!

by everybody because of the advantage there would be for him in that on the Day of Judgment. There is also a report to the effect that if anyone calumniates the *Ṣulamā*, God will cause his heart to die before he himself dies.

GENERAL CONCLUSION

426.1 May God quicken our hearts with the light of faith and wisdom, and forgive us our sins because of our love for our brethren the *Imāms* who have preceded us in the faith! May He reward us for defending our Muslim brothers as He has promised by the tongue of His Prophet. Eleven traditions from Muhammad, their general tenor being that he who defends an absent Muslim brother will be safe from the Fire and assured of the Garden.

430.4 I hope that God will strengthen the *Ahl al-Haqq* ⁽⁹⁶⁾ by what I have mentioned in this book, and reward me for it after my death. I fear no adversaries who may reproach me for I have reported what I know to be certain, and I have aimed at showing how the early Muslims were innocent of what later slanderers attributed to them. It has been said: Who dares despite rebukes, to support the truth, God returns to him those rebukes as praise, and he who seeks praise by opposing truth, God returns to him that praise as blame. My only motive in defending the honor of al-Ash'ari has been salvation from the Fire on the day of retribution!

431.9 Ibn 'Asākir concludes his work with thirty-two verses of his own composing. They include some *fakhr*, praise of al-Ash'ari and of Ash'arism, reproof of al-Ahwāzī. As a conclusion to this summary I offer the reader this translation of his last four verses:

(96) People of the Truth — the orthodox, the Sunnites.

to believe what he said. But « every fallen date has its gleaner, and the hairdresser will match the worth of the face »

CONCLUSION OF THE REFUTATION

491B This is a sufficient answer to al-Ahwāzī who has harmed no one but himself by what he said. Al-Ash'arī's glory remains undiminished by al-Ahwāzī's lying. He is a model worthy to be set beside the great Companions (ؓ). And if the Ash'arites have been calumniated, we must remember that such was also the lot of the Companions. Thus 'Alī Baqr and 'Umar were vilified by the Rawāfiq, and 'Uthmān by the Rawāfiq and the Khawārij, and 'Alī by the Khawārij and the Banū 'Umayyā, and 'Aisha by the Ash'arī Rafq. The same has been true in the cases of the other Companions and of the Imāms of religion in all countries.

425 'Aisha is reported to have said « I heard your Prophet say « This Community will not pass away and I later members curse its early members » Ahmad b. Hanbal was bitterly attacked by the Mutazila, though others recognized his excellence. 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Mahdī and al-Hasan al-Baṣrī also suffered from the tongues of detractors and slanderers. Yahyā b. Zakariyyā (John the Baptist) is said to have prayed to God for protection from the tongues of men. He received this answer from God « O Yahyā, I have not done this for Myself, how, then, shall I do it for you? »

4235 But those who have thus suffered have an increased reward from God. 'Aisha and al-Shāfi'i are cited to the effect that such slander profits the dead, God thus willing that they should not be cut off from further reward, though they have been cut off from further good works. And 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Mahdī said that if it were not for the fact that it would be disobedience towards God, he would desire to be calumniated

(95) i.e. Muslims who were contemporaries of Muḥammad.

Ibn Farak, and Abū Abdallāh Muhammad b. 'Atiq b. Muḥammad. Some ignorant Hanbalites destroyed the superstructure of his tomb, but they harmed al-Ash'arī no more than the burning of Uthmān's tomb by some of the Rawāfiḍ harmed Uthmān. I have been told that a certain Hanbalite of Bagdad shamefully defiled al-Ash'arī's tomb, only to die in agony three days later. It is really a grace from God that al-Ahwāzī ended his calumnies with this palpable lie about the death of al-Ash'arī, otherwise, his previous lies might have been believed by some ignorant men.

ATTACK ON AL-AHWĀZĪ

4147 The immorality of al-Ahwāzī singularly unfitted him for criticism of the defects of others. He exemplifies the prophetic tradition that he who puts Muslims to shame will himself be shamed by God. Moreover, al-Ahwāzī was the most living of men in the matter of traditions on the Qur'anic « readings ». This is proved by various testimonies. He died in the year 406/1015. If he lied in the matter of the « readings », it is not surprising that he lied against an outstanding Imam like al-Ash'arī, whose work was of prime importance to the professors of God's oneness. The Khāṭib said: « Abū Abī al-Ahwāzī — a great liar in both Tradition and Readings ».

4148 I shall not emulate the ravings of al-Ahwāzī, but am content to leave it to God to requite him for them. Had he possessed any faith and reverence, he would not have cursed and vilified Imams. Four traditions from Muhammad condemning cursing, and another non-prophetic, against slander.

4149 Another defect of al-Ahwāzī was his incorrect language and barbarous expression. Really it would have been preferable to ignore him, for his utterances are not surprising in one possessed of so many personal defects. What is surprising is the fact that men have been found who are ignorant enough

A He would have been truthful had he said the exact opposite! No country is without an Ash'arite who expounds the truth and refutes the evasions of the Ma'attila and the Mashabihah. But every age also has some ignorant and obtuse and vicious whose slanders and calumnies harm himself most and who seduces only ignorant men of his own ilk.

- 4113 11. Al-Ahwazi affirms that al-Ash'ari never ceased wandering about countries, his teaching unaccepted, his state lowly, obscure and unwelcome in Islamic countries, finding no glory in Muslim domains and meeting no kindly reception among the learned, until he reached the land of al-Ahṣā', a land which no believer enters and in which no Muslim dwells, the resort only of wicked profligates and partisans of the unbelieving Qarmatians (93).

A This is the gigantic sort of falsehood which only the most insolent prevaricator would dare to utter. It is a matter of common knowledge that al-Ash'ari dwelt only in Baṣra and Baghdad. Al-Ahwazi's fondness for rhymed prose blinded him to the truth. Perhaps the titles of some of al-Ash'ari's works led him to suppose that al-Ash'ari had actually visited various countries. Actually those titles merely embrace the answers he gave to questions sent to him from men in those countries (94). These works, incidentally, show that al-Ash'ari was anything but obscure.

- 41210 12. Al-Ahwazi asserts that al-Ash'ari died in al-Ahṣā'.

A This is the concluding lie of his book. No one disputes the fact that al-Ash'ari died in Baghdad. I myself have visited his tomb and shed most copious tears there. Near it are the tombs of three of his famous followers: Ibn Mujāhid,

(93) Cf. art. *ḥarmatan* (Massgrave), in EI or HWB, also, B. Lewis, *The Origins of Isma'ism* (Cambridge, 1940).

(94) Cf. App. III, N° 31 ff.

run away with him as to speak offensively of the divine attributes.

- 410.5 38. Al-Ahwāzī asserts that al-Ash'arī's doctrine has always been shunned

A. This is manifestly untenable, since the majority of 'ulamā' and imāms everywhere follow al-Ash'arī. These are the leading authorities on religious matters to whom men turn in all their doubts and difficulties. Opposition to al-Ash'arī is confined to a small group of men, secretly anthropomorphists, inimical to those who profess *tanẓīh*, imitators of the Mu'tazila in assailing al-Ash'arī, and chiefly remarkable for their profound ignorance of his vast learning.

- 410.14 39. Al-Ahwāzī asserts that Ash'arism has been strong for less than thirty years.

A. The designation « Ash'arite » became widespread only in the time of al-Baḡillānī (90). I have already mentioned how Mu'tazilism prevailed and the adherents of the Sunna remained in seclusion until al-Baḡillānī boldly championed Ash'arism. From him it spread east and west, while he himself rendered it victorious in the « Abode of Peace and Dome of Islām » (91), i.e. Baghdad. Al-Baḡillānī was on the most friendly terms with a group of the Hanbalites and was buried in the cemetery of the Imām Ahmad b. Hanbal (92). He is famous everywhere.

- 410.6 40. — Al-Ahwāzī asserts that God leaves no country without someone to refute the doctrine of the Ash'arites and to expose their ignominy and overcome their utterances.

(90) Roughly 50-75 years after Ash'arī's death

(91) Qubbat al-Islām (the Dome of Islām) means Baḡra according to Hava, but most of Baḡillānī's work seems to have been done in Baghdad

(92) The Cemetery of the Martyrs — cf. Le Strange, *Baghdad during the Abbasid Caliphate*, 158.

A What a barbarous expression! And it is also a lie, because the Aṣḥāb al-Kalām refuted those others and warned men against them and exposed all their deficiencies.

409 36. Al-Ahwāzī adds « and with those who professed unbelief and *dhād* » (87).

A How could this have been so, when they exposed and refuted the unbelief and innovation of those others? This is a particularly shameful thing to come from one who pretends to be a Muslim. This enormity leads Ibn 'Asākir to embark on a long discussion of *takfir* and *tafsiq* (88). He cites ten traditions to show the abhorrence in which one should hold such *takfir*.

409.3 These are reinforced by the citation of a letter written by Abū Maḥammad 'Abdallāh b. Abī Zayd of Qarawān to the Mutazite, 'Alī b. 'Ahmad b. Ismā'īl of Baghdad, in which the former refutes the charges of the latter that Ibn Kalāb and al-Ash'arī were guilty of innovation and unbelief respectively.

409.5 Al-Ahwāzī has simply imitated the Mutazida. Al-Ash'arī himself would never accuse any of the Ahl al-Qilla (89) of unbelief. And his followers showed the same restraint, even though they differed on some questions. In this they were unlike the Khawārij, Mutazida, and Rawafid.

37.—Al-Ahwāzī accuses the Ash'arites of abandoning Book and Tradition and of plunging into analogy and reasoning.

A This is a calumnious lie and an empty and heedless claim! They were ceaseless students of the texts which they illuminated by their tools and illustrated by the soundest traditions, unlike the babbling al-Ahwāzī who so far let his tongue

(87) i.e. irreligion, atheism, unbelief

(88) *Takfir* — calling one a *kāfir* (atheist), *tafsiq* — calling one a *fāsiq* (grave sinner)

(89) Another name for Muslims, i.e. the people who turn in the direction of Mecca when they pray

al-Ash'ari's followers. Thus he erred in counting al-Qalānisi among the « four » followers, because al-Qalānisi was a contemporary, and not a disciple, of al-Ash'ari⁽⁸³⁾. Moreover, his impugning of Ibn Mujāhid is shown to be false by the weightier testimony of the Khaṭīb. His remark that al-Bāqillāni was the hireling of al-Fāmi, and that he attained eminence only by dancing attendance on the rulers, and not by learning, is ignorance and wilful blindness to the widespread fame of al-Bāqillāni. The same is true of his assertion that Abu'l-Hasan al-Jabari, the companion of al-Bāqillāni, was never distinguished in kalām.

- 400.7 34. Al-Ahwāzi asserts that al-Ash'ari had no standing in learning, Qur'ān, jurisprudence, or tradition.

A. This is a lie often repeated by this malicious and ignorant man. Al-Ash'ari's knowledge of the Qur'ān is amply attested by the acknowledged excellence of his *Tafsīr*. As for his knowledge of the *uṣūl*⁽⁸⁴⁾, the 'ulamā are agreed that he was unique in his time in this respect. In jurisprudence he followed the system of al-Shāfi'i, or that of Mālik, and composed works on its roots which he garrisoned with excellent proofs. As for tradition, he learned what he needed to know in order to accomplish his aims. Notice, furthermore, how clumsily al-Ahwāzi expresses himself by seeming to distinguish between « learning » and what follows.

- 40.2 35. Al-Ahwāzi asserts that the *Ashbāh al-Kalām* are found only in the *sadr*⁽⁸⁵⁾ along with the philosophers and geometry and logic and *zandaqa*⁽⁸⁶⁾.

(83) Al-Kawthari notes that al-Qalānisi preceded Ash'ari in defending the Sunna. He also refers to a work of Ibn Fāruk which has the interesting title « The Disagreement (*al-khiṭāf*) of the Two Shāfi'is, al-Qalānisi and al-Ash'ari ».

(84) i.e. the *uṣūl al-dīn* — cf. n. 69, *supra*.

(85) The word means breast, chest, beginning, forefront. Perhaps he meant what we mean by « right up with... ».

(86) i.e. free thought — cf. n. 66, *supra*.

without being killed? We have already mentioned the zeal of al-Ash'ari in the performance of his religious duties

395.10 29 Al-Ahwāzī's relation from Ibn al-Sūlūk from the latter's father gives away his lie, for he did not know what name to give al-Sūlūk. Both father and son were circumcised by the Qaḍī Abū 'Umar Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusain, who was one of the most zealous champions in Khurāsān of the system of al-Shāfi'i and al-Ash'ari. Indeed, all three propagated the system of al-Ash'ari. How, then, could father and son have related any such thing of the Imām whom they followed?

396.9 30 Al-Ahwāzī's assertion that al-Ash'ari resided in Basra unfrequented by the learned because he himself was not one of the learned reveals his own irreligion and impudence and want of understanding. Al-Ash'ari's learning is a commonplace among the learned.

397.1 31 Al-Ahwāzī's assertion that al-Ash'ari had only four followers is patently false. Those who heard him lecture and followed him became outstanding Imāms in all countries. The list we have already given is a sufficient exposure of al-Ahwāzī's ignorance and malice.

397.9 32 Al-Ahwāzī asserts that Ibn 'Aynūn manifested no unbeliefs in Baghdad.

A Were there, then, in the teaching of al-Ash'ari, unbeliefs which Ibn 'Aynūn concealed, but which were manifested by other followers of al-Ash'ari? Ibn 'Aynūn and the other Ash'arites were far removed from unbelief. They held fast to Book and Sunna in very adverse circumstances, refusing to go the way of the Qadarite Mu'tazila⁽⁸²⁾, joining together traditional and rational proofs, shunning the excesses of the Mu'tazila and other heretics, and exposing the errors put forward by the latter.

398.6 33.—Al-Ahwāzī makes various false statements about

(82) * Strippers * — i.e. those who deny God's attributes

effect that al-Ash'ari did not show himself in Baghdad up to the time that he departed from that city.

A The last detail mentioned shows the falsity of the whole story. Al-Ash'ari never left Baghdad once he had made his way there. There he died, and his tomb is there. As for his not showing himself, we have already related how he went every Friday to attend the circle of Abū Ishāq of Merv, the renowned jurist.

391.6 24 Al-Ahwāzī's assertion regarding the question of faith goes well with his other calumnies. Al-Ash'ari did not hold the absolute eternity of faith, but he distinguished between the uncreated faith of God and the created faith of creatures.

394.10 25 Al-Ahwāzī's assertion that it is firm and certain from the transmission of excellent men that al-Ash'ari was a man of no religion is quite untrue according to the learned and intelligent — even though it may have been maintained by the Salamiyya, Mu'tazila, and Jahmiyya. As for al-Ahwāzī himself, his opinion is worthless.

394.14 26 Al-Ahwāzī's citation from Abū'l-Hasan al-Shāmī is valueless, for the latter has no authority. Indeed, what he said shows that he was a Mu'tazilite. For he considered abandoning the doctrine of the Mu'tazila to be *ilhād*.

394.18 27. Al-Ahwāzī's likening al-Ash'ari to Ibn al-Rawandī (81) is absurd. We have already seen that al-Ash'ari related the false doctrines of Ibn al-Rawandī. How, then, could they be regarded as comparable in *ilhād*?

395.1 28. Al-Ahwāzī's story, related from his own brother, that al-Ash'ari did not pray for twenty years is an especially loathsome lie. What standing has al-Ahwāzī's brother? How could anyone have omitted prayer for so long in those times

(81) Cf. n. 2, under n° 1, App. III

work and not believe and profess what it contained? As a matter of fact the Hanbalites are firmly attached to the doctrine of the *Ibāna* and rely on the work. For they are not Mu'tazila, nor do they deny God's attributes, etc. When *kalām* is useless, they refrain from it, just as a skilful doctor uses now one remedy and now another. Recall the saying of Sufyān: "If you are in Syria, speak of the virtues of 'Alī and if you are in Kūfa, speak of the virtues of 'Uthmān." A swimmer does not use his skill in swimming while he is on dry land, but he makes energetic use of it when he finds himself in a sinking ship. So it is only when the tranquil possession of faith is threatened by *tashbīh* or *ta'til* that men need to resort to interpretation and *kalām*. The *Ibāna* has always been highly regarded by men of religion. The Imām Abū 'Uthmān Ismā'il b. Abd al-Rahmān b. Ahmad al-Ṣabbāḥ never went out to give a lecture without taking the *Ibāna* with him. Had the Hanbalites rejected what is in the *Ibāna*, the fact would certainly have been handed down. But I have it from trustworthy sources that al-Ash'arī was a friend of many of them, as were also Ibn Majaḥid and al-Baqillānī. In the year 370-980-1, a distinguished gathering in the house of Abū'l-Ḥasan, Abū al-Azīz b. al-Ḥārith al-Tamīmī, the Shaikh of the Hanbalites, included Abū Bakr al-Abḥārī, the Shaikh of the Mālikites, and Abū'l-Qāsim al-Darīkī the Shaikh of the Shāfi'ites, and Abū'l-Ḥasan Ṭahīr b. al-Ḥasan, the Shaikh of the Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth, and Abū'l-Ḥusain b. Sam'ān, the Shaikh of the preachers and ascetics, and Abū Abdallāh b. Mujaḥid, the Shaikh of the Mutakallimūn, and the latter's companion, Abū Bakr b. al-Baqillānī. Had the roof fallen on them, there would have remained in Irāq no *muftī* comparable to anyone of these!

23 — Al-Ahwazī has a story from al-Barbahārī⁽⁸⁰⁾ to the

(80) Cf. al-Kawtharī's two notes, p. 390, and p. 392.

is a dreadful thing to say of one at that terrible hour when the tomb opens before him. Besides, we know that al-Ash'ari vigorously refuted the Mulhida. So this whole assertion is simply proof of an impious mind, in addition to its having been related from one who has no standing whatever among the traditionists.

- 383.4 21 Al-Ahwāzī contends that the repentance of heretics is unacceptable. He argues from the Qur'ān (3:90/84), and from certain traditions. He asserts that a heretic's repentance would not be valid unless all those who had followed his heresy also repented. But heretics do not repent, for their repentance is inconceivable, and they never come to believe that they have been in error.

A The argument from the Qur'ān is inadmissible. The verse must be taken in its context (3:85-91/79-85). The correct interpretation of this passage according to expert commentators 384.2 387.3. As for the traditions which al-Ahwāzī cites, they are rejected by the experts. The assertion regarding the necessity of the repentance of the heretic's followers is untenable. How does al-Ahwāzī know that al-Ash'ari led anyone to profess Mu'tazilism? And if he did, can al-Ahwāzī prove that those who had gone astray did not return to the doctrine of the Ahl al-Sunna when al-Ash'ari did? The last statement—that heretics simply do not repent—is absurd and is contradicted by the efforts of the Imāms of the Ahl al-Sunna to draw men away from heresy and by the historical case of such a man as Na'im b. Ḥamad, who recognized the error he had followed while he was a Jahmī.

- 388.4 22 The attacks of al-Ahwāzī on the *Kitāb al-Ibāna*. He asserts that al-Ash'ari's followers used the *Ibāna* as a protection against the Hanbalites. And he claims that the Hanbalites did not accept what al-Ash'ari had set forth in the *Ibāna*.

A How could a Muslim compose such a distinguished

repented and is not a religious and pious man. But when he manifests sorrow for his past sin, and is known to be truthful and trustworthy, there can be no doubt about the genuineness of his repentance. This was the case with al-Ash'ari, and it is further attested by his effective disputation with al-Jubbā'i and other Mu'tazila and by his writings against the heretics.

281 10

19. Al-Ahwāzī relates from Abū Abdallāh al-Hamrānī an unknown witness that the latter said: "Men differed over the cause of al-Ash'ari's conversion. His followers said that the truth became clear to him, and that this was the cause of his shunning Mu'tazilism. Others said that one of his male or female relatives died, and therefore he repented lest the judge should prevent his inheriting. And others said that he abandoned the doctrines of the Mu'tazila because he had attained to no eminence in the eyes of the common people."

A. We have already mentioned the abstinence and unworthiness of al-Ash'ari, which amply refute the assertion about the inheritance. And in that case how explain his books which must have converted many? The assertion that his conversion was motivated by a desire for fame and honor can be made only by one who does not believe in the resurrection. How could a Muslim give expression to what contradicted his real interior sentiments, especially in matters touching beliefs and fundamental religious principles? It is the first reason mentioned by al-Hamrānī which is the true one.

282

20. A second relation which al-Ahwāzī reported from al-Hamrānī seems to have been the assertion that al-Ash'ari was born a *mulhid* (79) and died a *mulhid*. The first part of this assertion contradicts the view of the Mu'tazila that everyone is born a professor of God's oneness. As for the second part, it

(79) Irreligious, atheist, unbeliever

Basra really means that he was reporting what was said by the Mu'tazila and by Sāṭimiyya like himself. His sources are either unknown, or like himself. Where does he find authorization for such an orgy of cursing and blaming? God Himself said: « Curse not those, apart from God, upon whom they call, lest they in return unwittingly curse God » (16:108). And if God forbade the cursing of wood and stone, how can it be licit for one to curse excellent 'ulama'? A possible objection is refuted by the example of Muḥammad, who would not curse the polytheists, but said: « I was not sent as a curser, but as a mercy ». Al-Ahwāzī follows neither the guidance of God nor the example of the Apostle, but in his blindness does the will of Satan. For God said: « Satan only seeks the incidence of enmity and hatred among you » (5:91-93). If al-Ahwāzī had possessed any sense, or any knowledge of the Law, he would have known that his cursing of the great 'ulama' was a hateful thing and a great sin.

380.4 17. The assertion that al-Ash'arī turned from Mu'tazilism is denied by nobody. But only those whose opinion is negligible deny that he became a Sunnite after having been a Mu'tazilite.

380.10 18. Al-Wazzān asserted that al-Ash'arī underwent no real change of mind in his « conversion », for God sent no prophet guaranteed by miracles so that creatures should necessarily abandon their position.

A. A stupid statement, since he claimed that a change of mind was the cause of the conversion. Moreover, the assertion that one abandons his position only on the occasion of a miracle is absurd. Many other reasons can be assigned, such as effective reasoning, the guidance of God, a dream, or persevering search for truth — all of which were realized in the case of al-Ash'arī. Doubt may arise concerning the sincerity of repentance when the one repenting merely claims to have

we are told that al-Ash'ari lived on the income from a property left by Bilal to his descendants. If Abul-Hasan had not been one of his descendants, he certainly would not have received that income. Al-Ahwazi's appeal to an ancient verse is of no avail, for it merely serves to manifest his ignorance and his inability to distinguish between *al-kunā* and *al-kināyat*. (77)

377.1 13 Al-Ahwazi says: « And he (al-Ash'ari) claimed to belong to the Ahl al-Sunna » No claim that, but the simple truth, as anyone with any knowledge can testify !

377.4 14 — He continues « And a group of ignorant men were partial to him » Actually, those who followed al-Ash'ari were the *ulama* and the jurists, distinguished Imams in every country, as we have shown in the list which we have already given

377.8 15 His next words « and his case became notorious and was talked about everywhere » contradict his later assertion that al-Ash'ari was obscure and that he was not received in the countries of Islam. But such contradiction is not surprising in one so ignorant and foolish !

377.9 16 Al-Ahwazi asserts that al-Ash'ari was wont to defend innovation and to urge upon men the doctrine of the *Mu'tazila* and the *Zanādiqa*. (78)

A. Another example of weak-minded invention. Look at al-Ash'ari's works and you will see how he detested the *Mu'tazila*, and the *Zanādiqa*, as did also his followers. Al-Ahwazi's claim to be reporting what was said by the people of

(77) *Kanā* is the plural of *kunya*, and *kināyat* the plural of *kināya* i.e. *metonymy*, or the expression of something by means of a word which does not clearly indicate it — cf. Shartūnī, *Mabād al-Arabīyya*, IV, 134

(78) Plural of *zindiq* — cf. n. 65, *supra*.

- 374.9 10. Al-Ahwāzī continues: « However, his genealogical claim is a lie »

A. This is a brazen calumny by one who did not realize the enormity of his crime. We have already mentioned several testimonies to al-Ash'ari's genealogy. And in another, reported from Abū Bakr b. 'Uthmān b. Muḥammad, the Imām of Baghdad, the genealogy is traced back through eight intermediaries to Abū Mūsā.

- 374.17 11. Al-Ahwāzī asserts that followers of al-Ash'ari avoid the genealogical ascription of al-Ash'ari to Abū Bishr and zealously and earnestly fly from that because of what they know about the reason for that ascription.

A. This is also a lie. We have already mentioned that Ibn Jarīr and the Khafīf, two of al-Ash'ari's famous followers, both ascribe al-Ash'ari genealogically to Abū Bishr. One calls him al-Ash'ari's father, and the other his grandfather, because of the confusion caused by the use of the name and the *kunya* ⁽⁷⁶⁾ with reference to the same person. That was the case with many of the great Companions, e.g. Abū Bakr b. Abū Qur'āṭa and 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī Awlā.

- 375.9 12. Al-Ahwāzī mentions a baseless narrative from some of the savants of Bagdad to the effect that Abū Bishr was a Jew who embraced Islām at the hands of one of the Ash'arivans.

A. This is a lie related from unknown sources. Only the scribe has denied al-Ash'ari's descent from Abū Mūsā. How could he dare tell this lie, when all know that al-Ash'ari's genealogy is as we have mentioned? Recall the account of Bandār b. al-Ḥusain, already mentioned, in which

(76) The *kunya* is the name compounded, e.g., of a father of and the son's name - for example, Al-Ḥasan (The Favour of Hasan) which was Ash'ari's *kunya*. Cf. Wright, *Arabic Grammar*, I, 10. D. Ash'ari's grandfather had the name Ishāq, and the *kunya*, Abū Bishr.

lack of learning. He did not know *fiqh*, and his knowledge of Arabic was abominable. His writings on tradition deserve only erasure. Though he was learned in Qur'anic readings, some of his statements about them were out and out lies. His knowledge of interpretation and exegesis was indifferent. On the other hand, we have already seen how the *ulamā* were eloquent in their praise of al-Ash'ari's learning. God crack al-Ahwazi in his head and shatter his mouth! He was a *Salim* (?), *mushabbih*, *mujassim*, *hashwī*. Anyone who chances on his *Kitab al-Bayan fi Sharh 'Uqūd Ahl al-Imān* (73), a part of which in his own handwriting is in Damascus, will easily recognize the evil of his benefits. That it was which moved him to such violent criticism of al-Ash'ari!

3713 9. « Tracing back Abu l-Hasan's origin to Abu Musa reflects no credit on the religion of the former, for Prophets and just men have begotten unbelievers and hypocrites. »

A. It is true that genealogy alone does not take the place of doing good. But when both ancestor and descendant are good and distinguished, then distinguished ancestry is a blessing of God, and the excellence of the forebears is an earnest of successful posterity. Recall the Qur'anic story of the noble youths and their pious father (?). And some of the commentators say that the ancestor in question was ninth or seventh. There are several traditions from Muḥammad to the effect that God preserves the believer in his son and the son of his son, and the son of the son of his son, and his neighbor, etc. And Abu Musā was the ninth forebear of al-Ash'ari in the ascending line.

(73) One of the *Salimyya* — cf. *Tritton*, 136.

(74) « Exposition of the Tenets (?) of the People of Faith ». It is not quite clear that al-Ahwazi's attack on Ash'ari was contained in this work, as Mehren states, *Exposé*, 5-6.

(75) Qur. 18.82-81.

to repel error, nor does He allow the heretic to be high and mighty in speech and act » True enough, but it was those whom he attacked, and not himself, who were such

- 366 14 5. « There is no good superior to the Sunna, nor is there any evil worse than innovation. »

A. Consider this carefully that you may know that it was al-Ash'ari, and not al-Ahwāzi, who showed the greater attachment to the Sunna and superior learning by his refutations of all sorts of heretics. Could al-Ahwāzi point out any place where al-Ash'ari was guilty of innovation ?

- 367 5 6. « In His beneficence God has manifested in the case of every group of heretics something which has turned away from them the hearts of the common people. »

A. And what is it that turns men's hearts from the doctrine of the heretics ? Knowledge and understanding ? Or belief in *tawhid* and *tanzih*, and shunning *taṣṭim* and *tashbih* ? Or affirmation of the divine attributes and reverent refusal to predicate members of God ? Surely such things as these, and not their contraries.

- 367 1 7. He said « And God has removed the heretics far from the threefold teaching (72) which is the root of the Law and the mainstay of the Community. » Note the faulty Arabic in that expression « threefold teaching », and recognize the ignorance and barbarous diction of the man !

- 367 19 8. — Al-Ahwāzi claimed that al-Ash'ari fitted that description, and that he was not a man of science and learning, and so for all like him among the *mutakallimūn*

A. Al-Ahwāzi himself is the man whom this description fits ! His own works amply demonstrate his shortcomings and

(72) Book, Tradition and Consensus ? The Arabic is *al-ta'lim al-thalāth* which Ibn 'Asakir would correct to *ta'lim thalāth hanna aṣl*, or, 'an al-'ulām al-thalāth al-lawā'it hanna aṣl

of those of others, for he who seeks out the vices of others does so in proportion to those which he himself has.¹

- 364 8 1. — Al-Ahwāzī said « I have remarked that the good estate of religion is threatened by serious opposition, and that neglect in this matter has become excessive. The leaders have become impotent and the multiplication of error abridgment (71). The foolish are many, and the learned few. »

Answer His words are true, but not to his purpose. If such had not been the case, a Persian from Ahwāz would not have shown such ignorant presumption in attacking a great Arab Imam. Had the crisis in his day not been so few, the deceivers of Ahwāz would not have been able to stigmatize the Arabs of Basra. But the children of the Magians accused the sons of the Immigrants of atheism and archaism out of pure and idle spite, because Ahwāz was one of the places conquered by Abū Mūsā al-Ash'arī. But since al-Ahwāzī dared not calumniate Abū Mūsā, he tried to vent his spleen on Abū'l-Hasan.

- 366 6 2. — Al-Ahwāzī's words « and the investigators of doubts have disappeared » must be true, for otherwise he would not himself have been able to profess such a dubious doctrine!

- 366 7 3. — He went on to say « and seekers of the Sunna have become weak, except those to whom God has granted immaturity and special help — and these are few indeed. » But how could he say that, when he claimed that the great multitude of men followed his doctrine?

- 366 8 4. — Then he said « Truly God does not leave earth without a learned speaker and wise savant to speak the truth and

(71) Arabic: *ma'akthar min al-bā'il 'ijān*. Ibn 'Asākir criticizes this use of *ijān*. And what I have translated by « Leaders have become impotent » seems literally to be « Heads have become buttocks ».

heretics what was common to the Ahl al-Sunna and explained what was held by all four of the Imāms and others

362. We style ourselves « Ash'arites » in matters pertaining to dogma not by way of blind and unquestioning acceptance, but because we agree with the principles established by al-Ash'arī in such matters, and, so in order to distinguish ourselves from the various heretics who were related by al-Ash'arī. The four great Imāms did not differ regarding the basic principles of religion, but were agreed on *tawhīd* and *ta'wīl* (") and the denial of *tashbīh*. If you consider the holding of *ta'wīl* and the renouncement of *tashbīh* as « Ash'arizing », then all who profess God's oneness are Ash'arites!

363. There is a verse by al-Shāfi'ī in which he says : « If a love for the family of Muḥammad be *rafḍ*, then let men and jinn bear witness that I am a Raḥīqī! » In a similar sense someone sang « If you consider that one who denies all defects of his Lord has Ash'arized, and think that he entertains innovation in his mind, then let men and jinn bear witness that I am a » Ash'arite » It is also reported that someone once said to Abū Umar b. Yammā'ish « They say that you are an Ash'arite » He replied « What blessing, if it be true! »

DIRECT REPLY TO AL-AHWAZI

364. A few introductory remarks in condemnation of al-Ahwāzī. If the latter had not by self been possessed of so many defects and faults, he would not so readily have forged so many against a man not of his own race. His case recalls the remark a certain Bedouin is said to have made to another whom he heard speaking of the vices of others : « You have proved the multitude of your own vices by speaking so much

(70) i.e. removing (the human element from) perfections predicated of God) ~ cf. SDA, s. v. *nazzaha*

in technical terminology. Such terminology was used by the *matakalimān* to facilitate the progress of learners. The pious early Muslims did not use that terminology, but they had the same knowledge. Parallels are to be found in the development of the terminology used by jurists, grammarians, and traditionists.

358 6 Preoccupation with the science of *kalām* is not an innovation. The early Muslims followed the way of reasoning and were not characterized by blind and unquestioning acceptance. The Companions, the Followers, and the successors of the latter were in, or close to, the age of the Apostle. It was only the advent of the *Khawārij*, *Jahmīya*, *Mu'tazila* and *Qadarīya* which compelled the *Ahl al-Sunna* to busy themselves more explicitly with *kalām*. They followed the injunction of God: "And dispute with them, using what is best" (16:125-126). There is certainly *kalām* in the *Qur'ān* itself.

359 1 In fine, then, two types of men are opposed to *kalām*, the ignorant (for men are always hostile to what they do not know; and the heretics, who fear that *kalām* will lay bare their heresies and evil beliefs.

THE NAME «ASH'ARITE»

359 4 Some ignorant heretics may say: "We recognize only four systems. Whence, then, this fifth *Ash'arite* system? Why are you not content with being known as Shafi'ites?" I reply: This objection is far-fetched and untrue. Why do you limit the systems to four? What about other systems such as those of al-Laith b. Sa'd of Egypt, and Uthmān b. Sa'īmān al-Battī of Basra, and Ishāq b. Rahawīh of Khurāsān, and Da'ūd b. 'Alī of Isfahān, and others? They differed on legal questions, but not on the fundamental principles of religion. Moreover, we do not concede that al-Ash'ari originated a fifth system in the sense alleged. He simply defended against the

other Imams of ours. Abdallāh b. Yazīd b. Hurmuz of Medina, the Shaikh of Malik b. Anas, the master of al-Shāfiʿī, was penetrating in his kalām and refutation of heretics. Al-Ḥusayn b. al-Faḡl al-Bajilī relates the discussion which Zuhair b. Ḥarb had with al-Ma'mūn on the creation of the Qur'ān, and tells of the instruction which he (al-Bajilī) received from Zuhair.

354.4 Abu l-Ma'ād points out how the Companions and early Muslims had revelation and the Prophet's guidance under their eyes, as it were, and so had no need of the various Islāmic sciences⁽⁶⁷⁾. But as time went on various circumstances led to the development and organization of these sciences.

355.9 A testimony in favor of kalām is drawn from a dream of Abū Muḥammad 'Abdallāh b. Yūsuf al-Juwānī. In that dream he saw Abraham and asked him his opinion on the science of kalām. Abraham replied: «By it doubts and vanities are repelled».

356.5 Abū l-Qasim al-Qushairī remarks that just as we distinguish between two men praying, the one distractedly and the other recollectedly, so we must distinguish between the alim who cannot answer a difficulty and one who can. Kalām is the greatest jihād⁽⁶⁸⁾, for it is a jihād against all the enemies of religion. And, however, the men learned in the *uṣūl*⁽⁶⁹⁾ are very few nowadays. This is reinforced by some verse. And another verse citation contains the phrase: «every science is a servant of the science of kalām.»

357 The same Abū l-Qasim denies that al-Ash'arī held that most men are unbelievers because they do not know the science of kalām. But he and others did demand a reasonable knowledge of God and His attributes. This need not be phrased

(67) Cf. GAL, 101 ff.

(68) The «holy war» — cf. art. *Djihād*, in EI or Hwb.

(69) i.e. *uṣūl al-dīn* — kalām, or «theology».

with Ḥafṣ and with others on such questions as the increase and decrease of faith, the vision of God, etc.

- 142.7 Two more incidents in which al-Shāfi'i figures as an opponent of kalām. As a matter of fact he himself knew kalām well, but he preferred to avoid it when it was unnecessary. That was also the case with the early Muslims who were content with Book and Sunna with regard to the Qadar and other questions. But when Book and Sunna were attacked and impugned, our Imāms undertook to show that they were in harmony with reason.

145. There is another reason which explains the abstention from kalām by al-Shāfi'i and others. When al-Shāfi'i came to 'Irāq during the caliphate of al-Rāshid, he visited al-Ma'mūn and saw the favor which the latter showed to Bishr al-Marisi and other heretics. And when he returned to 'Irāq during the caliphate of al-Ma'mūn and saw the prevalence of heresy, and knew the Mihna in the time of al-Ma'tasim and al-Wāthiq, he, and other pious men like him, opposed associating with the rulers, and he advised his companions not to engage in kalām, lest they suffer from the Mihna. His words to Abū Ya'qūb al-Buwayhī — "You will die in iron" — were prophetic. For the latter was loaded with chains during the Mihna, because he would not admit that the Qur'ān is created, and died in his bonds.

147. Everyone knows what befell Ahmad b. Hanbal and others during the Mihna. Some were actually put to death, and some even capitulated. We are told that Abū Ibrāhīm al-Muzani refused to discuss the creation of the Qur'ān. Al-Li'l-Qāsim al-Amānī took his place and brought forth telling arguments from Book, Sunna, Consensus, and reason.

- 151.12 All this shows why our Imāms abstained from kalām, and that the kalām they reproved was that of the heretics who opposed Book and Sunna. But kalām in conformity with Book and Sunna was approved of and engaged in by al-Shāfi'i and

that it refers to the *kalām* of the innovators. It may also be explained as referring to the devoting of oneself to *kalām* to the exclusion of *fiqh* and practice. *Ḥalīm b. Unwān al-Aṣamm* said: « *kalām* is the root of religion, *fiqh* its branch, and practice its fruit.» A similar saying, attributed to *Abū Bakr al-Warrāq*, speaks of *kalām*, *fiqh*, asceticism, and piety.

- 335.6 The objection to *kalām* drawn from the sayings of al-Shāfiʿī is more serious. He is reported to have said: « If a man were afflicted by everything which God has forbidden, save polytheism, it would be better for him than to be afflicted by *kalām*. I have known the devotees of *kalām* to say a thing which I never thought would be said by a Muslim.» Again: « No one ever engaged in *kalām* and was successful.» And: « If men knew the vain desires which are in *kalām*, they would flee it as they do the lion.» And on the occasion of the proximity of some men engaged in *kalām*: « Either be near us with good, or move away from us! »

- 336.2 Such sayings of al-Shāfiʿī are to be explained as expressions of disapproval of the *kalām* of innovators, particularly the Qadariyya. But *kalām* which conforms with Book and Sunna and explains the truths of the fundamental principles of religion when discord makes its appearance — is praised by the *ʿulamaʾ*. Al-Shāfiʿī himself engaged in this praiseworthy *kalām*, e.g. with *Ḥalīf al-Iʿrād* on the question of the increment of the Qurʾān and with *Ibrāhīm b. Isḥāq al-ʿUṭayy* on the *khawar al-uhūd* (60). Al-Baḥaqqī tells us that al-Shāfiʿī's disapproval was aimed precisely at such *kalām* as that of *Ḥalīf al-Iʿrād*. But he can scarcely be said to have disapproved of all *kalām* in view of the fact that he himself engaged in it.

(60) Let the testimony of one man, though the term was as so used of any testimony which did not give necessary knowledge — cf. *Tamhīd*, 164 (2 ff).

And Ibn 'Iyād said: « The ways of guidance are not lonely because of the few who follow them, nor do they become dry because of the multitude of them who perish » Ibn 'Asakir then observes that those who persist in blaming the Ash'arites after reading this book will be lying, calumniators and will fully deserve the fate of such

332. Citation of a *fatwa* (62) in which the Ash'arites are praised and those who curse them are condemned. It is signed by the three distinguished Imāms: Muḥammad b. Ali al-Damaghāni, Ibrāhīm b. 'Alī al-Firzabādī, and Muḥammad b. Ahmad al-Shāshī

THE LEGITIMACY OF KALĀM (63)

- 333.4 It may be objected that there is no glory for al-Ash'ari in the fact that he was a *mutakallim*. For the best 'ulamā of Islam have regarded *kalām* as an innovation and have strongly disapproved of it. Moreover, even if no other had done so, the fact that al-Shāfi'ī (64) condemned *kalām* would be enough to damn it. Furthermore, a tradition attributed to al-Shāfi'ī, and in two other versions to Abū Yūsuf and Mālik b. Anas, affirms that he who severs religion by *kalām* becomes a *zindīq* (65).

- 334.7 Abū Bakr al-Baḥāqī explains that tradition by saying

(62) A legal decision given by a *mufti* concerning a problem of conduct — almost like an authoritative solution of a *casus conscientiae*.

(63) This section is very interesting from the standpoint of the historical development of Muslim theology. It seems significant that Ibn 'Asakir finds it relevant, and possibly necessary, to devote so much space to the subject.

(64) The founder of what came to be known as the Shāfi'ite school (of jurisprudence). Cf. J. Schacht *Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence*, Oxford, 1950.

(65) Cf. art. 55 in EI or HWB. « Freethinker » conveys the general idea, though the epithet was often used to stigmatize various kinds of adversaries.

- 32 75 Our Shaikh, the Qadî the Imâm Abu'l- Abbas Ahmad b. Salama b. 'Ubadallah b. Mukhallad, known as Ibn al-Ruqbi (d. 527/1132-3)
- 322 76 Our Shaikh, the Imâm Abu 'Abdallah al-Furawi (Mehren Furawi) al Naisaburi (d. 530/1135-6)
- 323 77 Our Shaikh, the Imâm Abu Sa'd Isma'il b. Abi Şahh Ahmad b. Abd al-Malik b. Abi b. Abd al-Samad al-Naisaburi, known as al-kur'ani (452/1060-1 531 1136-7)
- 326 78 Our Shaikh, the Imam Abi 'Husayn al-Sulami al-Dimashqi (450/2 1058-60 537 1138-9)
- 327 79 Our Shaikh the Imâm Abu Ma'sûr Mahmud b. Ahmad b. 'Abd al-Mun'im b. Mashadhab (d. 536 1141-2)
- 328 80. The Imâm Abu'l-Futuh Muhammad b. 'Ulad b. Abi-ha amad b. al-Mutamid al-Isfahani (d. 538/1143-4)
- 330 81 Our Shaikh the Imâm Abu'l-Lath Naisabali b. Muhammad b. Abd. l-Qawi al-Majisi (448/1046-7 542 1147-8)

330.12 (Ibn Asakir) Those whom I have mentioned are outnumbered by those left unmentioned. I should have said much more about the distinguished Ash'rites, were it not that I am anxious at brevity. Enough has been said to illustrate the point. Just as I cannot number the stars of heaven, so I am unable to exhaust the list of those who have followed the teaching of al-Ash'ari. Let the merits of those mentioned be an indication of the merits of those unmentioned. The mere mention of prophetic calls down the blessings of God.

331.6 So, if one may object that the great majority of men, in different times and countries, have not followed the teaching of al-Ash'ari. The answer to this is that the men who really count did follow al-Ash'ari. In this matter it is quality, and not number, which is to be desired. God Himself said: « And only a few believed along with him » (11:40/42), and again, « Rare among my creatures is the truly thankful » (31:13-12)

- 274 61. Abū l-Muẓaffar al-Isfahānī (d. 471/1078-9)
 276 62. The Sharīf Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm b. Alī b. Yūsuf a-
 Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083-4)
 278 63. The Imām Abū 'Alī 'Abd al-Malik b. 'Abdallāh b.
 Yūsuf a-Juwānī al-Nūsabūrī (419/1028-478/1085-
 6). The Imām al-Haramain, son of No. 47
 284 64. Abū 'Uthmān Naṣr b. Ibrāhīm al-Muqaddasī (d. 490/
 1096-7)
 288 65. Abū 'Abdallāh al-Talātī, Naẓīd Makka (d. 498/1104-5)

V — THE FIFTH CLASS

This class includes men of whom Ibn 'Asākir was a con-
 temporary, some of whom he knew by sight or from being
 with them in assemblies.

- 286 66. Abū l-Muẓaffar al-Khawāṣṣī al-Nūsabūrī (d. 500/1106-7)
 288 67. The Imām Abū l-Hasan al-Jabart, known as al-Kiyā
 (d. 504/1110-1)
 291 68. The Imām Abū Ḥamd al-Just al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111)
 306 69. The Imām Abū Bakr al-Sayyidī (d. 507/1113-14)¹¹⁵
 307 70. The Imām Abū 'Alī Qasim al-Anṣārī al-Nūsabūrī (d. 512
 1118-9)
 308 71. The Imām Abū Naṣr 'Abd al-Rahīm b. 'Abd al-Karīm
 b. Ḥawāzin al-Qusnārī (d. 514/1120-1). Son of No. 59
 72. Our Sharīf, the Imām Abū 'Alī al-Hasan b. Sulaymān
 (Mehren, Salman) al-Iṣbahānī (d. 525/1130-1)
 320 73. The Sharīf, the Imām Abū Saīd Asad b. Abī Naṣr b.
 al-Faḍl al-Umawī al-Mithnī (d. 527/1132-3)
 322 74. Our Sharīf, the Sharīf the Imām Abū 'Abdallāh Mu-
 hammad b. 'Ahmad b. Yahyā b. Jinnat al-'Uthmānī al-
 Dīwānī al-Muqaddasī (462/1069-70-527/1132-3)

[115] The date in the text, 577, is surely a mistake (cf. GAL, I, 1, 190), where the date is given as 507, which fits in with Ibn 'Asākir's chronological dating according to the date of death.

- 256 46. Abū Bakr al-Dimashqī al-Zahīd, known as Ibn al-Jirmī (d. 436/1044-5)
- 257 47. The Imam Abū Muḥammad al-Jawānī (d. 438/1046-7). The father of Imān al-Harammān, No. 63
- 258 48. Abū l-Qāsim b. Abī 'Uthmān al-Ḥamdānī al-Baghdādī (355/966 — 440/1048-9)
- 259 49. Abū Ja'far Muḥammad b. Ahmad al-Simnānī, the Qaḍī of Mosul (361/971-2 — 444/1052-3)
- 260 50. Abū Ḥatīm al-Ṭabarī, known as al-Qazwīnī (?)
- 260 51. Abū l-Ḥasan Rīṣā b. Naṣīf al-Dimashqī (d. 444/1052-3)
- 261 52. Abū Muḥammad al-Ishāḥānī, known as Ibn al-Labbān (d. 446/1054-5)
- 53. Abū'l-Faṭḥ Salīm b. Ayyūb al-Rāzī (l. 447/1055-6, aged more than eighty)
- 263 54. Abū 'Abdallāh al-Khaḍbāzī al-Naisābūrī (d. 447/1055-6)
- 264 55. Abū'l-Faḍl b. 'Amrūs (Mehren Amroush) al-Baghdādī a-Malīkī (372/982-3 — 452/1060)
- 56. Toe Ustādī Abū l-Qāsim al-Isfara'īnī (d. 452/1060). A teacher of Imān al-Harammān
- 265 57. Abū Bakr al-Naisābūrī a-Baḥāqī al-Ḥafīz (384/994-458/1065-6)

IV — THE FOURTH CLASS

This class consists of — n who sought light in al-Ash'arī's penetrating exposition through imitating and following his views.

- 268 58. Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī al-Ḥafīz, known as al-Khāṭib (391/1000-1 — 463/1070-1)
- 271 59. Abū l-Qāsim a-Qusairī al-Naisābūrī, then al-'Ustūrī (376/986-7 — 465/1072-3)
- 276 60. Abū Abī b. Abī Ḥarīṣa (Mehren Harīṣa — حرصية) al-Ḥamdānī al-Dimashqī (d. 466/1073-4)

- 233 28. Abū Saʿīd b. Abī ʿUthmān al-Naysabūrī al-Kharkashī
(d. 406-7 1015-7)
- 236 29. The Qaḍī Abū ʿUmar Muḥammad b. al-Ḥusayn al-
Bistāmī (d. 407-8 1016-18)
- 30. Abū l-Qāsim b. Abī Amr al-Baḡdādī (d. 410
1019-20)
- 239 31. Abū l-Ḥasan al-Māshadḥal al-Ishāhānī (d. 414 1023-4)
- 32. The Shāfiʿī Abū Ṭālib b. al-Muḥadd al-Ḥasrī al-
Dimashqī (d. 415 1024-5)
- 33. Abū Maḥmūd b. Abī Saʿīd b. Abū Bakr al-Jarānī (?) So-
of No. 20, grandson of No. 9, nephew of No. 26
- 24 34. Abū Ḥazim al-ʿAbdawī al-Naysabūrī (d. 417 1026-7)
- 241 35. The Ḥanbalī Abū Ishāq al-Ishāhānī (d. 418 1027-8)
- 245 36. Abū ʿAlī Saʿīd al-Baḡdādī (332/945-1 — 420
1034-5)
- 246 37. Abū Naʿīm al-Ḥaṭīz al-Ishāhānī (336/947-8 — 430
1038-9)
- 247 38. Abū Ḥamd al-Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Dawūd (Māhrawī
332/945) al-ʿUstuwāʿī al-Dulwī (d. 434 1042-3)

III. — THE THIRD CLASS

This class consists of those who met the companions of
al-Ashʿarī's companions and acquired knowledge from them.

- 39. Abū l-Ḥasan al-Sukkārī al-Baḡdādī, the poet (357
967-8 — 413 1022-3)
- 249 40. Abū Maḥsūr al-Ayyūbī al-Naysabūrī (d. 421/1030)
- 41. The Qaḍī Abū Muḥammad Abū l-Wahhāb b. Abī al-
Baḡdādī (d. 422 1031)
- 42. Abū l-Ḥasan al-Naṭṭāl al-Basrī (d. 423 1031-2)
- 43. Abū Ṭāhir b. Kharrāsh al-Dimashqī (d. 428 1036-7)
- 253 44. The Ḥanbalī Abū Maḥsūr Abū al-Qāsim b. Ṭāhir al-
Naysabūrī, known as al-Baḡdādī (d. 429 1037-8)
- 255 45. Abū Dharr al-Harawī (355-6 966-7 — 434 1042-3)

- 195 11 Abu l-Hasan Ali b. Muhammad b. Mahdi al-Tabari (?).
 96 12 Abu Ja'far al-Sulami al-Baghdadi al-Naqqash (294 906-
 7 379, 989).
 197 13 Abu Abdallah al-Ishbani known as al-Shah 1 (d. 381
 991-2).
 97 14 Abu Muhammad al-Qurasht al-Zuhri (d. 382 992-3).
 98 15 Abu Bakr al-Bukhari, known as al-Udai (d. 385/995).
 99 16 Abu Mansur b. Hushad (Mehren M.ushad) al-Naisa-
 buri (316 928 388 998).
 200 17 The Shaikh Abu l-Hasan b. Samun al-Baghdadi al-
 Mudhakkir (300 912-3 387 997).
 206 18 Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Shurafi al-Jurjani (d. 389 999).
 204 19 Abu Ali al-Faqih al-Sarakasi (293 903-4 389 999).

II — THE SECOND CLASS

This class consists of those who were the companions of
 the companions of al-Ash'ari

- 207 20 Abu Sa'd b. Abi Bakr al-Isma'ili al-Jurjani (333 944-5
 396 1005-6).
 211 21 Abu'l-Tayyib b. Abi Sahl al-Shalaki al-Naisaburi (?).
 The son of No. 6.
 214 22 Abu'l-Hasan b. Da'ud al-Muqri al-Darani al-Dimashqi
 (d. 402/1011-2).
 215 23 The Qadi Abu Bakr b. al-Tayyib b. al-Baqillani al-
 Basri (d. 403/1013).
 226 24 Abu Ali al-Daqqaq al-Naisaburi (d. 405/1014-5).
 227 25 Abu Abdallah Muhammad b. Abdallah b. Hamduwaih
 (Mehren Hamuwaih and مسويه) (321 933 405/
 1014-5).
 231 26 Abu Nasr b. Ali Bakr al-Isma'ili al-Jurjani (d. 405.
 1014-5) The son of No. 9.
 232 27 Abu Bakr Muhammad b. al-Hasan b. Furak al-Ishbani
 (d. 406 1015-6).

DISTINGUISHED ASH'ARITES

177 Ibn 'Asākir now embarks upon a series of more or less
biographical notices of famous Ash'arites. (61) The number
and quality of these is a testimony to the excellence of al-
Ash'ari himself based on the principle « The merit of the
follower as a proof of the merit of him who is followed »

1 THE FIRST CLASS

This class consists of those who were al-Ash'ari's contemporaries. They were those who followed his teaching, or who actually studied under him

- 177 1. Abū 'Abd al-lah b. Mujāhid al-Basrī (d. 370 (980-1))
178 2. Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Bāhūtī al-Baḡrī (?).
79 3. Abū'l-Ḥasan Bādār b. al-Ḥasan al-Satrāzī al-Ṣafī
(d. 353 (964))
81 4. Abū Muḥammad al-Ṭabarī, known as al-'Iraqī (d.
359 (970))
81 5. Abū Bakr al-Qaṭṭā al-Shashī (d. 365 (975-6))
183 6. Abū Saḥl al-Ṣāliḥī al-Naṣabūrī (276 (889) - 369 (979))
188 7. Abū Zaid al-Murwazī (d. 371 (981-2))
90 8. Abū 'Abdallāh b. Khaldūn al-Shirāzī al-Ṣafī (d. 371 (981-2))
92 9. Abū Bakr al-Jurjānī, known as al-Isma'īlī (277 (890) -
371 (981-2))
195 10. Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Muḥammad b. Ishāq al-
Ṭabarī, known as « al-dūd » (?) (Mehcār al-Dammālī)

(61) I have contented myself with listing the names and the dates so that the interested reader may know those whom the author thought worthy of mention. The « biographies » are very deeper in merit, but often some interesting information is given. Mehren gives some references to some of the men listed. I cannot guarantee the correctness of my transliterations, since I was unable to check on all the names, and of course the texts contain none of the short vowels or any indication of doubled consonants.

(39.18.19). We are asked to remark especially the passages concerning Ahmad b. Hanbal in order that we may know that he and al-Ash'ari agreed in their belief and were not at variance regarding the fundamental principles of religion and the doctrine of the Sunna. Of old the Baghdad Hanbalites invoked the assistance of the Ash'arites against the heretics. For those Hanbalites were mutakallimun belonging to the Ahl al-Ithbat, and those of them who discoursed in refutation of the heretics did so in the language of the Ash'arites.

- 61.12 That was the case until disagreement arose in the time of Abu Nasr al-Qushairi, during the ministry of al-Nazzam. There has always been a group of the Hanbalites who exaggerate regarding the Sunna. The fact that these were always ready to stir up trouble reflects no discredit on Ahmad Ibn Shahnai said: "Two upright men were sorely tried by evil followers. Ja'far b. Muhammad and Ahmad b. Hanbal."

- 164.3 A citation from Abu l-Ma'ali 'Azizi b. 'Abd al-Malik, largely concerned with al-Ash'ari's ancestry. In the few lines which describe al-Ash'ari's work as a defense of truth based on tradition and reason the four "loci", or sources, of al-Ash'ari are mentioned: al-Kitab, al-Sunna, al-Ijma', al-Qiyas (Qur'an, Tradition, Consensus, Reasoning).

165.4

THREE DREAM ANECDOTES ⁽⁶⁰⁾

LAUDATORY VERSE

167.9

Twelve citations from poems in praise of al-Ash'ari. There are 153 lines in all, but they add nothing new to the material already cited in the more pedestrian vehicle of prose.

(60) These are interesting, but they scarcely add anything very pertinent.

after embracing Islam, and that some of them had not really embraced Islam. And the Umayyads held that they could not be wrong at all. But al-Ash'ari followed a middle course between them and held that every *mujtahid* (*) is right, and that all of them were in the right, and that they did not differ about fundamental principles, but only about secondary conclusions, and that each one's *ijtihad* led to something, and that he was right and received reward and recompense for that.

- 152.4 13. — And the same was true of other principles too numerous to enumerate and relate. Al-Ash'ari did not follow these ways out of vain desire or wilfulness, nor did he originate them by way of innovation and personal opinion. Rather did he affirm them because of tried rational demonstrations and tested proofs from positive sources and signs leading to the truth and arguments summoning to the right and the true. These are the ways to God Most High, and the path to salvation and deliverance. He who holds fast to them will be delivered and saved; but he who deviates from them will stray and be misled.

THE SOUNDNESS OF HIS DOCTRINE

- 152.11 To show the soundness of al-Ash'ari's beliefs, Ibn 'Asākir now quotes the *Ibāna* from its beginning to the end of the Creed. Then he says

- 143.3 Reflect on the clarity and expository force of this creed, and acknowledge the excellence of this Imam who explained and elucidated it (†). Behold the easy eloquence and excellence of its expression, and be of those of whom God said: "Those who listen to the word and follow the best of it."

(*) One who exercises *ijtihād* — personal exertion in solving a problem or determining a course of action, cf. art. *Idj ihād*, in EI or Hwh.

(†) The reader may form some judgment on this creed from the translation of it in App. IV.

once sincerely believes in God does not become an unbeliever by apostasy or unbelief, and that a grave sinner is never written against him. And the Mu'tazila held that a grave sinner, despite his having believed and obeyed for a hundred years, will never emerge from the Fire. But al-Ash'ari followed a middle course between them and held that the grave sinner who is a believer and professes God's oneness is dependent on the will of God: if God wills, He will pardon him and introduce him into the Garden, and if God wills, He will punish him for his crime and then introduce him into the Garden, but no individual and distinct grave sin is punished by a continuous and perpetual punishment.

51 10. In like manner, the Rāhqa held that the Apostle of God and 'An have the power to intercede without God's command or leave, and that even though they were to intercede for unbelievers, their intercession would be acceptable. And the Mu'tazila held that Muhammad has no power of intercession whatsoever. But al-Ash'ari followed a middle course between them and held that the Apostle intercedes acceptably in the case of believers who deserve punishment, interceding for them by God's command and permission, and not interceding save for whom He wills.

151 11. Likewise, the Klawārij held that Uthman and Ali were guilty of unbelief, whereas al-Ash'ari enjoined the profession of friendship for them both and preference of the former to the latter.

151 12. Similarly, the Mu'tazila held that the Caliph Mu'awiya and Talha and al-Zubair and the Mother of the Faithful, 'Ā'isha (37), and all who followed them were in the wrong, and that even though they were to bear witness concerning a single seed, their testimony would be unacceptable. And the Rāhqa held that all these were unbelievers who apostatized

(37) The doings of these will be found chronicled in Mas'udī, *The Caliphate*.

is the descent of some of God's signs and of His angels, and that the « being firmly seated » (on the Throne) means God's dominion. And the Mushabbihā and the Hashwiyya held that the descent is the descent of God Himself, involving motion and movement from place to place, and that the being firmly seated is sitting on the Throne and localization thereon. But al-Ash'ari followed a middle course between them and held that the descent is one of God's attributes, and that the being firmly seated is one of His attributes, and that the action of His action on the Throne is called « being firmly seated ».

- 150.14 7. In like manner, the Mu'tazila held that God's speech is created, produced, originated. And the Hashwiyya al-Mujassima held that the separate letters, and the bodies written upon, and the colors in which the writing is executed, and everything between the two covers, are antecedently eternal. But al-Ash'ari followed a middle course between them and held that the Qur'an is God's speech, eternal, immutable, uncreated, unbegun, and unoriginated, but the separate letters, the bodies, the colors, the sounds, things limited, and all the qualified things of the world are created, originated, produced.

- 150.20 8. Likewise, the Mu'tazila, Jahmiyya, and Najariyya held that faith is created absolutely. And the Hashwiyya al-Mujassima held that faith is eternal absolutely. But al-Ash'ari followed a middle course between them and held that faith is of two kinds: the faith of God, which is eternal, because He said « the Faithful, ⁽⁵⁷⁾ the Watcher » (30:23), and the faith of creatures, which is created, because it becomes manifest in them and they are rewarded according to its sincerity and punished according to its uncertainty.

- 151.4 9. And similarly, the Murji'a ⁽⁵⁸⁾ held that he who

(57^{bis}) Blachère: le Pacificateur (?) — cf. his note, II, 981

(58) The Postponers — cf. Tritton, *II*, art. *Murji'at* (Wensinck), in *El or Hwb*, *Watt*, 42 ff

149.12 2 Similarly, Jahm b. Safwan held that the creature can neither create nor acquire anything. And the Mu'tazila held that he can both create and acquire. But al-Ash'ari followed a course between them and held that the creature cannot create, but can acquire, and he denied the power to create and affirmed the power to acquire.

49.17 3.— In like manner, the Hashwiyya al-Mashabbihā held that God will be seen, qualified and limited, like all things seen. And the Mu'tazila and Jahmiyya and Najjāriyya (54) held that God will not be seen in any state whatsoever. But al-Ash'ari followed a middle course between them and held that God will be seen without any localization or limits or qualification, just as He sees us without being Himself limited or qualified, so we shall see Him without His being limited or qualified.

150.1 4 Likewise, the Najjāriyya held that the Creator is in every place without localization or direction. And the Hashwiyya and Mu'assima held that God is localized on the Throne, and that the Throne is a place for Him, and that He is sitting on it. But al-Ash'ari followed a middle course between them and held that God was when no place was, and then He created the Throne and the Seat without His needing a place, and He was just the same after creating place as He had been before He created it.

150.6 5 And the Mu'tazila held that God has a hand in the sense of power and grace, and that His face is a « face of existence ». And the Hashwiyya held that God's hand is a corporal member, and that His face is a « face of form ». But al-Ash'ari followed a middle course between them and held that God's hand is a « hand of attribute », and that His face is a « face of attribute », as in the case of hearing and seeing.

150.9 6. Similarly, the Mu'tazila held that the « descent » (55)

(54) Followers of al-Najjar — cf. Tritton, 71 ff.

(55) Cf. App. IV, *Maqāṣid* 38, *Ibāna* 37, *Ibāna* (Klein) 85, MC 90,

AL-ASH'ARI'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS HERETICS

148.2 Abū 'Alī Zāhir b. Ahmad said that al-Ash'ari died in his arms, and that he muttered something as he was dying. Abū 'Alī leaned over and listened and heard these words: "God curse the Mu'tazila! They confused men and lied!"

149.1 According to another account Abū 'Alī said: "When the time of al-Ash'ari's term drew near in my house in Baghdad, he called me. I came to him and he said: 'Be my witness that I accuse no one of the people of this *qibla* of unbelief, for they all point to the same God. But all this is only a difference of expressions.'"

THE MIDDLE POSITION OF AL-ASH'ARI (51)

149.5 The Qaḍī Abū l-Ma'ālī mentioned al-Ash'ari and said

1 He studied the books of the Mu'tazila, the Jahmiyya, and the Rab'īa, and saw that they stripped and canceled and held that God has no knowledge, no power, no hearing, no sight, no life, no perdurance, and no will. On the other hand, the Hashwiyya (52) and the Mujassima and the Mukawwifa al-Muhaddida (53) held that God has a knowledge like other knowledges, and a power like other powers, and a hearing like other hearings, and a sight like other sights. But al-Ash'ari followed a course between them and held that God has a knowledge which is not like other knowledges, and a power which is not like other powers, and a hearing which is not like other hearings, and a sight which is not like other sights.

(51) Cf. GAI, 58-9, and L. Gardet's art. *Raison et foi en Islam*, *Revue Thomiste*, 1937, 457-464.

(52) Cf. A. S. Halkin's art. *The Hashwiyya*, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 54 (1934) 1-28.

(53) i.e. those who attribute a shape and assign limits to God. The epithets seem to be generic.

date is 324-935-6. Perhaps al-Wazzān meant to say * a little after 320 * rather than * a little after 330. * Ibn Furak mentions 324, and he was in a position to know, because he was a disciple of al-Bāhī, who was a disciple of al-Ash'ari.

A DREAM

4713

The Shaikh Abu l-Husain b. Sa'mān said that he had a certain companion who used to frequent his assembly. This man was virtuous, handsome, and zealous. The Shaikh gave this excellent man a fine burial, when he died, and then * A few days later I saw him in sleep, and he was naked, deformed, and miserable looking. So I said to him: 'O 'Abdallāh, what has God done to you?' He replied: 'I have been repelled, as you see. I said: "But did you not think rightly of God Most High?" He answered: "Yes, but I thought of this Shaikh." I looked, and there was a Shaikh, exceedingly tall, bright in appearance, well-formed, sweet smelling, with beautiful features, reciting in a loud and splendid voice: "We have found what our Lord promised us to be true. Have you found what your Lord promised to be true?" (7:41-42). He was looking at that wretched companion of mine, and with him were an innumerable multitude of men. And I asked about him, and was told: "This is Abu l-Hasan al-Ash'ari. God has pardoned him." And I think that they said: "And God has constituted him successor for his companion." Ibn Asākir remarks that he himself has heard it reported that al-Ash'ari, like his ancestor Abu Mūsā, was described as having a beautiful voice—just as he was heard by Ibn Sa'mān in his dream. (*)

(*) Dreams figure very often in the old biographies and accounts. We have seen some examples in the accounts of Ash'aris encounters, and both of our creeds contain an article on visions seen during sleep. *Maqadā* 49. *Itimā* 47, in App. IV. I am not aware of any study devoted to this subject. Cf. *Handbook*, s.v. Dream(s), 61-2.

continually in his company in Baghdad until he died. I never met a godlier man or one who kept his eyes averted more, and I never saw a Shaikh more restrained concerning the things of this world or more active about the things of the next world.»

- 141.15 The Qāḍī Abū'l-Ma'ālī spoke highly of al-Ash'arī's services to truth and religion and of his putting to flight the forces of error and heresy. Bandār b. al-Ḥusayn is quoted to the effect that al-Ash'arī's yearly expenditure amounted to seventeen dirhams.

A PECULIAR GRACE

- 42.12 Ibn 'Asākir devotes this section to the special grace enjoyed by al-Ash'arī by reason of his belonging to the best of the centuries of the Islamic Community. This claim is based on a tradition from Muhammad which is cited in three forms, each slightly different from the other two.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Here is the one related from 'Abdallāh:

- 142.11 «The Apostle of God said: The best of my Community are those of my century, then those who will follow them, then those who will follow them, then those who will follow them, then will come people among whom one's *shahāda* will outstrip his oath, and his oath will outstrip his *shahāda*»

- 142.4 Four traditions cited to prove that a «qarn» is a hundred years. This is the word translated in the previous citation by «century»

THE DATES OF AL-ASH'ARĪ

- 142.14 Abū Bakr al-Wazzān is the authority for the statement that al-Ash'arī was born in the year 260/873-4. There is a difference of opinion regarding the date of his death, but the best

(49) Many references to this tradition in Wensinck, *Handbook* 48 A

the doctrine of al-Ash'ari and composed works agreeing with it.
 * However, some of our associates among the Ahl al-Sunna wa'l-Jamā'a hold that Abu'l-Hasan al-Ash'ari erred on some questions, e.g. his identification of *al-takwīn* and *al-mukawwim* (1), etc., as will appear. So he who is aware of the questions in which Abu'l-Hasan erred and knows his error may fearlessly read his books. Indeed many of our companions among the Ahl al-Sunna wa'l-Jamā'a have accepted his books and studied them.

- 140.13 (Ibn 'Asakir) The questions referred to in the preceding citation bring no discredit on al-Ash'ari and do not involve him in unbelief, deviation, or heresy. Careful study will show that there is really basic agreement. The *ulamā'* have constantly disputed certain points among themselves and have exerted themselves in research and examination without that being considered a fault on their part. His two companions opposed Abu Hanifa on certain points in times past. God covers all the *Ummā* with His mercy and assembles us all in their party by His kindness and compassion!

AL-ASH'ARI'S PIETY AND ASCETICISM

- 141.5 Abu'l-Hasan al-Sarawi used to say that for nearly twenty years al-Ash'ari was accustomed to say his morning prayer with the night ablution (18), and that he never said a word about his zeal to anyone. Abu Imran Mas'ud b. Ahmad b. Ali the jurist said that he had heard his father say: "I served the Imam Abu'l-Hasan in Bagra for several years, and I was

(47) *Takwīn* production, or creation; *mukawwim* producer, or creator. The reference may be to the question: Is the *ʿif* (attribute) the same as the *wasf* (description), or as the *muwṣṣif* (the qualified, described)?

(48) This may refer to his taking very little sleep, but I am puzzled by the Arabic here.

of al-Ash'ari's book *Fīl-Naqd 'alā'l-Jubba'i fīl-ʿṣāl* (44), in forty parts, from the copy which the last named had made from al-Ash'ari's own copy in Baṣra.

128.14 The works of al-Ash'ari (Cf. Appendix III)

134.4 The *khutba* of al-Ash'ari's *Tafīr* (45).

139.7 Abu l-Abbās, known as Qāḍī'l-ʿAskar, tells us how he examined the books of those who had written on *ʿilm al-tawḥīd* (46). Those by philosophers, such as Ishāq al-Kindī, al-Isfārāzī, and others, stray far from the straight path of religion. They should not be read, since they lead to perdition, being filled with polytheism and hypocrisy under the name of *tawḥīd*. Hence the Ahl al-Sunna wa'l-Jamā'a took nothing from their books. Then there were the books of the Mu'tazila, such as 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Rāzī, al-Jubba'i, al-Kaḥlī, al-Nazzām, and others. These, too, should not be read, lest they create doubts, injure faith, and lead to heresy. And therefore the Ahl al-Sunna wa'l-Jamā'a took nothing from those books. Then there were the books of the Mujassima, such as Muḥammad b. al-Ḥaṣam and others, which should also be avoided, for those are the worst of heretics.

139.20 * And I found many books on this subject by Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'ari. They number nearly two hundred, and *al-Māyīz al-Kabīr* contains all that is in his books. Al-Ash'ari had composed a large work to prove the doctrine of the Mu'tazila — for he followed that doctrine at first. Then God showed him their error and he abandoned what he had held of their doctrine and composed a work refuting what he had written in defense of the Mu'tazila. * The Shāfi'ites followed

(44) This seems to be N° 16 of the list in App. III

(45) i.e. the Preface (or Introduction) to his Commentary on the Qur'an — App. III, N° 61. This *khutba* is competent, but not especially remarkable.

(46) i.e. theology — i.e. the science of the profession of God's unity.

26.13 Another tradition reports 'Abdallāh b. Mas'ūd as saying: « The apostle of God asked me: 'What bonds of Islām are the strongest?' I said: 'God and His Apostle know best.' He said: 'Ruling in God, love in God, and hatred in God. And O Abdallāh, do you know which man is the most learned?' I said: 'God and His Apostle know best.' He said: 'Verily the most learned is he who is most learned in the truth when men disagree, even though he be remiss in practice, and even though he crawl on his buttocks.' » And Abdallāh is reported to have said: « Let him who has knowledge speak of what he knows, and let him who has no knowledge say: God knows best. » Ibn 'Asākir says that such traditions are a perfect description of al-Ash'arī and of his work.

127.9 Abū Bīr b. Farāq: « The Shaikh Abū'l-Hasan 'Alī b. Ismā'il al-Ash'arī turned from the doctrines of the Mu'tazilā to the defense of the doctrines of the Ahl al-Sunna wa'l-Jamā'a by means of rational arguments and composed many works along those lines. » After a brief mention of al-Ash'arī's background he continues: « When God helped the Shaikh Abū'l-Hasan to abandon his Mu'tazilite errors and guided him to the defense of the Ahl al-Sunna wa'l-Jamā'a, he became prominent and his works had a wide circulation after the year 300-912-3. He lived until the year 324-935-6. »

127.10 Ibn Farāq then mentions some of al-Ash'arī's companions and disciples. One was Abū'l-Hasan al-Bahūtī, formerly a distinguished Imām⁽⁴³⁾, converted as the result of a disputation with al-Ash'arī. Others were Abū'l-Hasan al-Rummānī, Abū 'Abdallāh Hamawānī al-Sirāfi, Abū 'Alī Zahir b. Ahmad al-Sirakhistī, Abū Zaid al-Marwazī, Abū Sa'ad al-Su'fakī, and Abū Nuṣr al-Kawwāzī. Ibn Farāq tells us that he made a copy

(43) An Imāmīte (one of the Imāmīyya). Cf. El or Hwb under *Imām* and *Ihnā Ashariya*, at Newbakhū, *Faraq al-Shu'a* (ed. Ritter, Istanbul, 1931) 90 ff.

Al-Ash'ari replies readily enough with two traditions, both isnads beginning with the name of his master, al Sāji, and both affirming that there is no prayer without the *Fātiḥa*. Ibn 'Asākir remarks that an intelligent and sharp-minded person will see in this story a proof that al-Ash'ari was a Shāfi'ite. So said Abū Bakr b. Furak in the *Kitāb Tabaqāt* ⁽⁴⁰⁾ *al-Mutakallimīn* and others of our Imāms and Shaikhs.

- 125.2 Enough for Abū'l-Ḥasan that his excellence is attested by such outstanding Imāms, and sufficient for his glory that he is praised by such prominent 'ulama. He cannot be harmed by witless calumnies which are no more than mere assertions and bare accusations!

THE RENOWN OF HIS LEARNING

- 125.12 Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Isfara'īnī is reported to have said: « By the side of the Shaikh Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Bāliḡ I was like a drop of water in the sea, and I have heard that Shaikh say that by the side of the Shaikh al-Ash'ari he was like a drop of water beside the sea. » Abū Ja'far al-Sunnamī, the « Crown of the 'Ulama », said that someone once said to the Qaḍī, the « Tongue of the Community », al-Bāqilānī that his *kalam* was better than that of Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'ari. Al-Bāqilānī retorted: « By God! The best of my circumstances is that I understand the *kalam* of Abū'l-Ḥasan! »

- 126.5 Ibn 'Alībās explained the Qur'anic text « Obey God and obey the Apostle and your leaders » ⁽⁴¹⁾ by saying: « That means the men of *fiqh* and of *dīn* ⁽⁴²⁾ and those obedient servants of God who teach men the contents of their religion and command them to do what is good and forbid them to do what is evil, hence God made obedience to them obligatory. »

(40) « The Classes of .. »

(41) Qur. 4.59/62.

(42) « Religion »

peculiar to himself. Just as the people of Medina became Malikites, though Malik himself simply followed others, so did the Ahl al-Sunna become Ash'arites.

- 101 Al-Māyūrī goes on to mention some details concerning such outstanding Ash'arites as al-Baqlānī, Abū Abdallāh al-Azdi, Abū Tāhir al-Baghdādī, Abū Muḥammad b. Abī Zaid, and Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Qābisī.

- 122.12 Abū'l-Ḥasan Aṭī of Qairawān, known as Ibn al-Qābisī, in answer to a question from a Tunisian, said: 'Know that Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī's only aim in this (kalām) was to explain and to confirm the *sunan* and to dispel doubts about them. He was only one of a group who undertook to defend the truth. As for your saying that theology was perfected only by the doctrine of al-Ash'arī, why this shows that you understand that al-Ash'arī held theological doctrines which put him outside the Ahl al-Ḥaqq. He himself refuted those who urged that against him. Al-Ash'arī died, and the Ahl al-Sunna wept for him, whereas the innovators were delighted to be rid of him. Whoever describes him otherwise simply does not know him.'

- 123.9 The Maliki, Abū Muḥammad Abdallāh b. Abī Zaid of Qairawān, in a letter which he wrote in reply to accusations made against al-Ash'arī by the Mutazilite, 'Alī b. Ahmad b. Ismā'īl of Baghdad, said of al-Ash'arī: 'He is famous for his refutation of heretics and Qadariyya and Jahmiyya, and held fast to the *sunan*. I have it (ultimately) from Abdallāh b. Muḥammad b. Tāhir the Sufī, who said: 'I saw Abū'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī in the Mosque of Baṣra. He had just silenced the Mutazila in disputation when one of those present said to him: 'We know very well your profound knowledge of kalām, but I am going to ask you about an outstanding problem of jurisprudence. Al-Ash'arī said: 'Ask what you will.' The other said: 'What is your view regarding prayer without the *Fātiha*? (20)''

(20) The first Sura of the Qur'ān, the 'Opener'.

Masā al-Māyurqī we are told that in the time of the Mihna (33), under al-Ma'mūn and al-Mu'tasim, such men as Ahmad b. Hanbal, 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Mas'ki, and al-Hārith al-Muhāsbi refrained in pious horror from disputing with the Mutazila. But al-Ash'ari wrote works against them and sought them out to dispute with them, so that the true doctrine of the Ahl al-Sunna might prevail over the pernicious Mu'tazilite teaching which had been gaining ground under the aegis of prominent men. He soon became a center of attachment for Mālikites, Shāfi'ites, and some Hanafites (34). The arguments of his kalām were used by the Ahl al-Sunna in east and west. He wrote numberless works, among them his *Makhlūzāt*, on the Qur'ān, which is said to have reached the Sura of the Cave (35) in one hundred books.

- 11711 Al-Māyurqī says that al-Ash'ari was a Mālikite, though the Shāfi'ites have claimed that he was of their rite (36). Nowadays the Ahl al-Sunna are Ash'arite in their theology because al-Ash'ari's works were so numerous and so widely read. But « he was not the first mutakallim in the tongue of the Ahl al-Sunna. He simply followed the *sunan* (37) of others and championed a well-known body of beliefs. His own contribution to that *madhhab* (38) was by way of argument and exposition, but he introduced no new doctrine of his own, nor any benefit

(33) i.e. the «inquisition» of W. M. Patton, *Ahmad b. Hanbal and the Mihna*, Leyden, 1897.

(34) Three of the four chief «rites», or legal schools — i.e. the handbooks on Islam. The fourth, the Hanbalite, is omitted — perhaps significantly. It will be seen that there was a certain amount of Hanbalite opposition to Ash'ari and Ash'arism.

(35) Sura (Chapter) 18 of the Qur'ān — a little less than ~~way~~ way through the text. Is this No. 48 of the list of Ash'ari's works? Cf. the note added there.

(36) Cf. al-Kawthari's note p. 117, in which it is said that Ash'ari was really a Hanafite.

(37) Plural of *sunna* — custom, practice, «tradition».

(38) System of belief, doctrine, «school».

dl of all the Ahl al-Sunna • Dated Dhu'l Qa da of the year 436/1045; written by Abd al-Karīm b. Hawāzin al-Qushairī.

- 13.9 Then follow the autograph expressions of concurrence and signatures of Muhammad b. 'Alī al-Khabbāzī; Abū Muḥammad al-Juwānī, Naṣr b. Muḥammad al-Shāshī, 'Alī b. Ahmad al-Juwānī, Naṣr b. al-Ḥusayn al-'Umairī al-Harawī, Ahmad b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Abī Ayyūb, 'Alī b. Muḥammad b. Abī Ayyūb (brother of the former), Ismā'īl b. Abd al-Rahmān al-Ṣabānī, Abdallāh b. Ismā'īl al-Ṣabānī (son of the former), 'Alī b. al-Ḥasan al-Bakrī al-Zuhairī, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan, 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Mulqabadhī, Abd al-Jabbar b. 'Alī b. Muḥammad al-Isfara'īnī (his approval in Persian), Muḥammad b. 'Abd al-Jabbar b. Muḥammad (the former's son).

- 13.1 The Shaikh Rukn al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad Abdallāh b. Yūsuf al-Juwānī, in the last part of his book *Aḡlāt Ash'arī al-Imām al-Muttaḥibī al-Shūfī*⁽³²⁾, mentions that al-Ash'arī, though a Shāhite, differed from al-Shāfi'ī on certain points. It so, al-Juwānī must differ from al-Ash'arī. It has also been alleged, he says, that al-Ash'arī held certain doctrines — that there is no Qar'ān in the volume, and no prophet in the grave, and the use of the exceptive clause regarding faith, and the denial of eternal creative power, and accusing the common people of unbelief and holding them obliged to know the proof of doctrine. Al-Juwānī remarks that he has examined some of al-Ash'arī's books, but has found nothing to support such charges. Al-Ash'arī was such a thorn in the side of the Qadāriyya and other heretics that their calumniating him arouses no wonder — a man who is not envied is not much good!

- 13.63 In a lengthy citation from Abū Abdallāh Muḥammad b.

(32) The Be' of (Creed) of the Associates of the Imām al-Muttaḥibī ('', al-Shāfi'ī). The author was the father of Imām al-Haramain — cf. GAL, GI, 385, SI, 667

Explanation of the tradition. « Ikhṭilāfu ummati raḥ-
ma. » (29)

109.15 A letter of Abū'l-Qāsim al-Qushairī on the cursing of al-
Ash'arī in Naisābur in the year 440 1053-4. After his intro-
ductory remarks and a eulogy of al-Ash'arī, he writes

111.12 « The only fault they could find with al-Ash'arī was that
he affirmed God's qadar, its good and evil, its benefit and
harm, and that he affirmed of God the attributes of majesty.
His power, knowledge, will, life, duration, hearing, seeing,
speech, face, and hand, and affirmed that the Qur'ān is the
uncreated speech of God, and that God Most High exists and
can be seen, and that His will effectively accomplishes His
volitions, and other well-known fundamental questions in
which al-Ash'arī's ways are contrary to those of the Mu'tazila
and the Mujassima (30). »

112.6 (Ibn 'Asākir) From the previous writer's grandson I have
received the following document which I recognize as being in
the handwriting of his grandfather:

113.1 « In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Beneficent. The
Aṣḥāb al-Hadīth (31) are agreed that Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Is-
mā'il al-Ash'arī was one of the Imāms of the Aṣḥāb al-Hadīth,
and that his doctrine was that of the Aṣḥāb al-Hadīth. He dis-
coursed on the fundamental principles of religion according to
the method of the Ahl al-Sunna, and refuted erring and heret-
ical adversaries, and was a drawn sword against the Mu'tazila,
Rawāḍ, and innovators within and without the Community.
Whoever calumniates, attacks, curses, or vilifies him, speaks

(29) « The diversity of my Community is a mercy (of God). »
I translate « diversity » in keeping with the explanation which follows.
For another explanation of this tradition, see MG, 112-3.

(30) The Corporealizers — i.e. those who attributed to God a
body (*jumy*); cf., e.g., Tritton, 48-50.

(31) The Partisans (Followers) of Tradition. These were the
« orthodox », opposed especially to the Mu'tazila and the Sūfī.

(al-Baihaqi) « O ye Shariḥ, Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, introduced nothing new into the religion of God, nor did he bring into it any innovation. On the contrary, he accepted the doctrines of the Companions, Followers, and later Imāms on the fundamental principles of religion. These he defended by fuller explanation and exposition, and showed that those doctrines on the fundamental principles and what has come by way of divine positive law are sound from the viewpoint of reason, contrary to the specious claims of the heretics that some of those doctrines do not square with the conclusions of reason. His exposition was both a corroboration of what had not been proved by any member of the Abū al-Sunna wa l-Jamāʿa and a defence of the doctrines of former Imāms. » Such former Imāms were Abū Ḥanīfa, Sulaym al-Thawri, al-Awzāʿī, Malik, al-Shāfiʿī, Ahmad b. Ḥabīb, al-Ladhīqī, Saḍī, al-Bukhārī, and Mūsā b. ʿUbayy al-Haḍāḡ. After citing this tradition on the centenary reformer, al-Baihaqi continues:

« When the innovators grew numerous in this Community and abandoned the literal meaning of Book and Sunna, denying the traditional doctrine on God's attributes, viz. life, power, knowledge, will, hearing, seeing, and speech, and rejecting what was proved by Book and Sunna, viz. the ascension of Muḥammad, the punishment of the grave, the Balance, the creation of the Garden and the Fire, the exit of believers from the fires, or the Prophet's Ḥasn and his intercession, the vision of God by the People of the Garden, and the egitimacy of the rule of the first four Caliphs, claiming that nothing of that was supported by reason or consonant with rational truth — then did God raise up from the seed of Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī an Imām who undertook the defense of God's religion... and showed that what has come in Book and Sunna and was professed by the early members of this Community agrees perfectly with right reason. »

THE EXCELLENCE OF AL-ASH'ARĪ HIMSELF

- 91.2 The account of al-Askari, already cited, *supra*, pp. 150-3
- 9.17 The clumsiness in composition which al-'Askari ascribes to al-Ash'arī characterized him only in the beginning and not after he had received guidance from God. Ibn Hāzim's declaration that al-Ash'arī's works numbered fifty-five is incorrect, as we shall see
- 93.14 Abū Sahl al-Sulūkī tells us how al-Ash'arī, in a Basra assembly, routed the Mutazila, one after the other, so that they were afraid to come back to a second assembly. A similar incident caused Abū 'Alī lallāh b. Khafīf to wonder how many tongues and ears and eyes al-Ash'arī had!
- 95.11 Two more stories from the same Abū 'Abdallāh show that al-Ash'arī did not initiate discussions in the assemblies, but, when questioned, replied in order to make plain the truth as God had commanded him to do
- 97.10 An expression used by al-Ash'arī himself has been wrongly understood by some. There are two kinds of 'innovation', one blameworthy, the other not, as al-Shāhī himself pointed out. Al-Ash'arī called disputation with the heretics 'innovation' and disliked it, because the ancients had regarded it as error and folly.
- 99.11 Muḥammad said: 'Do not sit in the company of the Ahl al-Qadar, and do not begin to dispute with them.' But when error became widespread and dangerous to the Community, such disputation became a necessity. Muḥammad also said: 'Whoever Islām is endangered by any innovation, God has a friend who defends Him and discourses on His signs.' So seize upon those assemblies as occasions for defending the weak, and trust in God, the best of managers!
- 100.11 A long letter of Abū Bakr 'Abmad al-Husām al-Bahāqī, occasioned by the public cursing of the Ash'arites during the reign of Tughrilbeg

Bil'ah. In my opinion (Ibn As'akir) the list should read, 'Umar, al-Sha'fi', al-Ash'ari, al-Baqillani, and al-Ghazali.

THE DATE OF AL ASH'ARI'S DEATH

- 55.18 According to Abu'l-Qasim Abd al-Wahid b. Ali al-Asadi he died in Baghdad «after 320/932 and before 330/941-2, and was buried in the Street of the Ceils.» And according to Abu Muhammad Ali b. Ahmad b. Sa'id b. Hazm of Andalusia he died in 324/935-6. Some contemporaries said that he died a little after 330. This last seems to me (i.e. Ibn 'Asakir) incorrect, and the best date is 324. So Ibn Faruk. Al-Ash'ari's conversion seems to have taken place in the year 300/912-3, for it took place in the lifetime of al-Jubbai, who is said to have died in the month Sha'han of the year 303/916.

DISTINGUISHED ANCESTRY

- 57 Many traditions on the virtues of the Ash'ariyyun — their generosity, bravery, impressiveness in reciting the Qur'an, etc.

- 71.3 In the time of the Apostle of God the Ash'ariyyun were expert in high and outstanding among the Companions for their knowledge. The most renowned among them was Abu Musa al-Ash'ari. Fortunate the man who had such an ancestor!

- 71.8 The virtues of Abu Musa — many traditions.

- 85.10 The virtues of Abu Musa's son, Abu Burda.

- 85.10 The virtues of Abu Burda's son, Bilal.

- 90.6 These details concerning the virtues of Abu Musa and his sons redound to the credit of al-Ash'ari.

and victory, and the people of al-Yaman have come.' Someone said: 'O Apostle of God, and what are the people of al-Yaman?' He said: 'A people with subtle minds and supple obedience. And faith is Yamanite, and *fiqh* (27) is Yamanite and wisdom (28) is Yamanite.'

- 49.1 Five traditions in which Muḥammad himself interprets a certain verse of the Qur'an as referring to Abū Mūsā and his descendants. Here is the first, going back to Ḥadīth al-Ash'arī: 'On the occasion of the revelation of "And God will bring a people whom He will love and who will love Him" (5:54), the Prophet nodded towards Abū Mūsā and said: "They are the people of this man."'

THE CENTENARY REFORMER

- 51.6 Another prophetic foreshadowing of al-Ash'arī's eminence is contained in the tradition announcing the appearance of a great religious reformer in every century. Abū Hurayra said that the Apostle of God said: 'God will indeed send to this Community at the beginning of every hundred years a man who will renew for it its religion.'
- 52.7 The reformers for the first two centuries were the Caliph 'Umar b. al-Ka'bi and the great jurist, al-Shāfi'ī. For the third century there is mention of Ahmad b. Hanbal al-Ash'arī, Abū Na'im al-Astarābādī, and Abū l-Abbās Ahmad b. 'Umar b. Sa'īd al-Baḡdādī and Abū l-Tayyib Saḥl al-Shūṭī have been suggested for the fourth century, and for the fifth al-Ghazālī and the Caliph al-Mustasim.

(27) Cf. Goldziher's art. *Fikḥ*, in I I or Hwh. Here the word seems to have more of its earlier meaning of insight into religious doctrine. Cf. MG, 110-112.

(28) Arabic *ḥikm*. This word was used at times to designate philosophy. This tradition occurs in several of the collections of Wensinck, *Handbook of Early Muhammadan Traditions*, 263. Yaman. It would be interesting to know more about its circumstances.

as his representative. That went on for a long time. One day al-Ash'ari was representing al-Jahli in an assembly when another disputed with him and overcame him in the dispute. A companion of al-Ash'ari, one of the common people, started sprinkling almonds and sweetmeats on him. But al-Ash'ari said to him: "I have done nothing. My opponent has triumphed over me and explained the argument and reduced me to silence. He is more deserving of your favor than I am." After that incident he manifested repentance and changed his belief. (26)

It may be objected that such a sudden about-face as that of al-Ash'ari was suspicious, unheard of, and unacceptable. But these allegations are bare assertions supported only by weak traditions, and are contrary to the Qur'an, reason, and actual historical cases.

PROPHETIC INTIMATIONS

Light traditions, the burden of which is Muhammad's announcement of the coming of a very intelligent people. These turn out to be the Ash'arites from Yaman and in part Egypt, and Mosa. Here is the text of the eighth, which goes back to Ibn Abbas: "While the Apostle of God was in Medina suddenly he said: 'God is supreme! God's help has come,

(26) This sixth "account" may well be the closest to what really happened. I do not mean that we must ignore the other accounts, but it seems to me likely that Ash'ari's conversion was a gradual process marked by gathering doubts and—as it were, leading to a break by some such incident as that related here. One also thinks of the "story of the three brothers" which Ash'ari is said to have proposed as a dilemma to al-Buhārī. (cf. e.g. F. E. Peters, *A Commentary on the Creed of Islam*, p. 59. It is at least curious that this oft-quoted story is unrecor-dered by Ibn Asakir).

side of affirmation » Then he said to me « Reflect on the other questions and be mindful of them » Then I awoke and rose and collected all my *kalam* books and set them aside and devoted myself to books on Tradition, Qur'anic exegesis, and the legal sciences. However, I did ponder the other questions in accordance with his command.

43.5

And after we entered the third decade I saw him again on the Night of Power and he said to me, with an appearance of exasperation, « What have you done about what I said to you ? » I answered : « O Apostle of God, I keep reflecting on what you said and continue to think about and ponder the questions. However, I have rejected and turned aside from all *kalam* and I have devoted myself to the legal sciences. » Then he said to me angrily : « And who commanded you to do that ? Compose books, and reflect in this way which I have commanded you, for it is my religion and the truth which I brought » And I awoke, and thenceforth began to compose books and to defend and expound the true doctrine. So this was the cause of his return from the views of the *Ma'azila* to the doctrines of the *Ahl al-Sunna wa'l-Jamā'a*.

6 *An account from Abū Muhammad al-Ḥisan b. Muḥammad al-'Askari*

9.2

Al-Ash'ari was the disciple of al-Jubbā'i under whom he studied and from whom he acquired learning, never leaving him for forty years. He was a master of reasoning in the assemblies and boldly attacked opponents. But he was not a writer. Whenever he took the pen in his hand he produced either nothing, or a *kalam* that was disagreeable. On the other hand, Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'i was a master of composition and writing who never had any difficulty in expressing copiously whatever he wanted to say; but he was an indifferent disputant in the assemblies. So when the necessity of attending the assemblies weighed heavy on him he used to send al-Ash'ari

5. *An account from Abū 'Abdallāh al-Ḥusain b. 'Abdallāh b. Ḥatīm al-Azdi*

424 The Sa'akhi Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Ismā'īl al-Ash'arī was originally a Mu'tazilite. We have been told by Abū 'Abdallāh al-H. sa'ī, the mutakallim of Ray, that he had it from 'Abd l-Ḥasan b. Mahdī in Ṭabaristān that he had been told by Abū l-Ḥasan himself. The motive which impelled me to turn from Mu'tazilism and to examine their proofs and to explain their error was that I saw the Apostle of God in my sleep at the beginning of Ramiādān. He said to me: « O Abū l-Ḥasan, have you written traditions? » I replied: « Certainly, O Apostle of God! » Then he said: « Have you not written that God Most High will be seen in the next life? » I answered: « Certainly, O Apostle of God! » Then he said to me: « The what prevents you from holding that doctrine? » I replied: « Rational proofs have prevented me, and therefore I have interpreted the traditions. » And he said to me: « Do you not find that there are rational proofs which prove that God Most High will be seen in the next life? » I answered: « Certainly, O Apostle of God, but they are only doubts(?) » He said to me: « Reflect on them and examine them most carefully; they are not doubts, but they are proofs. » And he disappeared, and I awoke in great fear and began to reflect on what he had said. And I persevered and found the matter to be as he had said. The proofs of affirmation grew strong in my mind while those of negation grew weak. So I kept silent and revealed nothing to men, remaining the while in great perplexity over my position.

Then, in the second decade of Ramiādān I saw the Apostle of God again. He approached me and said: « O Abū l-Ḥasan, what have you done about what I said to you? » I replied: « O Apostle of God, the matter is as you said, and power is on the

21 Arabic *shubah* doubts here in the sense of difficulties to be solved, if possible

Creator?» And he said to me: «Defend the doctrines related from me, for they are the truth!» Then I awoke, much saddened and disheartened, and resolved to give up *kalam*. And I applied myself to Tradition and the recitation of the Qur'ân.

- 415 On the night of the twenty-seventh⁽²¹⁾ — and it was our custom in Basra for the Reciters and me of learning and virtue to meet for a global recitation of the Qur'ân during that night — I remained among them in accordance with our custom. But I grew so overpoweringly sleepy that I rose and went home and slept, regretting the splendid occasion which I was missing. Then I saw the Prophet, and he said to me: «What have you done about what I commanded you?» I answered: «I have given up *kalam* and have adhered to the Book of God and to the Sunna.» And he said to me: «I did not command you to give up *kalam*, but I commanded you to defend the doctrines related from me, for they are the truth!» I said: «O Apostle of God, how can I leave a system after having thought about its questions and known its proofs for thirty years, because of a dream?» And he said to me: «Were it not for my knowledge that God will give you His special help, I should not leave you — as I had given you a full explanation of those things. You seem to think that this my coming to you is a mere dream. Was my vision of Jibrîl a mere dream? You will see me no more about this matter. So be earnest in it, for God will give you His special help!»

- 417 Thus he spoke, and I awoke and said: «After truth there is only error!» And I began to defend the traditions on the vision of God, the intercession of the Prophet, the lawfulness of speculation and other points. And there used to come to me something which I swear I had never heard from an adversary nor read in any book, and I knew that it was due to the help of God which the Apostle of God had foretold to me.

(21) This is the *Lailat al-Qadar* (Night of Power). Cf., e.g., Gaudefoy-Demonbynes, *Muslim Institutions*, 104.

then exposes the defects of what he has abandoned and becomes the fiercest foe of the Ahl al-Dhimma (21). Just so did al-Ash'ari become the fiercest foe of the Mu'tazila, who took to reviling and calumniating him.

3 *An account from Abū Abdallāh al-Hamirani*

- 40.6 Before we had noticed it, one Friday, al-Ash'ari suddenly ascended the pulpit of the mosque in Basra after the Friday prayer. With him he had a palm rope which he tied around his middle. Then he cut it and said: «Be ye my witnesses that I have not been following the religion of Islam, and that I now embrace Islam and that I repeat of the Mu'tazilite views which I held.» Then he came down.

4 *An account from Abū Abdallāh al-Husain b. Muhammad, from «more than one of our Imāms»*

- 40.15 Al-Ash'ari said: While I was asleep, during the first decade of Ramadān (22), I saw Mustafā (23), and he said: «O 'Alī, defend the doctrines related from me, for they are the truth.» When I awoke I was considerably perturbed and gave much anxious thought to my vision and my preoccupation with elucidating the proofs concerning the contrary position. Then came the second decade, and I saw the Prophet in my sleep, and he said to me: «What have you done about what I commanded you?» I replied: «O Apostle of God, what could I do in view of my having opposed the doctrines related from you in ways based on the interpretation of kalām and my having followed the sound proofs which are applicable to the

(21) Cf. art. *Dhimma* in E.I. or Hwb. These were the non-Muslim subjects of a Muslim country, particularly the Christians, who were allowed to retain their religion but were bound to pay a certain tax (*jizya*).

(22) The Muslim month of fasting.

(23) «Elect» — another name for Muhammad.

Apostle of God said 'You must hold fast to my Sunna!' Then I awoke and I compared the theses of kalām with what I found in the Qur'ān and the Traditions. And I affirmed the latter and cast all else away. »

2 *An account from Abū Bakr Ismā'il al-Qairawānī*

39 10

Al-Ash'arī, our Shaikh, Imām, and mainstay, held the Mu'tazilite views for forty years and was one of their Imāms. Then he withdrew from the society of men into his own house for fifteen days. After that he went out to the mosque, ascended the pulpit, and said « O men, I withdrew from you for a while simply because I had reflected and found the proofs equal in my mind, the true and the false being exactly balanced so far as I could see. So I sought guidance from God, Most Blessed and High, and He has guided me to the belief in what I have confided to these books of mine. And I strip myself of all that I used to believe just as I strip myself of this garment » And he stripped himself of a robe that was upon him and cast it aside and handed over the books to the people. Among them were the *Kitāb al-Lum'a*, and a book in which he exposed the shortcomings of the Mu'tazila, which he called *Kitāb Kashf al-Asrār wa-Hak al-Astar* ⁽¹⁾, and others. When those books had been read by the traditionists and jurisprudents of the Ahl al-Sunna wa'l-Jamā'a, they accepted and adopted what was in them and acknowledged al-Ash'arī's excellence and chose him as Imām, so that their system of belief was named after him. Thus his relation to the Mu'tazila became like that of a scripturary ⁽²⁾ who embraces Islam and

(1) « The Revealing of Secrets and Reading of Veils ». The title is full of interventions, but one wonders if this could be the work of al-Bāqillānī to whom Geleziakoff refers. *Streitschrift des Gazali gegen die Bāqillānī-Sekte*, p. 15.

(2) One of the *ahl al-ktāb* (People of the Book), i.e. those who claimed to have a written revelation: especially the Jews and Christians.

When his father died, he was entrusted to the care of the Shafi'ite jurist, Zakariyyā b. Yahyā al-Sāḥi. The latter was the author of several books, among them the *Kitāb Ikhtilāf al-Fuqahā* ⁽¹⁶⁾ and from him al-Ash'ari related many traditions in his own *Kitāb al-Tafsīr* ⁽¹⁷⁾

35.10 (Ibn 'Asākir:) Abū Bishr was really al-Ash'ari's grandfather. The genealogical ascription of al-Ash'ari's father to Abū Bishr is a refutation of al-Ahwāzī's pretense that al-Ash'ari got his name through a genealogical error. A tradition from Muḥammad in which he condemns ignorant attacks on genealogies.

36.1 Further genealogical details regarding Abū Mossā, in which the latter's descent is traced back to Adam.

AL-ASH'ARI'S CONVERSION

1 — An account going back to Ahmad b. al-Ḥusain

I heard one of our associates say: After the Shaikh Abū'l-Ḥasan had gone deep & into Mu'tazilic kalam and mastered it, he used to propose questions to his masters. But when he got no satisfactory answer to his questions he became perplexed. And it is related of him that he said: "One night there occurred to my mind a dogmatic question which had been occupying me. So I rose and prayed two rak'as ⁽¹⁸⁾, and, after asking God to guide me along the straight path, I fell asleep. While I slept I saw the Apostle of God, and I complained to him about the matter which was perplexing me. And the

Ḥadīthī is a relative adjective from *ḥadith* = tradition, here it signifies one who accepts the sound traditions which have been handed down.

(16) The Disagreement of the Jurisprudents.

(17) i.e. his Commentary on the Qur'an.

(18) A rak'at is a division or cycle comprising certain acts and utterances. An interesting book on Muslim worship is E. E. Calverley's *Worship in Islam*, India, 1925.

TWO HEINOUS OFFENSES

- 29.7 Those who calumniate the learned are guilty of an enormous crime. Moreover, God does not give knowledge to a man in order that he may conceal it. Proof of these assertions: nine traditions from Muhammad, e.g.
- 30.12 « If later members of this Community should curse its earlier members, then let him who has knowledge manifest it, for on that day he who conceals knowledge will be like one who conceals what has been sent down to Muhammad »
- 31.20 « He who conceals knowledge will be bridled by God with a bridle of fire. »
- 33.9 « Whoso eats his brother's flesh in this world will be offered his flesh in the next, and it will be said to him: 'Eat it dead as you ate it living.' And he will eat it, grimacing and shrieking. »
- 34.6 « Revile not the dead, for they have arrived unto that which they forwarded. » (14)

NAME AND ANCESTRY

- 34.11 Abū Bakr Ahmad al-Baḥqī said that he saw the name as follows in « the books of our associates »: Abū'l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Ismā'īl b. Ishāq b. Salm b. Ismā'īl b. 'Abd al-Ḥā b. Māsā b. Bū'ī b. Abī Barca b. Abī Māsā al-Ash'arī.
- 34.18 The *Khāṭib* (see Appendix I, down to « » in the Mosque of al-Manṣūr. » (p.p. 139-40, *supra*)
- 35.5 Ilāz Farak al-Ash'ar's father was Abū Bishr Ismā'īl b. Ishāq al-Ash'arī himself was a *ṣaḥīḥ jamā'i* (*hadīth*) (15)

(11) ... see works and particularly it would seem, their good works.

(15) *Sunni* = *Sunnite*, *jamā'i* — relative adjective from *jamā'a* the multitude, and probably also containing the implication of one who accepted *ijmā'* (consensus). The « orthodox » ~~are~~ styled themselves the « *Ahl al-Sunna wa'l-Jamā'a* », cf. SBA, s.v. *jamā'a*.

tioned, held fast to the Sunna (9) and restrained men from wading in the perilous waters of *Kalām*. The most redoubtable champion of the Muthbitūn was Abū'l-Hasan al-Ash'arī, who avoided the extremes of *ta'til* (10) and *tashbīh*. Inspired by God to defend the Sunna by rational arguments, he became the rallying point and mainstay of the Muthbitūn. He divided created existing things into accidents, atoms, and bodies (11), and affirmed of God what God affirmed of Himself, and denied of God that which is unworthy of Him.

The envy of al-Ash'arī's adversaries led them to calumniate him, but their criticisms only redounded to his credit. In every age the great men of religion have had their vilifiers. Were it not for the eminence of him who has requested this work (12), I should have refrained from mentioning the slanders with which it is concerned. But the Ashāb al-Haqq (13) overcome their detractors, for God is their stay and their support.

28.1 Al-Ash'arī's worth and virtues and noble lineage and influence in the sphere of religion are beyond question. His works are well known to the learned and amply attest his eminence in learning and reasoning, e.g., his *Ibāna*, and his commentary on the Qur'ān composed to refute the falsehoods of those who erred. With God's help, therefore, I propose to mention what has come to my attention regarding al-Ash'arī.

(9) Custom, or tradition, especially that of the Prophet. Cf. art., s.v., in EI or Hwb.

(10) *the stripping*: in this case stripping God of His attributes, as the Mu'tazila did.

(11) Ash'arī was not the first to do this.

(12) It seems impossible to say who this was.

(13) *The Fellows of the Truth*. Like *«Ahl al-Haqq»* the People of the Truth, it signifies the *«orthodox»* i.e. the Sunnites, and no doubt more specifically in the writer's mind, the Ash'arites.

THE EXPOSURE OF THE CALUMNIATOR'S LYING
CONCERNING WHAT HAS BEEN IMPLIED
TO THE IMAM ABU L-HASAN AL-ASH'ARĪ

INTRODUCTION

24.1 In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Beneficent! Praise be to God . . . (laudatory formulae and the customary literary amplification of the *shahāda*) (3).

25.1 AMMA BAYD (4) — God singled out certain of His creatures to be His Prophets, among whom Muḥammad is preeminent. God also raised up learned men to be the Imāms (5) of Religion — i.e. to explain it and to defend it against heresies such as the Mu'tazila and the Ahl al-Tashbīḥ (6). The 'ulama' (7) of the Muthabātān (8), harried by the heretics just men

(3) i.e. the Muslim «witnessing» — «There is no divinity at all save God and Muḥammad is the Apostle of God!»

(4) «Now then» This is the customary phrase which indicates that the writer has finished his formal introduction (often something of a literary *tour de force*) and is ready to attack his subject more directly.

(5) «Imām» means «leader». The word is used of the Caliph, of the leader of the formal Prayer, and often of a distinguished teacher or outstanding savant.

(6) The Assimulators, i.e. Anthropomorphists. The form «Mushabihīya» is also used. *Tashbīḥ* means «likening», in this case likening God to man (cf. Haskin, *Moslem Schisms and Sects*, 31 ff).

(7) The plural of *ʿālim* — learned man, teacher. The usual English form is «ulema».

(8) *Ahl al-Mithbātān* — the Affirmers. This seems to be a generic name for those who «affirmed» the divine attributes, as opposed to those who denied them (Mu'tazila) or made them too human (Anthropomorphists). And cf. *Watt*, Index, s.v. *Ahl al-Ithbat*.

The ostensible motive of Ibn Asākir in undertaking this apology was the refutation of the charges levelled against al-Ash'ari by a certain al-Ahwāzī. But the latter had been dead for at least a hundred years when Ibn Asākir decided to write the *Tabyīn*. Why, then, after so many years, did the author feel that it was incumbent on him to answer al-Ahwāzī? From various indications in the *Tabyīn* itself it seems to me that Ibn Asākir's concern with the defense of the eponym of Ash'arism was equalled, and perhaps even surpassed, by his concern with the defense of Ash'arism itself. This suggestion gives added force to the words of al-Subkī, cited by al-Qudṣī on the title page of the Damascus edition: "Every Sunnite who does not possess Ibn Asākir's *Kitāb al-Tabyīn* is blind to his own interests."

The *Tabyīn* is certainly an interesting example of a traditional type of Muslim scholarship. But the reader will be disappointed if he expects to get from it a detailed and clear-cut picture of al-Ash'ari. The latter must, I think, always remain for us a somewhat legendary figure overshadowed by the thing which came to be called Ash'arism.

In the summary I have let Ibn Asākir do the speaking, usually in a abbreviated form. Any remarks or observations of mine have been relegated to the footnotes.

APPENDIX II


IBN 'ASĀKIR'S APOLOGY

The following pages contain a summary of an interesting work devoted to the vindication and glorification of al-Ash'ari. This work is the *Tabyin Kaṭṭab al-Muflaḥ fi mā Nusiba ila l-Imām Abi l-Ḥasan al-Ash'ari* ⁽¹⁾ by the famous historian of Damascus, Abi l-Qasim 'Alī b. al-Ḥasan b. Hibata lāh Thiqataddīn IBN 'ASĀKIR (490-1106-571, 1178). In the summary the numerical references are by page and line to the printed Damascus edition of 1347-1348-9 edited by Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Qudsi, with an introduction and notes by the well-known Meissen scholar, the Shaikh al-Kawthari.

More than seventy years ago, the orientalist, M. A. Mehren, published an abridged text and summary translation of the *Tabyin* under the title *Exposé de la Réforme de l'Islamisme* (an extract from Vol. II of the Third Session of the International Congress of Orientalists, St. Petersburg, 1879). His work is useful, but not always easy to consult. So I have thought it worthwhile to include the following rather detailed summary, which is fuller than that of M. Mehren. Since so much of the original is taken up with long isnads ⁽²⁾ which the average reader finds very tiresome, and with a collection of biographies of distinguished 'Asārites, I think I may claim to have omitted nothing of real pertinence to the subject of the apology.

(1) The title is translated at the beginning of the summary.

(2) The chains of the names of those who have handed down the tradition or report.



II. IBN 'ASĀKIR'S APOLOGY



Abu'l-Hasan Ali b. Muhammad b. Yazid say that he had heard Abu Bakr b. al-Sarafī say: "The Mu'tazila held their heads very high until God Most High manifested al-Ash'arī, who then forced them into the cups ⁽¹⁰⁾ of sesame seeds."

10) Arabic *qamā*. The word *qamā* (also *qamā* for *qamā*) is strong in use here in Iraq. It is the name for the seed of a little cup in which the date is set. It also means the little cup which holds the acorn. Presumably the sesame seed has something of the same sort, though I have been unable to verify this. However, the force of the figure is clear.

Kawārij (6), and the various other innovators.

He was a native of Basra, and lived in Baghdad until he died there. On Fridays he used to sit in the circle of the jurist-prudent, Abū Ishāq of Merv, in the Mosque of al-Manṣūr. A man of Basra declared that Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī was born in the year 260/873-4, and died a little after 330/941-2. But I have been told by Abū l-Qāsim Abū al-Wahd b. Abī al-ʿAsdī that al-Ashʿarī died in Baghdad after 320/932 and before 330/941-2, and that he was buried near the Wharf of the Water-jars (7) in some land adjoining a mosque and close to a bath. This would be on the left hand of one going from the Saq to the Tigris. Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Ahmad b. Saʿīd b. Ḥazm, the Andalusian, mentioned that Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī died in the year 324/935-6, and said that his works numbered fifty-five.

We have it from the Qaḍī Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh b. Muḥammad b. Abū al-Rahmān al-Ishbāhānī that he heard Abū ʿAbdallāh b. Dāniyāl (8) say: 'I heard Bādār b. al-Ḥusayn say: and he was the servant of Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl in Basra.' — 'Abū l-Ḥasan used to live on the income from an estate which had been bequeathed to his descendants by his grandfather, Bālā b. Abī Burdā b. Abī Māsā al-Ashʿarī. His yearly expenditure amounted to seventeen dirhams.'

I have it from Maḥammad b. Abī al-Ṣoʿrī that he heard Abū al-Ghānī b. Saʿīd the ḥafīẓ (9) say that he had heard

(6) Cf. El or Hwb s.v. *Khāridjīen*.

(7) Cf. Le Strange, *Baghdad during the Abbasid Caliphate*, 181 and 182, n. 1. In the *Tabaqat* we are told that Ashʿarī was buried in the 'Street (8) of the Cells' — i.e. with the reading *ṣanāyā* for the *ṣanāʿat* of the *Khāridjī*, a difference of only one dot in the Arabic.

(8) The text reads 'Dāniyāl'. I prefer the reading 'Dāniyāl', which is found in the *Tabaqat*, 14.15.

(9) A title given to those who had memorized (*ḥafīẓ*) the entire Qurʾān.

APPENDIX I

THE KHAYYĪB'S ACCOUNT OF AL-AŠH'ARĪ

In his *Tarikh Bagh-lad* Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. 'Alī b. Tāb-
bī al-Khayyib al-Baḡdādī (332/1002 - 403/1071) has the
following brief notice of al-Ash'arī. It will be found in Vol. VI,
pp. 366-7 (No. 6189). To the best of my knowledge it is the
earliest biography of Al-Ash'arī which we possess. In view of
the fact that it was written more than a century after the death
of al-Ash'arī its brevity and restraint are remarkable, and, per-
haps, very significant.

Alī b. Ismā'il b. Abū Rishā — and the latter's name was
Ishaq — b. Sa'ad b. Ismā'il b. 'Abdallāh b. Mūsā b. Bādā b.
Abū Burda b. Abū Mūsā — Abū Ḥusayn al-Ash'arī, the most
famous, (1) author of books and works refuting the Muḥida (2)
and others, such as the Muḥida (3), Bahja (4), Jahmīya (5),


(1) i.e. one who engages in *kulām*, or that polemic theology
which takes no account of moral argument. For *ḥujja* is
ḥujja-ḥujja.

(2) i.e. the Irreligious, the Atheists. This name often seems to
be used in a rather general sense.


(3) Cf. art. s.v., in El or Hwb. They seem to have been the
principal opponents of Ash'arī.

(4) i.e. the Refusers or Separates. Cf. El or Hwb s.v. *Rāfiḍīn*.
They are also called the *Rawāḍīn*. They refused to acknowledge the
imānates of Abū Bakr and 'Umar. Often enough the name seems to
be used as a synonym for Shi'a, though, strictly speaking, the names
are not synonymous.

(5) Followers of Jahm b. Ṣafwān — cf. Halkin, *Modern Schisms
and Sects*, 190 ff.



I. THE KHATIB'S ACCOUNT



Part Two

THE APPENDICES

wanted you to make? Why, then, do you under (mean from engaging in) *kalām*? You use it yourselves when you want to; but when you are silenced (in a discussion), you say: 'We are forbidden to engage in *kalām*.' And when you want to, you blindly and unquestioningly follow your predecessors, without argument or explanation. This is willfulness and capriciousness!

28. Then one should say to them: 'The Prophet did not discuss vows and testamentary injunctions, or manumission, or the manner of reckoning the interrupted transmission of estates, nor did he compose a book about those things, as did Mālik, and al-Thawrī, and al-Shāfiʿī, and Abū Ḥanīfa⁽⁴³⁾. Hence you are forced to admit that they were deviating innovators, since they did what the Prophet had not done, and said what he had not said explicitly, and composed what the Prophet had not composed, and said that those who maintain that the Qurʾān is created are to be called unbelievers, though the Prophet had not said that.

What we have said contains enough to satisfy any intelligent man who is not perverse or stubborn. The work is ended: praise be to God, and His blessing be on our Master, Muḥammad, and his household, and his Companions!

(43) Four renowned Jurisprudents and founders of legal schools. The reader will find articles on them in EI (al-Thawrī under Sufyān), and Hwb (except al-Thawrī).

For the Apostle of God never said: *If anyone should ask about any of those things, refuse to answer him, or, do not greet him, or, leave him* Since he said nothing of the sort, you would be innovators if you did that.

26. Moreover, why have you not refused to answer him who says that the Qur'ān is created? (42) And why have you accused him of unbelief? There is no sound tradition from the Prophet on denying its creation and accusing of unbelief him who says that it is created. They may say: Because Ahmad b. Hanbal denied that it is created and held that he who says that it is created should be accused of unbelief. One should say to them: And why did not Ahmad keep silent about that instead of discussing it? They may say: Because Abū al-ʿAbbās, and Wakiʿ, and Abū al-Rahmān b. Mahdī, and so-and-so, and so-and-so, said that the Qur'ān is uncreated, and that he who says that it is created is an unbeliever. One should say to them: And why did not they keep silent about what Muhammad had not discussed? They may say: Because ʿAmr b. Dīnār, and Saʿyān b. ʿUyayna, and Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad, and so-and-so, and so-and-so, said that it is neither creating nor created. One should say to them: And why did not they refrain from saying this, since the Apostle of God did not say it?

27. And if they refer that back to the Companions, this is sheer obscurity. For one may say to them: And why did not they refrain from saying that, since the Prophet did not discuss it, and did not say: *Call him who says it an unbeliever.* They may say: The Ṣaḥābā simply must engage in kalām on a new question, so that the ignorant may know how to judge the matter. One should say: This is the admission which we

(42) On this question, and the names mentioned by the author, cf. the references given in n. (1), p. 20, *supra*.

held that. One should say to them: The Companion, or the Follower, is subject to the same constraint as you are, namely, that he is a deviating innovator for saying what the Apostle did not say. And another may say: I suspend my judgment on that, and I do not say created, nor do I say uncreated. To him one should say: Then you, in suspending your judgment on that, are a deviating innovator. For the Prophet did not say: « If this question should arise after my death, suspend your judgment on it, and say nothing. » Nor did he say: « Regard as deviating and unbelieving him who affirms that it is created, or, him who denies that it is created. »

24. Furthermore, tell us: If one were to say that God's knowledge is created, would you suspend your judgment on that, or not? If they say no, they say to them: Neither the Prophet nor his Companions said a word about that. And likewise, if someone were to say: Is this Lord of yours satisfied with food, or with drink, or is He clothed, or naked, or cold, or hot, or damp, or a body, or an accident, or does He smell odors, or not smell them, or has He a nose, and a heart, and a liver, and a spleen, and does He make the pilgrimage every year, and does He ride horseback, or not, and is He grieved, or not, and other questions of that sort, you would have to refuse to answer him. For neither the Apostle of God nor his Companions ever discussed a single one of those points. Or you would not remain silent, and would explain by your *kalam* that none of those things can be predicated of God, etc. etc., because of this argument, and that, etc.

25. Someone may say: I should be silent and answer him not a word, or, I should shun him, or, I should leave him, or, I should not greet him, or, I should not visit him if he fell sick, or, I should show no respect to his corpse if he died. To him one should say: Then you would be bound to be, in all these ways which you have mentioned, a deviating innovator.

22. But even though there was no explicit instruction of the Apostle of God regarding each one of these questions, they referred and likened each to something which had been determined explicitly by the Book of God, and the Sunna and their own *ijtihad* ⁽³⁹⁾. Such questions ⁽⁴⁰⁾, then, which involved judgments on unprecedented secondary cases, they referred to those determinations of the Law which are derivative, and which are to be sought only along the line of revelation and apostolic tradition. But when new and specific questions pertaining to the basic dogmas arise, every intelligent Muslim ought to refer judgment on them to the sum of principles accepted on the grounds of reason, sense experience, intuition, etc. For judgment on legal questions which belong to the category of the traditional is to be based on reference to legal principles which likewise belong to the category of the traditional. And judgment on questions involving the data of reason and the senses should be a matter of referring every such instance to (something within) its own category, without confounding the rational with the traditional, or the traditional with the rational. So if kalām on the creation of the Qur'an and on the atom and the leap, in these precise terms, had originated in the Prophet's time, he would have discussed and explained it, just as he explained and discussed all the specific questions which did originate in his time.

23. Then one should say: There is no sound tradition from the Prophet to the effect that the Qur'an is uncreated or created. Why, then, do you hold that it is uncreated? They may say: Some ⁽⁴¹⁾ of the Companions and the Followers

(39) i.e. their own personal exertion — cf. art. *Ijtihad*, in *El or Hwb*.

(40) I find the Arabic of this sentence (and of much of this number) rather difficult, though I think I have conveyed the thought of the author.

(41) Or, « One of .. » The Arabic *ba'd* is sometimes ambiguous.

THIRD ANSWER

21. The third answer is that the Apostle of God did know these questions about which they have asked, and he was not ignorant of any detail involved in them. However, they did not occur in his time in such specific form that he should have, or should not have, discussed them — even though their basic principles were present in the Qur'an and the Sunna. But whenever a question arose which was related to religion from the standpoint of the Law, men discussed it, and inquired into it, and disputed about it, and debated and argued. Such, for example, were the questions concerning the fraction of the inheritance (35) to which grandmothers are entitled — which is one of the questions involving obligations and other questions touching on legal determinations. Such, too, were the questions pertaining to what is unlawful, and to the effects of irrevocable divorce (36), and to *ḥabluḥi 'ala ḥabluḥi* (37), and the questions concerning hand-punishments (38) and divorce. These questions, too numerous to mention, arose in their days, and in the case of each one of them there had come no explicit determination from the Prophet. For if he had given explicit instructions concerning all that, they would not have differed over those questions, and the difference would not have lasted until now.

(35) Arabic: *al-ḥawl* cf. Santillana, *Istituzioni di diritto musulmano malachita*, II, 512-513.

(36) Arabic: *niḥl ba'ida waḥḍaḥa* cf. Santillana, *op. cit.* Index B, under *Bāḍin* and *Battāḥ*.

(37) Literally: Thy rope is upon thy withers. The phrase referred originally to a she-camel allowed to graze freely, and hence has here the meaning: You are free to do as you like. Cf. Lane, s.v. *ghāḍib*. The formula seems to have been used in connection with final divorce and manumission. Cf. A. W. T. Jayakī, *Jas Shajarat* (trans. of *al-Tanbih* of Abū Isḥāq al-Shirāzī), Leiden 1879, 174-8 and 212-4.

(38) i.e. penalties determined by the Qur'anic law.

from confusion or the lack of anything to say, but from astonishment at 'Abdallāh's ignorance, because there is nothing in the verse which necessitates the entrance into it of Jesus and 'Uzair and the angels. For God said: «and what you worship», but He did not say: «and everything which you worship, apart from God». But Ibn al Zibāri simply wanted to argue speciously against the Prophet, in order to make his people think that he had argued against Muhammad successfully. So God sent down the verse: «Those, indeed, who have already received from us the best (reward)» — i.e. those of them who are worshipped — «are far removed from it (Gehenna)» (21.101). The Prophet then recited that verse, and thereupon they raised a great outcry to mask their confusion and their error, and they said: «Are our divinities better, or is he?» — i.e. Jesus. So God sent down the verses: «When the Son of Mary is proposed as an example, see how your people turn away from him. They ask: 'Are our divinities better, or is he?' They have proposed this example to you only out of disputatiousness. Truly they are a contentious people» (43.57/58) (33)

20. All the verses which we have mentioned, as well as many which we have not mentioned, are a basis and argument for us in our kalām on what we mention in detail. It is true that no question was particularized in the Book and the Sunna. But that was because the particularization of questions involving rational principles did not take place in the days of the Prophet. However, (he and) the Companions did engage in kalām of the sort which we have mentioned. (34)

(33) These verses seem to have been revealed on a different occasion from that of the encounter with a Zhihr — cf. Backer: II, 264, n. 57.

(34) This translation seems to me to convey the sense, though the Arabic itself seems rather awkward.

and said to him: « I conjure thee by God, do you find in what God has revealed of the Torah that God detests the lat rabbi? » And the rabbi became angry at being thus reproached, and he said: « God has not sent down anything to a human being » (6.91). Then God said (29): « Say: Who sent down the Book which Moses brought as light and guidance for men? etc » (6.91). So he quickly refuted him, because the Torah is a thing, and Moses a human being, and the rabbi admitted that God had sent down the Torah to Moses. And in a similar way he refuted the men who claimed that God had enjoined upon them that they should not believe an apostle until he should come to them with a sacrifice which fire would consume (3.183-189). For God said: « Say: Apostles before me have already brought you evidences, and the very thing you have mentioned: Why, then, did you kill them if you are truthful? » (3.183-189). And by means of that he refuted them and argued against them.

19. Our basis in correcting the sophistry of our adversaries is taken from the words of God: « You and what you worship, apart from God, will be fuel for Gehenna. You are drawing near to it! If these false gods had been divinities, they would not have arrived at (Gehenna). All will be there eternally. There they will send forth groans, but they will not be (30) heard » (21.98/100). For when this verse came down (31), word of it reached Abdalāh b. al-Zubair — a disputatious and contentious man — and he said: « I have as good as triumphed over Mahammad and the Lord of the Ka'ba! » Then the Apostle of God came to him, and Abdalāh said: « O Mahammad, do you not claim that Jesus and 'Uzair and the angels were worshiped? » And the Prophet was silent (32), not

(29) Cf. Baidawī on this verse.

(30) Cf. Baidawī, II, 301, n. 100.

(31) Cf. Baidawī on this verse.

(32) The Arabic text has a note here, citing Baidawī, to the effect that Mahammad was not silent, but answered straightway.

ther in all of its respects or in one of its respects. Now if He resembled it in all of its respects, He would of necessity be produced in all of His respects. And if He resembled it in one of its respects, He would of necessity be produced, like it, in that respect in which He resembled it. For every two like things are judged the same regarding that in which they are alike. But it is impossible for the produced to be eternal, and for the eternal to be produced. Indeed God has said: « There is nothing like Him » (42:11-9), and He has said: « There is no one equal to Him » (112:4).

16. The basis for declaring that the body has a limit, and that the atom cannot be divided (*ad infinitum*), is the statement of God: « And everything has been numbered by us in a clear archetype » (36:12-11).⁽²⁷⁾ Now one cannot number what has no limit, and the single thing cannot be divided (*ad infinitum*). For this would necessitate that they (*endlessly*) be two things — and God has declared that numbering applies to them both.

17. The basis for declaring that the act must be effected for the Producer of the world as He intends and chooses, and in the absence of any aversion for it on His part, is the utterance of God: « Do you not then see what you reject? Is it you, who create it? Or are we the creators? » (36:38-39). And they could not affirm with proof that they created (it).⁽²⁸⁾ Despite their desire to have a child, he would not come if God was unwilling that he should. Thus God called their attention to the fact the Creator is He from whom creatures proceed according to His intention.

18. The basis of our rational refutation of our adversary is taken from the Sunna of our Master, Muhammad. I refer to the teaching he received from God when he met the fat rabbi

(27) And cf. 72:28.

(28) Cf. *Lamû*, N° 3.

ad infinitum — we find the basis of that in the Sunna of God's Apostle. On a certain occasion he said « There is no contagious disease and no bad omen » (23). And a Bedouin said « Then what is the matter with camels, flawless as gazelles, which mingle with scabby camels and become scabby ? » And the Prophet said « And who infected the first ? » And the Bedouin was silent because of what he had made him understand by that rational argument. Likewise we say to him who claims that there is no motion not preceded by a motion : If that were the case, then not a single motion would ever have begun to be, because the (antecedently) limitless cannot begin to be.

14. Similarly, when a certain man said (24) « O Proprietor of God! My wife has borne a black male child » — and he hinted that he would repudiate it — the Prophet said « Have you any camels ? » He replied « Yes » The Prophet said « What color are they ? » He said « Red » And the Apostle of God said « Is there an ash-colored one among them ? » He said « Yes, there is an ash-colored one among them » The Prophet said « And whence came that ? » He said « Perhaps a sweat (25) spoiled it » And the Proprietor said « And perhaps a sweat spoiled your son » This, then, is the way in which God taught His Prophet to refer a thing to its kind and like, and it is our basis in all the judgments we make regarding the similar and the like.

15. We use that argument against him who holds that God resembles creatures and is a body by saying to him (26) If God resembled anything, He would have to resemble — then

(23) I have not succeeded in finding any reference to this story.

(24) This story, too, is unknown to me from any other source.

(25) The word may have other meanings, and perhaps even a technical meaning here, but the point is not very important.

(26) Cf. *Luma'*, N° 7.

This, then, was the argument which God (²¹) adduced against the group which admitted creation

11. As for the group which denied both the first creation and the second, and maintained the eternity of the world, a doubt entered their minds simply because they said: "It is our experience that life is wet and hot, and death is cold and dry, akin to the nature of earth. How, then, can there be any amalgamation (²²) of life and earth and decayed bones, resulting in a sound creation, since two contraries do not combine?" For this reason, then, they denied the resurrection

12. It is certainly true that two contraries do not combine in one substrate, or in one direction, or in what exists (already) in the substrate. But they can exist in two substrates by way of propinquity. So God argued against them by saying: "He who makes fire for you from the green tree—for lo! you kindle fire from it" (36:80). In saying that, God referred them to their own knowledge and experience of the emergence of fire from green trees, notwithstanding the heat and dryness of the former and the coldness and wetness of the latter. Again, God made the possibility of the first production a proof of the possibility of the last production, because it is a proof of the possibility of the propinquity of life to earth and decayed bones and of making a sound creation—for He said: "Just as we created man a first time, so we shall restore him" (21:104)

13. As for the discussion of the *mutakallimūn* involving (the principle) that (the series of) things which begin to exist has a first member, and their refutation of the Materialists who hold that there is no motion not preceded by a motion, and no day not preceded by a day—and the *kalām* against him who holds that there is no atom which cannot be halved

21) Or, Muhammad.

22) Fusion, union, or combination would perhaps be better

against their denial of the resurrection in two ways, according to the two groups of adversaries (17). For one group admitted the first creation, but denied the second, while the other group denied both (18) on the ground that the world is eternal.

10. So against him who admitted the first creation God (19) argued by saying « Answer: He will quicken them who produced them a first time » (36.79), and by saying « It is He who gives life by a first creation, then restores it, and it is very easy for Him » (30.27/26), and by His words « As He first made you, you will return » (7.29/28). By these verses He called their attention to the fact that he who is able to effect something without reference to a preexisting exemplar is all the more able to effect something which has already been produced. Indeed, the latter is easier for him, as you know from your own experience. But in the case of the Creator, it is not « easier » for Him to create one thing than to create another.

(20) It has been said that the objective pronominal suffix in *alaih* (for him) is an allusion to the capacity of creatures, the meaning being « It is easier and lighter for one of you to be raised and restored than to be created the first time. For his initial creation is always associated with partition, rearing, severance of the umbilical cord, swaddling clothes, cutting the teeth, and other painful and distressing signs, whereas his restoration takes only a single instant in which there is none of that. Hence his restoration is easier on him than his initial creation.

(17) Lit. « according to two groups of them — a group which admitted... and a group which denied... »

(18) I.e. both the first and the second creations.

(19) It is not perfectly clear whether God or Muhammad is the subject. In any case it does not matter much, because the argument is that revealed by God and used by Muhammad.

(20) This paragraph is an exegetical note which is almost independent of the text. Cf. Baiḍawī on this verse.

brief reminder of the proof that God is unique and peerless (13), and the kalām of the mutakallamūn, in which they argue to the divine unity from mutual hindrance and contention, simply goes back to this verse. God also (14) said: « God has taken for Himself no son, and there is no other divinity with Him — else each divinity would have taken away what he had created, and some would have been superior to others » (23 91/93). And so on until (15) He said « Or have they appointed for God partners who have created even as He has, so that creation is a puzzle to them? » (13 16 17) The kalām of the mutakallamūn, in which they argue to the unity of God, simply goes back to these verses which we have mentioned. And similarly, all the kalām which treats in detail of the questions deriving from the basic dogmas of God's oneness and justice is simply taken from the Qur'ān.

9. Such is also the case with the kalām on the possibility and the impossibility of the resurrection (of the body). This question had been disputed by intelligent Arabs and by others before them until they were amazed at the possibility of that and said: « What! When we have died and become dust? That is an incredible return! » (50 3), and « Never, never a hope of what you are promised! » (23 36 38); and « Who will quicken bones when they have decayed? » (36 78), and God's words « Does he promise you that when you shall have died and become dust and bones you will be brought forth? » (23 35 37). Apropos of such kalām of theirs God put into the Qur'ān an argument designed to confirm, from the viewpoint of reason, the possibility of the resurrection after death. Moreover, He taught and instructed His Prophet how to argue

(14) Lit. « without a partner » (*sharik*).

(15) Better perhaps: « to this verse, and to God's saying ».

(16) Perhaps a *waū* should be inserted before « *ilā qawbih* », and then the translation would read: « superior to others..., and to God's saying ».

innovator*. So you are constrained to regard yourselves as deviating innovators, since you have discussed something which the Prophet did not discuss, and you have accused of deviation him whom the Prophet did not so accuse.

SECOND ANSWER

6. The second answer is to say to them: Actually the Prophet was not ignorant of any item of the *kalâm* which you have mentioned concerning body and accident, motion and rest, atom and leap. It is true (11) that he did not discuss every one of these points specifically, and the same is true of the jurists (12) and learned men among the Companions. Nevertheless, the basic principles of these things which you have mentioned specifically are present in the Qur'an and the Sunna in general terms, not in detail.

7. Take motion and rest and the *kalâm* about them. Their basic principle is present in the Qur'an, where they prove the affirmation of God's oneness, and so for union and separateness. In relating what His friend Abraham said in the story of the setting of the star and the sun and the moon and their being moved from place to place, (13) God said what proves that his (Abraham's) Lord cannot be subject to any of that, and that one who is subject to setting and translation from place to place is not a divinity.

8. The *kalâm* on the basic principles of the profession of God's oneness is also taken from the Book. God said: « Were there divinities other than God in them, the heavens and the earth would be in disorder » (21-22). This *kalâm* is a

(11) Lit. « leap, even though he did not... »

(12) Strictly speaking, there were no « jurists » among the Companions. Perhaps the old meaning of « juris » should be understood here, i.e. insight, especially into matters of religion.

(13) Cf. *Lumâ'*, No 11.

3. They assert that if that were a matter of guidance and rectitude the Prophet and his Caliphs and his Companions would have discussed it. For, they say, the Prophet did not die until he had discussed and amply explained all needful religious matters. He left nothing to be said by anyone about the affairs of their religion needful to Muslims, and what brings them near to God and removes them far from His anger.

4. Since no kalām on any of the subjects which we have mentioned has been related from the Prophet, we know that such kalām is an innovation and such inquiry a deviation. For if it were good, the Prophet and his Companions would not have failed to discuss it. For the absence of such kalām on the part of the Prophet and his Companions can be explained in only two ways: either they knew it and were silent about it, or they did not know it, nay, were ignorant of it. Now if they knew it and did not discuss it, then we also may be silent about it, as they were, and we may abstain from plunging into it, as they abstained. For if it were a part of religion, they could not have been silent about it. On the other hand, if they did not know it, then we may have the same ignorance of it. For if it were a part of religion, they would not have been ignorant of it. So according to both explanations, such kalām is an innovation and plunging into it is a deviation.

This is the summary of their argument for abstaining from reasoning about the basic dogmas of religion.

FIRST ANSWER

5. There are three ways of answering that argument. The first is to turn the question against them by saying: It is also true that the Prophet never said: «If anyone should inquire into that and discuss it⁽¹⁰⁾, regard him as a deviating

(10) I.e. kalām on such subjects as those mentioned in N° 2

told ⁽⁴⁾ by the Shaikh, Abū'l-Faḍl Muhammad b. Yahyā al Nāṭiq in his house in Mazandarān, when I read it to him. I have it from Abū Naṣr 'Abd al-Karīm b. Muhammad b. Hārūn of Shirāz who had it from 'Alī b. Rustam who related that 'Alī b. Maḥdī ⁽⁵⁾ said: I heard that peerless Shaikh, the Shaikh of Shaikhs, Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī b. Ismā'īl Ash'arī, say:

Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds! And God's blessing be upon Muhammad the Prophet, and his goodly family, and his Companions, the elect Imāms!

THE OBJECTION TO KALAM

2. A certain group of men ⁽⁶⁾ have made ignorance their capital. Finding reasoning and inquiry into religious belief too burdensome, they incline towards the easy way of servile sectarianism ⁽⁷⁾. They calumniate him who scrutinizes the basic dogmas of religion and accuse him of deviation. If is innovation and deviation, they claim, to engage in *kalam* about motion and rest, body and accident, accidental modes and states ⁽⁸⁾, the atom and the leap ⁽⁹⁾, and the attributes of the Creator.

(4) Lit. — 'The Shaikh... told us...'

(5) This *isnād*, or chain of names, does not seem long enough to go back directly to Ash'arī himself, who died in 324. Perhaps, if it is authentic, some names have been dropped.

(6) Representatives of a rigid traditionalism — some of the Hanbalites?

(7) Arabic *al-taqlīd* = unquestioning acceptance of the authority of another. Cf. art. *Taqlīd*, III, in EI or Hwb.

(8) Arabic *al-awān* *maḥl-akawān*. According to 'A. A. al-Qaṣir al-Baḥrī (Cf. *al-Dīn* 40 ff.) these are the two main divisions of accidents. The phrase, therefore, might be translated simply by 'the various kinds of accidents'.

(9) Arabic *al-tafra*. This seems to refer to al-Nazzār's theory of the 'leap' — cf. *Tristram* 93, and *Madhhab al-Dharrā* *maḥl-akawān* (Arabic trans. of Pines, *Beiträge zur Islamischen Atomlehre*) 12, and 141.

IN THE NAME OF GOD,
THE MERCIFUL, THE BENEFICENT *

Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds! His blessing be upon our Master, Muhammad, and his household, and his Companions! God's peace to them all!


1. *We have it from the Shakh, the Imām, Jamāl al-Dīn Abū l-Ḥasan b. Ibrāhīm b. Abdallāh the Qurashite, with a licence written in his own hand, that he said: We have it from the jurisprudent, the learned Imām, Fakhr al-Dīn Abū l-Maʿār Muhammad b. Abū l-Faraj b. Muhammad b. Baraka of Mosul, when it was read to him — and I heard it in his masjid (1) in the Sultan's Market in Baghdad, on Tuesday, the eighth of Shawwāl, in the year 600 (June 9, 1204) — and it was said to him: You read (it) to the Shakh, the most trustworthy Imām, Abū Maʿāz al-Mubarak b. Abdallāh b. Muhammad of Baghdad the day that he made you recite (it) in his Ribāʿ (2), known as « Ribāʿ al-Bār al-Rayyā », to the east of the City of Peace (Baghdad), in the year 573/1177-8 » — and he acknowledged it.*

We were informed by the Shakh, the Imām, the Ḥāfiẓ, Jamāl al-Dīn Abū l-ʿAdāʾ Abd al-Raḥīm b. Aḥmad b. Muhammad b. Muhammad (b.) Ibrāhīm b. Khālid, who was known as Ibn al-Ikhwa (3), in the year 542/1147-8: I was

(1) i.e. his mosque, probably called « his » because he was accustomed to lecture there, or to pray there.

(2) A kind of « religious » house — cf. art. *Ribāʿ*, in EI or HWB.

(3) Or — Ukhuwwa



A VINDICATION
OF
THE SCIENCE OF KALAM

A TRANSLATION OF THE

RISĀLA (F) ISTIHSĀN AL-KHAWD
FI 'ILM AL-KALĀM

OF

Abū'l-Hasan 'Alī b. Ismā'īl
AL-ASH'ARĪ

of him who holds that the Prophet explicitly designated the Imāmate of another is false. For the Imāmate of a certain individual would be impossible if the Apostle had explicitly designated the Imāmate of someone else. And this necessitates the falsity of the assertion of him who maintains that the Prophet appointed 'Alī to be Imām after him.

199. The view of him who holds that Abū Bakr was explicitly designated to be Imām (9) is refuted by the fact that on the Day of the Porch (10) Abū Bakr said to 'Umar: "Stretch forth thy hand that I may swear allegiance to thee!" For if the Apostle of God had designated Abū Bakr's Imāmate, the latter could not have said: "Stretch forth thy hand that I may swear allegiance to thee!"

200. We have now spoken briefly about the subjects on which we have discoursed. The book is finished. Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds! God bless Muḥammad and his household!

(9) Ash'arī saw the danger in this view, though it must have had a certain attractiveness.

(10) This was the day on which Muḥammad died. For an account of the events that took place in the "Porch", cf. the first chapter of Muir, *The Caliphate*.

call upon you to fight them — « as you turned away before » — i.e. as you refused before — « He will punish you with a grievous punishment » (48.16).

196. Now we know that the one who called upon them was not the Prophet, because God had said to His Prophet « Say — You shall never again go out with me » (9.83-84), and He said in the *Sura* of Victory « wishing to change what God has said » (18.11). So God denied that they would go out with His Prophet, and characterized their going out with him as a changing of His word. Hence the one who called upon them, and whom they were ordered to follow, must have been someone who would call upon them after the Apostle.

197. Men have maintained two opinions. Some said that the people of great valor were the Persians and the Byzantines, and others said that they were the Yamāmites. Now Abū Bakr fought the Byzantines and the Yamāmites, and the Persians were fought during his lifetime, and were conquered after his death. Hence, if the people of great valor were the Yamāmites or the Byzantines, Abū Bakr fought them — which necessitates his Imāmate. And if they were the Persians, they were fought in his lifetime and were later finished off by Umar — which necessitates the Imāmate of Umar. But if Umar's Imāmate be certain, then the Imāmate of Abū Bakr must also be certain — because Abū Bakr invested Umar with the office. So if the text means him who fought the Persians and finished them off, then, if Umar's Imāmate be certain, Abū Bakr's Imāmate must also be certain — because Abū Bakr was the one who invested Umar with the Imāmate.

198. Thus what we have cited from the Qur'ān proves the Imāmate of al-Šiddiq and of al-Fāraq. And if Abū Bakr's Imāmate be certain because of the proofs which we have mentioned — from the ostensible meaning of the Qur'ān and the consensus of the Muslims of his time on it — then the view

the investiture of those Muslims who invested him with it, and the oath of allegiance of the Refugees and Helpers who swore allegiance to him, and the agreement of the Muslims of his time on him — especially since 'Alī and al-Abbās tendered their allegiance to him of their own accord and acknowledged his Imāmate and succession to the Apostle. Therefore, if, by consensus, the Imāmate concerned only these three, and if 'Alī and al-Abbās swore allegiance to Abū Bakr in company with all the Muslims, Abū Bakr must have been the Imām to whom obedience was due.

195. The Qur'ān has pronounced on the Imāmate of al-Ṣiddiq and of al-Farūq. (1) For God said, in the Sūra of Qat'at-tanzīl, to those who refrained from helping His Prophet and stayed back from fighting with him: « Say: You shall never again go out with me, and you shall never fight with me against an enemy! You were pleased to stay at home a first time — then stay at home with those who remain behind » (9:83/84). And in another Sūra He said: « Those left behind will say, when you set out in quest of booty, 'Let us follow you.' — wishing to change what God has said » (48:15). — i.e. His words: « You shall never again go out with me, and you shall never fight with me against an enemy! » Then God said: « Thus did God speak to you on a previous occasion. And they will say: 'But you are envious of us.' Nay, but they have very little understanding » (48:15). Then He said: « Say to those desert Arabs who were left behind: You will be called upon to fight against a people of great valor up to they shall surrender, and if you obey — God will give you a fine recompense » — i.e. if you obey Him who will call upon you to fight them, God will give you a fine recompense — « but if you turn away » — i.e. if you refuse to answer the call of him who will

8) « The Trusting » and « The Discerner » — complimentary epithets applied respectively to Abū Bakr and 'Umar.

the Apostle (1), 2) those who hold the Imāmate of al-Abbās (2); 3) those who hold the Imāmate of Abū Bakr. Now we see that 'Alī and al-Abbās swore allegiance to Abū Bakr and submitted to his command in company with all the Muslims (3). Even though some put off swearing allegiance for a time, they finally agreed to swear allegiance to him, and to be guided by his leadership, and to rally under his banner, and to obey his orders. Moreover, they addressed him with the words « O Caliph of the Apostle of God! » And it is impossible for the Community to agree on an error (4).

194. No one has any right to claim that the interior sentiments of 'Alī and al-Abbās were the contrary of those which they displayed (5). For if that were possible, we should be unable to conclude to the soundness of any consensus of the Community on anything. For we should never be sure but that the interior sentiments of some of the Community might be the contrary of those manifested exteriorly by them. Therefore, since the manifest agreement of the Community gives us certain knowledge of the consensus, we should ignore what anyone may claim regarding interior sentiments. One making such claims would be like a Khārijite who affirms that 'Alī's interior sentiments were the contrary of those which he actually displayed. Hence, since this would do away with all consensus, one must conclude to the Imāmate of Abū Bakr from

1) The Shi'as are the party of 'Alī who married Fātima, the daughter of Muhammad. Cf. Donaldson, *The Shi'ite Religion*, London, 1933. They split up into many sects — cf. Trilhon, 200-7.

(2) The uncle of Muhammad. Cf. Trilhon, 29 (the Hurariya).

(3) The traditional orthodox view of early Islamic history is for the most part that set forth in Murr's *The Caliphate: Its Rise, Decline and Fall*, Revised Ed. 1924.

(4) Muhammad is related to have said « My Community will not agree on an error ». Cf. Wensinck, *Handbook*, 48 A.

(5) i.e. that they only pretended to swear allegiance to Abū Bakr.

CHAPTER TEN

DISCUSSION OF THE IMAMATE ⁽¹⁾

193. Q What is the proof of Abu Bakr's Imāmate ? ⁽²⁾.

A. The proof of that is that we find men divided into three classes: 1) those who hold the Imāmate of Ali after

(1) i.e. the Caliphate. A caliph (*khalfā*) is a vicar, or viceroy, etc. An *imām* is a leader, leader of the prayer, leader of the Community, or of some section of it, etc. The earlier Muslim writers prefer the terms « *Imāma* » and « *Imām* » to « *Caliphate* » and « *Caliph* ». The reader may consult Arnold's *The Caliphate*, or his article, *Khalfā*, in *El* or *Hwb*. A modern work which is of interest in view of Kemal Atatürk's abolition of the Caliphate is *Le Califat dans la doctrine de Rashid Rida* Beyrouth: 1928—H. Laoust's annotated translation of Rashid Ridā's *al-Khilāfa, aw al-Imāma at-Tamīna* (Lara, 1341-1322-3). There is also much valuable material in the text and notes of Laoust's *Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Takiyat-din Ahmad al-Tamīmī*.

Other discussions: *Idāna*, 133-136; *Tamhid*, 160-239; *Irshād*, 344-363; *Justo Medio*, 348-364; *Heb*, 62-81; *Faqer*, 89-100.

(2) Abu Bakr was de facto the first Caliph. Was he also such de jure? This is the basic question which has caused so much shedding of Muslim blood, and of Muslim ink. Though it is not strictly a dogmatic question, it certainly had a great deal of influence on the development of dogma in Islam. The primary question is the one which Ash'ari discusses briefly in this chapter: Did the Prophet Mahammad explicitly designate his successor (*naib*) before he died, or was the choice of a successor a matter to be settled by election (*ikhtiyār*). The Shī'a held, and hold, the former, the Sunnis champion the latter view.

book in his left hand will say 'Would that I had not been given my book!' He was indeed wont not to believe in God the Mighty and not to urge the feeding of the poor » (69 25-34) (5).

(5) Ash'ari also seems to have held the orthodox doctrine on the intercession of Muhammad, though it is not mentioned in this work. Cf. *Ibāna*, 130-131. So even though a Muslim grave sinner were to be consigned to hell, he would certainly come forth ultimately and enter paradise.

belies and turns away » (92.14-16), one could conclude that all who endure the Fire are such. And from the ostensible meaning of God's words, 'Who judge not by what God has sent down, they, they are the profligate !' (5.47-51), one could conclude that only the profligate man refrains from judging by what God has sent down. Since, then, these verses do not compel one to conclude that only the unbeliever enters the Fire, the previously cited verses do not compel one to conclude that every profligate man will be in hell, and that everyone who consumes the wealth of orphans wrongfully and everyone who consumes the wealth of men wastefully will be in the Fire. And the answer to every verse which they use as an argument regarding the threat is like the answer to these verses.

191. God's words, « Who does that unjustly and wrongfully » (4.30-34), are to be interpreted as meaning « Who does that while declaring it licit » So they apply to all who are such. And His words, « while the profligate will certainly be in a burning fire » (82.14), are to be interpreted as meaning « some of them », i.e. the unbelievers among them. So they apply to all who are such. One should reply in the same way respecting every verse urged in proof of the universality of the threat.

192. Moreover, the Mu'tazila are constrained to admit that all « those of the Left » are unbelievers because of the ostensible meaning of God's words « The Companions of the Left! What are the Companions of the Left? They are in burning wind and boiling water and pall of smoke, neither refreshing nor rain-bearing. Once, indeed, they used to live delicately while they persisted in the Great Sin. And they were wont to say 'When we shall have died and become dust and bones, shall we indeed be raised again?' » (56.41-47/40-47), and from His words « But he who will be given his

Prayer • who profess God's unity will be in the Garden from the ostensible meaning of God's words • Those who will come with a good work will have something better than it; and on that day they will be safe from any fear • (27 89/91). And from the ostensible meaning of God's words • Reckon not those as dead who are killed while fighting for God. On the contrary they are alive, and with their Lord have sustenance • (3 169/163), one would have to conclude that everyone killed while fighting for God is in the Gardens and there has sustenance. And from the ostensible meaning of God's words • God indeed forgives sins, all of them! • (39 53 54), one would have to conclude that every sin can be forgiven, except (3) the sin of which God informed the Apostle, and the Muslims are agreed, that it is unforgivable, i.e. the sin of polytheism and unbelief. So one has no more right to say that the threat-verses are universal and the others particular than one has to reverse the statement and to say that the threat-verses are particular and the others universal.

190. Moreover, if one had to conclude from the ostensible meanings of the verses that every profligate man and everyone who consumes the wealth of orphans wrongfully will be in hell, then one could conclude (mendaciously) (4) from God's words • Each time a group is cast into it its guardians ask them 'Did no one come to warn you?' They reply 'Yes, one came to warn us, but we belied and said God has sent down nothing!' • (67 8-9), that only the unbeliever enters the Fire. And from the ostensible meaning of God's words • Therefore have I warned you of a fierce, blazing Fire which only the most impious must endure, who

(3) So the text seems to read, though we should have expected something like « even that sin... ».

(4) The « *mukallihdhan* » of the original seems awkwardly placed, or even superfluous.

187. Likewise, one cannot conclude that God's words, « while the profligate will certainly be in a burning fire » and « those who consume », refer to « some » or « all », since those expressions sometimes refer to « all », and again to « some ». If one could claim that the form means only « all » until it is proved to mean « some », he would have no more right to make this claim than another would have to say that this expression compels one to conclude that it means « some » until it is proved to mean « all ». So since both claimants would have the same right of assertion, both assertions must be excluded.

188. The poet Zuhair (2) said « Who is not profuse in flattery will be rent by fangs and trodden underfoot » But that is not true of everyone who does not use flattery. He also said « Who does not wrong men will himself be wronged » But not everyone who does not wrong men is himself wronged. Moreover, a speaker says « There came to me whom I loved » meaning only one person. And one says « The merchants came to me » — although all of them did not come to him. And one says « My neighbors came to me » although all of them did not come to him. And one says « The profligate cursed me abominably » without meaning all of them. Hence, since these expressions occur at times meaning « all », and at other times meaning « some », one cannot conclude that they mean « all » rather than « some », or « some » rather than « all », unless one has some positive indication.

189. Moreover, if one had to conclude from the form of these verses to the punishment of every profligate man, and of everyone who consumes the wealth of orphans wrongfully, and of everyone who consumes the wealth of men wastefully, then one would have to conclude that all those « People of the

(2) A famous pre-Islamic poet. The citations are from his « *mud'allaga* » — a special prize-winning poem.

CHAPTER NINE

DISCUSSION OF THE PARTICULAR AND THE UNIVERSAL, AND OF THE PROMISE AND THE THREAT⁽¹⁾

186. Q. Tell us about God's words: « while the profligate will certainly be in a burning fire » (82.14); and: « Who does that unjustly and wrongfully, we shall roast him with fire » (4.30-34), and: « Truly those who consume the wealth of orphans wrongfully are only consuming fire in their bellies, and they shall endure the blazing fire » (4.10, 11).

A. God's words, « Who does that unjustly », may be interpreted as applying to *all* who do that, or as applying to *some*. For the word « who » in our language applies sometimes to all, and sometimes to some. Hence, since the form of the word occurs now with the meaning of « some », and again with the meaning of « all », one cannot affirm positively, from its form alone, that it means « all » or « some ».

(1) The real question in this chapter is: Will any believer (Muslim) be condemned to hell *forever*? Ash'ari's answer, briefly, is: No — unless he commit the unforgivable sin of *shirk* (polytheism, associating others with God). But since, in such a case, he would cease to be a Muslim, we may say that his answer is simply: No. It is not that God could not, but that He will not. Difficulties arise from certain Qur'anic texts which seem to consign to hell those who commit other sins, and it is these texts which Ash'ari must explain.

he either a believer or an unbeliever one must conclude that Wāṣil's view is false.

185 Besides, if one could say that he who has faith and commits a grave sin is neither believer nor unbeliever, one could also say Nay, but he is a believer by reason of his faith, and it should not be said that he is a sinner by reason of his sin. Since this cannot be said, because there can be no sin which does not belong to a sinner, their assertion is also impossible, for there can be no faith which does not belong to a believer.

kills is a killer, and he who disbelieves is a disbeliever, and he who sins is a sinner, and he who believes ⁽²⁾ is a believer. Likewise, then, he who has faith is a believer.

182. If the sinner were neither believer nor unbeliever, he would neither disbelieve nor believe, and consequently would neither profess God's unity nor deny it, would be neither friend nor enemy of God. Since that cannot be, it is impossible that the sinner be, as the Mu'tazila claim, neither believer nor unbeliever.

183. Moreover, if the sinner was a believer before he sinned, by reason of his profession of God's unity, then adultery occurring after such profession does not annul the name which issues from the faith which he has not forsaken.

184. Furthermore, before the advent of Wāṣil b. 'Aṭā ⁽³⁾, the chief of the Mu'tazila, men followed two opinions. The Khawārij ⁽⁴⁾ among them regarded grave sinners as unbelievers, whereas the « People of Rectitude » maintained that the grave sinner was a believer by reason of his faith and a sinner by reason of his grave sin. But no one said that he was neither believer nor unbeliever before the advent of Wāṣil b. 'Aṭā. The latter withdrew from the Community and departed from its view, and because of his divergence from the consensus he was called a « withdrawer » (Mu'tazilī) ⁽⁵⁾. So from the absence of consensus on his view - for the Muslims were agreed that the disobedient member of the « People of the Prayer » must

(2) Here the verb is *qaddaqa*, and in the next phrase *āmana*, but it is difficult to bring this out in the translation.

(3) Cf. *Tritton*, 60, *Watt*, 63, and art. Wāṣil b. 'Aṭā, in *EI* or *Hwb*.

(4) *Tritton*, 35 ff., *Watt*, 32 ff., *MC*, Index, s. v. Kharijites, art. Kharijites, *EI* or *Hwb*.

(5) Or: seceder. Cf. Nallino, *Sull'origine del nome dei Mu'tazilīti*, in *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, VII (1916-18), 429-454. (Reprinted in *Raccolta di scritti etc.*, II, 170 ff.)

CHAPTER EIGHT

DISCUSSION OF FAITH

180. Q What, in your opinion, is faith in God? (1)

A It is belief in God. On that there is a consensus of those who speak the language in which the Qur'ân was revealed. God said: « We have sent no Apostle to teach, save in the language of his people » (14.4). He also said: « in plain Arabic speech » (26.195). Now faith, in the language in which God sent down the Qur'ân, is belief. God Himself said: « You do not have faith in us even though we are truthful » (12.17)—**i.e. you do not believe us. And everybody says:** « So-and-so has faith in the punishment of the grave and intercession », meaning that he believes in that. So faith must be that which is faith according to those who speak the language, i.e. it must be belief.

181. Q. What about the sinner who belongs to the People of the Qibla (1 bis): is he a believer?

A Yes—a believer by reason of his faith, a sinner by reason of his sin and grave fault. Those who speak the language are agreed that he who strikes is a striker, and he who

(1) The reader may consult with profit *Tritton* and *MC*, Indices *xv* Faith. He will note that in this chapter Ash'ari passes very quickly from the discussion of faith as such to the famous question: Is the grave Muslim sinner a believer?

(1 bis) i.e. those who turn to the same direction (Mecca) when they pray

They Yes. *We* Likewise, then, if He commanded us to lie, He could cause us to be lying.

178. Furthermore, do you not claim that prayer, when it exists, consists of motions, and that the man who moves is moving because motion inheres in him, and that the man who prays is praying because prayer inheres in him? If they reply affirmatively, one should say to them: Then, if a man obeys by effecting a motion which God has commanded him to effect, he must be obeying because obedience inheres in him, just as he is moving because motion inheres in him. If they agree, one should say to them: Then part of the man is obedient and part of him is disobedient when disobedience inheres in him. They must admit this. Then one should say to them: Why, therefore, do you deny that part of the man may be speaking, I mean his tongue, and part of him knowing and willing, I mean his heart? They may say: When the motion is obedience, ~~then~~ the man who moves is moving because the motion inheres in him; but the obedient man is not obedient because obedience inheres in him, but rather because he effects the obedience. One should reply: Then why do you deny, when the motions are prayer, and the man who moves is moving because motion inheres in him, that the man who prays is praying because he effects the prayer, and not because the prayer inheres in him?

179. If they agree with that, one should say to them: Then if God can command us to pray, but cannot Himself pray, it must be admitted that, if He commanded us to lie, He could not Himself lie, but rather could effect lying for us, just as He can effect prayer for us without being able to pray Himself. So say the same of lying! Moreover, when God commands us to move, He makes for us the motions by which we move. Likewise, then, if He commanded us to lie, why would it be impossible for Him to make for us a lie by which we should be lying?

is praying because he effects the prayer in himself, and that the man who moves is moving because he effects the motion in himself?

O. One of us may move without effecting the motion.

A. And one may will and speak who does not effect willing or speech, e.g. the passionate lover who loves his beloved with an uncontrollable love, and the sleeper, or epileptic, who utters insuppressible speech.

O. The love of the passionate lover is not really love, nor is his willing really willing.

A. Neither is the speech of the epileptic and of the sleeper really speech! Nor is the speech of a man who is awake really speech! Nor is the willing of the passionate lover really willing! This is nonsense which anyone can refute!

177. Moreover, if the man who prays is praying because prayer inheres in him, then is not the submissive man submissive, according to you, because submissiveness inheres in him? For submissiveness is in the heart, whereas the whole man is submissive. If they claim that the heart is submissive and lowly, we force them to admit that it is the tongue which is really speaking and the heart which is really willing. *They.* The man who is submissive is not submissive because submissiveness inheres in him. *We.* Then if God commands us to be submissive, according to your reasoning He must Himself be submissive. *They.* No, but He effects submissiveness for another. *We.* And just so, if He commanded us to lie He could effect lying for another. *They.* The man who lies is lying because he himself effects the lying. *We.* Then the same is true of the man who is submissive. *They.* The submissive man is submissive neither because submissiveness inheres in him nor because he effects it. *We.* The same is true of the liar. Moreover, if God commanded us to move, could He not cause us to be moving?

174. A The argument by which they constrain us to admit that the Creator can be — far exalted He above that! — is that He can command lying, for He must be able to be qualified by everything which He can command.⁽⁹⁾ If that be so, then, if God can command that the motions by which we move and the prayer by which we pray inhere (¹⁰) in us, it must be possible for motions by which He would move and prayer by which He would pray to inhere in Him! Unless, indeed, they mean to say: If God can command another to lie, why can He not effect a lie by which that other will be lying, just as, if He commands another to pray, He can effect for that other a prayer by which he will be praying? If they ask the question in this form, it is something undeniable.

175. However, if the man who prays is praying because prayer inheres in him, just as the man who moves is moving because motion inheres in him, then every atom⁽¹¹⁾ of the man, when prayer inheres in him, must be praying, just as every atom of the man, when motion inheres in him, must be moving. Moreover, in our language « prayer » is « invocation ». So if the man who prays is praying because prayer inheres in him, then he must also be invoking because invocation inheres in him. But they hold this to be false.

176. Furthermore, if the Creator can effect for another a prayer by which He Himself will be praying, why can He not effect for another a volition by which He will be willing, and a speech by which He will be speaking?

O The man who speaks and wills is speaking and willing because he effects the speech and the willing.

A Then why do you deny that the man who prays

(9) This seems to be an evasion, for the adversaries have not really made such a sweeping claim, as is clear from N° 173.

(10) This is the verb « *halla* » — cf. a. 12 to Chapter Five.

(11) Arabic : *juz'*

171. O. Then lying is evil only because God has declared it to be evil.

A. Certainly. And if He declared it to be good, it would be good; and if He commanded it, no one could gainsay Him.

172. O. Then allow that God can lie, just as you allow that He can command lying!

A. Not everything which God can command can be predicated of Him. Do you not see that He has commanded us to pray and to be submissive and to move, yet He cannot pray and be submissive and move, because that is impossible for Him? Likewise, He cannot lie, not because it is evil, but because it is impossible for Him to lie. So He cannot be qualified by the power to lie, just as He cannot be qualified by the power to move and to be ignorant. For if one could claim that the Creator can be qualified by the power to lie but not by the power to be ignorant, without introducing any distinction, then another could reverse the statement and claim that the Creator can be qualified by the power to be ignorant but not by the power to lie. Since that is impossible, what they say is false ⁽⁸⁾.

173. O. When God commands us to pray our prayer consists of the motions by which we move when we pray, and the man who moves is moving because motion inheres in him. But he who curses and lies is cursing and lying only because he effects cursing and lying, and not because they inhere in him.

(8) Ash'ari does not seem to have reached the heart of the difficulty. His abhorrence of predicating lying of God may ostensibly have been dictated by his reading of revelation and tradition but it is hard to escape the feeling that it was also the result of an instinctive aversion found in all normal men and based on the objective evil of lying.

QUESTION

169. Q Is God free to inflict pain on infants in the next life (4) ?

A God is free to do that, and in doing it He would be just. Likewise, whenever He inflicts an infinite (5) punishment for a finite sin, and subordinates some living beings (6) to others, and is gracious to some and not to others, and creates men knowing well that they will disbelieve — all that is justice on His part. And it would not be evil on the part of God to create them in the painful punishment and to make it perpetual. Nor would it be evil on His part to punish the believers and to introduce the unbelievers into the Gardens. Our only reason for saying that He will not do that is that He has informed us that He will punish the unbelievers — and He cannot lie when He gives information.

170. The proof that He is free to do whatever He does is that He is the Supreme Monarch, subject to no one, with no superior over Him who can permit, or command, or elude, or forbid, or prescribe what He shall do and fix bounds for Him. This being so, nothing can be evil on the part of God. For a thing is evil on our part only because we transgress the limit and bound set for us and do what we have no right to do. But since the Creator is subject to no one and bound by no command, nothing can be evil on His part (7).

(4) Cf. *Ibāna*, 112. (The passage in the middle of that page apparently should read: "The Banū Ismā'īl (or 'Isrā'īl ?), their little ones (reading *ṣiḥāruhum*) are in hell.")

(5) Arabic: *lā gatanāhā* — which will never end

(6) Arabic: *al ḥayawān*. The context seems to require "men", though other rational creatures (angels and jinn) may be included.

(7) This is the doctrine which Averroes finds so distasteful. As he points out, and as the next number makes clear, there can be nothing good or bad in *se*.

166. O. Then since God has not effected in unbelievers what would ensure their belief, He has been miserly towards them

A Miserliness consists in the agent's not doing what he ought to do. But where something is a matter of generosity, he who is generous is free to be generous with that or not to be generous. And in such a case an miserliness attaches to the agent if he does not do the thing (2)

167. Q. Since God has not effected in unbelievers what would ensure their belief, has He, then, willed their folly and unbelief?

A. Yes -- and we have explained that in the course of an earlier discussion (3).

QUESTION

168. Then one should say to them: If since God has not effected in unbelievers what would ensure their belief, He must will their perversity, why do you deny that, since He created them while knowing that they would disbelieve, He must have willed their unbelief? They may say that he who wills folly is foolish. One should ask them: Is it not true that the Creator of him who He knows will disbelieve is not foolish because He creates him, and that His creating him is not folly? Why, then, do you deny that the Creator was not foolish when He willed their folly? But we have already discussed this question in an earlier section.

(2) Cf. N° 41, *supra*

(3) Cf. N° 63-4, *supra*

CHAPTER SEVEN

DISCUSSION OF THE IMPUTATION OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE TO GOD⁽¹⁾

165. Q Is God able to grant a favor such that, had He effected it in the unbelievers they would have believed?

A Yes — and the proof of that is the fact that God can effect in the believers and in His servants that which, had He effected it in them, they would surely have done mischief in the earth. For God has said: «And had God given more ample sustenance to His servants they would surely have done mischief in the earth» (42.27-28) and «Were it not that men would have formed one community» — i.e. in unbelief — «we would surely have appointed, for those who are ungrateful to the Benefactor, roofs of silver for their houses and stairs of silver on which they might mount» (43.33-32). Hence, since God can effect in creatures that which, had He effected it in them, they would have all disbelieved, He can also effect in them that which, had He effected it in them, they would have all believed. Moreover, we have already proved that the existence of the capacity entails the existence of the act. So if God can empower men to believe, He can also effect that which, had He effected it in them, they would have all believed.

(1) *Irshād*, 233-265. Averroes strongly criticizes the main principle underlying this section. *Teologia*, 334 ff.

God » (63.1), and God said : « And God knows that you are indeed His Apostle, and God testifies that the Hypocrites are indeed liars » (*ibid.*)

164. Q What about God's words « God wills for you ease, and He does not will for you hardship » (2.185 181) ?

A God meant that they would not be guilty or culpable because of omitting to fast when travelling or sick, and that they would not be in hardship because of their breaking the fast.

A. They mean I did not enjoin that upon them, nor did I command them that, but they lied against me and fabricated a lie in what they said, i.e. that I had commanded them that

161. The Qur'anic proof that God can enjoin what cannot be done is His remark to the angels «Tell me the names of these» (2.31-29) - i.e. the names of creatures when they did not know that and were unable to do it. God also said that the impious «will be called upon to prostrate themselves and will be unable to do it» (68.42). So if God can enjoin upon men in the next life what they will be unable to do, that is also possible in this life. Moreover, God has commanded justice; yet He said: «You will never be able to treat your wives justly, even though you be eager to do so» (4.129/128).

162. Q. What about God's words «God wills no injustice for creatures» (10.31-33), and «God wills no injustice for the Worlds» (3.108, 104)?

A. They mean that God Himself has not willed to wrong them, although He has willed that they should wrong one another.

163. Q. What about God's words «Those who have become polytheists will say 'Had God willed, we should not have become polytheists, nor our fathers'» - to His words⁽³²⁾

«Thus did those who preceded them give the lie» (6.148-149)?

A. They said that mockingly and not by way of belief. So God called them liars for saying what they did not believe, just as He called the Hypocrites liars for saying mockingly: «We testify that you are indeed the Apostle of

(32) This phrase indicates that Ash'ari has abbreviated his citation of the verse.

of what preceded the act, when that was manifest to her only after he had done it? So it is certain, according to us, and certain too the argument against our adversaries, that his capacity for that must have coexisted with his very doing of it.

158. The rational proof of that is the fact that, if we were to see a man actually praying, we should not know precisely when his capacity had begun to exist for him. However, we should know from the act itself that his capacity was evidently for the act, i.e. the prayer which he was performing. And our argument against our adversary, in all the questions which he may propose on the subject of the capacity, is just like what we have sketched in the foregoing exposition and explanation. And in God is help!

QUESTION

159. Q What about God's words « I created jinn and men only that they might adore me » (51:56)?

A By those words God meant some of the jinn and men, i.e. those of them who do adore God. For He said in another place « And we have created for hell many jinn and men » (7:179-178) and the Qur'an does not contradict itself. So God must have created many for hell, because of the verse which we have just cited, and He must have created some of them to adore Him, because of His words « I created jinn and men only that they might adore me ». And those whom He has created to adore Him are those who He has willed should adore Him and who end by adoring Him.

160. Q What about God's words « God did not institute any Bahira, or Sa'iba, or Wasila, or Hami⁽³¹⁾; but those who disbelieve fabricate a lie against God » (5:103-102)?

(31) Different kinds of camels, named from certain practices of the pagan Arabs.

instances in the Book of God; but what we have used as proof suffices. Another instance is found in the words of God « except the people of Jonah when they believed » (10 98) (29).

QUESTION

157. Someone may ask about what the daughter of Shu'ayb said to her father « O father, engage him. The best of those whom you have engaged is this strong and faithful man » (28 26). Al-Jubba'i claimed that this verse means that she declared Moses to be strong enough for the work of which her father stood in need. And he argued from that, as he claimed, that the capacity is prior to the act. How impossible for him to deduce this conclusion from this verse in any way at all! For she did not know Moses before he removed the stones and drew the bucket, but only after she had seen his power and strength and fidelity. And that was because, when she returned to him the second time and said to him « My father summons you » (28 25), Moses said to her « Walk behind me and direct me along the way ». For the wind was describing her to him, and fear overtook Moses, and therefore he said to her « Walk behind me and make known to me the way, right, left, and ahead, by your tongue », and she did that (30). Then when she came to her father and told him that Moses was strong and faithful, her father was very angry with her and said to her « My daughter, you know his strength from what you have seen of him. But how do you know his fidelity? » Then she told him what she had seen him do. How, then, could she have known that he was capable because

(29) Ash'ari's point seems to be that the people of Jonah were not able to believe until God enabled them to do so.

(30) The Qur'anic text is quite economical and contains none of the details mentioned by Ash'ari — least of all the indignant question of Shu'ayb.

opened it. So this proves that they had no capacity before the act, but only with the act and for the act precisely because God willed that.

154. Then there are the words of God about the companion of Joseph: «But the devil made him forget to mention Joseph to his master, so Joseph remained in prison for several years» (12.42). The devil caused the man who was released to forget to mention Joseph to the king. So the man who was released had no capacity to mention the affair of Joseph to the king, although he had promised Joseph, before he came out of prison, that he would mention him to his master. This was in order that the will of God respecting Joseph might be accomplished at the time known to God, i.e. when the king saw the vision.

155. Moreover, there are God's words to His Prophet: «O! no account say of anything 'I shall do that tomorrow' without adding 'God will ing'» (18.23). Thus God commanded His Prophet not to venture to do anything which might occur to him without using the exceptive phrase⁽²⁸⁾ in his speech. So God told His Prophet that «you should not say 'This will be' before you do it, save if I will that». And the Prophet submitted to the command of God.

156. And Moses said: «Our Lord! Blot out every trace of their wealth, and straiten their hearts, and let them not believe, even when they see the painful chastisement» (10.88). So they were unable to believe when they saw the chastisement compelling them to believe, for if they had been able to do that they would have believed when they saw the chastisement beginning to descend on them. There are many such

(28) Arabic *al-istithnā'*. An interesting discussion of the use of this phrase still so common on the lips of the Arabic-speaking Muslim, will be found in *al-Raḥḥat al-Bakyya*, 6-8.

contains no argument against the religion of the Lord of the worlds.

151. The Mu'tazila claim that Solomon, who was one of God's Prophets, did not call the ifrit a liar when he said « I shall bring it to you before you can rise from your place. Truly I have the strength to do it, and I am faithful » And they say that no one can lie in the presence of a Prophet, for he knows that God will refute any lie of his by the tongue of the Prophet. Thus God said to His Prophet « When the Hypocrites come to you they say 'We testify that you are indeed the Apostle of God'. And God knows that you are indeed His Apostle, and God testifies that the Hypocrites are indeed liars » (63 1) So God Himself made it known that they were lying And there are many similar instances in the Qur'an The Mu'tazila argue, therefore, from the ifrit's words, that the capacity is prior to the act Wretched their thought and opinion ! Nay, but their own souls have enticed them into vanities !

152. We reply to him who thus argues against us In this verse related by God of the ifrit, by his words « Truly I have the strength to do it, and I am faithful » the ifrit must have meant either « If I am able to do that and undertake it and will it », or, « Truly I have the strength to do it, and I am faithful, God willing » If Solomon had not known that the ifrit was suppressing some such phrase, he would certainly have called him a liar and related what he had said

153. That is proved by God's words « And they were unable to surmount it, nor could they breach it » (18 97 98) The explanation of this - and it is not disputed by anyone who professes the unity of God - is that they were hoping every day to find that they had opened it without having said « God willing ». But if it had been determined, they would have said « God willing », and would have found that they had

mentioned spending : « And let him whose sustenance has been determined for him spend of what God has given him. God demands of a soul only what He has given it. »

149. Q. What about God's words « God enjoins upon a soul only what it can do » (2.286) ?

A They mean that God does not enjoin upon a soul anything that would afflict it too severely, such as banishing from one's soul thoughts which invite to evil, for God may overlook that and be generous to Muslims regarding the disobedience to which their souls invite them, if they do not commit it after its having been such an affliction for them ⁽²⁵⁾. So the meaning of « God enjoins upon a soul only what it can do » is « only what He makes possible for it. » For what God commands His creatures to do is not too difficult for them, and they are not unable to effect it ⁽²⁶⁾. And some of our associates have said that « God enjoins upon a soul only what it can do » means « only what it can do lawfully »

150. Q. What about the words which God related of the 'ifrit : « Truly I have the strength to do it, and I am faithful » (27.39) ⁽²⁷⁾ ?

A If the 'ifrit was telling the truth, his words « Truly I have the strength to do it, and I am faithful » mean « If I undertake that and will it » And if he was one for whom, when he willed that, God would produce the power to do it, then he did not lie But if he did not say these words in that sense, then he did lie However, the speech of 'ifrits and devils

(25) This seems to be sense of the Arabic ; but if Ash'ari is consistent it is hard to see how they could thus acquire any merit for not doing what they could not do

(26) Nor are they able to effect in unless God supplies the *istithā'a*, according to Ash'ari. Otherwise they can only « omit to do » the thing, and are somehow responsible.

(27) The reader should consult the context in order to appreciate the difficulty (And so for the texts which follow).

they swore to the Apostle of God that they had no means and no mounts on which to go with the Prophet of God. So God gave them the lie respecting their oath, because they did have the means. But the dispute between them and the Apostle of God was not about whether the capacity is with or prior to the act, it was simply a quarrel about wealth and mounts. Such is what has been mentioned by the commentators, the transmitters of traditions, and the relaters of the same. If this be the case, we do not deny that material means must precede the act; we simply deny that the bodily capacity is prior to the act.

QUESTION

146. Q What about God's words: « So fear God as well as you can » (64.16) ?

A. These words may be interpreted in the sense that God meant « Fear God, in so far as you are able to do so ». So if they are able to fear God, they are bound to do so, and if they are able to omit doing so, they are still bound to fear God, because the fear of God is binding on them only if they are able to effect it or able to omit it. The words may also be interpreted as « Fear God in whatever you are able to do so. »

QUESTION

147. Q What about God's words: « and he who cannot must feed sixty poor people » (58.4-5) ?

A. These words mean: « He who cannot, because of an inability, must feed sixty poor people ».

148. Q. What about God's words: « God demands of a soul only what He has given it » (65.7) ?

A. They mean that God enjoins the spending only of what He has given the soul. For He said that after having

given them » (7.190) The Mu'tazila claim that the « them » of « had given them » does not refer to something mentioned previously, but to the polytheists among the children of Adam and Eve⁽²²⁾ Thus they contradict their view that the « it » of « able to do it » refers only to an antecedent already mentioned. Moreover one of the Companions read the text⁽²³⁾ and interpreted it as meaning that they are obliged by it but are unable to do it⁽²⁴⁾.

QUESTION

144. Q. What about God's words « And pilgrimage to the House is a duty towards God incumbent on those who can find a way to accomplish it » (3.97/91) ?

A God meant material means, i.e. provisions and a mount, and not bodily capacity, the existence of which entails the existence of the object of its power. The proof from reason that the capacity is with the act confirms our interpretation and refutes that of our adversaries.

QUESTION

145. Q. What is the meaning of God's words, « And they will swear by God 'Were we able, we would certainly go out with you' » (9.12) ? Must they not mean that they were able to go out but did not, and that even though they were able to go out, they did not ?

A By ability they meant wealth and means, and

(22) On the face of it the « them » seems to refer to Adam and Eve. Yet what Ash'ari says seems to be the view of the commentator Zamakhshari — II. 187.

(23) Ash'ari here repeats the text, but since there are no vowels in the manuscript it is difficult to say just what the difference in the reading was.

(24) This seems to be the sense, but the uncertainty of the reading also affects the understanding of the interpretation.

A. They may be interpreted as signifying that God meant those who are able to feed a poor man and who are unable to fast, for them there is a ransom if they break the fast. They may also be interpreted as signifying that God meant those who are able to fast, i.e. if they undertake it and will it⁽¹⁹⁾. This second interpretation accords with the view of those who refer the «it»⁽²⁰⁾ of «able to do it» to an antecedent already mentioned, i.e. the fast.

142. The Mu'tazila maintain that the «it» can refer only to an antecedent already mentioned, i.e. the fast. Our answer to them is that the first interpretation which we mentioned is the interpretation of some of the ancients⁽²¹⁾, and that the grammarians are no argument against the Companions and the Followers. Nevertheless, many grammarians do allow that the «it» does not refer to an antecedent already mentioned.

143. Then we counterattack the Mu'tazila and say to them: Tell us about God's words «He it is who created you from one soul, and from that soul He made its consort that the man might trust in her» - i.e. Adam and Eve «And after he had covered her she carried a light burden, and she passed her days with it. Then when she became heavy» - i.e. Eve «they both prayed to God their Lord: If Thou wilt give us a virtuous son, we shall surely be among the grateful» - i.e. Adam and Eve (7:189); and his words «Then when He had

Bardawi, 39 and Zamakhshari, I, 226, for other possible readings. The force of the objection seems to be: The Qur'an (i.e. God), says that those who are able to fast may nevertheless adopt an alternative, i.e. feeding a poor man.

(19) This meaning also seems to be allowed by the commentators.

(20) This is the objective pronominal suffix, i.e. the «hu» (it) of *gufiqinahu*. The question is: does it refer to *at-ṣiyām* (the fast), mentioned in the previous verse, or to the alternative of the ransom, mention of which follows.

(21) Cf. Bardawi, *loc.*

particular thing is distinct from the inability to do every other thing. And in God is help !

QUESTION

140. Q Tell us about a man who divorced his wife and freed his slave . when was he able to divorce the one and to free the other ?

A He was able to free his slave at the moment of the manumission, and to divorce his wife at the moment of the divorce.

O Then he was able to divorce her who was not his wife, and to free him who was not his slave (17) !

A He was able to divorce her who was not his wife at the moment of the divorce, but who had been his wife prior to that, and to free him who was not his slave at the moment of the manumission, but who had been his slave prior to that just as he divorced her who was not his wife at the moment of the divorce, but who had been his wife prior to that. The same answer should be given to queries about throwing down a staff, and passing from the sun to the shade, and breaking what is broken.

QUESTION

141. Q. Tell us about the words of God * and for those who are able to do it (18) there is a ransom * (2.184-180).

(17) The point of the objector seems to be that a man is never in a position *actually* to divorce his wife, since, the moment he is able to do so, she is divorced. Ash'ari, on the other hand, would seem to mean that he is never able to divorce her until he actually divorces her.

(18) Arabic *yalīqūnahū* Bell * those who are in a position to fast * which seems to be the obvious meaning. However, see

an absence that entails the absence of all power - or that He should command when inability exists - an existence which does not entail the nonexistence of the power

138. The Shaikh Abu'l-Hasan said. And every question concerning the enjoining of what cannot be done - such as commanding the payment of the Zakat⁽¹⁵⁾ when a man has no wealth, and so forth - is to be answered as I have answered their question about commanding when the limb is nonexistent, and enjoining an obligation when inability exists.

139. Q. Why do you deny that the thing and its contrary may be inexistent because of the existence of two inabilities?

A. Because there is a limit to what cannot be done by the impotent man who has no power at all. But if the inability to do each particular thing were distinct from the inability to do every other thing, such a man would have unlimited inabilities - which is absurd. Moreover, death is the greatest of inabilities, since all acts are impossible when it is present. Now if the inability to do each particular thing were distinct from the inability to do every other thing, then the nonexistence of acts, in the case of a dead man, would be due to the existence of all inabilities. This would necessitate the presence in one atom⁽¹⁶⁾ of two inabilities and two deaths. But if this were possible, one of the two could be supplanted by life with the result that the same atom would be simultaneously living and dead - which is absurd. Since this is impossible, we know that it is absurd for one to say that the inability to do each

(15) A religious tax legally binding on Muslims. Cf. art. Zakat, in EI or Hwb.

(16) Arabic *juz'*. Here perhaps 'individual' would be better. But death and inability were both classified among the accidents - cf. al-Baghdadi, *Uṣūl al-Dīn* 43.8 ff. and 44.11; and Ḥaq lānī seems to say that it is the atom which receives the accident - *Tamhīd*, 41.21 ff.

same would have to be true of the power. The existence of the latter, as a power over the thing and its contrary, would therefore require that the thing and its contrary coexist with it. For one's judgment regarding the coexistence of the two contraries with the existence of the power must be the opposite of one's judgment regarding the inability. And in the case of the inability one judges that both the object of the inability and its contrary must be nonexistent when the inability exists. So if such a comparison be impossible, their allegation is vain and their objection collapses, and there is no necessity of comparing the power with the inability, since there is no reason which brings them together ⁽¹³⁾, and since power does not belong to the genus of inability.

137. O. Then God can enjoin a thing when the limb does not exist and the inability exists.

A. No, because a man is commanded only to accept or omit, and when the limb does not exist there can be neither acceptance nor omission. Likewise, when inability exists, neither acceptance nor omission can coexist with it, because it is inability to do either the thing or its contrary. Moreover, if, in the case of God's commanding a man to do a thing when the man's limb did not exist, God would have to command the thing in the absence of all power, then, in the case of God's commanding a man when the latter lacked certain knowledge — knowledge of God, and knowledge that He was commanding — God would have to command him to act in the absence of all knowledge ⁽¹⁴⁾. So if this be not necessary, neither is it necessary, when God commands a man in the absence of the power to do what He commands him to do, that He should command in the absence of the limb.

(13) i.e. nothing common to them both.

(14) I believe the translation is correct, but the precise meaning of the argument eludes me.

If you mean by your words that he is incapable of believing because of his impotence to do so — no. But if you mean that he is incapable of believing because he omits to do so and is preoccupied with the contrary of belief — yes.

Q Then why do you deny that God enjoins on the unbeliever an obligation which he is unable to fulfil because he omits to fulfil it?

A Inability to do a thing is had when both the thing and its contrary are beyond one's power (12). Hence it is impossible for one who is unable to do a thing to be unable simply because he omits to do it.

136. Q Why do you deny that one who is able to do a thing is also able to do its contrary, just as one who is unable to do a thing is also unable to do its contrary?

A If the power to do a thing were also a power to do its contrary, by analogy with inability, then help to do a thing would have to be help also to do its contrary, by analogy with the fact that inability to do a thing is also inability to do its contrary. Moreover, if the power to do a thing were also a power to do its contrary, by analogy with inability, (because inability to do a thing is also inability to do its contrary), then the same necessity would apply to both inability and power, namely that both the thing and its contrary should result from the power, just as both the thing and its contrary are rendered impossible by the inability. And if, when the inability exists, both the thing and its contrary (which are the objects of the inability) are nonexistent, and the man who has the inability acquires neither of them, then the

(12) This may seem to be a rather odd notion of "inability." But it is also accepted and used by Baqir'ani in his treatise on the apologetic miracle. Bear in mind that for Ash'ari the existence of an ability, or power, entailed the simultaneous existence of the object of the power. In the light of this notion this and the following number may be more intelligible.

133. Another proof that the capacity is with the act is to be found in the words of al Khidr to Moses: « You will certainly be unable to have patience with me » (18.67/86) So we know that, since Moses was not patient, he was not capable of being patient. This shows that when there is no capacity, no act takes place, and that when there is a capacity, the act indubitably takes place.

134. Another proof of that is the fact that God has said « They were unable to understand » (11.20-22), and « and who were unable to understand » (18.101) although they had been commanded and ordered to understand the truth. That also proves that God can enjoin what cannot be done⁽¹⁾, and that he who does not accept the truth and does not readily listen to it is unable to do so.

Q. Are they not able to accept it?

A. What is the difference between you and him who says that they are unable to accept the truth because they are preoccupied with omitting to accept it?

QUESTION

135. Q. Has not God charged the unbeliever with the duty of believing?

A. Yes.

O. Then the unbeliever is capable of believing.

A. If he were capable of believing, he would believe.

O. Then God enjoins on him an obligation which he cannot fulfil.

A. This is a statement which involves two matters.

(11) A reference to the famous question: Can God enjoin upon man what the latter cannot do? Cf. Watt, 69, *Irshād*, 206-8, *Justo Medio*, 269-274; *al-Rawḍat al-Bahyya*, 53-7.

A. The weaving is nonexistent because of the non-existence of the power to do it, not because of the nonexistence of the knowledge of how to do it. If the weaving were nonexistent because of the nonexistence of the knowledge of how to do it, it would exist when such knowledge existed. Since that is not the case, and since knowledge of how to do it may be accompanied by impotence, we know that the nonexistence of the weaving is due only to the nonexistence of the power to do it, and that, were God to make it a custom to create the power to do it along with the nonexistence of the knowledge of how to do it, the weaving would indubitably take place.

132. O. If the nonexistence of allowing⁽⁸⁾ and freedom from restraint entails the nonexistence of the act, then their existence entails the existence of the act.

A. So we say⁽⁹⁾

Q. If the nonexistence of a constitution capable of supporting the act entails the nonexistence of the act, why does not the existence of such a constitution entail the existence of the act?

A. That is just what we say, because the constitution supports only what subsists in it⁽¹⁰⁾. And every objection they urge concerning this point is to be answered as we answered the objections regarding the limb and life, because the nonexistence of the acquisition is not due to the nonexistence of such things.

doctrine held by various individuals, cf. *Tritton Index*, s.v. "capacity".

(8) Arabic *al takhlīḡa* — i.e. putting no obstacle or hindrance in the way.

(9) Presumably because God's "allowing" would have to include the creation of the power.

(10) Presumably because the constitution (*ṭinḡa*) would have to include the power.

129. Q. Is it not true that the nonexistence of the limb entails the nonexistence of the act ? (7)

A. The nonexistence of the limb entails the nonexistence of the power, and the nonexistence of the power entails the nonexistence of the acquisition. For if the limb does not exist, the power will not exist. But it is because of the nonexistence of the power that the acquisition is impossible

when the limb does not exist — and not because of the nonexistence of the limb. If the limb were nonexistent, and the power existed, the acquisition would take place. Furthermore, if the acquisition were impossible only because of the nonexistence of the limb, then when the limb existed the acquisition would exist. But since the limb can exist in conjunction with impotence, whereas, when the power is nonexistent there is no acquisition, we know that the acquisition does not take place, because of the nonexistence of the capacity, and not because of the nonexistence of the limb.

130. Q. Is it not true that the nonexistence of life entails the nonexistence of the acquisition ?

A. Yes, because when life does not exist the power does not exist; and it is because of the nonexistence of the power that the acquisition is impossible, not because of the nonexistence of life. Do you not see that life can exist along with impotence, so that a man does not acquire ? We know, therefore, that the acquisition is not nonexistent because of the nonexistence of life, and that it does not exist simply because life exists. So the answer respecting life is like that respecting the limb.

131. Q. If the nonexistence of knowledge of how to weave entails the nonexistence of weaving, why does not the existence of such knowledge entail the existence of weaving ?

(7) The *Mu'tazila* in general seem to have held that the capacity consisted in soundness of body, freedom from ailments, etc. For the

a condition of man's power that its existence include the existence of its object. Since that is so, it is impossible for a man to have power over both the thing and its contrary. For if he had power over both, both would have to exist, and that cannot be.

127. Q Why do you deny that there may be one power over two volitions, or over two motions, or over two like things?

A We deny that because a power is a power only over what exists with it in its locus ⁽⁶⁾. So if there were one power over two motions, it would have to be a power either over two motions such that they would exist with it at the moment that it began to exist, or over two motions that would exist one after the other. Now if it were a power over two motions which would exist simultaneously, two motions would exist in one place at the same time. If this were possible, one of the two motions could be supplanted by its contrary, i.e. quiescence, so that the substance would be simultaneously moving from and quiescent in its place, but this is impossible. On the other hand, if it were a power over two motions which would exist one after the other — and it has already been proved and demonstrated that the power does not endure — this would necessitate the existence of the act in virtue of an in-existent power, but we have already shown the falsity of this.

128. Another proof that the capacity is with the act and for the act is the fact that he for whom God does not create a capacity cannot acquire anything. Hence, since he cannot acquire the act if there be no capacity, it is certain that the acquisition exists only because the capacity exists. And this is equivalently an affirmation that the capacity exists with the act and for the act.

(6) Arabic: *maḥall* — locus, or subject, or substrate.

were to endure of itself, it would have to be its own duration, and it could not exist save as enduring. But this would necessitate that it be enduring at the very moment that it begins to be. On the other hand, if it were to endure because of a duration subsisting in it — and duration is a quality — a quality would subsist in a quality, and an accident in an accident, and that is false. For if a quality could subsist in a quality, then a power could subsist in a power, and a life in a life, and a knowledge in a knowledge, and that is false.

126 Q Why do you deny that the power over a thing is a power over both it and its contrary?

A. It is a condition of created power that its existence include the existence of the object of the power (5). For if that were not so, and if it could exist for one unit of time without an object, then it could exist for two or more units of time without an object, since there is no difference between one unit of time and two or more units. And if that were so, it could exist perpetually, the creature possessing it being all the while an agent in no wise acting. Do you not see that, since it is not a condition of the Eternal's power that its existence include the existence of its object, and since it can exist without any act, it is not impossible for it to exist eternally without any sort of act? But since it is impossible for a man's power to exist perpetually without the existence of an act of his, use or abstention, obedience or disobedience, so long as the command and prohibition remain in force, the same impossibility is true of even one unit of time. And if it be impossible for his power to exist without an object for even one unit of time, it must be

al-Baghdādī, *Uṣūl al-Dīn*, 42:12-18, and 50:10 ff. on the impossibility of the duration of accidents.

(5) This seems to beg the question. But presumably Ash'arī feels that he has sufficiently established the simultaneity of the power and the act.

A. We claim that because the act must begin to exist either with the capacity at the very moment that the latter begins to be, or after it. If the former is the case, then it is true and certain that the capacity exists with the act and for the act. But if the existence of the act is posterior to that of the capacity — and there is solid proof that the capacity does not endure ⁽³⁾ — then the act must begin to exist in virtue of an nonexistent power. If that were possible, impotence could begin to exist after the capacity had ceased to exist so that the act would take place in virtue of an nonexistent power. And if a man could act, at a time when he was impotent, in virtue of an nonexistent power, then he could act a hundred years after the power had begun to be, even though he would have been impotent during all those hundred years, and that in virtue of a power which would have been nonexistent for a hundred years. This is false.

124. Moreover, if the act could begin to exist, despite the nonexistence of the power, and if the act could take place in virtue of an nonexistent power, then burning could be effected by the heat of an nonexistent fire after God had turned the fire into cold, and cutting could be effected by an nonexistent sword after God had turned the sword into a reed, and the cutting could be done by an nonexistent limb — all of which is impossible. So if that be impossible, the act must begin to exist with the capacity at the very moment that the latter begins to exist.

125. Q. Why do you claim that the power does not endure?

A. If it were to endure, it would endure either of itself or because of a duration ⁽⁴⁾ subsisting in it. Now if it

(3) N° 125, *infra*

(4) Arabic *baqā'*. The question of *baqā'* gave rise to many subtleties. For a definition, and reference to disputes, cf. 'Abd al-Qāhir

CHAPTER SIX

DISCUSSION OF THE CAPACITY (1)

122. Q Why do you say that man is capable in virtue of a capacity which is distinct from him?

A He is sometimes capable and sometimes impotent, just as he knows at one time and does not know at another, and now moves and again does not move. Therefore he must be capable in virtue of something distinct from him, just as he must be knowing in virtue of something distinct from him, and as he must be moving in virtue of something distinct from him. For if he were capable of himself, or in virtue of something inseparable from him, he would not exist save as capable. But since he is sometimes capable and sometimes incapable, it is true and certain that his capacity is something distinct from him (2).

123. Q You affirm of man a capacity which is distinct from him, but why do you claim that it cannot precede the act?

(1) Arabic: *istitā'a*. The usual translation seems to be «capacity». Cf. Tritton, 68, and n. 2. Wensinck uses «faculty» in M¹. The word means «ability», or «power». Ash'ari himself uses *qudra* and *quwwa* as synonyms of the following paragraphs, and Watt 90 n. 37. For a Mu'tazilite distinction between *qudra* and *istitā'a*, cf. *Nādir*, II, 61. But of course Ash'ari denied that distinction.

(2) It should be remembered that the chief concern is with human acts.

Qadariyya, because we say that God makes our acts as determined for us, they would be Qadariyya because they say that God makes all His acts as determined for Him. And if we were Qadariyya because we say that God determines acts of disobedience, they would be Qadariyya because they say that God determines acts of obedience. Since that is not the case, what they say is false.

to say that God lied to him therein, because lying cannot be predicated of the Creator, since it is impossible for Him to lie. But when God creates lying for another, or creates a lie in the heart of another, it is not necessary that He be lying, just as, when He creates a power, or a volition, or a motion in another, it is not necessary that He be thereby powerful, or willing, or moving.

QUESTION

120. Q Why have you named us Qadariyya? (41)

A. Because you claim that *you* determine your acquisitions and effect them as something determined by you and not by your Creator. The Qadari is he who ascribes that to himself, just as the goldsmith is he who acknowledges that he himself does goldsmith's work and not he who claims that it is done for him, and as the carpenter is he who claims that he himself does carpentering and not he who acknowledges that it is done for him, without his doing any of it himself. Likewise, the Qadari is he who claims that he himself makes his acts to be determined, and not his Lord, and who claims that his Lord effects nothing of his acquisition.

121. Q You are constrained to admit that *you* are Qadariyya, because you affirm the Qadar of God.

A. We affirm that God determines our works and creates them as determined for us, but we do not affirm that of ourselves. But he who affirms the Qadar of God and claims that the acts are determined by his Lord is not a Qadari, just as he who affirms goldsmith's work and carpentering of another is himself neither goldsmith nor carpenter. If we were

(41) *Ibūna*, 113, Watt, 48-50, and the article of Nallino to which he refers, in *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, VII (1916-18) 461-6 reprinted in *Raccolta di scritti editi e inediti*, II, 176 ff.

words «quit of the polytheists» proved that He had not created their polytheism, they would also prove that He had not created the polytheists themselves, because He would be quit both of the polytheists and of their polytheism. And if His words «quit of the polytheists» entailed His not having created their polytheism, the Qadariyya would be forced to admit, since God has said that He is «the Patron of the believers» (3.68/61), that God creates the faith of the believers. Since they do not hold this to be so, what they say is vain.

QUESTION

119. The following difficulty may be raised. There were twins in a desert, and it occurred to the heart of one of them that God is one — who cast that into his heart? God. Was what God cast into his heart true? Yes. Did God tell him the truth in what He cast into his heart? God's veracity is simply His speech. But what occurred to the man's heart was not God's speech in such wise that one should say that God told him the truth therein.⁽³⁹⁾ Now for the other twin. It occurred to his heart that God is the third of three⁽⁴⁰⁾ — who cast that into his heart? God. Was what God cast into his heart false? Yes. Did God tell him the truth in what He cast into his heart, or did He lie to him? It is wrong to say of God that He told him the truth therein, because the Creator's veracity is one of His essential attributes, and is in fact His speech. And it is wrong

(39) I think that Ash'ari means that what actually occurred to the man's heart was not God's speech, which is a divine attribute, but something created. In the first case this created something was true, in the second case it was a lie, but imputable to God only as His creation, and not as His utterance.

(40) A common phrase to indicate the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. One might have expected that Ash'ari would have refused to take this rather fantastic objection seriously. But he accepts it soberly and painstakingly answers it.

they agree, they should then be asked: Why, then, do you deny that God's words «over everything Powerful» (2:20-19) prove that there is nothing which can be done over which God has not power? And that His words «the Creator of everything» (13:16-17) prove that there is nothing produced or made of which God is not Producer, Maker, and Creator?

QUESTION

117. Q What is the meaning of God's words «that God is quit of the polytheists (38), and His Apostle, too» (9:3)?

A This verse was revealed concerning the treaties that existed between the polytheists and the Apostle of God. For God said: «A quitance from God and His Apostle directed to those polytheists with whom you covenanted. Travel in the earth for four months, and know that you cannot thwart God, but that God confounds the unbelievers» (9:1-2). Thus God granted them four months of immunity. Then He said: «And a notice from God and His Apostle» — i.e. an announcement from God and His Apostle — «to men on the day of the Greater Pilgrimage, that God is quit of the polytheists, and His Apostle, too» — i.e. released from the treaties that existed between the Apostle of God and them, once the four months should have elapsed. Then he excepted a group of the polytheists — it is said that they were of Banu Kināna — and said: «excepting those with whom you covenanted at the Masjid al-Haram, as long as they are straightforward with you, be you straightforward with them» (9:7) — i.e. until their time elapses.

118. Moreover, God explicitly mentioned the polytheists, and He did not say «quit of their polytheism». So if His

(38) The objector wants this phrase to mean that God has nothing to do with polytheists as such. Hence, by implication, the polytheism is entirely their own doing.

the vain, and yet not conclude from the other that God created the acts of angels and others which were between them at that time ?

114. One should also say to them. If God's words concerning the polytheists * They twist their tongues in the Book so that you may think that what they say is from the Book but it is not from the Book¹ And they say It is from God But it is not from God ! * (3 78.72) — mean that God did not create what they said, then why are not acts of obedience created by God, since you maintain that they are from God ? And if unbelief and acts of disobedience are not created by God because they contain faults⁽³⁶⁾, then why are not acts of obedience created by God, since you hold that they do not contain faults ? And if God's words * Who has executed perfectly all that He has created * (32 7 6) apply universally to everything which God created, then why do not His words * the Creator of everything * (13 16.17) apply to everything distinct from Himself ?

115. Q Then what is the meaning of God's words * And we created not the heavens and the earth and what is between them save with (37) truth * (15.85) ?

A. God created all that. So if He said to it * Be ! *, the truth was His saying to both of them * Be ! * and they were

QUESTION

116. The champions of the Qadar should be asked. Do not God's words * the knower of everything * (2.20/27) prove that there is nothing knowable which God does not know ? If

(36) A reference to the text in N° 109.

(37) Blachère * avec sérieux *.

« I shall not reward him who obeys me, nor shall I punish him who disobeys me and disbelieves in me ». For the unbelievers thought that they would neither be quickened nor raised from the dead in order to be punished. So God explained that He had created creatures only that some of them might come to a reward and others return to punishment, and that the unbelievers thought otherwise. He made it clear that it was a question of reward and punishment, because He went on to say « Shall we treat those who will have believed and done pious works like the tormenters of evil on the earth? Or shall we treat the pious like the profligate? » (38.28-27). Thus He announced that it was the opinion of the polytheists, of whom He disapproved, that there would be no punishment which would cause a separation between believers and unbelievers.

112. The Shaikh Abu'l-Hasan said: One may also interpret « We did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them in vain » as meaning « I did not create *all of that as vain* », because the vain is only a part of God's creation. And it may be interpreted as « I did not create *that as vain* » — i.e. « I did not make it vain when I created both of them, because the vain began to exist after I had created them » (34).

113. Moreover, God has said: « He who, in six days, created the heavens and the earth and what is between them » (25.59-60). The universality of these words proves that He created the creatures between them who began to exist, such as the angels who were between them, and the acts of living beings which He created at that time (35). Why, then, do they conclude from one of the two verses that God did not create

(34) These interpretations are ingenious, but apparently unnecessary.

(35) This last point seems to be a rather partisan interpretation of the text.

of the Benefactor, no irregularity — i.e. in the heavens. For God said, « Look again! » — after He had mentioned the heavens — « Do you see any fissures? » (67/3) — i.e. any cracks, but unbelief does not have cracks in it. Then God said, « Then look again, twice over! » — i.e. at the heavens and the earth, « Your sight will come back to you weakened » — i.e. hurt, « and worn out » — i.e. overcome (67/4). But God made no mention of unbelief or of the acts of creatures in this verse, and therefore it contains no argument for the Qadariyya.

QUESTION

110. Q. Then what is the meaning of God's words « Who has executed perfectly (32) all that He has created » (32/7/6)?

A. They mean that He is proficient in creating, just as one says that so-and-so is proficient in the goldsmith's craft, meaning that he knows how to do goldsmith's work. So God declared that He knows how to create things.

QUESTION

111. Q. Then what is the meaning of God's words « And we did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them in (33) vain » (38/27/28)?

A. God said « That is the supposition of those who disbelieve » (*ibid*). That proves that the verse means « He created them both and what is between them », and not

(32) Blachère « qui a excellé en tout » The objector wants it to mean « who has made good » rather than « who has made well ».

(33) Arabic *balṭan* Blachère « à la légère », Bell « to no purpose ». The objector wants the verse to mean that God creates no « *bāṭil* », i.e. nothing false or vain.

belong to God, without saying, in detail, that wife or child belong to God. Or it is like our saying, in globo, that what is inferior to God is weak, without saying, in detail, that the reign of God is weak. The Shaikh Abu'l-Hasan said: But I maintain that evil is from God in the sense that He creates it as evil for another, not for Himself.

QUESTION

108. Q Then what is the meaning of God's words: « They twist their tongues in the Book so that you may think that what they say is from the Book but it is not from the Book! And they say: It is from God! But it is not from God! » (3. 78-72)? ⁽³⁰⁾

A. These words mean that they perverted the description of the Apostle of God and led the foolish among them to imagine that it was from their Book. God said: « But it is not from the Book! » And they say: « It is from God » i.e. God has revealed it — and God said: « But it is not from God! » — i.e. I did not reveal that to them, as they pretend.

QUESTION

109. Q Then what is the meaning of God's words: « You see, in the creation of the Benefactor, no irregularity » ⁽³¹⁾. (67. 3)?

A. God said: « Who has created seven heavens in layers » — i.e. one above the other; « You see, in the creation

(30) The real force of the objection — and Ash'ari does not meet it directly — seems to be that the text proves that those men did something evil which was not from God.

(31) Cf. Hachere's note on this word, II, 272. Bell has « oversight ». Presumably the point of the objection is that God does not create anything bad.

one to imagine that the argument of God has no truth. Similarly, then, our being pleased applies to the decree and the determination, but not to the unbelief. This is the answer of those associates of ours whose reply we mentioned above.

105. Other associates of ours reply to the question by saying that we are pleased with the decree and determination of God with which He has commanded us to be pleased, thus following the order of Him Who cannot be contravened or gainsaid. This is like our being pleased with the survival of the Prophets and our dislike of their deaths, and our dislike of the continued existence of the devils—but everything is by the decree of the Lord of the Worlds!

QUESTION

106. Q Which is better: the good, or he from whom the good proceeds?

A He from whom the good proceeds, and to whom it is united ⁽²⁸⁾, is better than the good.

Q. And which is worse: the evil, or he from whom the evil proceeds?

A He from whom the evil proceeds in such wise that he is thereby unjust is worse than the evil ⁽²⁹⁾.

QUESTION

107. Q Do you hold that evil is from God?

A Some of our associates say that all things are from God, in globo, without saying of evil specifically that it is from God. This is like one's saying that all things, in globo,

(28) I.e. so that it can be said to be *his* good.

(29) Recall Ash'ari's dictum that God creates evil as evil for another, not for Himself. Cf. next paragraph.

103. Some of our associates answer by saying « God's decree of disobedience and unbelief . . » — and they say of disobedience and unbelief « They are false » But they do not say of the decree that it is false For one's saying « The decree of God is false » is like his saying, when he sees a broken piece of wood, that the wood is broken, but is, nevertheless, an argument of God But he does not say of the argument that it is broken, because this would lead one to imagine that the argument of God has no truth Likewise, unbelief is false, yet unbelief is the decree of God in the sense that it is the creation of God But we do not say « The decree of God is false », because this would lead one to suppose that God's decree has no truth It is like our saying « The unbeliever believes in the idol and the image » But we do not say « The unbeliever believes . . » and then remain silent, because that would be ambiguous. And we say « The Prophet disbelieves in the idol and the image » But we do not say « The Prophet disbelieves . . » and then remain silent, because that would be ambiguous.

QUESTION

104. Q Are you pleased with (27) God's decree and determination of unbelief?

A We are pleased that God has decreed unbelief as bad and determined it as false, but we are not pleased that the unbeliever is thereby unbelieving, because God has forbidden us that When we speak of being pleased with the decree we are not obliged to say the same of unbelief, just as, when we say that the piece of wood is an argument of God, and that the piece of wood is broken, we are not obliged to say that the argument of God is broken, for this would lead

(27) i.e. Do you approve of.

those which must not be endured patiently, such as unbelief and all other acts of disobedience ⁽²⁴⁾

QUESTION

101. Q. Has God decreed ⁽²⁵⁾ and determined acts of disobedience?

A. Yes, in the sense that He has created them, and has written ⁽²⁶⁾ them down, and has announced that they will be. Thus He said: « And we decreed for the Children of Israel in the Book » (17.4) — i. e. we told them and informed them. And He said: « save his wife; we had determined that she would be among those remaining behind » (27.57/58) — i. e. we wrote her down and announced that she would be among those remaining behind. But we do not say that God has decreed and determined acts of disobedience in the sense that He has commanded them.

102. Q. Is the decree of God right?

A. The decree of God which is a creation includes what is right, such as acts of obedience and what God has not prohibited, and it also includes what is wrong, such as unbelief and acts of disobedience. For creation includes what is right and what is vain. But the decree of God which is a command, and the decree which is an informing, and an announcing, and a writing, is right, because it is distinct from what is decreed.

(24) This statement seems to imply that, perhaps at least, Ash'ari felt the need of allowing to man some measure of self-determination.

(25) The verb *qada* (and the noun *qadā'*) I translate by « decree ». They might also be translated by « decide » and « decision ». Baqillani enumerates various meanings of *qadā'* in his *Insāf* 147.

(26) Cf. Qur. 9.51. The idea of God's writing down what will happen to every man is common in discussions of the *qadar*. Cf. A. de Vlieger, *Kitāb al-Qadar*, Leiden, 1903.

by the speech of another. We simply said that He creates injustice for another, not for Himself, and is not thereby unjust Himself. So the parallel to this is that He creates speech for another, not for Himself, and is not thereby speaking Himself. Moreover, if this objection were compelling, He would have to utter the lie who does not lie, just as He makes the injustice who is not unjust, and He makes the willing who is not thereby willing, and He makes the motion who is not thereby moving. So if this be not compelling, neither is what they have said. Besides, we have already proved in the beginning of this book of ours that God's speech is one of His essential attributes. Therefore it is impossible for Him to be speaking by the speech of another, just as, since knowledge is one of His essential attributes, it is impossible for the knowledge of another to be a knowledge of His, and for the Lord of the Worlds to be knowing by a temporally produced knowledge.

QUESTION

100. Q Is the creature ever free from being either the recipient of a favor for which he must give thanks, or the object of a trial which he must endure patiently? (23)

A The creature is never free from favor and trial. Among trials are those which must be endured patiently, such as misfortunes of sickness and disease, those which affect one's goods and children, and the like. And among them are

(23) This particular question may have had a special historical background. Possibly the adversary merely wanted to undertake the futility of any kind of human reaction to the visitations of God. It is unfortunate that we have so few reliable sources of information regarding the "other side." Malazite texts seem to have disappeared almost completely. Perhaps the Shiite libraries will some day help us to a fuller reconstruction of Malazite views and arguments.

97. Q Has not God, then, created the injustice of creatures?

A He created it as their injustice, not as His (21)

Q Then why do you deny that He is unjust?

A One who is unjust is not unjust because he makes injustice as another's injustice and not as his. If he were unjust for this reason, no creature would be unjust. Hence, since one who is unjust is not unjust because he makes injustice as another's injustice, God is not necessarily unjust because He creates injustice as another's injustice and not as His (22). Moreover, if what they say were compelling, then, if God were to make a volition and a desire and a motion for another and not for Himself, He Himself would have to be willing, desiring, and moving. Since this is not necessary, neither is what they have said.

98. Q Then God may create a motion which no one would acquire without being moving Himself

A And likewise, were God to create an injustice which no one would acquire, He would not thereby be unjust, but it would be injustice for him for whom He created it as injustice, and by it that one would be unjust

99. Q Then why does not God speak the speech of another, just as He creates the injustice of another?

A We did not say that He is unjust by the injustice of another in such wise that we must say that He speaks

(21) This is the basic distinction to which Ash'ari returns again and again. It is hard to see how it leaves any room for human responsibility or merit, or how reward and punishment can be anything but pure arbitrariness on the part of God.

(22) Recall that injustice, according to Ash'ari, depends solely on the divine will. Yet it seems fair to ask: How does anyone become really unjust if his injustice is handed to him, so to speak, ready-made?

95. Furthermore, impotency does not prove that God creates its object more forcibly than the power which God creates proves that God creates the object of the power. For that over which God creates in us power is a fortiori the object of His power, just as His knowledge of a thing is superior to that which He creates in us, and His hearing of a thing is superior to that which He creates in us. So if that be equally true of God's power, then when God empowers us over acquired motion it must be He who creates it in us as our acquisition.⁽²⁾ For when He can effect something in us, but does not effect it in us as an acquisition, He refrains from effecting it in us as an acquisition. And when He refrains from making it to be an acquisition of ours, it is impossible for us to acquire it. So what we have said proves that we acquire a thing only after God has created it as an acquisition of ours.

QUESTION

96. Q If man's acquisition be a creation, then why do you deny that he is its creator?

A I did not say that my acquisition is a creation of mine in such wise that I am compelled to say that I am its creator. I said only that it is another's creation. How, then, if it be the creation of another, am I compelled to say that I am its creator? If I were the creator of my acquisition, when it is really a creation of God, then God Himself would be moving by the necessary motion which He creates in one who moves thereby. Since that is impossible, because God creates it as the motion of another, we are not constrained by what they say, because our acquisition is a creation of another.

(20) How, then, is it "our acquisition" any more than one of our necessary motions is "our acquisition"? This fundamental question is never really answered.

94. Q Why do you deny that what proves that one of the two motions is created by God is the fact that necessary motion takes place as something regarding which the creature is impotent? So if the other takes place as something over which the creature has power, it transcends⁽¹⁸⁾ the necessity of being created by God.

A If what takes place as an object of the power of someone other than God transcended the necessity of being created by God, there would be no guarantee that the motions of a man shaking from palsy or shivering from fever are not effected in the one moving necessarily by one of the angels empowered by God over that. For it is not impossible, according to our adversaries, for a creature possessing power to be able to effect something in another.⁽¹⁹⁾ Thus necessary motion would cease to prove that God made it as it is. Moreover, the same would have to be said of the motions of the celestial spheres and of the union and composition of the parts of the heavens. And if this were so, these things would cease to prove that God made them as they are, and one could not be sure but that the parts of the heavens have a uniter who is not God, and the celestial spheres an arranger, and the stars a mover who is not God. So if that cannot be, what they say is false, namely, that if a thing be the object of the power of someone other than God, it transcends the necessity of being created by God.

between an act of man and a human act simply, in the last analysis, a matter of extrinsic denomination? It would seem that Ash'ari would have to say yes.

(18) Arabic *kharrajat min an* — lit. goes beyond, & outside of. Perhaps «transcends» is a little too strong.

(19) Ash'ari is in basic opposition to this: God is the unique Creator of everything and, vice versa, everything (which begins to be) is created. This is not a mere philosophical premise with Ash'ari, but an imperious dogma which he derived from his reading of revelation and tradition.

motion must be an acquisition — because the true meaning of acquisition is that the thing proceeds from its acquirer in virtue of a created power. Now since the two states differ, in the two motions, and since one of them fulfils the notion of necessity, this one must be a necessary motion, and since the other fulfils the notion of acquisition, it must be an acquisition. But the proof of creation is the same with respect both to necessary and to acquired motion. Therefore, if one of the two motions be a creation, the other must also be a creation.

93. Surely it is clear that their differing with respect to necessity and acquisition does not necessitate their differing with respect to beginning to be and existing after having not existed. Likewise, the 1, their differing with respect to necessity and acquisition does not necessitate their differing with respect to creation. Do you not see that if a body be not prior to temporally produced things, it must itself be temporally produced, because it falls under the notion of beginning to be? But its falling under the notion of beginning to be, because it shares that notion with temporally produced things, does not mean, if one of the temporally produced things be a motion, that the body must be motion, or, if one of them be a body, that the motion must be a body. For they are equal, not with respect to the notions of body and motion but with respect to the notion of temporal production. Similarly, then, since acquisition and necessity are alike with respect to the notion of creation and beginning to be, if one of them be a creation of God, the other must also be such. Hence their differing with respect to necessity and acquisition does not entail that the two motions differ with respect to creation (17).

(17) What is it, then, that specifically differentiates the two types of motion? Ash'ari's answer would doubtless be that the acquired motion proceeds from its acquirer in virtue of a created power (cf. N° 92 *supra*). But this motion necessarily takes place concomitantly with that created power. Is, therefore, the difference

The creation of necessary motion is also proved by its need of a place and a time — and the same is true of acquired motion. Hence, since every proof by which one infers that necessary motion is created by God compels one to judge that acquired motion is also created by God, the creation of acquired motion is necessary for the same reasons that necessitate the creation of necessary motion.

92. Q. Then if one of the two motions be necessary, the other must also be necessary. And if one of the two be an acquisition, the other must also be an acquisition.

A. There is no necessity of that, because the two differ with respect to necessity and acquisition. For necessity means that to which the thing is constrained and compelled and forced, and from which it can find no way to get free or to escape, even though it strive to be freed from it and want to escape from it and exhaust its endeavors to do so. So if one of the two motions be of this description, i. e. the description of necessity, as in the case of one shaking from palsy or shivering from fever, it is necessary motion, and if the other motion be of a contrary description, it is not necessary motion. For the man who goes and comes, and approaches and recedes, is quite different from one who shakes from palsy or shivers from fever. One knows how to distinguish between the two states, in himself and in others, by a necessary knowledge which leaves no room for doubt ⁽¹⁶⁾. So if there be impotence in one of the two states, power, which is its contrary, must exist in the other. For if impotence existed in both states together, the man's way of acting would be the same in both. Since this is not so, and since there is power in one of the motions, this

(16) This is certainly true — and it is the basis of the proof from consciousness of the freedom of the will. But Ash'ari's further interpretation of the data of consciousness scarcely seems to touch the real difficulty. For his « acquired » motion seems to be quite as ineluctable and inevitable as his « necessary » motion.

is is also the agent who makes it as it really is. For the acquirer acquires a thing because it takes place in virtue of his created power over it. But the Lord of the Worlds cannot be one able to do a thing in virtue of a created power, and therefore cannot acquire the acquisition, although He is the agent who really makes it.

90. Q Does a man, then, acquire the thing as it really is, i.e. as *va'in* unbelief and good faith?

A This is an error. « He acquires unbelief » means only that he disbelieves in virtue of a created power. Likewise our saying « He acquires faith » means only that he believes in virtue of a created power, without his having acquired the thing as it really is ⁽¹³⁾. But he who makes it as it really is is the Lord of the Worlds. The question of lying, and that it has an agent who makes it as it really is, and one who is thereby lying, who is not the one who makes it as it really is, is to be treated as was the question of the agent who makes the motion as it really is, and the one who really moves thereby, who is not the one who makes the motion as it really is. We have already explained that above ⁽¹⁴⁾.

91. Another rational proof of the creation of men's acts is that the proof which proves that God creates necessary motion also proves that He creates acquired motion. For that which proves that God creates necessary motion is the latter's beginning to be — and the same is true of acquired motion ⁽¹⁵⁾.

(13) If the text is not faulty, he probably meant — without his having produced the thing as it really is, either causatively or specifically. Otherwise it is not difficult to understand how the Ash'arite « *ash* » became a proverbial symbol of subtlety.

(14) It is hard to escape the conclusion that the liar, according to Ash'ari, is under the same compulsion to lie as he is in any of his involuntary acts.

(15) Recall that for Ash'ari there was no such thing as secondary causation. Hence any kind of motion — and anything outside God — must be due to the direct creation of God.

it really is, does not prove that it really has no acquirer save God?

A. Acts must have an agent who makes them as they really are, because an act cannot dispense ⁽¹⁾ with an agent. So if the agent who makes the act as it really is be not the body, God must be the agent who makes it as it really is. But the act does not need an acquirer who acquires it as it really is in the same way that it must have an agent who makes it as it really is ⁽¹⁾, so that, if the act be an acquisition, God must be its acquirer.

89. Do you not see that necessary motion is itself proof that God is the agent who makes it as it really is, but not that the one moving thereby is really God — when the motion exists — just as He is the agent who really makes it? Nor must the one who moves of necessity be the agent of the motion as it really is — when he really moves thereby. For « the one moving » means that the motion finds its locus ⁽²⁾ in him — which is impossible respecting our Lord Most High. Similarly, if the acquisition is itself proof of an agent who makes it as it really is, it does not necessarily prove that the agent who makes it as it really is is also the one who acquires it, nor does it prove that the one who acquires it as it really

(10) Or: be independent of, get along without

(11) This does not seem to be true, if the act is a human act, though it is obvious that God cannot be the subject of acquisitions. It may well be doubted that Ash'ari's contribution to the vexed problem of the relation of God to human acts is anything more than terminological.

(12) I have usually translated the verb « *halla* » by « find a locus in ». If I am not mistaken, Ash'ari uses the word only of accidents, and so we might translate it by « find a subject of adhesion in », or simply, « find a subject in ». Many writers have emphasized the « atomism » of Ash'arism. While I do not deny its importance, it seems to me that a very fruitful study could be made of the Ash'arite notion and use of « accident » (*'araḍ*).

And its producer can never be the unbeliever, who desires that unbelief be good, right, and true, whereas it is the contrary of that. Likewise faith must have a producer who produces it as it really is, toilsome, painful, and vexatious, and who is not the believer, who, though he strive that faith be contrary to its actual painfulness, toilsomeness, and vexatiousness, has no way to effect that. So if the one who produces unbelief as it really is cannot be the unbeliever, and if the one who produces faith as it really is cannot be the believer, then the intentional producer of both must be God Most High, Lord of the Worlds (6). For no body can produce them, since bodies can effect nothing in things distinct from themselves (7).

87. Q. Why is it that the occurrence of the act which is an acquisition does not prove that it has no agent (8) save God, just as it proves that it has no creator save God?

A. That is exactly what we say.

Q. Then why does it not prove that there is no one with power over it save God?

A. It has no agent who makes it as it really is save God, and no one with power over it so that it will be as it really is, in the sense that he creates it, save God (9).

88. Q. Then why is it that its being an acquisition, as

issue. The full extent of the position to which Ash'ari is committed may be better realized if we substitute disobedience and obedience, or sin and good act, for unbelief and belief. Later on Ash'ari will have to deal with these.

(6) There is a hint here of another doctrine held by Ash'ari, viz. the sole determinant of goodness and badness is the will of God, hence there is no such thing as an act good or bad in se.

(7) Another Ash'arite thesis: God is the unique efficient cause of everything. This is emphasized in the following paragraph.

(8) Arabic: *fā'il* — agent, maker, doer.

(9) The creature's power over it is a created power, and once God creates this power the act must take place concomitantly — cf. the next chapter, on the « capacity ».

referred to works in His words « as a reward for what they once did » So if one could claim that God's words « has created you and what you make » mean something other than their works, just as His words « their deceiving » mean something other than their deception, another could claim that God's words « as a reward for what they once did » mean something other than their works, just as His words « has created you and what you make » mean something other than their works, and as His words « their deceiving » mean something other than their deception. Since this cannot be, the questioner's assertion is impossible.

85. The rational proof of the creation of men's acts is our experience that unbelief is bad, false, vain, inconsistent, and of a certain contrarieness, whereas faith is good, wholesome, and painful. And it is our experience that even though the unbeliever deliberately exert himself to make unbelief good and right, it will be contrary to his intention, and even though the believer wish that faith be not wholesome, painful, and vexatious, it will not be according to his wish and desire. Now we know that an act does not come to be as it really is unless someone produces it as such. For if it could come to be as it really is without a producer who produces it as such, then a thing could come to be as an act without a producer who would have produced it as an act. Since that is impossible, it is certain that it comes to be as it really is only because someone intentionally produces it as such. For if an act could come to be as it really is without someone who intends that, one could not be sure but that all acts are like that, just as, if an act could come to be without an agent, one could not be sure but that all acts are like that.

86. Such being the case, unbelief must have a producer who intentionally produces it as unbelief, vain and bad (5).

(5) The examples of unbelief and belief may tend to obscure the

Since the reward attaches to their works, God is the creator of their works.

83. Q Has God not said « Do you adore what you carve ? » (37 95 93), meaning the idols which they had carved ? Why, then, do you deny that His words « has created you and what you make » mean the idols which they had made ?

A Your supposition is wrong, because the idols really were carved by them, and hence God's words « Do you adore what you carve ? » do refer to the idols. But the wood was not really made by them in such wise that God's words « has created you and what you make » must refer to it.

84. Q Has God not said « it catches up their deceiving » (7 117 114) (4) ? But He did not mean their deception. Why, then, do you deny that His words « has created you and what you make » do not refer to their works ?

A. Their deceiving was the likenesses which they pretended to men were moving serpents, and their deception was their pretending. So by His words « their deceiving » God meant their pretending to men that the likenesses were moving serpents, and their deception was their inducing men to imagine that the thing was contrary to what it really was. The likenesses were the subject of their deceiving and their pretending to men that they were really moving, and it was these which the staff of Moses caught up. But they could not really have made the wood. Hence, by His words « has created you and what you make » God could not have meant the wood, but must have been referring to their works, just as He

(4) It is impossible to give in these notes the context and background of every text mentioned by Ash'ari. The reader may consult the translations, such as those of Bell (English) and of Blachère (French). The reader who knows Arabic will often find it instructive (and sometimes surprising) to consult such commentaries as those of Tabari, Zamakhshari, and Baidawi.

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION OF THE QADAR (1)

52. Q Why do you claim that the acquisitions (2) of creatures are created by God?

A We say that because God has said: « When it is God who has created you and what you make? » (3) (37:96-98), and « as a reward for that they once did » (16:14-15).

(1) I refer the reader in a general way to Watt, *Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam* and to Prof. Thompson's extended commentary on the same in *The Muslim World* XI, 1930: 267 ff. and 276 ff. and to Wensinck's *The Muslim Creed*. For a later Ascarite discussion, *Arabica* 173-232. Averroes has some interesting things to say: *Tenopet* 321-331. For Ma'aruf's *Avant*, I, 77-79, and II, 58-73.

I have retained the Arabic word « *qadar* », which is so intimately bound up with the whole discussion. It conveys the idea « determination ». The main question is: Who determines human acts: God or man? We have already seen that Ascar held that God was all such acts. The present chapter involves not only His determination, but also His creation of such acts (*khaly al-'amal*).

(2) Arabic *akṣab* part of the various terms « *kash* ». Cf. Watt, *Index*, s.v. *kash* (*iktāb*), also his article: *The Origin of the Islamic Doctrine of Acquisition* in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1943, 234-247. The words (noun and verb) are used in the Qur'an, where they seem to be a borrowing from the vocabulary of commerce and are applied to those actions of man for which he deserves reward or punishment, i.e. what we would call his human acts or free acts.

(3) It seems to be the obvious meaning of the verse, despite Ascar's argument. Bacher translates: « ce que vous avez façonné ». However, the Arabic word « *ta'malūn* » contains the ideas of « make » and « do ».

not so, one must not apply that judgment to the invisible. We likewise have no experience of an agent who is not a body, or of a thing which is neither substance nor accident, or of one knowing, powerful, and living who is not such by reason of temporarily produced knowledge and life and power. Yet we must not apply that judgment to the invisible (1). For the agent is not an agent because he is a body, nor is the thing a thing because it is a substance or an accident.

(1.) Yet omitting the notion of "temporarily produced" is not thus, precisely what he has done in his rational proof of the existence of the divine attributes?

knowledge, but seeing is not a defect which finds a locus in what is seen, and therefore seeing need not be denied for the same reason which compels the denial of sleep.

QUESTION

80. Q If the Eternal could be seen, although He is not like other things which are seen, then He could be touched and tasted and smelled, although He is not like other things which are tasted and touched and smelled.

A What is the difference between you and him who says: And if the Eternal could be seeing, knowing, powerful, and living, although He is not like others who are seeing, knowing, powerful, and living, then He could be touching, tasting, and smelling, although He is not like others who are touching, tasting, and smelling? (13) If there be no compulsion to say this, why do you deny that there is no compulsion to say what you have said?

QUESTION

81. Q Have you, then, ever seen anything visible which was not a substance or an accident, limited or inhering in something limited?

A No. But what is visible is not seen because it is limited, or because it inheres in something limited, or because it is a substance, or because it is an accident (14). Since that is

(13) Presumably Ash'ari would deny that God can be touching, tasting and smelling. But his grounds would be more traditionalist than rational. Recall what he said in No. 74.

(14) The adversary would say that what is visible is not such qua accident, but because it is an accident which is color. Ash'ari does not really meet this objection. Indeed, given his basic principle of the utter transcendence of God, it is hard to see how he could do more than take refuge in a kind of nominalistic agnosticism.

another verse that eyes will look at Him, we know that the time of which He says that eyes do not attain to Him is different from the time in which He has revealed to us that they will be looking at Him.

78. (11) Q. Why do you deny that His words « looking at their Lord » mean « looking at the reward of their Lord » ?

A. The reward of God is something distinct from Him, and one may not turn from the literal to the figurative meaning of speech without a convincing reason or proof. Do you not see that when God said « Pray to Me and worship Me », (12) one could not say that He meant some one distinct from Him ? And if one could claim that His words « do not attain to Him » mean that eyes do not attain to something distinct from Him, one could also claim that His words « Pray to Me and worship Me » mean someone distinct from Him. If this be false, so is what they say.

79. Q. If His words « Eyes do not attain to Him » refer to one time rather than another, then why do you deny that His words « Slumber lays not hold of Him, nor sleep » (2:255-256) refer to one time rather than another ?

A. The difference between the two is that He told us in one verse that eyes do not attain to Him, and He said in another verse that faces will look at Him. So we use both verses and say that the meaning therein is that they look at Him at one time and do not attain to Him at another. But He did not tell us in one verse that slumber and sleep lay hold of Him, and in another that they do not lay hold of Him, so that we must apply the verses to different times. Moreover, sleep is a defect which subsists in the sleeper and deprives him of

(11). Compare this paragraph with the discussion in the *Ibāna*, 57-58. There seems to be some confusion of texts but the general argument is clear.

(12). « Worship Me » occurs several times in the Qur'an, but I do not find there the phrase « Pray to Me ».

26 Q Has not God said « And on that day other faces will be frowning, thinking (*) that a misfortune is to be visited upon them » (75.24-25) ? But thinking is not done with the face. Similarly, then, His words « On that day some faces will be bright, looking at their Lord » mean the « look » of the heart.

A Your objection has no force, because thinking is not done with the face, but only with the heart (*). Hence, since He coupled thinking with the mention of the face, it means the thinking of the heart, because thinking is done only with the heart. And if « look » were restricted to the heart, His mentioning it in connection with the face would have to refer to the heart. But since « looking » may be done by the face and in other ways, in coupling it with the mention of the face He must mean by it the « look » of the face, just as, in coupling it with the mention of the heart He would have to mean by it the « look » of the heart.

QUESTION

77. Q Then what is the meaning of His words « Eyes do not attain to Him, but He attains to eyes » (6.103) ? (†)

A They refer to this life and not the next, for the Qur'an does not contradict itself. Hence, since He says in

(8) So Blachère. Bell « One would think », Palmer « They would think ». Bandaw (Cairo ed. 1344), 380, refers it to the owners of the faces — they will be awaiting.

(9) Arabic *qalb* = the heart. It is used frequently where we should use « mind ».

(10) Baquāni has no less than eight answers to this favorable objection of the Mu'tazila. *Iḥṣāf* 161-163. It is interesting to note that one of the answers he suggests is that in the next life man will receive a new « sight » (*ḥasrat*) enduring and imperishable, so that the Enduring God will be seen by the enduring. He also remarks that it has been said that the doctrine cannot be defended save on the score of God's creating a sixth sense for His friends by which they will see Him. One feels that he went further than Ash'ari.

hear Him speaking, since He has already caused Moses to hear Him speaking (6).

75. The proof that God will be seen by eyes is His declaration: « On that day faces will be bright, looking at their Lord. » (75.22-23) (7).

1) His words « looking at their Lord » cannot mean « considering as an example », as in the case of His words « Will they not consider how the camels were created ? » (88.17), because the world to come is not the place for considering examples.

2) Nor can His words mean « feeling sympathy for » or « having mercy on », as in His words « God will have no regard for them » (3.77-71) - i.e. will not have mercy on them or feel sympathy for them - because the Creator cannot be the object of sympathy.

3) Nor can His words mean « expecting ». For when « look » is coupled with the mention of faces, it does not mean the « look » of the heart, which is expectation, just as, if « look » be coupled with the mention of the heart, it does not mean the « look » of the eye. For when a man says « Look with thy heart at this matter » he means the « look » of the heart. Likewise, if he couples « look » with the face, he means only the « look » of the face, and the « look » of the face is the « look » of seeing, which is done by the eye which is in the face.

So it is certain that His words « looking at their Lord » mean « seeing », since they cannot mean any of the other kinds of « look ». For if « look » is limited to four kinds, and three are impossible in the present case, the fourth kind must be certain, namely, the « look » of the seeing of the eye which is in the face.

(6). Various places in the Qur'an. To Moses is applied the epithet « *kalīm Allāh* » — cf. Qur. 4.164-162.

(7). This is the classic proof text. It is also used in *Ibāna*, 56-58, along with other texts.

is not impossible (4). And if it be not impossible, it is predicable of God.

73. O Touching and tasting and smelling involve no affirmation of temporal production or of the temporal production of a quality in the Creator.

A. Some of our associates maintain that touching is one of the kinds of contingencies, and likewise tasting, which is the union of the tongue and uvula with the body which has the taste; and that smelling is the union of the nasal cartilage with what is smelled, at which union the perception of it takes place. And they say that two things which are contiguous are such only because of the temporal production of two contingencies in them. So the affirmation of that would involve the affirmation of the temporal production of a quality in the Creator.

74. And some of our associates say: By his mention of touching and tasting the objector must mean that God produces a perception of Him in these members (5) without producing any quality in Himself, or he must mean the temporal production of a quality in God. If he means the temporal production of a quality in God — why that is something impossible. But if he means the temporal production of a perception in us, that is possible. But the commanding of denomination belongs to God. If He commands us to call it touching and tasting and smelling, we do so, and if He forbids us we forbear. As for hearing, our associates do not differ over it, but all allow its possibility and maintain that the Creator can cause us to

(4) Abstract here agrees the obvious argument which the Muftazila used: what is visible is such because it has color, shape etc. i.e. has accidents. For only accidents, and not substances, are visible. He does, however, touch on this point in No. 81.

(5) i.e. the organs of touch and taste (and smell).

every temporally produced thing is seen — and they hold that to be false. Furthermore, if what is seen were seen because of its temporal production, the seer would be a producer of the seen, since it would be seen because of its temporal production.

70. 2) The Vision involves no affirmation of the temporal production of a quality in what is seen, because colors are seen, though there can be no temporal production of a quality in them ⁽²⁾. Moreover, if what is seen were seen because of the temporal production of a quality in it, that quality would have to be the seeing itself. But this would entail that our seeing a dead man would result in the temporal production of seeing in him, and thus seeing would be united with death, and our seeing the blind man's eye would result in the temporal production of seeing in his eye, and thus seeing would be united with blindness. Since that is impossible, what they say is false.

71. 3) The affirmation of the Vision of God involves no likening the Creator to creatures, and no classing Him under a genus ⁽³⁾, and no essential alteration in Him. For we see black and white without their becoming homogeneous or alike because sight falls on them, and without there being any essential change of black to white, or of white to black, because sight falls on them.

72. 4) The Vision involves no charging God with injustice or oppression or lying. For we see the unjust and the oppressor and the liar, and we see him who is not unjust, not an oppressor, and not a liar.

Therefore, since the affirmation of the Vision involves nothing which cannot be predicated of the Creator, the Vision

(2) Because they are accidents, and an accident cannot itself be the subject of another accident.

(3) So that He would be "like" visible creatures. Recall that Ash'ari denied that God can in any way resemble creatures.

CHAPTER FOUR

DISCUSSION OF THE VISION

68. Q Why do you say that the Vision of God ⁽¹⁾ with the eyes is possible from the standpoint of reason?

A. We say that because what cannot be predicated of the Creator and cannot be true of Him is such because allowing it would involve: 1) the affirmation of His temporal production, 2) or the affirmation of the temporal production of a quality in Him, 3) or likening Him to creatures, or classing Him under a genus, or making some essential alteration in Him, 4) or charging Him with injustice or of pressing on or lying.

69. 1) The allowability of the Vision involves no affirmation of God's temporal production, for what is seen is not seen because it is temporally produced. If that were the reason why it is seen, our opponents would have to hold that

(1) *Ibāna*, 56-60; *Insāf*, 156-171 (a much more developed exposition); *Irshād*, 156-172, *Justo Medio*, 110-126, *Hikm* 3:37; *Nādir*, I, 112-118. The remarks of Wensinck, *MC*, 45-66, need some qualification. The Christian « vision beatifica » seems to be essentially different from the Ash'arite vision of God. In the former there is no question of any ocular vision of God. In Wensinck's quotation from the *Catholic Encyclopedia* the dropping of a few lines has given a meaning quite contrary to that intended. A fine article on the subject is that of Michel, in *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, VII, cc. 2351-2394 — « Intuitive (Vision) ».

A Why do you not take the verse literally and say: No matter how He wished that the fight should not take place, it would not have taken place? And the same query should be addressed to them regarding God's words: « And had thy Lord willed, all on earth would have believed, all of them! » They may say: Had God wished to force them to believe, they would have believed. One should reply: Could they, then, not disbelieve, despite the forcing, just as they were able to believe? How, then, by reason of the forcing, would they have had to believe, since they would have been able to withhold their belief, despite the forcing, just as they were able to believe previously when there was no forcing?

67. Q The existence of what God does not will entails no weakness, just as the existence of what He has not commanded entails no weakness.

A His own acts existed, according to you, without His having commanded them, and weakness did not overtake Him, but had they existed without His having willed them, weakness would have overtaken Him. Similarly, then, the existence of what He did not command from another would not entail His weakness; but the existence of what He did not will from another would prove weakness. Moreover, the existence of what He has not commanded, but has forbidden, and yet He has willed its taking place, does not mean that weakness overtakes Him (19).

(19) Apparently it also means the denial of human freedom and responsibility. Would Asʿari really have admitted this? The question will occur in more pointed form in connection with the doctrine contained in Chapters 5-7.

despite his having previously forbidden them to fornicate such a man is foolish. So judge the same of God, otherwise you are inconsistent.

64. Q If one who is not foolish could will folly, one who is not a liar could lie.

A What is the difference between you and one who says: If one who is not a mere wisher could will what he knows will not be, and one who is not foolish could allow his maidservants and menservants to fornicate one with another, despite his abhorrence of fornication, according to you, and despite his power to prevent it and to separate them, then he who is not a liar could lie. They will find no difference in this! And one should also say to them: Just as one of us who wills folly is foolish, so one of us who wills obedience is obedient. Judge the same, then, regarding the invisible world!

65. That God wills everything which can be willed is also shown by His words: "But you shall not will unless God will" (76:30). Thus He declared that we will only what He wills that we should will. God has also said: "And had thy Lord willed, all on earth would have believed, and of them!" (10:99) And: "And had we willed, we would have given every soul its guidance" (32:13). And: "And had thy Lord willed, they would not have done it" (6:112). And: "And had God willed, they would not have fought, but God does what He will" (2:253-254). Thus He declared that, had He not willed the fight, it would not have taken place, and that what He willed of that, He effected (18).

66. Q. The meaning of "had God willed, they would not have fought" is: Had He wished to prevent their fighting, the fight would not have taken place.

(18) The appeal to the Qur'an in this (and in the closely related question of the *qadar*, Chapter Five) is not in itself conclusive — cf. MC, 51.

respecting the acts of His creatures is not His commanding them, one should say to him: If the denial that God wills the acts of His creatures entails His abhorrence of them, then tell us: Does God will the existence of those acts which are neither acts of disobedience nor acts of obedience? If he replies affirmatively, one should say to him: You must say that they are acts of obedience, for you hold that obedience is obedience to the one obeyed simply because he wills it. But if he answers that God does not will them, one should say to him: Then you must say that God abhors their existence. But this necessitates their being acts of disobedience, because what God abhors is disobedience, just as you hold that what He forbids is disobedience. And one should also say to them: If the denial of willing entails the affirmation of abhorrence, then, if God eternally willed nothing at all, you must maintain that He was eternally abhorrent, since the denial of willing entails the affirmation of abhorrence.

QUESTION

63. One should also say to the Mu'tazila: Why do you claim that only one who is foolish wills folly? They may say: Because among us the willer of folly is foolish. One should reply: And likewise among us one who wills what he knows will not be, or thinks it unlikely that it will not be, is a mere wisher. So judge the same of God, since you claim that He wills the existence of what He knows will not be (''). And one should also say to them: Likewise one who allows his men-servants and maidservants to fornicate one with another in his presence when he is not unable to separate them, despite his abhorrence of fornication, according to your principles, and

created while he was himself a Mu'tazila. A summary of his doctrine will be found in *Tritton*, 141-149.

17) Since according to the adversaries He commands obedience though He knows that some men will disobey

weakness and feebleness. For when something occurs, to the existence of which God was averse, there exists something the existence of which He refused. And if there exists something the existence of which He refused, then it exists regardless of whether God willed it or refused it. This enforces the conclusion that the thing is, regardless of whether God willed it or refused it — which is the very description of weakness.

61. Moreover, the Mutazila entertain two opinions. Some maintain that God's will respecting the acts of His creatures is His commanding them. Others hold that God's will respecting the acts of His creatures imposes no obligation and is not His commanding them. Now he who maintains that God's will is His command is bound, since the Creator does not command the acts of infants and madmen, to maintain that God abhors those acts — if the denial of the willing of creatures acts entails abhorrence of them. But God abhors only disobedience, just as He forbids only disobedience. So if these Mutazila do not hold this to be true of the acts of infants and madmen, what they say is false. Besides, if God's not commanding what can be commanded must mean that He abhors it, those who were contemporaries of the Apostle — since it was possible in his time for God to reveal the prohibition of something "permitted" (15) which is not an act of obedience — would have had to conclude, in the absence of an explicit command of God, that God abhorred the "permitted." But this would enforce the conclusion that everything "permitted" is disobedience.

62. As for him who follows the second opinion — and it is the opinion of al-Jubbā'ī (16) — namely, that God's will

(15) Arabic *al-mabūh* — the permitted, or indifferent, one of the five legal categories. Cf. for example, M. Gaudelrey-Demonbynes, *Muslim Institutions* 69, or Schacht, art. *Sharia*, in *EI* or *Hwb*.

(16) The elder Jubbā'ī, with whom Asa'ari was so long asso-

the result of unmindfulness, it must be the result of weakness and failure to attain his desire. That is so because the reason which enforces the man's weakness and failure to attain his desire, when he knows what proceeds from him but does not will it, is that what he wills does not take place and that he did not will what does take place. For if what he wills takes place, he is not overtaken by weakness or feebleness, but if it does not take place, he is overtaken by feebleness and failure to attain his desire, because A proceeds from him while he knows it but does not will it. So if the reason be what we have mentioned, the same must also be true concerning what proceeds from a second man when the first does not will it. For if the reason why A must be qualified by the contrary of the knowledge of what proceeds from himself is that it proceeds from him without his knowing it, the same must be true of A in relation to what proceeds from B without A's knowing it, since the same reason applies. And the same must be said of willing. Moreover, if something proceeds from B which A does not will, then A has already disapproved of it⁽¹⁴⁾, and if A has disapproved of its existence, then he has refused it. This necessitates that the thing was, regardless of whether A willed it or refused it — which is the very description of weakness and feebleness.

60. Q Why do you deny that all that is required of God in connection with acts of His creatures which He does not will is that He be averse to them, and that this entails neither weakness nor feebleness?

A On the contrary the occurrence of those acts of theirs when God was averse to them would undoubtedly entail

(14) Ash'ari apparently ignores the possibility that A's «not willing» may not be quite the same as «disapproving». I do not know what the full position of the Qadariyya was, but the verbal manoeuvring of Ash'ari seems to leave much to be desired.

Creator does not possess the power to do that which, were He to effect it, creatures would undoubtedly believe (2) For according to the Qadariyya creatures can disbelieve even when signs come down which compel belief, just as they can believe before that happens. And when a man can disbelieve, even when a sign comes down, there is no guarantee that he will not do so. Furthermore, if an act of man could take place, unwilled by the Creator, without the Creator's being thereby overtaken by feebleness or weakness, because He can force the man to do it, then an unwilled act of the Creator Himself could take place without His being thereby overtaken by weakness or failure to attain His desire, because He can make it take place and can create it. If this cannot be, and if the taking place of an unwilled act of God would necessitate His being weak and feeble, the same must be true regarding the acts of His creatures.

59. Q Why do you deny that, although the taking place of an unwilled act of a man must be attributed to the man's unwillfulness or to his weakness and feebleness, that is not necessarily so regarding the taking place of the act of a second man which the first does not will — and that the same must be true of the Eternal?

A The matter is not as you suppose but the story regarding the man's own act and that of another is the same. For when an unwilled act of a man takes place, it must be the result of unwillfulness, or weakness and feebleness, or failure to attain his desire. And the same must be said of a second man's act which the first does not will, for if it is not

with Muʿtazila since they are called by the latter name in № 61. There is a *spanish* article on the Muʿtazila by N. Nyberg in I and III. The reader may also consult the works mentioned in my Introduction.

(13) Ashʿari of course held the contrary. Cf. Chapter Seven *infra*.

and is powerful by a power — for such, among us, do we find him to be who is proved by works of wisdom to be knowing and powerful. Why, then, do you deny that, according to your argument, the works must not prove that the Creator is powerful and knowing? Thus they should be opposed by the argument that the works of wisdom prove that he from whom they proceed is knowing and powerful because he is one who has a knowledge and a power — for that is so among us. (10)

57. Q Why do you deny that the Creator would not be overtaken by weakness, feebleness, and failure to attain His desire, because He can force His creatures to do what He wants them to do?

A According to your principle the Creator wills that creatures should believe only in virtue of an obedience for which they will deserve to be rewarded (11). But if He forced them to believe, according to you they would be neither obedient nor deserving of reward. And just as the taking place of what He did not will would entail weakness, feebleness, and failure to attain His desire, if He did not possess the power to force them to it, so He would have to be qualified by weakness, feebleness, and failure to attain His desire, if He willed its taking place in a way which it would be beyond the scope of His power to effect.

58. Moreover, if he who could believe could also disbelieve, the Qadariyya (12) would be bound to hold that the

(10) This use of the retort is a feature of Ash'ari's dialectic which is often apt to disconcert the reader. But its uncerclusiveness did not seem to bother him.

(11) It is clear that the main issue in this chapter is the relation between the divine will and human acts. I use the phrase «human acts» in opposition to «acts of man» (*actus humani* — *actus hominis*). The former are voluntary, or those which we commonly regard as free, the latter are involuntary.

(12) This is the first time that Ash'arī names his adversaries. Cf. art. Qadariyya, in *El* or *Hwb*. Here the name is doubtless synonymous

Lord of the Worlds is not to be described save in the way which best accords with the attribute « having power »

55. O If one wills a thing and it is, and wills it not and it is not, his « having power » (1) is due only to those who follow and help him, and his weakness is due to the fewness of his helpers and followers. But the Lord of the Worlds cannot be numerically increased by the addition of anyone

A If what you claim be true, why do you deny that one who wills the being of an act of his which in fact will not be and the not-being of one which in fact will be is worthier of the description « having power » than one who wills the being of what will be and the not-being of what will not be? For the former can be described as « having power » only because he is one who can be helped by others in his act. So his « having power » must be due to him who helps him, and his weakness to him who refrains from helping him (2)

56. One should also say to them: Why do you claim that one who wills from us the being of what in fact will be can be described as « having power » only because he is strong by reason of the many who help him, and weak because of the many who refrain from helping him? They may say: Because this is so among us. We reply: Then in like manner the work of wisdom proves that he from whom it proceeds is knowing and powerful only because he is one who knows by a knowledge

(8). Arabic *qūdār*. It may mean « having power », or « being enabled ». It would seem that the objector has the latter meaning in mind. The objection itself appears to be rather fatuous, but we must not be hasty in judging cases like this, where the terms used may have a background (and even a meaning) which we cannot fully appreciate.

(9). This answer is not crystal clear. If the text and my translation are accurate, I suggest the « having power » must be understood in the second sense mentioned in the previous note, i.e. having power because one is enabled, or helped, by another or others.

53. Moreover, if there were in the world something unwilled by God, it would be something to the existence of which He would be averse (6). And if there were something to the existence of which He was averse, it would be something the existence of which He would refuse. This would necessitate the conclusion that ans exist, God willing or God refusing. But this is the description of one who is weak and dominated — and our Lord is very far above that!

54. O — Tell us about the case of a king of this world who passes by a blind and paralyzed cripple and is curled by him, though the king does not wil that the man should curse him; do you hold that in this case the king is overtaken by weakness, feebleness, and failure to attain his desire, since he wils that the man should not curse him, and yet he does curse him?

A — Certainly. And if the paralytics will to curse had not been realized and the king's desire for praise had been fulfilled, that would have all the more forcibly diverted any suspicion of weakness and feebleness on the king's part. But if the king did not wil to be curled by the blind cripple, and if he had warned the latter not to curse him and had refused to allow it (7), and yet the man curled the king without regard for the king's desire or disapproval — why this is the very description of weakness and feebleness. Moreover, when someone wils something from us and it is, and when he does not wil it, it is not, he deserves to be described as « having power » much more than one who wils the being of what wil, not be, and the not-being of what wil be. And the

(6) The completeness of this disjunction is questionable. Ash'ari himself allows that « wiling » may have other connotations besides « aversion ». Here he is probably influenced by his concept of God as sole Creator.

(7) This is an addition to the original objection.

we are agreed are His actions. If one who claims that there is some action of God which He does not know is bound to attribute to God ignorance or one of the contraries of knowledge, do you not see that the same obligation constrains one who claims that there is some action of another which God does not know? Likewise, if one who claims that God announces that there will be some act of His which in fact will not be is bound to attribute lying to God, then one who claims that God announces that there will be some act of another which in fact will not be is also bound to attribute lying to God. In this respect there is no difference between what we are agreed is God's act and that which proceeds from another. Similarly, then, if the taking place of an act of His which the Creator does not will would necessitate His weakness and failure to attain His desire or His unmindfulness and neglect, the same would be necessitated by the taking place of another's act unwilled by Him.

52. Furthermore, it has already been proved that all temporally produced things are created by God (). Hence, if the Creator cannot do what He does not will, there cannot proceed from another what He does not will — since all the things which proceed from others are acts of God.

(5) Strictly speaking Ash'ari has not proved this in this work. He holds, of course, that God is the Creator of everything outside Himself and, as he goes on to say, that everything which proceeds from creatures is an act of God, i.e. God's doing. For an explicit discussion of God as sole Creator, cf. *Insāf* 12: 139. We must remember that the *ʿAṣmāʾ* is not intended as a thorough discussion of every single point of doctrine. It is so worth remarking that Ash'ari's adversaries may not always have had precisely the same understanding of a given term as he had. An example of this is the term « creation » (*khalq*), particularly as applied to human acts — cf. Wolf, 84, and n. 113. One also thinks of the rather absurd verbal rigidity involved in the Ash'arite rejection of the Christians' predicating « substance » of God — cf. *Tamhīd*, 78 21-81, 7.

create what He does not will. God Himself has said «Effective doer of what He wills » (85 16 and 11 107 109). Furthermore, there cannot be in God's dominion anything which He does not will. For if there were in God's dominion something not willed by Him, one of two things would have to follow: either the affirmation of unmindfulness and neglect, or the affirmation of weakness, impotence, feebleness, and failure to attain His desire. Since such things cannot be said of God, there cannot be in His dominion anything which He does not will.

50. Q. And why do you claim that?

A. If what is willed takes place, he whose desire (1) takes place is not overtaken by weakness or by failure to attain his desire because of the occurrence of the thing willed. But if what a man wills does not take place, he must be overtaken by weakness and failure to attain his desire. Do you not see that when what a man knows takes place he is not overtaken by ignorance or by one of the contraries of his knowledge of that thing, since it takes place and he knows it? This proves that if the thing does not take place, and he does not know it, he must be ignorant or qualified by some contrary of knowledge. Similarly, if what he wills takes place, he must not be qualified by unmindfulness, or weakness, or feebleness, or failure to attain his desire; but if something which he does not will takes place, he must be qualified by unmindfulness, or weakness, or feebleness, or failure to attain his desire.

51. Moreover, if the taking place of what God does not will of those actions of His which we are agreed are His actions would necessitate unmindfulness, neglect, weakness, feebleness, and failure to attain His desire, then, when there takes place some action of another which He does not will He must be bound by the same necessity as that which would arise from the unwilled taking place of one of those actions which

(1) Arabic: *marâd* — i.e. «willed», or «the thing willed»

CHAPTER THREE

DISCUSSION OF THE DIVINE WILLING AND ITS EMBRACING ALL TEMPORALLY PRODUCED THINGS ⁽¹⁾

49. Q Why do you maintain that God wills everything which can be willed ? ⁽²⁾

A We maintain this because the divine willing, being one of God's essential attributes, as we have already proved, must embrace everything which can truly be willed, just as the divine knowledge, being one of God's essential attributes, must embrace everything which can truly be known ⁽³⁾ Moreover, it has already been proved that God is the creator of everything which begins to be and He cannot

(1) *Ibāna*, (Klein) 100-106 ; *Inṣāf*, 139-149 , *Irshād*, 216-232 , *Fyṣṣe*, 33-35. This question of the divine will is bound up with the questions to be discussed in Chapters 5-7 of the *Luma'*. The adversaries (Mu'tazila) denied that God could will evil or folly.

(2) The question must be understood as referring, not to every thing which can be willed but to those things which can be and de facto are willed.

(3) The parallel must be understood in the sense indicated in the previous note. While God actually knows everything knowable, He does not actually will everything which He can will, but every thing that is willed, is willed by Him. Perhaps it is this distinction which Ash'ari means to express by the phrase *alā haqīqa* which I have translated by 'truly', it could also be 'really', 'in reality', or even 'as it really is', if *'alā haqīqatuhu* is the better reading.

of such a comparison, i. e. that God produces His speech in another just as He produces His act, favor, bounty and benefit in another.

47. Q. May not God produce writing in another, and yet the thing in which the writing subsists will not be writing? (22)

A. If God produces in another a necessary writing, that other's writing is of necessity, and similarly, if the writing be an acquisition, that other is writing by acquisition. So if God were to produce His speech in another, that other would have to be speaking by the speech of God.

48. This proof of the eternity of God's speech is also the proof of the eternity of God's willing. For if His willing were temporally produced, it would have to be produced by God either in Himself, or in another, or is self-subsistent. But God cannot produce it in Himself, because He is not a substrate for produced things, and He cannot produce it as self-subsistent, because it is an attribute, and an attribute cannot subsist in itself — just as God cannot produce a knowledge and a power subsisting in themselves, and He cannot produce it in another, because this would make it necessary for that other to be willing by God's willing. Therefore, since it is impossible to allow these alternatives of which one would have to be realized — God's willing were temporally produced — it is certain that God's willing is eternal, and that by it God has ever been willing.

no, therefore beautiful but powerful. Another suggestion: read * when God created His speech (kalāmahu) in another.*

[22]. There seems to be some confusion here between writing as an act and writing as something written.

quality were its being « prohibition », that body would have to be « prohibiting ». Hence, since another cannot speak by God's speech, or command by His commanding, or prohibit by His prohibiting, God cannot produce speech in another in such wise that He Himself would be speaking thereby. Therefore, since it is impossible to allow the alternatives of which one would have to be realized if God's speech were temporally produced, it is certain that God's speech is eternal, and that by it God has ever been speaking.

46. Q May not God produce in another an act, a favor, a bounty, a benefit, and a sustenance, so that He Himself is thereby acting, generous, bountiful, benefiting, and sustaining? Why, then, do you deny that He may produce in another a speech by which He Himself would be speaking?

A. If this were binding, then God would have to know and be powerful by the knowledge and power which He produces in another, just as He is generous and gracious and bountiful by what He produces in another as favor and bounty and benefit and sustenance. So if this be not binding, neither is your assertion. Moreover, when God produces in another a favor, bounty, act, benefit, and sustenance, that body is qualified by the most distinctive quality of the act, generosity, sustenance, bounty, and benefit. For if the favor, bounty, benefit, and act be « power », that body must be « powerful », and the same would be true if it were knowledge, or life, or willing, or hearing, or seeing. So when God created speech in another, that other would have to derive a name from the most distinctive quality of the speech. But since that is impossible, (21) it is false for you to make speech the object

(21) What is impossible? Not what he has just said, though the text seems to give that impression. If the text is to be retained as it is, I presume that Ash'ari really has in mind the impossibility of the comparison instituted by the objector: God is called *bountiful*, when He bestows a bounty, e.g. power. But the recipient of the bounty is

its contrary. We reply: Then say that one who has power over speech and its contrary may be devoid of both, but not devoid of another speech or its contrary over which he has no power.¹

45. Another proof that God has been eternally speaking is that speech must be either eternal or temporally produced. So if God's speech be temporally produced, then God produces it either in Himself, or as self-subsistent, (18), or in another. But God cannot produce it in Himself, because He is not a substrate (19) for produced things. And He cannot produce it as self-subsistent, because it is an attribute, and an attribute cannot subsist in itself. And He cannot produce it in another, for if He were to produce it in another, the body containing the speech would have to derive from the most distinctive quality of the speech a name for the speech itself and a name for the whole to which the locus (20) of the speech would belong. So if the most distinctive quality of the speech were its being «speech», that body would have to be «speaking» and if its most distinctive quality were its being «command», that body would have to be «commanding», and similarly, if its most distinctive

(18) Arabic *qā'imun minfayn* which seems to be the equivalent of the scholastic «per se status». The disjunction is complete if one assumes that God is speaking. From the rational standpoint the conclusion is that God has to «speak» at all. Ash'ari is prepared to explain this precisely the nature of a divine attribute, and the nature of the distinction between God's essence and His attributes. If the latter is a mystery to be accepted on faith, it must be shown that the mystery has been revealed and is not a mere *voicing* to the demands of a questionable analogy.

(19) Arabic *muhall*. Perhaps «substrate» is too technical a translation. The ordinary meaning «place» might do, or, even better, «subject». Literally *muhall* is a place where a person or thing descends.

(20) Also *muhall*. The argument may seem a bit involved but is simply this: If speech is found in A, then only A can be said to be «speaking» by that speech, and one cannot say that God is speaking thereby.

A When you say that if He has not been moving something He has been keeping something at rest you must mean one of two things. Either you mean: If He has not been eternally moving Himself, He has been eternally keeping Himself at rest. Or you mean: If He has not been keeping some body in motion, He has been keeping it at rest. Now if you mean: If He has not been keeping Himself in motion, He has been keeping Himself at rest, why this is an error, because God cannot move Himself. And we did not say that if one does not speak who cannot speak, he is qualified by some contrary of speech. On the other hand, if you mean: If he has not been eternally keeping some body in motion, He has been eternally keeping it at rest, why no bodies eternally coexisted with God so that, if He were not keeping them in motion, He must have been keeping them at rest. What did not exist could not move. So if He did not move what could not move, He did not have to be keeping it at rest.

QUESTION

44. Q One of us who has the power to speak may be devoid both of speech and of its contraries etc., while he has the power to speak.

A This is something with which we cannot agree. For one of us who has the power to speak, at the very moment that he has this power, is speaking, no doubt about it.* We shall prove that further on in this book (1). However, we now say to this objector: Why do you deny that one who has the power to know may be devoid both of knowledge and of its contraries? He may say: One who has the power to know may be devoid of the knowledge and the contrary over which he has power and still not be devoid of another knowledge or

(17) He refers to the discussion of the « capacity » in Chapter S x

A. Generosity is something which the generous one is free to exercise or not. But miserliness is bad only when the miser denies a claim which he ought to acknowledge.⁽¹⁾ The Creator, however, is not bound to do anything.

42. Q. Then the denial that God has been ever just necessitates His having been ever unjust or impotent.

A. The denial of justice does not necessitate a contrary which is impotence or injustice, for there is no genus of justice which God cannot effect in us along with impotence. So the denial of justice does not necessitate the affirmation of a contrary which is impotence. Nor does it necessitate the affirmation of injustice, because a man may not be just, when there proceeds from him no justice acquired or effected by him, and yet not be unjust. Hence, of him of whom we deny justice we do not affirm a contrary which is injustice or impotence—since we may deny it of ourselves without affirming a contrary which is impotence or injustice. But if one who is living, among us or others, is not knowing, he is qualified by some contrary of knowledge. Moreover, a man may not be just, and yet not be unjust by reason of some injustice belonging to the genus of the justice. So the denial of justice does not necessitate a contrary which is injustice with the same necessity that is present in the case of speech and willing. For a man may be just by being in a place, if God has commanded him to be in it, and at another time he may be unjust by being in that place, if God has forbidden him to be there. In such a case the justice would be owing to the genus of the injustice, because being in a place belongs to the genus of being in it.

43. Q. If the Creator has not been eternally moving something, why do you deny that He has been eternally keeping something at rest?

(16) The Arabic word usually translated by 'miserliness' also means 'refusing something to another', cf. SDA, s.v. *bakha'a*.

motion to take place in my body (14) Do you not see that, if it be impossible for me to effect knowledge in myself when I am dead, it is also impossible for my Lord to effect knowledge in me when I am dead? Hence, since impotence is not contrary to acting, but only to power, and since omitting a thing is doing its contrary, (15) even though the Creator was not ever effecting anything in any way, the denial of His having been ever acting does not necessitate His having been ever impotent or omitting to act.

39. Moreover, if one who is living be not-speaking and not-willing, he must be qualified by some contrary of willing and speech, but if he be not-acting, it is not necessary to affirm a contrary which is impotence or omitting to act, since the man's impotence is not contrary to his acting. So the denial that God has been ever acting does not necessitate the affirmation of an omitting to act or an impotence in the same way that the denial of His having been ever speaking and willing necessitates the affirmation of their contraries.

40. Q. Then the denial that God has been ever moving necessitates His having been ever quiescent

A. If God were once capable of moving, the denial of His motion would certainly necessitate His being quiescent just as the denial of His having been ever speaking and willing necessitates the affirmation of their contraries — since He is one for whom speech and willing are not impossible

41. Q. Then the denial that God has been ever generous necessitates His having been ever miserly.

(14) i.e. so long as I am impotent with respect to motion. But, in thus dealing with accidents it would seem that Aristotle lays himself open to the charge that God's «acting» is also an accident.

(15) This definition of «omitting a thing» seems rather arbitrary. It would be verified in the world of accidents: e.g. if fire is not moving it is quiescent, and if it is not white it is some other color, etc. But there is no place in God for accidents.

trary which is not willing⁽¹¹⁾. So if the Creator were living, but not-speaking and not-willing, He would have to be qualified by the contrary of speech and willing. But acting has no contrary which is not-acting, so that the denial of the agent's being acting would necessitate the existing of its contrary. For if something existing is not temporarily produced, it is eternal, and the eternal is not contrary to produced things⁽¹²⁾. Hence since acting has no contrary which is not-acting, the denial of God's having been ever acting does not necessitate the affirmation of a contrary. But since speech has a contrary which is not speech, the denial of God's having been ever speaking does undoubtedly necessitate affirming that contrary of Him.

35. Q. If the Eternal had been ever not-acting, He must have been either impotent or omitting to act.

A. Impotence is not contrary to acting. For there is no genus of acting — be it motion, rest, or some other accident — which God can not create along with impotence⁽¹³⁾. By that, therefore, we know that impotence is not contrary to acting, because bodies and atoms are among the things produced by the acts of God. We know, then, that impotence is not contrary to acting; for if my impotence were contrary to my effecting motion, it would be contrary to my Lord's causing

(11) e. g. aversion, inadvertence, etc.

(12) Perhaps the point here is that God's «acting» is the production of something in time, i.e. something *mubdath* (cf. n. 3, Ch. I). Since the *mubdath* is temporal, God's «acting» is also temporal, and so can have no contrary in God, who is eternal. Ash'ari seems to have held that God's active attributes (those concerned with His operations ad extra like creation, sustenance, etc.) were qualitative & temporal, and denotatively eternal. Thus, God was eternally «creator» but not eternally «creating» just as a weaver is a weaver even when he is not actually weaving. Cf. *at-Raṣāʾil al-Balaghā*, Hyderabad, 1322, pp. 39 ff.

(13) Not of course, with regard to the same accident — i.e. a body could not be simultaneously moving and unable to move. The pertinence of this is open to question.

allows one of the two things in the invisible world must be like one who allows the other.

36. This is also the proof that God has ever been willing. For if one who is living wills nothing whatever, he must be qualified by one of the contraries of willing, namely such defects as numbness, aversion, and so forth, just as, if one who is living knows nothing at all, he must be qualified by one of the contraries of knowledge, namely such defects as ignorance, innumbness, neglect, death, and similar defects. Now it is impossible for the Creator to have ever been qualified by some contrary of willing, because this would have necessitated His never willing anything in any way whatever. This is so because, had the Creator ever been qualified by some contrary of willing, the latter would have had to be eternal — and it is impossible for the eternal to cease to exist, just as it is impossible for it to begin to exist. So the impossibility of the contrary's non-existence would have necessitated the Creator's never willing or intending to make anything in any way whatever — which is false. And if that be false, it is true and certain that the Creator has ever been willing.

37. (9) Q. Why do you say that one who has ever been not-speaking and not-willing must be qualified by some contrary of willing and speech, provided he be one for whom speech and willing are not impossible? And why, then, do you deny that one who has ever been not-acting must be qualified by the contrary of acting and must ever have been omitting to act?

A. Your objection is not compelling. For speech has a contrary which is not speech, (10) and willing has a con-

(9) In Nos 37-44 Ash'ari answers various objections which claim to be based on his own principle, the absence of a perfection in a subject capable of that perfection necessitates the presence of some contrary of that perfection.

(10) e. g. silence, dumbness, etc.

nor qualified by some contrary of knowledge, and that a man cannot be living and neither speaking nor qualified by some contrary of speech, and that there is no sound proof of that in the invisible world. So if one of the two were possible, namely a living man who is neither speaking nor qualified by some contrary of speech, then the other would be possible, namely a living man who is neither knowing nor qualified by some contrary of knowledge.

85. Moreover it is impossible for a human knower to be qualified by a contrary of knowledge so long as he knows, or for a human speaker to be qualified by a contrary of speech so long as he speaks. Since both these cases are equally impossible, he who allows, in the invisible world, a speaker qualified by some contrary of speech at the same time that he is speaking must be like one who allows, in the invisible world, a knower qualified by some contrary of knowledge at the same time that he knows. Similarly, then, since the impossibility of there being a living man who is neither knowing nor qualified by some contrary of knowledge compels us to acknowledge the impossibility of there being a living man who is neither speaking nor qualified by some contrary of speech the same impossibility must apply to the invisible world. (7) So, in, way

(8) The obvious retort is that a living man has the organs of speech (tongue, mouth, larynx, etc.), whereas God has none of these material things. But the matter is not as simple as that. Ash'ari held firmly that God has two hands, two eyes, and a face. But *ʿl-lāh* without asking how (Maqālāt Creed 8-10). So he might have applied the same formula to the present case. Or his answer might have been based on his concept of «speech». Al-Juwaynī says the Ash'ari defined speech as «that which entails that its source (*qābil*) be speaking» (*Irshād*, 10). Al-Juwaynī himself prefers the definition «the saying (*al-qawf*) residing in the soul which is indicated by means of expressions and conventional signs». This is almost the same as Baqir's definition, *Irshād* 34-11. If it is possible that Ash'ari himself had some such notion of *kalām nafsī*

33. Here is an analogical ⁽⁶⁾ proof that God has ever been speaking. Had God ever been not speaking — and He is one for whom speech is not impossible — He would have been qualified by one of the contraries of speech, such as silence or some ailment. And if He had ever been qualified by a contrary of speech, that contrary of speech would have been eternal. And if that contrary of speech had been eternal, it would have been impossible for it to cease to exist and for the Creator to speak; for the eternal cannot cease to exist, just as it cannot begin to exist. So the Creator would have had to be not-speaking, not-commanding, and not-prohibiting in any way whatever. Now both they and we hold this to be false. So if this be false, it is true and certain that the Creator has ever been speaking and saying.

34. Q And why do you claim that if the Creator had ever been not-speaking He would have been qualified by some contrary of speech?

A. One who is living, if he be not qualified by speech, is qualified by its contrary, just as, if he be not qualified by knowledge, he is qualified by its contrary. That is so because among us one who is living is always such, and there is no sound proof that the invisible world ⁽⁷⁾ contains anyone who is living and at the same time devoid both of speech and of its contraries, just as there is no sound proof of anyone living who is devoid both of knowledge and of its contraries so that he can be described neither as knowing nor by some contrary of knowledge. The same features are common to both cases — that a man cannot be living and neither knowing

(6) Arabic *mā al-qiyās*. *Qiyās* means comparison or analogy, the reasoning and syllogism. In Ash'ari it is *shibā* a *raisonnement à deux termes* — cf. GAI, 358-363, and 365-7.

(7) Arabic *al-ghuṣb* — the absent, remote, hidden, i.e. what does not fall under our direct experience and perception. It is opposed to *fiṣṣa būriyā*, and to *al-shāhid wa'l-wajūd*.

Q. Then why do you deny that the words « that we say to it 'Be!' » mean « that we create it, and it is » ?

A. The difference therein is that an inert thing cannot will so long as it retains its inertness, whereas it is not impossible for the Creator really to will or to speak. Therefore His words « that we say to it 'Be!' and it is » do not mean that He creates it. Moreover, if His words « that we say to it » did not mean the affirmation of His speaking to the thing but signified only that He creates it, just as His words « a wall threatening to collapse » mean that it was about to collapse, then it could be claimed that God's words « we will a thing » mean « we make it » and that He does not really will its making, just as His words « a wall threatening to collapse » mean that it was about to collapse. In fact this accords even better with the real meaning of the comparison. So if this be not necessary, neither is what you have said.

31. One should also say to them: Let us suppose that God's willing the making of a thing means that He makes it, and that His willing the movement of a thing means that He moves it. Why, then, do you deny that the inert thing really wills its own movement in the sense that it is moving? And why deny that the Creator is not superior to the inert thing in willing, and that He is not superior to one whose act takes place without his willing it? For the latter acquires the quality of « acting » just as the Creator does.

32. Q. What, then, is the meaning of God's words « They replied: We are coming obediently » (41:11-10)?

A. They mean that the two of them really said « We are coming obediently. » (5)

(5) This seems to contradict the principle which he follows in No 30. But there may have been some special reason for this devotion to the letter in what seems clearly to be a figurative expression.

created. Moreover, if God could speak to His own speech, He could also will His own willing — a thing which both we and they hold to be false. And if this be false, it cannot be that the Qur'an is created.

28. Q Why do you deny that God's words «that we say to it 'Be'», and it is «mean that He creates the thing and it is, and not that He actually says anything to it»?

A. God said: «When we will a thing our only utterance is that we say to it 'Be', and it is». Now if one could maintain that God does not really say to a thing «Be», and that His words mean only that He creates the thing, and it is, then another could claim that God does not really will a thing, and that «we will a thing» means only «we make a thing» without any implication of real willing.

29. Q The meaning of God's willing the thing is that He makes it. (1) Thus He really wills it in the sense that He makes it.

A. If the speaker may say this, then someone else may claim that God really says «Be!» to the thing and that this means that He creates it. Thus he would affirm of God a real speech which would be the «spoken to», just as you claim that God has a real willing which is the thing He wills. And if one may claim this, another may say that God's knowledge of the thing is His making of it.

30. Q Has God not said «a wall threatening (1) to collapse» (18:77-76)? Now the wall really had no will, but God said «threatening» in a wide sense, the meaning being that the wall was about to collapse.

A. That is so.

(3) *Nūr*, II, 91

(4) Arabic *yaridu* — which verb means «to will»

CHAPTER TWO

DISCUSSION OF THE QUR'AN AND THE DIVINE WILL

27. Q Why do you hold that God has been ever speaking and that the speech of God is uncreated? (1)

A We hold that because God has said "When we will a thing our only utterance is that we say to it 'Be!', and it is" (16:40-42). So if the Qur'an had been created, God would have said to it "Be!". But the Qur'an is His speech, and it is impossible that His speech be spoken to. For this would necessitate a second speech, and we should have to say of this second speech and its relation to a third speech what we say of the first speech and its relation to a second speech. But this would necessitate speeches without end, which is false. (2) And if this be false, it is false that the Qur'an is

(1) This chapter is chiefly concerned with the famous question, *Is the Qur'an the created or the uncreated speech of God?* Here are a few references: *Istisād*, 98-129; *Jawāb Maḥmūd*, 182-193; *Taḥqīq*, 243-7; *Hawā*, 258; *Nadwī*, I, 103-111. *Wadī*, *Early Discussions about the Qur'an* (The Muslim World, XL (1960) 27-30, and 96-105; *Patton*, *Aḥmad ibn Hanbal and the Miḥna*, Leyden, 1897.

(2) The impossibility of such an antecedently eternal series seems to have been accepted by Ash'ari on Qur'anic grounds: cf. *Risāla*, N° 16. But there is a suggestion of a more philosophical reason at the end of N° 13 of the *Risāla*. It does not seem to have occurred to Ash'ari that one might distinguish (rationally) between an antecedently infinite series of finite causes with no Uncreated Cause, and an antecedently infinite series of created beings.

knowing by Himself, He Himself would have to be knowledge. For if one said that God is knowing by a quality distinct from Himself, he would have to say that this quality is knowledge. But knowledge cannot be knowing, nor can the knower be knowledge, nor can God be identified with His attributes. Do you not see that the way in which one knows that knowledge is knowledge is that by it the knower knows? For the power of man, by which he does not know, cannot be knowledge. Hence, since the Creator cannot be knowledge, He cannot be knowing by Himself. And if that be impossible, it is certain that He is knowing by a knowledge which cannot be Himself.

26. Q. Why do you deny that the Creator is knowing neither by Himself nor by a quality which cannot be Himself? (22)

A. If this were possible, it would be possible for our saying « knowing » to refer neither to Himself nor to a quality, and by it there would be no affirmation either of Himself or of a quality which cannot be Himself. Since this is impossible, what they say is false.

This proof also proves the affirmation of all God's essential attributes, such as life, power, hearing, sight, and the other essential attributes.

(22) This question may involve the distinction mentioned in *Nūṭ*, I, 38-9. Abū'l-Hudhail and the Mu'tazilites were careful to say « God is knowing by His essence, not by a knowledge », and not « God is knowing by a knowledge which is His essence ». Otherwise it would seem to represent the view of anti-kalamists (Hanbalites?) who were ready to cry a pox on both houses Ash'arism and Mu'tazilism.

of knowledge and not because of « otherness » or temporal production. So the proof that the knower is knowing must also be a proof of knowledge. ⁽¹⁸⁾ Knowledge is not knowledge because it is distinct from the knower or because it is temporally produced by reason of the existence of something distinct which is not knowledge and of a producer who is not knowledgeable. Hence the proof that knowledge's knowledge need not be a proof that it is temporally produced or that it is distinct from the knower. ⁽¹⁹⁾ Moreover, if one may claim that the proof that knowledge is knowledge is also a proof of its temporal production, or a proof that it is distinct from the knower, then another may claim that the proof that the knower is knowing is also a proof of his temporal production and of his being distinct in his essence. ⁽²⁰⁾

23. The proof that God has a power and a life's like the proof that God has a knowledge

24. God has said « He has sent it down with His ⁽²¹⁾ knowledge » (4:166/164), and « No female conceives or bears save with His knowledge » (35:11-12). Thus God affirmed knowledge of Himself. And God has said « Did they then not see that God, Who created them, is far more powerful than them ? » (41:15-14). Thus He affirmed power of Himself.

25. Among the proofs that God is knowing by a knowledge is the fact that He must be knowing either by Himself or by a knowledge which cannot be Himself. Now if He were

(18) Ash'ari seems to beg the question here. Surely the Mu'tazila would disallow a proof of knowledge which is not the one knowing — in the case of man, yes; in the case of God, no.

(19) We must remember that Ash'ari is trying to maintain the two elements of his doctrine — which seemingly are contradictory.

(20) This last phrase is not very clear to me. Perhaps it is only a dialectical exaggeration.

(21) The phrase may also be translated: « with knowledge of Himself ». So Bell.

things can be somehow separate from the other. Hence, since there is solid proof of the eternity both of the Creator and of His knowledge, it is impossible for them to be two distinct things. Furthermore, if one could claim that the work of wisdom proves that the knower is knowing and his knowledge is known subsequently, another could claim that the work of wisdom proves that the knowledge is knowledge and it is known to belong to a knower subsequently. If this be impossible — and the two assertions are equal — the proof that the knower is knowing must also be a proof of knowledge.

21. Objection: The work of wisdom proves the knowledge of the knower only because he is one subject to death and ignorance. (17)

A. If one may say this, then one may also claim that the work of wisdom proves that the knower is knowing because he is one who may die and be ignorant.

22. The assertion that the work of wisdom's proof of the knowledge of a human knower is a proof that the knowledge is distinct from the knower and that it is temporally produced is also refuted by the fact that the knower is knowing because

doctrine of the divine attributes was summed up: "They are not God and they are not other than God." Cf. *Irshād*, 137 — (And among God's names are some which are not to be credited with Him, and yet are not distinct from Him, i.e. every designation which characterizes an eternal attribute e.g. the Knowing and the Powerful). Averroes found this doctrine as distasteful as that of the Trinity — *The longer* 210 and *The shorter and better* 206, ed. Boeniges, 1620-4 ff.

(17) The Māzharis held that to predicate knowledge of God is simply to deny that He is ignorant. This objection, then, seems to mean that a work of wisdom proves that its agent has a knowledge only in the case of an agent subject to accidents such as death and (acquired) knowledge. But since God is His own knowledge and life, His wise works can not be a proof of His having a knowledge which is distinct from Him. If this be the real meaning of the difficulty, Ash'ari's retort is not very convincing.

way that they prove him to be knowing? For the meaning of his being knowing is not that he has knowledge because the knowing man may be known to be knowing by one who does not know that he has knowledge.

A If you may make this claim, then another may claim that works of wisdom prove that I have knowledge of of them, but do not prove that I am knowing. For the meaning of knowing is not that one has knowledge, since a man may be known to have knowledge by one who does not know him to be knowing. Tit for tat! However I hold the questioner's allegation to be false because I hold that one's being knowing means that he has knowledge. Thus one who does not know that Zaid has knowledge does not know that Zaid is knowing.

20. Q Why do you deny that the work of wisdom proves that a man has a knowledge which is distinct from him, inasmuch as you maintain that it proves a knowledge?

A Granted that the work of wisdom proves that a man has knowledge, it does not therefore prove that the knowledge is distinct from him, just as, though it proves that the man is knowing, it does not prove that he is in any way distinct ⁽¹⁶⁾ Moreover « otherness » means that one of two

(16) This seems to be a correct translation though the reader may ask: Distinct from what? The answer, I think, is: Distinct from everything, i.e. a separate entity in himself. The argument is a bit involved but all that Ash'ari seems to mean is: The existence of wisdom in a work is proof that he who made the work has knowledge, but it is not in itself, a proof that his knowledge is distinct from him. The latter is a further inference. In the case of God, according to Ash'ari, such an inference is simply impossible, since it would destroy the divine unity. In man knowledge is an accident, but God's knowledge cannot be an accident. On the other hand — and this creates the real difficulty — Ash'ari did not hold that the divine knowledge is identified with the divine essence, that God is His knowledge. This is explicitly denied in N° 23. In the *Lumā'*, then, we find both elements of the classic phrase in which Ash'ari's

been eternal, it would have been impossible for Him ever to be powerful and for acts to proceed from Him. Likewise, had God been ever living, but not hearing and seeing, He would have been ever qualified by some contrary of hearing such as deafness and other ailments, and by some contrary of sight such as blindness and other ailments. But it is impossible for the Creator to be subject to ailments because they are among the characteristics of temporal production. So what we have said proves that God has always been knowing, powerful, seeing and hearing.

QUESTION

18. Q Why do you say that the Creator has a knowledge by which He knows? ⁽¹⁵⁾

A Just as works of wisdom do not proceed from one of us unless he be knowing, so also they do not proceed from one of us unless he have knowledge. If the works did not prove the knowledge of the man from whom they proceed, then they would not prove that the man from whom they proceed is knowing. Consequently, if works proved that the Creator is knowing by analogy with their proving that we are knowing, but did not prove that the Creator has knowledge by analogy with their proving that we have knowledge, it would be allowable for someone to claim that works prove our knowledge, but do not prove that we are knowing. If this be impossible, the assertion of this speaker is also impossible.

19. Q Why do you deny that works of wisdom do not prove the knowledge of the man who is knowing in the same

(15) In this number and the rest of the chapter Ash'ari seeks to prove that God has a knowledge, a power, a life, a hearing, and a sight, i.e. that He is not only knowing, but knowing by a knowledge, etc. The necessity of such proof seems to be dictated by such texts as are quoted in No 24.

Q'ESTION

16. Q Do you maintain that God has always been knowing, powerful, hearing and seeing? ⁽¹⁴⁾

A. So we maintain

Q. What is the proof of that?

A. The proof of that is that one who is living, if he be not knowing, is qualified by some contrary of knowledge such as ignorance, doubt or other defects. So if the Creator had been ever living, but unknowing, He would have been qualified by some contrary of knowledge such as ignorance, doubt or other defects. But if He had been ever qualified by some contrary of knowledge, it would have been impossible for Him ever to know. For if the contrary of knowledge had been eternal, it would have been impossible for it to cease to be, and if it had been impossible for it to cease to be, it would have been impossible for Him to have made works of wisdom. Hence, since God has made such works, and since they prove that He is knowing, it is true and certain that God has always been knowing, since it is clearly impossible for Him to have been ever qualified by some contrary of knowledge.

17. Similarly, had God been ever living, but not powerful, He would necessarily have been ever impotent, ever qualified by some contrary of power. And had His impotence

and the different kinds of predication. It is also noteworthy that, even though he is opposed in principle to the application to God of conclusions based on human experience, when Ash'ari seeks to rationalize his own dogmatic position he falls back on just such conclusions. This will be clearer in No. 34-5, where he proves the principle on which his argument for the existence of the divine attributes is based.

(14) In this and the following number Ash'ari sets himself to prove the antecedent eternity of the five divine attributes under discussion. He has not proved explicitly that God Himself is eternal. But we must remember that this work is not a detailed examination of all the points involved in Ash'ari's dogmatic position.

the life arranged in him by God, and his hearing and sight, and the ways in which food and drink are distributed in him, and his perfection and completeness, and when we behold the firmament with its sun, its moon, its stars, and their courses, we see in that proof that the maker of what we have mentioned could not have made it without knowing its mode and nature. Besides, if works of wisdom could be produced by one who is not knowing, we could not know but that perhaps all the determinations, dispositions and works which proceed from living beings proceed from them while they are unknowing. The impossibility of that proves that well-made works can be produced only by one who is knowing.

14. It is likewise true that works can be produced only by one who is powerful and living. For if they could be produced by one who is not powerful and not living, we should not know but that perhaps all the things which proceed from men proceed from them while they are powerless and dead. Since that is impossible, the works prove that God is living and powerful.

QUESTION

15. Q Why do you say that God is hearing and seeing?

A. One who is living, if he be not qualified by some defect which prevents his perceiving audible and visible things when these exist, must be hearing and seeing. Therefore, since God is living, and since He cannot be subject to such ailments as deafness, blindness, and so forth — for ailments prove the temporal production of him who is subject to them — it is certain that God is hearing and seeing. ⁽¹³⁾

(13. Ash'ari's acceptance of the epithets applied to God in the Qur'an seems to be very literal indeed. There is no suggestion, as I have already mentioned, of an awareness of the analogy of being

Why do you deny that God is long, broad, and united? — or he must mean calling God a body, even though He be not long, broad, united, and deep. (11) Now if he means: Why do you deny that He is long, broad, and united? — as that is said of the bodies of which we have experience — why this is impossible, because the united is not one thing. For the numerically least of unions is that of two things, since the thing which is one cannot be united to itself. But we have shown above that God is one thing. Hence it would be false to say that He is united. On the other hand if the speaker means: Why do you not call God a body, even though He be not long, broad, and united? — why it is not for us to assign names, and we may not call God by a name which He has not applied to Himself and which has not been applied to Him by His Apostle and on which, and the meaning of which, there is no consensus of the Muslims.

QUESTION

13. Q. Why do you say that God is knowing? (12)

A. Well-made works can be wisely ordered only by one who is knowing. That is clear from the fact that a man who lacks skill and knowledge cannot weave patterned brocade or execute fine points of craftsmanship. So when we behold in man an embodiment of wise organization, such as

(11) The minimum number of atoms required to constitute a body was disputed, but the essential note of a body was union or composition (*taḥṭif*) — cf. *Tamhid* 41 16 ff. On «atomism» the reader may consult: S. Pinx, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomlehre*, Berlin, 1936 (Arabic translation by Abu R. dah, Cairo, 1935 1-146).

(12) In this and the following numbers of this chapter five of God's essential attributes are discussed. The other two of the classic seven, speech and will, are considered in more detail in the next two chapters. In Nos 14-15 Ash'ari is concerned with proving that God is knowing, powerful, living, hearing, and seeing. It is clear that these epithets are taken from the Qur'ān.

despite the latter's being moist and damp, a proof of the possibility of His creating life in decayed and crumbling bones and of His power to create its like. Then He said «Is He then who created the heavens and the earth unable to create men like them?» (36/81) This is the passage on which we rely in arguing about the possibility of the restoration of creatures.

10. This is also the proof of the validity of argumentation and reasoning ("") For God Most High applied the same judgment to the thing and its like and made the way and course of one term of comparison the course of its like, because He has said «God gives life by a initial creation, then restores it» (36/11-10). And He said «And it is He who gives life by an initial creation, then restores it and that is very easy for Him» (30/27/28) — meaning: it is easy for Him. Thus He likened the initial creation to the restoration.

11. Q Enlighten me further about the validity of reasoning.

A. God most High has related what Abraham said when he saw the star «He (Abraham) said: This is my Lord. Then when it set he said: I like not those who set. Then when he saw the moon rising he said: This is my Lord. Then when it set he said: Unless my Lord guide me I shall certainly be one of the people who err» (46/76-77). Thus Abraham joined the moon and the star in the judgment that one of them cannot possibly be God and Lord since setting is common to both. Now this is the reasoning and inference which some repudiate and eschew.

QUESTION

12. Q Why do you deny that God Most High is a body?

A We deny it because the speaker must mean

(10) This theme, briefly discussed here, is the subject of the *Risāla*

and the impotent can be neither God nor eternal. And if the will of only one be accomplished, impotence necessarily attaches to the one whose will is not accomplished — and the impotent can be neither God nor eternal. Thus what we have said proves that the Maker of things is one. And God Most High has said: «Were there gods other than God in them, the heavens and the earth would be in disorder» (21-22). This is the meaning of the argument which we have just presented.⁽⁷⁾

QUESTION

9. Q. What is the proof that the restoration of creatures⁽⁸⁾ is possible?

A. The proof of that is the fact that God did not create them initially according to an antecedent exemplar. So if their initial creation was due solely to Him, He is not incapable of creating them anew. God Himself has said: «He has propounded to Us a parable, forgetting the whole the fact of his own creation. He asks: Who will quicken bones which they have decayed? Answer: He who quickened them who produced them a first time, for His omniscience encompasses every creature» (30-78-79). Thus He made the first creation a proof of the possibility of the last creation, because the same concept is realized in both. Then He continued: «He who makes fire for you from the green tree — for he has kindled fire from it» (30-80). Thus He made the appearance of fire, notwithstanding its heat and dryness, from the green tree.

(7) The unity of God is the chief dogma of Islam — *La ilaha illallah*! (There is no other divinity at all save God!). The argument given here is the classic argument from *ta'wîd* (rational monotheism), inspired, as is evident, by the Qur'ân itself. Cf. *Risâla* N° 8. Averroës criticized this proof: *Teologia* 238-240. Algaze's proof is more «philosophical»: *Justo Medio*, 127-134.

(8) The dogma in question here is that of the resurrection of the body. Cf. *Risâla* N° 9-11. The reader may consult El or Hwb. s.v. *Kiyâma*, for details on Muslim eschatology.

QUESTION

7. Q Why do you claim that the Creator is unlike creatures?

A. If He were like them, His relation to temporal production would be the same as theirs. And if He were like them, He would have to be like them either in all respects or in some one respect. So if He were like them in all respects, He would be temporally produced, as they are, in all respects. And if He were like them in some one respect, He would be temporally produced in that respect in which He was like them. But it is impossible for the temporally produced to have preexisted eternally. And God Most High has said: «There is nothing like unto Him» (42.11/9), and, «No one is His equal» (112.4) (7).

QUESTION

8. Q Why do you say that the Maker of things is one?

A. The governance of two will be neither harmonious nor consistently effective, but impotence will inevitably attach to one or to both of them. For if one of the two wills a man's life and the other wills his death, one of three things must ensue: the will of both together will be accomplished, or the will of neither will be accomplished, or the will of only one will be accomplished. Now it is impossible that the will of both together be accomplished, for the body cannot be simultaneously living and dead. So if the will of both together be not accomplished one must conclude to the impotence of both.

(7) The argument of this paragraph is used also in the *Ḥisāla*, No 15. The two texts cited from the Qur'an seem to have provided Ash'arism with a theological cornerstone which was also a touchstone. Logically Ash'ari seems to have no room in his thought for the analogy of being. But whether or not, in practice, he really subscribed to an agnostic fideism is another question.

they created what they ejected. Despite their desire to have a child, he would not come, and despite their unwillingness to have him, he would come. And God Most High has said, reminding His creatures of His unity, « And in yourselves (there are also signs). Well then, do you not see? » (31 21). He thus declares to them their impotence and their pressing need of a maker who made them and a governor who governs them wisely.

6. Q What makes you sure that the semen did not preexist eternally?

A If your assumption were true, the semen could never have become operative and effective, nor could it ever have undergone change and mutation. For the eternal cannot be translated and changed, nor can it be subject to the characteristics of temporal production. (5) For what is so subject, and also inseparable from lowliness, can never be free from the characteristics of temporal production, and what is not prior to the temporally produced is itself temporally produced and made. (6) Therefore it is false to affirm the eternal preexistence of the semen or of any other bodies.

(5) Usually I use « temporal production » and « temporally produced » to translate *ḥadath* (*ḥudūth*) and *mudath*. The Arabic root *ḥ-d-th* seems to convey the general idea of « happening » or « being new ». The essential note of a being which is *mudath* (subject to *ḥadath*) is that its existence had a beginning. Cf. Baḥḥānī, *Taḥḥīṭ*, 41 10 ff and 73,5 ff. Since the existence of such a being has a beginning, it must be produced in time. Thus the contrary of *qadīm al-ʿālam* (the eternity of the world) is *ḥadath al-ʿālam*. Cf. also the words and meaning given by Gauthier in his *Ḥaḡḡ ben Yoqoḥān*, Beyrouth, 1930, p. 164 (of the Arabic part). Others (on occasions) myself prefer such translations as « contingent, produced, created » etc. No aḥlī Ashʿarī and Baḡḡalānī looked upon *mudath* (agent form of *ahdath*) as a synonym of « creator ».

(6) This principle is used again in No 93.

can do a thing when he is imperfect, a fortiori he can do it when he is mature, and if he cannot do a thing when he is mature a fortiori he is incapable of it when he is imperfect. From seeing him a baby, then a youth, then a man in the prime of life, then an old man, we know very well that he does not translate himself from youth to old age and decrepitude. For even though a man strain to rid himself of old age and decrepitude and to restore himself to his youthful condition, he cannot do it. So what we have said proves that it is not he who translates himself through these states, and that he has a translator who translates him from state to state and governs his every condition. For his translation from state to state without a translator and governor is impossible. (4)

4. An example which makes that clear is the fact that cotton cannot change into spun thread and woven cloth without weaver or craftsman or supervisor. If a man selected some cotton and then waited for it to become spun thread and woven cloth without craftsman or weaver, he would be beyond the pale of reason and abysmally ignorant. Likewise if a man went to a waste land and found there no castle already built, and waited for the clay to change into bricks which would join together without workman or builder, he would be witless. Now if the change of semen to clot, then little lump, then flesh and blood and bone be an even greater move, it proves all the more forcibly that there is a maker who made the semen and translated it from state to state.

5. God Most High has said: "Do you not then see what you reject? Is it you who create it? Or are We the creators? (50:58-59). And they could not affirm with proof that

(4) This argument, though rational, is essentially Qur'anic in inspiration. Later Ash'arites, such as Baqilani, Juwaini, and Ghazali, give proofs which are more strictly philosophical. Ash'ari himself may have done so in other works.

CHAPTER ONE

DISCUSSION OF GOD'S EXISTENCE AND ATTRIBUTES (1)

QUESTION

3. Q (2) What is the proof that creation has a maker who made it and a governor who wisely ordered it?

A The proof of that is that the completely mature man was originally semen, then a clot, then a small lump, then flesh and bone and blood (3) Now we know very well that he did not transmute himself from state to state. For we see that at the peak of his physical and mental maturity he is unable to produce hearing and sight for himself, or to create a bodily member for himself. That proves that he is even more incapable of doing that when he is weak and imperfect. For if he

(1) *Ishād*, 36 ff., *Justo Medico*, 66 ff., for Muḥibbī's views, *Nād*, I, 37 ff., for a Shāfi'ite presentation. *Ilh*, 119, for a philosophical view. *Taḥqīq*, 207 ff. I would remind the reader that the references which I give here, and on other questions are merely a few suggestions taken from the many which could be given.

(2) I have chosen to use the symbols «Q», «O» and «A» (Question, Objection, Answer) rather than to weary the reader with the constant repetition of translations of the full Arabic phrases, such as: If someone asks, Someone may say, If they say, One should say to him, etc. This catechetical form of presentation indicates that this work like so many others was intended as a kind of practical handbook of polemics.

(3) Cf. Qur. 22.5 and 23.14.

INTRODUCTION

*In the Name of God, the Merciful,
the Beneficent ! On Him I call for help !*

1. Praise be to God, munificent and praiseworthy, all glorious and supreme, Lord of splendor and magnificence ! I praise Him for His copious bounty and generous largesse ! And I testify that there is no god at all save God alone ! No partner has He ! With Him will the encounter be ! And I testify that Muhammad is His servant and His Apostle, the Seal of the Prophets !

2. You ⁽¹⁾ have asked me to compose for you a compendious book which will contain a summary exposition of the arguments which elucidate what is true and refute what is vain and empty assertion. And I have thought it good to help you by doing that — may God direct you aright, grant you abundant graces, and aid you to acquire a full knowledge of all that you seek !

(1) There seems to be no clue to the identity of the person addressed



HIGHLIGHTS OF THE POLEMIC
AGAINST
DEVIATORS AND INNOVATORS


A TRANSLATION OF THE

KITĀB AL-LĪ MA' FĪL-RADD
‘ALĀ AHL AL-ZAIGH WA’L-BIDA

OF


Abu’l-Hasan ‘Alī b. Ismā‘īl

AL-AṢḤARĪ



Part One

THE TRANSLATIONS



CORRIGENDA

1 The reader's attention is called to a mistranslation which occurs on p. 101, at the beginning of paragraph 176. The translation should read « Furthermore if the Creator can effect for another a prayer by which that other will be praying why can He not effect for another a volition by which that other will be willing, and a speech by which he will be speaking? » Text and context seem to require this translation, although the Arabic is a little ambiguous.

2 Note (18) on p. 120. Abd al Qābir al-Baghdādī gives *awāl-akwān*, not as « the two main divisions of accidents », but as the first two divisions of accidents. The *akwān* are mentioned first and include motion, rest and composition. According to al-Jawānibī *frshād*, ed. Luciani p. 10, Cairo ed. p. 17) the *akwān* are motion and rest, union and separation. So my translation p. 120, l. 17 should not be « accidents: modes and states », but « (accidental) modes and causes ». I may add here that the notion of accident seems to me to be a very important element of the Ash'arite « metaphysics » and that it deserves more attention and study than it has hitherto received.

3 Typographical errors are practically inevitable. On p. 124, l. 15, one should read « experience » for « experience », and on p. 147, l. 12, one should read « Ahl al-Tashbih » for « Ahl al-Tashh », and on p. 226, ll. 2-3, read *De Caelo et Mundo* for *De Caelo and De Mundo*. Any other slips will be readily corrected by the reader. Personally I feel deeply grateful to the excellent staff of the Imprimerie Catholique for the care and patience they have shown in their work.

لنر لي نفس الله روحه وور صريحه. قول القائل ما مني يقول حجة الاسلام
 فيمن يدعي معرفة الله تعالى والاحاطة بكنهه ذاته وصفاته هل هي متصورة
 في ذاتها وهل مدعيها صادق ام لا مع ان الحجابات والروحانيات لا تحاط
 بها ولا تتحقق ماهياتها وهل الاحاطة بذاته وصفاته توجب حدا له وحصر
 ام لا. الجواب ينبغي ان يتحقق قبل كل شيء انه لا يعرف الله حق معرفته
 الا الله ولا يحيط بكنهه جلاله سواء. . . .

Ending وهذا القدر كاف في جواب هذه الاسئلة والذي اوصي به هذا
 السائل ان ينظر نفسه ودينه ويتقي ربه ويطلب علماً ملئاً بعلم العقل والشرع
 ليهديه الى طريق الحق. . . . والله تعالى وبه الكفاية والمداية وهو
 حسب ونعم الوكيل والحمد لله رب العالمين وصلواته على خير خلقه محمد وآله
 الاكرمين واصحابه المنتخبين.

B. INSIDE TITLE PAGE OF M

وقف

كتاب الصغ تاليف

الشيخ ابي الحسن علي بن اسمعيل

بن اسحق بن سالم بن اسحق

بن عبد الله بن موسى بن بلال

بن ابي ردة بن ابي موسى

الاشعري صاحب رسول الله صلى

(stuck to page one from here down)

In the left margin there seems to be some details concerning the *waqf* of the manuscript

C. THE RISALAT AL-LADUNIYYA

Beginning : بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَبِهِ نَسْتَعِينُ

الحمد لله الذي يدر تلويح خواص عبده نور اولاية وربي ارواحهم بحس
المنابة وفتح باب التوحيد على الصالحين بفتح الدراية واصلى على محمد
سيد المرسلين صاحب الدعوة والزمانية ودليل الامة الى الهداية وعلى آله
سكان حرم الحلية. اعلم ان واحدا من اصداقنا حكى عن بعض العلماء انه
اسكر العلم النبي الذي...

Ending : والان تحتم هذه الرسالة فان في هذه الكلمات كفاية لاهلها ومن لم
يحمل الله له نورا بها به من نور واقفه وبي التوفيق وعليه التكلان تمت
الرسالة والحمد لله وحده وصلواته على سيدنا محمد النبي وآله الاخيار وسلام
تأليفه (crossed out) (قوبلت : or) قوبل

D. MASĀ'IL SU'ĪLA 'ANHA

Beginning : بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ وَبِهِ نَسْتَعِينُ

مسائل قيل عنها حجر الانام صحة الاسلام ابو حامد محمد بن محمد بن محمد

referred to by al-Bāqilānī, al-Juwaynī, and the author of the *Fihrist*. And, so far as I can see, no argument against his authorship can be drawn from anything in the text itself.

2. THE TEXT OF THE RISALA

I need say very little about this text, since I have simply reprinted the Hyderabad edition of 1341-1925. I have changed the paragraphing a little, and have numbered the paragraphs. Whether or not the list of authorities cited in N. 1 is a sufficient guarantee of the authenticity of the text, I cannot say. I believe it has been suggested that the work was probably composed by a later Ashʿarite. On the other hand some of the doctrine of the *Risala* is certainly contained in the *Fama*, as I have indicated in the notes. And I see no reason for denying that the rest of the doctrine is also that of al-Ashʿarī. At present, therefore, I am inclined to accept the *Risala* as an authentic exposition of al-Ashʿarī's thought on the subject, largely, if not entirely, in his own words.

A. OUTSIDE TITLE PAGE OF M

كتاب التتم للشيخ أبي الحسن الأشعري
 وكتاب الرسالة الدينية في العلم
 الذي لحقه الإسلام أبي
 حامد القرطبي رضي الله عنهما
 ورفع عليهما أمي
 وايضاً فيه مسائل في معرفة الله تعالى
 واجوبتها لحجة الإسلام ايضاً رضي الله عنه
 قال في طبقات الصوفية من ذل في نفسه رفع الله قدره
 ومن عز في نفسه ادله الله في اعيى عباد

evidence » viz agreement with the terminology and ideas found in others of Ibn Arabi's works — is balanced by the remark of Margaret Smith « the theory of knowledge set forth here and the psychological doctrine are almost identical with those of the *Ihyā' 'Ulum al-Dīn* » (*Al-Risālat al-Laduniyya*, JRAS, 1938 (April), p. 177, n. 1). But I leave this discussion to the experts. It is good to know that we now have another manuscript of the *Risālat al-Laduniyya*. And if, as I believe, this manuscript antedates Ibn 'Arabi (560-1165-638-1240), we have another reason for believing that it is an authentic work of al-Ghazālī.

I undertook the translation of the *Luma* with a good deal of diligence. An even greater diligence has marked my editing of the manuscript. There were many obvious mistakes on the copyist which I have corrected, in some of the most obvious cases, tacitly. In some places I have made suggestions, but I have let the reader know what the manuscript contains. In general, I am responsible for anything enclosed in square brackets. The paragraphing is mine, and the paragraph numbers correspond to those of the translation. The page numbers of the manuscript have been indicated, and I have numbered the lines to make reference easier. In the notes M means the AUB manuscript. The transcript has a period now and then, and I have added a few more. The logic of my periods (and my paragraphing) may be open to question occasionally, but I have simply tried to make the text a little more readable and manageable.

The only title which occurs in the manuscript is '*Kitāb al-Luma*'. From the list of al-Ash'ari's works in the *Tahṭih* I have borrowed the rest: *fi l-radd 'ala ahl al-zuḥd wa l-bidā'*.

There seems to be no reason for doubting that the *Luma* is an authentic work of al-Ash'ari. It seems to be the work

same hand, at about the same time, in the same ink, and on the same kind of paper. These works are :

1. The *Kitāb al-Luma'*, pp. 1-117.
2. The *Risālat al-Laduniyya*, title page, and pp. 1-37. The title page reads *al-risālat al-laduniyya fi l-'ilm al-laduni taswif al-shaikh al-imam hujjat al-Islām Abi Ḥanūd al-Ghazālī rahimahū llāh*

Underneath this title something else was written, but it is now illegible because of three small holes and large black blot. In the upper left hand corner there is a name which seems to be Maḥmūd b. al-Burḥān (?) al-Baghdādī. At the side of the title and at the foot of the page there seem to be other names, on the whole rather illegible. The beginning and the end of this work are given below under C.

3. *Masā'il su'ūla 'anḥā*. *al-Ghazālī*, p. 37 (of the previous work), and pp. 1-24. The beginning and the end of this work are given below under D.

How old is the manuscript? There is no explicit mention of a date, so far as I can see, but I venture to suggest that the character of the writing indicates that it was written not later than the seventh century A.H. (thirteenth century A.D.), and that it may well have been written in the sixth century A.H. (twelfth century A.D.). Al-Ghazālī died in 505 (1111), and the manuscript as a whole seems to have been written after his death.

Asin Palacios did not believe that the *Risālat al-Laduniyya* is an authentic work of al-Ghazālī — cf. his *La Espiritualidad de Alqo'el y su Sentido Cristiano*, IV, p. 388. To me his argument is not entirely convincing, since it seems to me that Ibn 'Arabi may very well have taken the passages in question from al-Ghazālī. His argument from « interna

A NOTE ON THE ARABIC TEXTS

1 THE TEXT OF THE *LUMA'*

My first text of the *Luma* was that in the Library of the British Museum. Since this manuscript (Or. 3091) is simply a rather imperfect copy of the text contained in a manuscript of the Library of the American University of Beirut, I need say no more about it. However, the reader will want to know something about the A.U.B. manuscript.

This manuscript has the shelfmark MS 2973 A811A. It is bound in a fairly modern board binding. The manuscript itself measures 13×19 cm. (page), and 10×16.5 cm. (text). For the most part there are 17 lines to the page, written in an old naskh, in very black ink, on paper somewhat yellowish with age. There are very few vowels, and many of the dots which serve to distinguish various letters have been omitted. The inside title page (back of p. 1) is partially stuck to the back of the outside title page. There are many worm holes in the manuscript, and a few larger holes on p. 1 and the title page of the *Risalat al-Ladunyya*, but, on the whole, the manuscript is quite legible.

The contents of the outside title page, and of the inside title page so far as it is legible, are given below under A and B. The pages are numbered (by a later hand) 1, 2, 3, etc., the numbering starting over again for each of the other two works contained in the manuscript.

The manuscript contains the three works mentioned on the outside title page. Evidently all three were written by the

There is a summary translation of al-Ash'ari's *Risala* in M. Horten, *Die philosophischen Systeme der spekulativen Theologen im Islam*, Bonn, 1912, 623 ff. And a translation of the third chapter of the *Lama'* will be found in J. Hell, *Von Mohammed bis Ghazali*, Jena, 1915, 51-59. Neither of these was available when I was making my own translations.

24. Sauvaget, J. *Introduction à l'histoire de l'Orient musulman. Éléments de bibliographie*, Paris, (corrections et supplément), 1946.

This is a splendid guide to the literature on many subjects pertaining to Islam.

25. Schacht, J. *Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence*, Oxford, 1950.

26. SDA Dozy, R. *Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes*², 2 vols., Leiden-Paris, 1927.

27. Sweetman, J. W. *Islam and Christian Theology*, Part One, Vol. I, London, 1945, Vol. II, London, 1947.

28. *Tamhīd* al-Baqillānī's *al-Tamhīd fi l-Radd ala l-Mulhida* etc., ed. by Mahmūd Muḥammad al-Khudāiri and M. 'Abd al-Hādī Abū Rīdah, Cairo, 1366/1947.

29. *Teología* Alonso, M. (S. I.) *Teología de Averroes, Estudios y Documentos*, Madrid-Granada, 1947.

Spanish translations of Ibn Rushd (Averroes) *Faṣl al-Muqāl* *Kashf al-Manahij*, and *Dumma*, with much useful material in the *Prólogo*.

30. *Triton* — Triton, A. S. — *Muslim Theology*, London, 1947.

Enormously useful because of its mass of documented information.

31. *Watt* — Watt W. M. *Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam*, London, 1948.

Another book which the student of Muslim theology must read. It deals particularly with the problems to which so much of the *Lum'a* is devoted.

This is the famous work of the Imām al-Haramain (al-Jawāhid). My references are by page to the French translation. Another edition of the Arabic text has been published by Dr M. Yūsuf Mūsā and Abi Abd al-Mun'im al-Hamīd, Cairo, 1369/1950.

- 18 Justo Medio. Asim Palacios, M. *Et Justo Medio en la Creencia* (trans. of al-Ghazālī's *al-Iqṣāḍ fi l-Itiqād*, and summary translations of others of al-Ghazālī's works), Madrid, 1929.

The reader will also find much to interest him in the same author's *Aben hazam de Cordoba* (A study and fairly full translation of Ibn Hazam's *al-Fisal fi l-Milal*), 5 vols., Madrid, 1927-32.

- 19 Macdonald, D. B. *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*, N. Y., 1903.

Antiquated now, but still very readable.

- 20 Mammonides. *The Guide for the Perplexed?*, trans. by M. Friedländer, (7th impr.) London, 1947.

Contains some interesting annotations on kalām, pp. 107-144.

- 21 Mc Wenslock, A. J. *The Muslim Creed*, Cambridge, 1932.

This is another standard work which every student of Muslim theology must read.

- 22 Nādir. Nādir, A. N. *Falsafat al-Muʿtazila*, 2 vols., Alexandria, 1950, and Matbaʿat al-Rabīʿa, 1951.

Those who read Arabic will find these books a mine of information on the Muʿtazila.

- 23 Pines, S. *Beiträge zur Islamischen Atomlehre*, Berlin, 1936 (Arabic trans. by M. Abd al-Hādī Abū Rūdāh, *Madhhab al-Dhurra fīnd al-Muṣlimīn*, Cairo, 1365/1946).

This is a good translation, with excellent notes, of 'Abd al-Qāhir al-Baghdādī's *al-Farq bain al-Firag*. The translation of the first part (by Kate Chambers Seelye, N.Y., 1919) contains many defects.

- 11 *Handbook* — Wensinck, A.J. *A Handbook of Early Muhammadan Tradition*, Leiden, 1927.

- 12 *Hilli* — Miller, W. M. *Al-Bab al-Hadi Ashar* (an English trans. of part of the work of the two 'al-Hilli', Allāma and Miqdād), London, 1928.

This is another Shī'ite work

- 13 *Hughes* — *Dictionary of Islam*, London, 1885.

I have not referred explicitly to this work, but, despite its age, the reader will find much interesting information in it. It was reprinted again a few years ago.

- 14 *Hwb* — *Handwörterbuch des Islam*, Leiden 1941.

This is really the essence of the *Encyclopedia of Islam*. The English edition should be out by the time the reader sees this.

- 15 *Ibani* — *Kitāb al-Ibani an Usul al-Diyana*, Hyderabad, 1321; Cairo, 1348.

English translation by W. C. Klein, *The Elucidation of Islam's Foundation*, (American Oriental Series, 19), New Haven 1940. One should read the extended review by Prof. Thomson in *The Moslem World*, XXII (1942) 242-260. For the reader's convenience I have usually referred to this translation.

- 16 *Inṣāf* — An Arabic edition (for the first time) of al-Baq l-lanī's *Kitāb al-Inṣāf fi Asbāb al-Khilāf* by the Shaikh al-Kawthari, Cairo, 1369/1950.

- 17 *Irshad* — Luciani, J. D. *El-Irchad*, édité et traduit, Paris, 1938.

and will give the reader the Shi'ite viewpoint on many dogmatic questions.

- 6 GAI. Gardet, L. and Anawati, M. M. — *Introduction à la Théologie Musulmane*, Paris, 1948.

This is a « must » work for the reader who would like a good general introduction to the subject. It has been criticized for having too Thomistic a bias and preoccupation. The reader may form his own judgment on that, but the work is certainly very valuable for the great amount of information and references which it contains and for its stimulating suggestions.

- 7 GAI. Brockelmann, C. — *Geschichte der arabischen Literatur*, 5 vols., Leiden, 1937-49.

- 8 Gaudefroy-Demombynes, M. — *Muslim Institutions* (trans. of *Les Institutions Musulmanes*), London, 1950.

This is one of the standard general manuals. Others to which I would also call the reader's attention are Lammens, H. (S. J.) — *Islam, Beliefs and Institutions*, London, 1929 (Sir E. D. Ross's trans. of the original *L'Islam croyances et institutions*), Cobb, H. A. R. *Mohammedanism*, HUL. O. U. P., 1949, Moreno, M. M. *La dottrina dell'Islam*?, Bologna, 1940, Parca, I. M. *Islamologia*, Rome, 1951 — a very complete handbook.

- 9 Goldziher, I. — *Vorlesungen über den Islam*?, Heidelberg, 1925, and the excellent French translation by Aron, *Le dogme et la loi de l'Islam* (made from the first edition), Paris, 1920.

Of course all of Goldziher's works can be recommended, but this is the one which will most interest the reader of this book.

- 10 Halkin, A. S. — *Moslem Schisms and Sects, Part II*, Tel-Aviv, 1935.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

I have not added any formal bibliography to this work, since the reader will find all he may need in the bibliographies attached to many of the works mentioned below. This little list, for the most part quite arbitrary, is intended primarily for the reader who has little knowledge of things Islamic. It also explains the brief titles and abbreviations used in the notes.

1. Bell — Bell, R. — *The Quran Translated with a critical arrangement of the Surahs*, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1937-9

2. Blachere — Blachere, R. — I. *Introduction au Coran*, II-III. *Le Coran traduction nouvelle* Paris, 1947-50.

The arrangement of the Suras in this fine translation is chronological, and the volumes contain much material that will help the reader to understand the book so sacred to Islam.

3. EI — *The Encyclopedia of Islam*


A standard work though the articles differ greatly in merit. Work has been begun on the preparation of a new and thoroughly revised edition.

4. Elder, E. E. — *A Commentary on the Creed of Islam*, New York, 1950

This is an annotated English translation of al-Taftāzānī's commentary on the creed of al-Nasafī

5. Fyzee — Fyzee, A. A. A. — *A Shi'ite Creed*, O.U.P. Calcutta, 1942

This is a translation of al-Qāmmī's *Risālat al-Fiqādat*



contribution to the sum of human knowledge has within itself some justification. Moreover, this work of mine has had the added impetus of natural and supernatural interest in the thought and belief of the Muslims among whom I live. Of all the various aspects of their Islamic culture and way of life, their religious and theological thought has the greatest attraction for me from what I may call my professional point of view. Controversy and polemic, once so much the fashion, have yielded in our time to the more serene study of comparative theology. A splendid example of this is the excellent *Introduction à la théologie musulmane* of Pere Anawati and Louis Gardet. Naturally I believe myself to be the grateful heir of a living theological tradition wider and deeper than that of my Muslim friends. By training, and by conviction, my personal attitude is that of the Catholic theologian. Part of that attitude is a profound respect for what Muslim theologians have attempted in fields difficult and perilous. Philosophy is good and useful and necessary, but, in this economy, it is to theology that we must turn for the best and most authoritative guidance in our journeying from God to God.

languages, though in neither case is the number of references complete. A few notes try to elucidate the meaning of a passage, and some are mildly critical of the author. I hope that some of the notes will be helpful, and that the others will not be too irritating. At any rate they have been kept almost to the minimum.

No detailed note on the transliteration which I have used seems necessary. The reader who does not know Arabic may simply ignore all the signs, and the reader who knows Arabic will easily recognize the significance of any particular transliteration. In the many instances where Arabic names have been transliterated I cannot always vouch for the accuracy of the transliteration. Where it has been possible I have tried to check the transliteration by consulting Sam'ā, Yaqūt, etc., but these works were not always available when I needed them.

In the manuscript of al-Juwānī's *Shūmul* there is a section in which the author defends al-Ash'arī against certain attacks which had been made on his *Luma*. I had intended to include this section in the present work, but I could not find the time in which to prepare it. However, there is one thing which the author says which the reader ought to hear in mind. He complains of the unfairness of those who attack the *Luma*, a relatively simple work, and ignore the larger and more detailed works in which al-Ash'arī treated more fully and more profoundly the questions discussed in the *Luma*. Unfortunately we have not those larger works to which he refers. Nevertheless, I think we should do well to avoid being too dogmatic in conclusions based solely on the *Luma*. Of course we may, and should, draw some conclusions, but always with some reserve. There are still so many gaps in our knowledge of the early Muslim theologians.

I should like to think that this book will help, in a small way, to fill one of those gaps. I should also like to think that it may be a slight contribution to something else. Almost any

also made my own translations of Qur'anic texts. If these should occasion any doubt, the reader can always consult the many translations of the Qur'ān which have been made. My own preference is for those of Beal, in English, and of Blachère, in French. In giving verse references I have put first the number of the Cairo edition of 1342-1923, adding, after a virgule, the number of the verse in Flügel's edition when the latter is different. The year of the Christian era which corresponds to that of the Muslim reckoning (beginning from the Hegira) has been added after a virgule — as in the sentence just before this one.

A literal translation of the title of the *Risala* will be found under No 101 of Appendix III. The translation of *Luma* by « Highlights » was suggested by the meaning listed in Dozy, *Supplément aux Dictionnaires Arabes* — « ce qu'il y a de plus saillant dans quelque chose ». The reading *Luma'*, and not *Lum*, seems to be the correct one, especially in view of the rhyming *Buta'* in the full title. The word *kalām* occurs in the title of the *Risala*, in the chapter headings of the *Luma* (where it is translated by « discussion »), and many times in the Appendices. The reader may consult the article « kalām » in the *Encyclopedia of Islam* for the various meanings. In the present work it might well be translated by « polemic theology ». Most Muslim theology is polemic, and *kalām* seems to mean the kind of polemic which makes considerable use of rational argument.

It was not easy to determine the quantity and the quality of the notes. The specialist reader would need none, or very few. But I had to think of the non-specialist reader, and it is for his sake that most of the notes have been added. Often enough they are merely references, since detailed explanations would have taken too much space. Other notes have been added as suggestions for comparison with later texts, both those available in Arabic and those available in other

was usually credited with having been the main force in organizing and diffusing Ash'arism. My researches led me to the main script of the *Kitab al-Luma* in the Library of the British Museum. A note in C. Rieu's *Supplement to the Catalogue of the Arabic Mss. in the British Museum* (p. 104) states that this manuscript was transcribed « by a young Christian scribe, from a very old MS. in the American College, Beirut ». It was obvious that this copy contained many mistakes, and, through the good offices of the Rev. Joseph P. Connell, S. J., Principal of Baghdad College, I was able to secure a microfilm of the original manuscript in the Library of the American University of Beirut. This manuscript was very helpful to me in my study of al-Baqa'i, and its interest and importance, along with certain other circumstances, have impelled me to publish it even before I publish my study of al-Baqa'i. Since I had certain other material on al-Ash'ari at hand, I decided that it would be of some advantage to include this material in this book.

The student of theology who is unacquainted with the history or development of Islamic thought will, I hope, find in this book much that will interest him. Many of the terms and turns of thought will be strange to him, but I think that, with a little effort, he will understand and appreciate just what al-Ash'ari was trying to do. He may approach the translations directly, but perhaps he would be better advised to start with the Appendices or with some of the more general works mentioned in the bibliographical note.

Anyone who has had occasion to translate Arabic knows how difficult it is to produce a translation which satisfies oneself and others. In some ways, however, it was easier to translate the Arabic of al-Ash'ari than it would have been if his work were more literary and less technical. On the whole I think that my translation is fairly accurate and that little violence has been done to the thought of the author. I have

INTRODUCTION

The most important thing in this book is the Arabic text of the *Kitab al-Luma*. The presentation of this work for the first time in print will certainly be welcomed by those students of Muslim theology who are able to read Arabic. They will turn at once to the text after a glance at the more or less technical details mentioned in this little introduction. To them I need say nothing more. But I hope that this book will also be read by students of theology who have no special knowledge of Muslim theology. Such readers will feel the need of some introductory remarks of a general nature. Those which I shall make must be brief, but interested readers will be able to supplement them by consulting some of the works mentioned in the bibliographical note.

For centuries the largest school of Muslim theology has been that called « Ash'arite ». However, it is only in comparatively recent years that scholars have come to know much about al-Ash'ari, the eponym of this school. Even now our knowledge of him is far from being satisfactory, and it seems unlikely that we shall ever know in full, sharp detail either the man or his thought. Recent years have seen the publication of two of his few known extant works, one a kind of heresiology of great value to scholars (in Arabic only), and the other a polemic exposé of certain points of doctrine (in Arabic and in an English translation). A few smaller treatises have also been printed.

While preparing my doctoral dissertation on al-Bāqilāni I naturally became much interested in al-Ash'ari. The former

II. THE TRANSLATION OF THE *Risāla*

	Pages
Introduction: List of Authorities	119
The Objection to Kalām	120
First Answer	121
Second Answer	122
Third Answer	130

PART TWO. THE APPENDICES

I. The Khapḥ's Account of al-Ash'arī	139
II. Ibn 'Asākir's Apology	145
III. The Works of al-Ash'arī	211
IV. Two Creeds of al-Ash'arī	235
Index of Citations from the Qur'ān	257
Index of Proper Names (Persons and Places)	259
Index of Works Mentioned	267
Index of Subjects, Technical Terms, etc	271

PART THREE: THE ARABIC TEXTS

I The Text of the <i>Lumā'</i>	AR 9
II The Text of the <i>Risāla</i>	AR XV
Index of Proper Names (Arabic)	AR XX
Index of Words and Terms (Arabic)	AR 1-1
Table of Contents (Part Three)	AR 1-2


CONTENTS

	Pages
Preface	vii
Introduction	xi
Bibliographical Note	xvii
A Note on the Arabic Texts	xxiii

PART ONE: THE TRANSLATIONS

I. THE TRANSLATION OF THE *Luma'*

Introduction	5
Chapter One Discussion of God's Existence and Attributes	6
Chapter Two Discussion of the Qar'an and the Divine Will	20
Chapter Three Discussion of the Divine Willing and its Embracing All Temporally Produced Things	33
Chapter Four Discussion of the Vision	45
Chapter Five Discussion of the Qadar	53
Chapter Six Discussion of the Capacity	76
Chapter Seven Discussion of the Imputation of Justice and Injustice to God	97
Chapter Eight Discussion of Faith	104
Chapter Nine Discussion of the Particular and the Universal, and of the Promise and the Threat	107
Chapter Ten Discussion of the Innamate	112



PREFACE

It is my pleasant duty to thank Dr. Nabih Faris and the Library of the American University of Beirut for graciously allowing me to print the text of the *Luma'*. I am also indebted to the Dairatul-Maarif-il-Osmania, and its Director, Dr. M. Nizam-uddin, for permission to reprint their text of the *Risala*.

I must also acknowledge here the inspiration I have received from my friend Pere Anawati, O.P., and the generous and most helpful guidance given to me by Dr. J. Schacht while I was studying under his direction at Oxford University. Mu'ulim Becht Khoudary of Baghdad helped me considerably with the reading of the manuscript, and the Rev. J. J. Houben, S.J., Professor of Arabic and Islamics in the Catholic University of Nymegen, made valuable suggestions after carefully reading the entire manuscript. Those with whom I have lived during this past year helped me much more than they realized. So it is to them particularly that I offer these primitive fruits of my study of Muslim theology—to those of my household, the sons of my Mother. *Quam bonum et quam iocundum*.

CUM PERMISSU SUPERIORUM

11
Philip K. Hitti.

THE THEOLOGY OF AL-ASH'ARĪ


The Arabic texts of al-Ash'arī's *Kitāb al-Luma'*
and *Risalat Istihsan al-Khawḍ fi 'Ilm al-Kalām*,
with briefly annotated translations, and Appendices
containing material pertinent to the study of al-Ash'arī

RICHARD J. MCCARTHY, S.J.

M.A., D.Phil. (Oxon.)




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
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